Nutter Ex Rel. Mullins v. MaynardNutter Ex Rel. Mullins v. Maynard
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- Before:
- Workman
This case is before this Court pursuant to petitioners’ request for a writ of prohibition and mandamus. 1 Petitioners seek to prohibit the Circuit Court of Mingo County, the Honorable Elliott E. Maynard presiding, from enforcing an order entered on December 1, 1989, which directed that petitioners must provide defendants with written reports from each expert witness expected to testify at trial. The petitioners further seek this Court to prohibit Judge Maynard from continuing the trial until September 19, 1990, because the parties had agreed and stipulated to a trial date of April 2,1990. We grant the writ insofar as the written expert reports, but find that the court did not abuse its discretion in continuing the trial date and deny the writ in that regard.
The underlying case is a medical malpractice and products liability action evolving from the use of the birth control pill Lo-Ovral-28 by petitioner Linda Mullins who now suffers from akinetic mutism due to four massive strokes. Petitioners have alleged in their complaint that Doctors William Lester and Robert E. Fleer were negligent in prescribing the birth control pill and failing to adequately warn the petitioner Linda Mullins of the dangers of such pill; that the Nicholas County Health Department and the Nicholas County Family Planning Clinic were negligent in failing to employ adequately trained personnel to warn the petitioner Linda Mullins of potential side effects associated with such pill; that Wyeth Laboratories and Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. negligently failed to inspect, warn, inform, instruct and apprise the petitioner Linda Mullins or her physician of the danger of such pill; and that such alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the petitioner Linda Mullins’ injuries and damages.
We first take up the expert report issue. During the course of discovery, interrogatories were served upon the petitioners asking for the identity of any expert witness they expected to call at trial, the subject matter about which each such expert was expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert was expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion held by such expert. This request tracked the language of
1. Dr. _is expected to testify concerning the oral contraceptive Lo-Ovral-28 and the adverse effects of Lo-Ovral-28 on Linda Mullins.
2. Based on the facts of this case, it is Dr_’s opinion that young women are likely to have cerebrovascular malformations and other kinds of bleeding episodes and birth control pills do, by alteration of the estrogen-progesterone ratios, alter the clotting system and lead to the precipitation of a clotting episode.
3. Dr. _ will rely upon his experience, skill and medical [or pharmacological] training in offering his testimony. Dr_will also rely upon his review of relevant medical literature, relevant medical history, and other relevant information discovered or ascertained during the litigation of this matter.
4. Dr_is expected to offer an opinion that it was the deviance from the standard of care of practice to prescribe birth control pills given the facts and situations surrounding Linda Mullins’ medical history.
5. Dr_is expected to offer an opinion as to the adequacy/sufficiency of the product warning contained in the package insert/label. Dr_is expected to testify that the package insert and detailed label were insufficient to apprise a lay person of the risks, damages and hazards, and side effects associated with the use of defendant Wyeth’s product Lo-Ovral-28. 3
The discovery process in this case did not run smoothly and efficiently. The filing of answers to respondents’ interrogatories spanned a time period from December 12, 1987, to December 5, 1989. Respondent Fleer served interrogatories on the petitioners on August 12, 1987, and received the last set of supplemental answers to those interrogatories on December 5, 1989. Respondent Nicholas County Family Planning Clinic served interrogatories on the petitioners on January 28, 1988, and did not receive answers until December 21, 1988. Supplemental answers followed on February 3, 1989, and December 5, 1989. Respondent Wyeth Laboratories and Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. served interrogatories on March 11, 1988, and did not receive answers until December 21, 1988. Supplemental Answers followed on January 26, 1989, February 3, 1989, and October 5, 1989. Furthermore, numerous changes in petitioners’ representation may have created a substantial part of the delay with regard to the preparedness of this case for trial. It appears the respondents were somewhat frustrated by the length of time it took to receive answers to their interrogatories, as well as what they perceived to be the insufficiency of such answers.
At a status conference on November 6, 1989, discussion arose concerning the substance of the interrogatory answers regarding the petitioners’ expert witnesses.
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Doubt was raised by both defense counsel and the court with respect to whether an expert would be able to testify that Lo-Ov-ral-28 caused the petitioner Linda Mullin’s current condition. The court also expressed concern over the funds defense counsel would have to expend to depose petitioners’ experts prior to trial, especially since no expert reports had been submitted from petitioners’ experts. In an order entered December 1, 1989, the court directed that petitioners’ counsel must designate
The petitioners assert that the answers to the interrogatories provided to the respondents met the statutory requirement found in Rule
Although review of discovery matters is not generally appropriate through extraordinary remedies, we have previously “granted extraordinary relief where a discovery order presents a purely legal issue in an area where the bench and bar are in need of guidelines....”
State ex rel. Bennett v. Keadle,
175 W.Va. 505, 334 S.E.2d 643, 646 (1985). We deem the issue before us today to be a discovery issue appropriate for review under that standard, since the question of whether the right to order “discovery by other means” in
Other courts have determined that
In
State Highway Comm’n v. Havard,
508 So.2d 1099 (Miss.1987), the Supreme Court of Mississippi dealt with the issue of evasive or incomplete answers being given to interrogatories served pursuant to
The second issue in this case concerns the petitioners’ request to prohibit the circuit court from changing the trial date from April 2, 1990, to September 19, 1990. At the November 6, 1989 status conference, counsel for the petitioners informed the court that the parties had agreed to a trial date of April 2, 1990, and that this had been cleared with the Nicholas County Circuit Clerk’s office. In the order entered December 1, 1989, however, the trial was set for September 19, 1990. It is important to recognize that Judge Maynard was appointed by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals July 20, 1989, to oversee this case due to a voluntary recusal of the Honorable James H. Wolverton, Judge of the Twenty-eighth Judicial Circuit. Thus, the April 2, 1990 trial date had been set prior to Judge Maynard’s appointment. At the status conference, Judge Maynard expressed concern that discovery might not be completed by April 2, 199,0. Furthermore, Judge Maynard had already scheduled other matters on his docket for April 2, 1990. Under these circumstances, we find that the court did not abuse his discretion by changing the trial date. “It is well settled as a general rule that the question of continuance is in the sound discretion of the trial court, which will not be reviewed by the appellate court, except in case it clearly appears that such discretion has been abused.” Syl. Pt. 1, Levy v. Scottish Union & National Ins. Co., 58 W.Va. 546, 52 S.E. 449 (1905).
We therefore grant the writ of prohibition with respect to the provision requiring the preparation of expert witness reports,
Writ granted as moulded.
Notes
. Although the petition is styled as sounding in both prohibition and mandamus, petitioners’ prayer for relief includes only a request for relief by way of prohibition on the two issues raised.
. A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
. Answer number one was given with reference to Doctors Teitelbaum, Oppenheim, O’Donnell, Heck and Covington. Answer number two was given with reference to Doctors Teitelbaum, Op-penheim, O’Donnell, Heck and Covington. Answer number three was given with reference to Doctors Teitelbaum, Oppenheim, O’Donnell, Heck, Loftus and Cunitz. Answer number four was given with reference to Doctor Oppenheim. Answer number five was given with reference to Doctors Teitelbaum, Covington, Loftus and Cun-itz.
. A transcript of the proceeding was not included in the record before this Court due to the fact that a court reporter was not present at the status conference. However, an affidavit was filed by Marion E. Ray, counsel for petitioners, detailing what transpired at that conference. Nothing in response thereto having been filed in this case, this recitation of what transpired is based on that affidavit.
. Respondent Fleer cited Hulmes ex rel. Vest v. Catterson, 182 W.Va. 439, 388 S.E.2d 313 (1989) (per curiam) for the proposition that a motion to compel filed by defendants was not necessary. This argument is misplaced, because in the Hulmes decision no answers whatsoever had been filed. 182 W.Va. at 441, 388 S.E.2d at 315. In the case before us, the issue is the proper procedure to follow where answers have been served, but those answers are deemed by opposing counsel to be incomplete or insufficient.
. It appears from the affidavit of counsel for petitioners that the court entered the order directing expert reports sua sponte.