Nunez v. StateNunez v. State
Attorneys:
David Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for appellant
Derek E. Brown, Att‘y Gen., Daniel L. Day, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee
JUSTICE NIELSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICE PETERSEN, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE POHLMAN, JUSTICE JORGENSEN, and JUDGE HARRIS joined.
Before this case was decided, CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT recused himself from this case and JUSTICE HAGEN stepped down from the court. JUSTICE JORGENSEN and COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS, having reviewed the briefs and listened to a recording of the oral argument, substituted for*
JUSTICE DENT became a member of the Court after oral argument in this matter and did not participate.
JUSTICE NIELSEN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Oscar Alonso Nunez was convicted of various sexual abuse crimes, and his convictions were upheld on direct appeal. Nunez filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the district court summarily dismissed his petition as procedurally barred. Nunez later got new counsel and requested leave to amend his petition under rule 65C(h)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In his amended petition, Nunez added new claims for relief, but he filed the petition after the Post-Conviction Remedies Act‘s (PCRA) one-year statute of limitations had passed. The State moved to dismiss the amended petition as untimely, and the district court granted that motion. The district court concluded that Nunez‘s new claims did not satisfy the relation-back test of rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and dismissed his amended petition as untimely.
¶2 The district court‘s dismissal was in keeping with our decision in Noor v. State, 2019 UT 3, 435 P.3d 221, in which we held that rule 15(c) applies to PCRA petitions. Nunez tries to get around this holding in three ways. First, he argues that rule 65C(h)(3) permits a post-conviction petitioner to add new claims, independent of rule 15(c). Second, he argues that our decision in Patterson v. State, 2021 UT 52, 504 P.3d 92, overruled Noor, giving district courts discretion to apply (or not) rule 15(c). Finally, he argues that the PCRA‘s time bar is unconstitutional.
¶3 We affirm the district court‘s order dismissing Nunez‘s post-conviction relief petition as untimely. We rejected his first argument in Noor and do so again here. We reject his second argument because Noor and Patterson are consistent with each other. And as in Patterson, we again uphold the constitutionality of the PCRA‘s time bar.
BACKGROUND
¶4 A jury convicted Nunez of various child sexual abuse crimes. See State v. Nunez, 2021 UT App 86, ¶¶ 2, 19, 498 P.3d 458.
¶5 A year later, Nunez filed a petition for post-conviction relief, raising several of the same claims he raised on direct appeal. The district court determined on frivolousness review that because Nunez‘s claims had been “previously adjudicated” in his direct appeal, they were procedurally barred under rule 65C(h)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.1 It dismissed the petition without ordering the State to respond.
¶6 Nunez got new counsel and moved to set aside the dismissal under rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Nunez argued that he had been “deprived of notice of the [c]ourt‘s pending decision and an opportunity to be heard prior to the decision being finalized.” The district court agreed with Nunez and granted his rule 60(b) motion, reinstating his petition.
¶7 Nunez then requested leave to file an amended petition to cure alleged “defects” and “technical errors” in his original petition; the district court granted that motion. Nunez then filed his amended petition.
¶8 The State moved to dismiss Nunez‘s amended petition as untimely. The State argued that Nunez filed his petition after the one-year statute of limitations had passed and that the new claims for relief did not relate back to the original petition under rule 15(c)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under this rule, an amendment to a pleading “relates back” to the date of the original pleading if “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted
¶9 Nunez acknowledged that the claims in his amended petition were “admittedly quite different than” the claims in his original petition, but he argued that his amended petition should be considered timely for three reasons. First, under rule 65C(h)(3), a petitioner may request leave to amend his or her petition if “a claim is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule.”
¶10 Next, Nunez argued that rule 15(c)‘s relation-back test was discretionary, not mandatory. Nunez argued that “the limitations on post-conviction petitions are no longer governed by the PCRA statute except to the extent that [this] Court has elected to continue to apply its provisions.” (Citing Patterson v. State, 2021 UT 52, 504 P.3d 92.) Nunez acknowledged that we held rule 15(c) applies to post-conviction petitions in Noor v. State, 2019 UT 3, 435 P.3d 221, but he argued that “[i]n light of the relation back test‘s equitable nature . . . the mandatory application of the test in Noor no longer holds persuasive sway” in light of this court‘s holding in Patterson “that the legislature does not control the scope of PCRA actions.”
¶11 Finally, Nunez argued that the one-year statute of limitations under the PCRA was unconstitutional. He argued, among other things, that the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution “should be construed to bar the judiciary from closing [his] access to a remedy that he would be entitled to have received” at the state‘s founding—specifically, “some form of tolling” for the deadline of his amended petition. Nunez further argued that our decision in Patterson “invited future petitioners to raise new arguments on the same grounds” denied in Patterson, namely, that
¶12 The district court granted the State‘s motion and dismissed the amended petition. In rejecting Nunez‘s claims, the district court first noted that Nunez did “not dispute” that the claims in his amended petition “are entirely different from those in his original petition and [did] not satisfy the requirements of rule 15(c).” Next, the court rejected, based on Noor, Nunez‘s argument that rule 65C(h)(3) allowed him to amend his petition regardless of rule 15(c)‘s relation-back test. And the court rejected Nunez‘s argument that Patterson gave district courts the discretion to apply rule 15(c). The court concluded that ”Patterson did not overturn Noor or otherwise eliminate the PCRA‘s limitations periods,” and therefore, district courts do “not have discretionary authority to hear claims that are time-barred.” Finally, the district court rejected Nunez‘s argument that the PCRA‘s time bar is unconstitutional. Construing Nunez‘s argument as a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the PCRA‘s time bar, the court explained that “facial challenges are not of the type anticipated by Patterson” and that ”Patterson affirmed the time-bar restraints in the PCRA and in [r]ule 65C.” The district court concluded that Nunez failed to show that the time bar‘s “application to his particular circumstances would violate any of his own constitutional rights.”
¶13 Nunez timely appealed. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, see
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶14 Nunez challenges the district court‘s dismissal of his post-conviction relief petition. We “review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court‘s conclusions of law.” Kell v. State, 2023 UT 27, ¶ 20, 541 P.3d 940 (cleaned up). In this appeal, Nunez challenges the district court‘s interpretation of our rules as well as the constitutionality of the PCRA. We review a district court‘s interpretation of a rule of procedure for correctness. See Trapnell & Assocs. v. Legacy Resorts, LLC, 2020 UT 44, ¶ 29, 469 P.3d 989 (“The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness.” (cleaned up)); Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, ¶ 7, 250 P.3d 48 (same). We also review a district court‘s decision as to the constitutionality of a statute for correctness. See
ANALYSIS
¶15 We begin our analysis by addressing Nunez‘s argument that rule 65C(h)(3) allows him to freely amend an untimely post-conviction petition. Next, we consider his argument that our decision in Patterson v. State, 2021 UT 52, 504 P.3d 92, provided district courts the discretion to apply rule 15(c)‘s relation-back test. Finally, we address Nunez‘s constitutional challenge to his petition‘s dismissal. We reject each of Nunez‘s arguments and affirm the district court.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT RULE 65C(h)(3) DOES NOT SUPERSEDE RULE 15(C)
¶16 Nunez first argues that rule 65C(h)(3) allows him to amend his post-conviction petition with new claims for relief, irrespective of the PCRA‘s statute of limitations and rule 15(c)‘s relation-back test. We disagree.
¶17 The PCRA requires a petitioner to bring his or her claims for relief within one year after the cause of action accrues. See
¶18 Under rule 15(c), a party may amend a pleading to add new claims after the applicable statute of limitations has expired only if the new claims arise from the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out . . . in the original pleading.”
¶19 It is undisputed that Nunez filed his amended petition after the one-year statute of limitations had expired and that his
¶20 We rejected the same argument in Noor, 2019 UT 3, ¶¶ 20, 26, and do so again here. As we explained in Noor, “the legislature intended PCRA claims to be governed by all of the rules of civil procedure and that a court should make ‘procedural’ departures from the rules only when expressly called for in rule 65C.” Id. ¶ 26. “Because rule 65C does not explicitly address new claims in amended petitions filed after the one-year statute of limitations, other rules of civil procedure, including rule 15(c), should be used to fill in the gaps.” Id. (emphasis added).
¶21 This result was consistent with our prior caselaw and with amendments to both the PCRA and rule 65C. See Noor, 2019 UT 3, ¶¶ 27, 29, nn. 22–25. “In light of [the legislature‘s] changes,” it struck us in Noor as “highly unlikely that the legislature intended to grant a district court complete discretion to hear what would otherwise be time-barred claims in amended petitions filed after the limitations period had expired.” Id. ¶ 32.
¶22 Rule 65C(h)(3) is not a blank check to amend a post-conviction petition in any way the petitioner wishes. Id.2 The rule is quite narrow; it requires a district court to “return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 21 days” “[i]f a claim is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 65C(h)(3). That is, under (h)(3), a petitioner can correct pleading or technical errors on existing claims. Adding new claims does not correct a “pleading error” or fix a technical defect.3 Nunez‘s first argument fails.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT APPLYING RULE 15(c)‘S RELATION-BACK TEST WAS NOT DISCRETIONARY
¶23 Nunez next contends that the district court wrongly concluded that rule 15(c)‘s relation-back test must be applied. He argues that our decision in Patterson v. State, 2021 UT 52, 504 P.3d 92, gave district courts discretion in deciding whether to apply rule 15(c) to amendments like his. It did not.
¶24 In Patterson, we analyzed the constitutional history of habeas corpus in Utah, including the history and functions of the
¶25 Nunez argues that, after Patterson, “the PCRA does not govern post-conviction proceedings because the authority to issue post-conviction relief is not in the hands of the legislature; it is squarely within the ambit of the judiciary.” In Nunez‘s view, rule 65C “incorporates the PCRA by reference,” but “it does not necessarily incorporate the legislative intent to make [r]ule 15(c) mandatorily applicable.” He argues that because the “standard one-year limitation on actions continues to exist only because [r]ule 65C incorporates the PCRA‘s procedure into it . . . [i]f courts control the time limitation on [the] initial filing, then [r]ule 15(c) can be flexibly applied.”
¶26 But Patterson did not abrogate rule 15(c)‘s relation-back test as an impermissible procedural limitation on post-conviction petitions. See id. It did not overrule our holding in Noor v. State, 2019 UT 3, 435 P.3d 221, that district courts “lack[] discretion to allow new claims that do not meet rule 15(c)‘s relation-back test after the limitations period ha[s] run.” Id. ¶ 20. Nor did Patterson undermine our alignment with the PCRA; indeed, we reaffirmed that we have incorporated the PCRA through rule 65C—including the PCRA‘s one-year statute of limitation—and that we exercise our writ power “in total harmony with the PCRA.” Patterson, 2021 UT 52, ¶ 174. Nunez‘s second argument fails.
III. THE PCRA‘S TIME BAR IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL HERE
¶27 Finally, Nunez goes after the PCRA‘s time bar itself, claiming that it violates the Open Courts Clause of the Utah
¶28 But to agree with Nunez, we would first have to reinstate the now defunct “interests of justice” exception to the PCRA‘s time bar. We decline to do so.
¶29 Nunez relies on Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), a pre-Patterson case, where we held that “proper consideration of meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always be in the interests of justice,” and thus “[i]t necessarily follows that no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition.” Id. at 254. Nunez argues that when ”Julian was decided, [this court] acknowledged that an ‘interests of justice’
¶30 We rejected this very argument in Patterson, and we reject it again here for the same reasons. See 2021 UT 52, ¶¶ 200–04.5
¶31 Nunez insists—Patterson notwithstanding—that “‘fairness and equality‘” should be part of the Open Courts Clause analysis, and in that light, “the application of the strict time bar” on Nunez‘s claims “violates his right to an open court in light of all of his efforts to have the merits of his meritorious claims heard.” (Quoting Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985).) Those efforts included getting his petition reinstated after an incorrect dismissal and promptly amending when given the chance. Because these circumstances are purportedly worse than other petitioners who have sought an exception to the time bar, he reasons, he must qualify for the exception.
CONCLUSION
¶33 We reaffirm that rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applies to petitions for post-conviction relief, even where a district court grants a petitioner leave to amend a petition under rule 65C(h)(3). We also hold that the PCRA‘s one-year time bar, as well as rule 15(c)‘s application to Nunez‘s petition in this case, are not unconstitutional for the reasons he asserts. Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of Nunez‘s amended petition.