In this paternity action, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court order granting summary disposition in fаvor of defendant. We conclude that the trial court properly determined that plaintiffs action was barred by both the language of the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq., and controlling case authority, even though the action was brought before defendant gave birth to the child that plaintiff claims to be his. Wе affirm.
Plaintiff alleged that, following their relationship during summer 2002, defendant became pregnant. The rеlationship ended and, during the pregnancy, on February 21, 2003, plaintiff filed this suit to establish his paternity under the Pаternity Act. Nonetheless, defendant married another man on March 28,2003, and gave birth to the child while thus married. As a result, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition, reasoning that plaintiff сould not maintain this action because the child was not “born out of wedlock” within the meaning of the statute.
This result was required under the language of the statute as it has been construed in cases establishing or following the controlling precedent. In Girard v Wagenmaker,
This Court came to the same conclusion in Spielmaker v Lee,
Thus, for a child to be deemed born out of wedlock under the first definition of that phrase contained in the statute, it is necessary that the mother have been “not married” for the entire gestation, оr “from the conception to the date of birth of the child.” Because in the case at bar defendant was not, in fact, “not married” for the entire gestational period, or “from the conception to the date of birth of the child,” the child was not born out of wedlock.
This Court “has consistently applied the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the standing requirement under the Paternity Act” to prevent suits like plaintiffs. McHone v Sosnowski,
Plaintiff acknowledges this authority, but claims that the present case is distinguishable because he filed his
Plaintiff claims that it is unfair to allow an unmarried pregnant woman to preclude a paternity action simply by marrying before a child is born. As with other such policy arguments raised in previous cases, we conclude that our job is not to rewrite the statute and we dirеct plaintiff to the Legislature for any relief that might be forthcoming. See, e.g., Hauser, supra at 190-191; Spielmaker, supra at 59-60.
We affirm.
Notes
The Girard Court also noted a provision in the statute providing that “ ‘the father or putative father of a child bom out of wedlock may file a complaint in the circuit court....’” Id. at 237. That provision has since been deleted from the statute. Nonetheless, paternity actions under the statute may only be filed with respeсt to a “child,” which is defined to be a “child born out of wedlock,” MCL 722.711(b), and, accordingly, standing
We note that the Paternity Act provides that “[a]n action ... may be commenced during the pregnancy of the child’s mother....” MCL 711.714(3). That provision specifies when an action may be commenced. It does nothing to enlarge thе category of persons entitled to file or maintain an action. Further, the statute providеs that, in cases filed before a child is born, “the case, unless the defendant mother or defendant father consents to trial, shall be continued until the child is horn.” MCL 722.715(2). That would allow a court to determinе whether the child was “bom out of wedlock” for purposes of determining whether the action сould be maintained.
Plaintiff also suggests there may be equal protection or due procеss problems with the statute, but, because these claims were not raised in the statement of the quеstion presented and because plaintiff failed to cite any authority or argument in support, we will not consider them. In re BKD,