*780 OPINION
In Dеcember, 1974, the parties entered an exclusive licensing agreement whereby appellant acquired the right to provide car rental services to Ramada customers in Las Vegas. Pursuant to a contract between Ramada and TWA, purchasers of TWA package tours were referred to appellant by Ramada for rental vеhicles. In this manner, nearly two-thirds of appellant’s business was derived from TWA customers. Disputes arose as to payment of certain licensing fеes and Ramada instructed its customers, including TWA referrals, that effectivе January 1, 1977, Econo-Car would henceforth be its car rental agent.
On December 30, 1976, Number One obtained an ex parte tеmporary restraining order prohibiting respondents from any violation of its licensing agreement. Thereafter, on January 3, 1977, appellant filеd its complaint for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. Ramada answered, alleging appellant’s license had beеn revoked for failure to pay the licensing fees. Accordingly, Ramada counterclaimed for damages.
TWA answered the complаint and moved to dissolve the temporary restraining order on the grounds that no contractual relations existed between it and appеllant and that in any event, appellant has an adequate remedy at law.
The district judge granted respondents’ motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order. Complaining the trial judge abused his discretion by denying thе equitable relief, Number One perfected this appeal.
As the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is a question addressed to the discretion of the district court, our task on appeal is to searсh the record to determine whether the lower court exceeded the permissible bounds of judicial discretion. Nevada Escrow Serviсe, Inc. v. Crockett,
A preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo is normally available upon a showing that the party seeking it enjoys a rеasonable probability of success on the merits and that the
*781
defеndant’s conduct, if allowed to continue, will result in irreparable harm fоr which compensatory damages is an inadequate remedy. Memоry Gardens v. Pet Ponderosa,
In the instant case, we cannot say that thе trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law. First, money damages is an adequate remedy for the vindication of appellant’s right. Even if the substitution of Econo-Car as Ramada’s licensee should force appellant into bankruptcy, the trustee could bring the .damages suit in its behalf. Second, Number One has not alleged that it has performed all the terms, covenants and conditions of the agreement on its part. Thus, it has not shown that it is reasonably likely to succeed on the merits.
See
Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi,
Finally, appellant has failed to state any theory by which it would be entitled to relief against TWA or Econo-Car. The contraсt between Ramada and TWA did not create the rights of a third party beneficiary in appellant.
See
Olson v. Iacometti,
The trial court properly deniеd appellant’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Accordingly, wе affirm. 1
Notes
The Chief Justice designated Hon. David Zenoff, Senior Justice, to sit in this cаse in place of the Hon. John Mowbray, Justice, who was disqualified. Nev. Const, art. 6, § 19; SCR 243.