OPINION
Opinion by
Appellant, Nueces County, brings this accelerated interlocutory appeal following the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. 2 By one issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction because appellant is immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We reverse and remand.
I. Facts
Appellees, former and current employees of the Nueces County Sheriffs Department, brought an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) alleging that appellant: (1) failed to pay appellees compensation for time worked; (2) made the accruing of compensatory time compulsory; (3) failed to compute overtime accurately; (4) limited the amount of vacation leave and sick leave that could be accumulated; and (5) did not allow appellees to take their entitled sick leave or vacation leave. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201, 206, 207 (West 1998 & Supp.2002). Appellees seek statutory damages and penalties for the alleged violations of FLSA, pre-and-post judgment interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. Appellant filed a plea to the jurisdiction alleging it has sovereign immunity from appellees’ claims. The trial court denied appellant’s plea to the jurisdiction. This appeal ensued.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea; its purpose is “to defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.”
Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue,
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We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction under a de novo standard of review because subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law.
City of Fort Worth v. Robles,
When a plaintiff fails to plead facts that establish jurisdiction, but the petition does not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend.
Brown,
III. Analysis
Sovereign immunity, unless waived, protects the State of Texas from lawsuits for damages absent legislative consent.
Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co.,
Where these exceptions do not apply, the plaintiff must: (1) allege legislative consent to such suit in his petition, either by reference to statute or express legislative permission; and (2) plead facts
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which fall within the scope of the waiver relied on.
Ferguson,
IV. CONCLUSION
Having determined that appellees failed to state a claim for which sovereign immunity is waived, we must now decide whether their petition is incurably defective or, whether, under the facts alleged in the petition, it may be amended to allege a cause within the trial court’s jurisdiction.
See Brown,
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying appellant’s plea to the jurisdiction and remand this cause with instructions to grant appellant’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismiss this case for want of jurisdiction.
Notes
. We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 51.014(a)(8) of the civil practice and remedies code, which provides that an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order that grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as defined in section 101.001. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 51.014(a)(8), 101.001 (Vernon Supp.2003). A counly is such a governmental unit. Id. § 101.001(3)(B) (Vernon Supp.2003).
. Appellate courts often use the terms sovereign immunity and governmental immunity interchangeably.
Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor,
- S.W.3d -, No. 01-0491,
. It is not necessary to specifically plead consent in a petition where there is a general statutoiy right to bring suit against a particular governmental entity or particular type of claim.
Nueces County v. Ferguson,
