91 U.S. 426 | SCOTUS | 1875
NUDD ET AL.
v.
BURROWS, ASSIGNEE.
Supreme Court of United States.
*435 Mr. W.H. Swift and Mr. W.C. Grant, for plaintiffs in error.
Messrs. H.W. Tenney, H.M. Lewis, and J.C. McKenney, contra.
*437 MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.
The first of the assignments of error presents the question, whether the court erred in admitting in evidence the declarations of the bankrupt.
The suit was brought by the assignee to recover against Nudd and Noe for money and property which they had received from Emmons. They had applied the money and the proceeds of the property in payment of a debt which Emmons owed them. The property was live-stock, consisting of cattle, sheep, and hogs. The net proceeds were $7,553.27. The money was $1,000. The aggregate amount in controversy was $8,553.27. The assignee claimed that the stock was bought largely upon credit; that Emmons was at the time hopelessly insolvent; that Nudd and Noe knew it; and that the transaction was the fruit of a conspiracy between the parties, having for its object the giving to Nudd and Noe by Emmons a fraudulent preference over his other creditors.
Nudd and Noe received the property and money in January, 1871. The petition in bankruptcy against Emmons was filed in the following month of February. The action is founded on the thirty-fifth and thirty-ninth sections of the Bankrupt Act. The transaction was within four months before the filing of the petition. Upon the trial, the plaintiff proposed to prove what Emmons had said touching the purchase of the stock and the payment of the money to the defendants.
To each and all of the questions asked with this view the counsel for the defendants objected, "on the ground that they *438 called for the declarations of Emmons not made in the presence of either of the defendants, or brought to their knowledge."
Was this ground of objection well taken?
The counsel for the defendant in error insists that they were competent as the declarations of a co-conspirator.
In general, the rules of evidence are the same in civil and criminal cases. United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 469.
"Where two or more persons are associated for the same illegal purpose, any act or declaration of one of the parties in reference to the common object, and forming a part of the res gestæ, may be given in evidence." American Fur Company v. United States, 2 Pet. 365.
The bill of exceptions does not purport to give all the evidence. What proof had been given of the alleged concert and conspiracy on the part of the defendants when the declarations of Emmons were offered to be proved does not appear.
It is to be presumed it was sufficient to lay the proper foundation as to them for the introduction of the evidence. The declarations were competent to prove the whole case as against Emmons. 1 Taylor's Ev. 486.
Whether the declarations were made in the presence or brought to the knowledge of either of the defendants is immaterial. The objection as taken was confined to this point; and this is the only aspect in which it is necessary to consider it. If it were intended to rest it upon any other ground, it should have been so presented; and the court advised accordingly.
In the early part of December, 1870, Emmons and James W. and Richard Chandler were partners, under the name of Emmons & Chandler. The plaintiff claimed that the partnership was dissolved on the 13th of that month. The defendants insisted that it continued down to the close of the business in question, and that the transaction was not with Emmons alone, but with the firm of Emmons & Chandler.
They offered in evidence the declarations of the Chandlers touching the points in controversy. The court excluded the testimony, and the defendants excepted.
This ruling was correct. The declarations of a party may be evidence against him; but, except under circumstances which bad no existence in this case, they cannot be received in his *439 favor. The Chandlers might have been called as witnesses. Their declarations were merely hearsay, and, as regards this case, were res inter alias acta.
It appears by the bill of exceptions, that, in charging the jury, the judge commented upon the evidence.
Questions of law are to be determined by the court; questions of fact, by the jury. The authority of the jury as to the latter is as absolute as the authority of the court with respect to the former.
No question of fact must be withdrawn from the determination of those whose function it is to decide such issues.
The line which separates the two provinces must not be overlooked by the court. Care must be taken that the jury is not misled into the belief that they are alike bound by the views expressed upon the evidence and the instructions given as to the law. They must distinctly understand that what is said as to the facts is only advisory, and in no wise intended to fetter the exercise finally of their own independent judgment. Within these limitations, it is the right and duty of the court to said them by recalling the testimony to their recollection, by collating its details, by suggesting grounds of preference where there is contradiction, by directing their attention to the most important facts, by eliminating the true points of inquiry, by resolving the evidence, however complicated, into its simplest elements, and by showing the bearing of its several parts and their combined effect, stripped of every consideration which might otherwise mislead or confuse them. How this duty shall be performed depends in every case upon the discretion of the judge. There is none more important resting upon those who preside at jury-trials. Constituted as juries are, it is frequently impossible for them to discharge their function wisely and well with out this aid. In such cases, chance, mistake, or caprice, may determine the result.
We do not think the remarks and suggestions of the learned judge in this case exceeded the proper license.
They did not go beyond the verge of what has been often sanctioned by this and other courts. Games et al. v. Stiles, 14 Pet. 337; United States v. Fourteen Packages, Gilp. 254; 1 Taylor's Ev. 35.
*440 The modifications of the two instructions asked for by the defendants were, we think, correct in point of law. Only the second one calls for any remarks.
There was proof tending to show that on the 13th of December, 1870, the defendants adjusted their account with Emmons & Chandler, and, by the agreement of all the parties, transferred the amount due to themselves to the separate account of Emmons, and gave the Chandlers a release. The balance found due, and so transferred, was the same with the amount in controversy, as before stated. The business of the defendants was the selling of live-stock upon commission. The balance accrued in the course of their previous business in this way with the firm of Emmons & Chandler. They claimed a factor's lien upon the money and proceeds of the property in question for the satisfaction of this demand.
The court charged, that, as the lien could not attach until the money and proceeds were received by the defendants, if the previous transactions created the relation of debtor and creditors between them and Emmons, and they could have sued Emmons for the amount, "this would bring the debt under the Bankrupt Act the same as any other debt."
This must necessarily be so. The lien attempted to be set up was repelled by the circumstances referred to. Such a claim occupies no better ground than would a mortgage, pledge, or power to confess judgment, given at the same time and for the same purpose; otherwise every factor might be thus secured when his debtor was in the article of bankruptcy, and this class of creditors would have a monopoly of the preferences so given. Such preference, to whomsoever given, is forbidden by the Bankrupt Law, and is a fraud upon it. Fraud destroys the validity of every thing into which it enters. It affects fatally even the most solemn judgments and decrees. Bankrupt Act, sect. 35; 1 Story's Eq., sect. 252; Freeman on Judgments, sect. 486.
Whenever fraud is perpetrated by one party to the injury of another, the offender is liable. Paisley v. Freeman, 3 T.R. 51; Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385. Here the jury have found the facts charged by the assignee. This is conclusive against the defendants with respect to any claim upon the fund.
The last assignment relates to alleged errors of the court in *441 matters of practice. Before the judge began his charge to the jury, the counsel for the defendants requested him, in giving it, to conform in all things to the practice of the courts of record and the law of the State. This he refused to do. He also refused to allow the jury to take with them to their room the written instructions he had given them, and likewise the account-book, bills of lading, and additional papers, which had been introduced in evidence, other than the depositions. To each of these refusals the defendants excepted.
The Practice Act of Illinois provides that the court, in charging the jury, shall instruct them only as to the law of the case; that no instruction shall be given, unless reduced to writing; that instructions asked shall not be modified by the court, except in writing; that the instructions shall be taken by the jury in their retirement, and returned with the verdict; and that papers read in evidence, other than depositions, may be carried from the bar by the jury. 1 Gross's Stat. 289.
It is declared by the act of Congress of June 1, 1872 (17 Stat. 197, sect. 5), "that the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding, in civil causes, other than equity and admiralty causes, in the circuit and district courts, shall conform as near as may be" to the same things "existing at the time in the courts of record of the State within which such circuit and district courts are held."
The purpose of the provision is apparent upon its face. No analysis is necessary to reach it. It was to bring about uniformity in the law of procedure in the Federal and State courts of the same locality. It had its origin in the code-enactments of many of the States. While in the Federal tribunals the common-law pleadings, forms, and practice were adhered to, in the State courts of the same district the simpler forms of the local code prevailed. This involved the necessity on the part of the bar of studying two distinct systems of remedial law, and of practising according to the wholly dissimilar requirements of both. The inconvenience of such a state of things is obvious. The evil was a serious one. It was the aim of the provision in question to remove it. This was done by bringing about the conformity in the courts of the United States which it prescribes. The remedy was complete. The personal administration *442 by the judge of his duties while sitting upon the bench was not complained of. No one objected, or sought a remedy in that direction.
We see nothing in the act to warrant the conclusion that it was intended to have such an application.
If the proposition of the counsel for the plaintiff in error be correct, the powers of the judge, as defined by the common law, were largely trenched upon.
A statute claimed to work this effect must be strictly construed. But no severity of construction is necessary to harmonize the language employed with the view we have expressed. The identity required is to be in "the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding." The personal conduct and administration of the judge in the discharge of his separate functions is, in our judgment, neither practice, pleading, nor a form nor mode of proceeding within the meaning of those terms as found in the context. The subject of these exceptions is, therefore, not within the act as we understand it.
There are certain powers inherent in the judicial office. How far the legislative department of the government can impair them, or dictate the manner of their exercise, are interesting questions; but it is unnecessary in this case to consider them. Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24.
Judgment affirmed.