19 Conn. 250 | Conn. | 1848
The several questions in this case wall be considered in the order in which they are presented by the motion.
1. The defendant does not question the validity, either of the appointment of the plaintiff, as a surveyor of highways, or of the by-law under which the latter justified the making and repairing of the side-walk where the assault complained of was committed, and which was admitted to be within his district. That by-law, after providing, that there should be annually appointed, by the court of common council of the city of Norwich, four highway surveyors, who should be resident, one in each of the four districts into which said city had been in said by-law divided,and that they should constitute a board of city commissioners, whose duty it should be to examine and remove all nuisances, encroachments, and incumbrances, upon the streets and highways in said city, and cause to be executed all the provisions of the charter and by-laws of said city, relative to the prevention and removal of such nuisances, encroachments and incumbrances, further provides, that said commissioners shall constitute a permanent board, which shall
It has never been understood, that the highway surveyors of towns have no authority to act in the duties of their office, without a particular direction or regulation of the towns ap-appointing them ; and the inconvenience and injury, which might result from requiring such officers, in every case, where a highway is out of repair, to seek and obtain the particular direction of the town or city by whom they are appointed, before it could be put in order, constitutes a conclusive reason against such a construction of their powers as the defendant claims. The acts of the plaintiff, therefore, in relation to the side-walk in question, were not unauthorized, in consequence of no directions having been given to him in regard to it, by the board of city commissioners, or the court of common council, unless, as the defendant further claims, his authority, as a surveyor of highways, extended only to the other parts of the road. The streets and highways, however, embrace the side-walks, no less than the other portions of the road ; and unless these officers are restrained from exercising their powers over the former, by some particular provision of the charter or by-laws, we cannot perceive why it does not equally extend over both. If public necessity and convenience require, that there should be side-walks for the accommodation or safety of foot passengers, the same reasons exist why they should be made and kept in repair, as apply to the more central parts of the highway. But it is to be observed, that, in the third section of the by-law which has been mentioned, it is provided expressly, that “the said highway surveyors, each in the district in which he resides, shall have the particular
If, therefore, the side-walkin question was such as the public convenience and necessity required, as the jury have found, a majority of the court are of opinion, that the plaintiff had a right to build and repair it, as he claimed to have done ; and that the charge on this point was correct.
2. The instruction to the jury, that they might consider the expenses of the former trial, in their estimate of the damages, is sanctioned by the case of Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. R, 236. where the rule on this subject was fully considered and settled.
3. The next point respects the charge of the court below, on the subject of the right of the public to the use of land as a highway, by what is termed a dedication of it, by the owner, for that purpose.
The defendant has suggested, rather than argued, before us, that the public cannot acquire a right to use the land of an individual for that purpose, in that mode; but that they must take the steps prescribed by the statutes relating to the laying out of highways. This court has never had this point brought
This doctrine rests on the intelligible, rational, and wholesome principle of the common law, that, wherever a person has made representations, or pursued a line of conduct, with a view to lead or induce others to adopt a particular course of action, and such representations or conduct have produced that effect, they shall be held to be binding and conclusive against him, and he shall not afterwards be permitted to retract or repudiate them, to the injury of those who have been induced thus to act. This is a principle of public policy and good faith — of the greatest importance — and of very general, if not of universal, application. This rule is thus clearly and
Mr. Justice Thompson, in giving the opinion of the supreme court of the United States, in Cincinnati v. The lessee of White, 6 Peters, 431., where the subject of dedications to public uses is most thoroughly examined and clearly elucidated, speaking of the dedication there in question, which was that of a public common in the city of Cincinnati, after having shown, that all dedications of land to such uses, rest upon the same principle as the one which is applicable to dedications of public highways, says : “ After being thus set apart for public use and enjoyed as such,and private and individual rights acquired with reference to it, the law considers it in the nature of an estoppel in pais, which precludes the original owner from revoking such dedication. It is a violation of good faith to the public and to those who have acquired private property, with a view to the enjoyment of the use thus publicly granted.” The courts have uniformly considered this as the ground on which the right by dedication rests. 2 Greenl. Ev. § 662. Hobbs v. Lowell, 19 Pick. 405., and cases before cited.
This being the principle on which dedications of land for public highways are sanctioned and enforced, it is obvious, that they are not affected, by the statutes which prescribe the mode in which such highways may be laid out and established. Those statutes -were not designed to take away or abridge the
The defendant, however, further claims, that, in order to establish in the public a right to the use of land as a highway, by dedication, it is requisite that they should have used it as such, adversely and uninterruptedly, and also for the period of fifteen years. This claim proceeds on the supposition, that the title by dedication is founded on the presumption of a grant; and that such presumption arises, in this case, as in other cases of incorporeal rights growing out of long possession, only after an adverse and uninterrupted enjoyment, and that for the period, in this stale, of fifteen years, in analogy to the statute limiting the right of entry on lands of which the owner is disseised. This, however, is an entire misapprehension as to the nature of the title by dedication, as is obvious from the explanation already given of the ground on which it rests. A dedication, as such, is not held binding, because it is presumed that there was ever a formal grant, by the owner of the land ; nor because the enjoyment of it, by the public, is considered as evidence of such a grant. 2 Greenl. Ev. § 662. Woodyer v. Hadden, 5 Taunt. 126. The enjoyment by the public, is not viewed as furnishing evidence of the acquisition by them of the right of such enjoyment, in any particular mode. Cincinnati v. White, 6 Peters 431. If that were the ground on which it is placed, there would perhaps be a serious difficulty in recognizing the acquisition of such a title, excepting by an enjoyment in the manner and for the time suggested by the defendant. But the acquisition, as be. fore stated, proceeds on a different principle, namely, that the owner, after having permitted the public to use his land for the purpose for which it is claimed to have been dedicated, under such circumstances that the public accommodation and private rights, supposed to be acquired in consequence of such permission, might be injuriously affected, by an interruption of such enjoyment, is held to be precluded from denying that the public have acquired a right to such use in whatever manner, on the ground that such denial would be, on his part, a violation of good faith. This doctrine, so far from proceeding
It is very evident, from these views, and the doctrine on which the title by dedication rests, that it does not depend upon the length of time for which the public has had the enjoyment of the land. The length of such enjoyment is a circumstance, which constitutes proper, and usually very important, evidence, from which the assent and intention of the owner may be inferred ; and it may also tend to show whether the accommodation of the public and the rights of individuals might be injuriously affected, by an interruption of the use ; but "when it is shown, that the owner of the property has devoted it to the use of the public, by laying or leaving it out for that purpose, and that these consequences would result to the public and to individuals from such interruption, the question, whether he ought to be permitted to reclaim his original rights in the land, should not depend on whether he has permitted the public to use it for a longer or shorter period of time. Hence, it has also been uniformly decided, that the right of the public, in these cases, does not depend upon any particular length of possession. 2 Greenl. Ev. § 662., and cases before cited. Denning v. Roome, 6 Wend. 551. State v. Marble, 4 Iredell, 318. 1 Hill, 189-191. 9 Wend. 128.
This view of the subject furnishes an explanation of what is meant by the courts, when they speak of the length of time, during which it is necessary that land should be used by the public as a highway, in order to gain a right to it by dedication for that purpose ; and shows, that it was not intended to lay down an absolute rule of law," which required, in every
We think, therefore, that none of the exceptions to the charge, on this subject, are valid.
Whether that part of the charge in which the court below, in deference to what had been before ruled on the circuit, stated, that the mere use by the public of land as a highway, for any period short of fifteen years, would not be sufficient evidence of a dedication of it for that purpose, was not too favourable to the defendant, we are not called on to decide, in this case; and therefore, we express no opinion upon it.
4. The declaration of the defendant, as to the intention with which he deposited the stone in the ground, at what he claimed to be the West end of his ancient fence, did not accompany, nor wrns it a part of, that act; nor was it so connected with it as to characterize or explain it. It was merely a narrative of the transaction, by the defendant, to the witness, the next day after it was finished. It was, therefore, properly excluded. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 108.
5. Proof of genera] reputation was admissible, in this case, for the purpose of showing the existence and extent of the highway in question. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 128. § 139. And, in our opinion, the map or plan offered by the plaintiff, was properly received as evidence of that character. It was an ancient document, purporting to have been made by the committee, and therefore by the authority, of the ancient proprietors of the lands designated upon it, and was proved to have been found among the records of the town-elerk, which is the
A new tria! is not advised.
Upon one of the questions discussed in this case, I have not been able to concur with my brethren ; and if it was one of less importance, I should not, in this manner, record my views upon it; but I esteem it to be a question essentially connected with the interests of all our cities.
That the city highway surveyors have power to repair side-walks in the city of Norwich, and to remove nuisances, encroachments and obstructions from them, I have no doubt. I find this power expressly given, by the by-laws of the city ; and perhaps this is incidental to their office, if it had not been directly conferred. But the question which I wish to examine, is, have they an authority, independent of the board of city commissioners and of the court of common council, to locate or lay out side-walks, to determine their width and elevation, and to construct them in such fashion as they may prefer? Upon a careful inspection of the charter of this city and its by-laws, I have not discovered this power.
It will be recollected, that it was not the mere act of the plaintiff, as highway surveyor, in repairing the side-walk, which caused this affray: this was connected with his previous act in laying it out, which he had done in opposition to the defendant’s will, and without any other guide than his own discretion, and had constructed it in just such a place and manner as he pleased. If he had no authority to do this, he had no right to repair it, to the injury of the defendant, and was a trespasser in doing so.
For some purposes, side-walks may be deemed to be parts of a highway. They are within the surveyed limits of the highway, and are intended to accommodate the public travel; but they are not necessary appendages of it, even in cities, much less in country villages. There are highways in every
The charter of the city is its constitution, and no by-law or regulation of the city can be valid, which is opposed to the provisions of the charter. The first allusion, which I find, to side-walks in the city of Norwich, is in the third and fourth sections of the amended charter of 1830, by which the whole power to lay out or designate side-walks, and fix their width, heighth, course and level, is conferred upon the court of common council. It is an important power, and one which cannot be delegated to individuals acting alone, as mere ministerial officers, as the surveyors of highways are; nor can it be taken away from the court of common council, by any vote or regulation of a city meeting.
The surveyors of highways, by the by-laws of the city, have the power of general superintendence, direction and repair of side-walks; but this is essentially different from a power to lay them out and fix their width, heighth, course and level. They have the same superintending power over the public squares, greens, commons, and public burial-grounds in the city, which they have, by virtue of the by-laws, over the streets and side-walks ; but it will not be claimed, that they have power to lay out such streets and public grounds, independently of the board of city commissioners, and of the regulations and directions of the court of common council. See by-law of July 14, 1843, sections 2d and 3d.
No by-law has authorized the city highway surveyors to lay out side-walks, or to determine their width, course, heighth and level, as this plaintiff has presumed to do, as I can learn, either from the import of the language used, or from any intention expressed. Such a power would subject every proprietor adjoining a street or highway within the
I think, therefore, that the plaintiff, in assuming to construct a side-walk in front of the defendant’s grounds and buildings, which had not been established by the court of common council, and without their direction, was the aggressor.
New trial not to be granted.