23 Mont. 425 | Mont. | 1899
Lead Opinion
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the Court.
We believe that, upon consideration of all this evidence, the court was justified in finding no actual and intentional fraud on the part of the mortgagors and the mortgagee. The fact that a relationship existed between one of the mortgagors and the mortgagee cannot invalidate the mortgage. If the debt was one honestly due, the mortgagors had a right to secure it, whether ■ due to a relation or any one else, even though their action left nothing for their other creditors, provided, always, the transaction was in good faith, and entered into with honest intention. As evidence of fraud, and of an
Involved in this inquiry is the assertion of appellants that the instrument under consideration is, in effect, an assignment for the benefit of the creditors of Ross & Co., and should be so regarded. The facts, however, will not bear out this statement, for they go to prove that Ross & Co. intended to keep up their business, if they could, and that they merely gave the mortgage to secure. Fenske for a debt due to him, and to indemnify him for coming to their relief when other creditors were demanding immediate payment, and threatening to attach their property. As far as we can gather from the evidence in support of the court’s finding, they had no intent to
The fact that a mortgage upon all of a debtor’s property operates to secure certain creditors does not of itself make the security an assignment, where the written contract and the acts thereunder show an intention to give a security only, although it becomes the duty of courts to examine into the circumstances of such transfers very carefully, lest a transaction be given an effect in express contradiction of the intention of the parties to it. Tested by these principles, we conclude that Ross & Co. mortgaged their stock to Fenske, and that the law of chattel mortgages and not that of assignments for the benefit of creditors must be applied to the contract in question.
Mortgages of stocks in trade, with right to sell, cannot be said by judges to be the result of fraudulent intentions on the part of the parties to them, unless such intentions existed in fact; on the contrary, as Justice Brewer said of such transactions in Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U. S. 266, 11 Supreme Court 565, 35 L. Ed. 171, the supreme court could not “be blind to the fact that the tendency of this commercial age is towards increased facilities in the transfer of property, and to uphold such transfers so far as they are made in good faith.” In our opinion, where the law requires the filing of a chattel mortgage with the county clerk, as it does in Montana, in cases where the mortgage provides that the property may remain in the possession of the mortgagor (Compiled Statutes 1887, Fifth Division, Sec. 1540; Civil Code, Sec. 3864), and where “any interest in personal property which is capable of being transferred may be mortgaged,” which was the law generally before the Codes were adopted, as it is now (Civil Code, Sec. 3860), the records give the requisite information to persons dealing with mortgagors, and .contracts by way of security upon a stock of goods, with power to sell, under an agreement to apply the avails of sales to the payment of the mortgage debt, should be upheld, as promoting, rather than retarding, business arrangements, for they are not only compatible with perfect honesty, but suffer many a business to be kept up which would otherwise fail, and afford many a debtor an opportunity to gain a solid foothold in a community where he might otherwise go to the wall. “It is to be observed,” say the supreme court of Vermont in Peabody v.
Jones on Chattel Mortgages, Section 381, regards such mortgages as valid, and rests his text upon the principle that the statutes authorizing chattel mortgages where the mortgagor retains possession would fail of their purpose in respect to an important class of property, — merchandise held in stock and for sale, — if the doctrine of constructive fiaud must obtain, and render such instrument void on their face. The authorities for the more modern rule impress us as sound in their reasoning, and we hold that the question of the good faith of a mortgage transaction like the one .before us is, on principle, not co be decided as one entirely of law, but is largely one of fact, and must be ruled upon accordingly. (Etheridge v. Sperry, supra.)
In the very recent case of Williams v. Mitchell, (Kan. App.) 58 Pac. 1025, the case of Frankhouser v. Ellett, 22 Kan. 127, supra, and Whitson v. Griffis, 39 Kan. 211, 17 Pac. 801, are affirmed in the following language: “It is
Sales and application of proceeds of sales are strictly within the intended purposes of chattel mortgages of the kind before us, and, so long as the parties to them keep within the bounds of the lawful operations of such mortgages, they have a right to insert any reasonable provisions consistent with the intention of applying the stock mortgaged to the liquidation of the debt secured by it. Now, under the stipulation of the mortgage by Ross & Co. to Fenske, the accounts of all sales were to be made monthly, and at the accounting the proceeds of all sales and collections, less expenses, etc., as hereinbefore considered, were to be applied to the payment of the note to Fenske. This stipulation imputes no fraud to either party, for, so long as it was complied with, the mortgage was having its desired and lawful effect, and Noyes Bros. & Cutler were not injured; nor were they hurt by an extension of a credit for thirty days, because, as against them, or any unsecured creditor in like position, all sales, whether cash or for credits, .were to be accounted for; and we are of opinion credit sales should, as between mortgagors and mortgagee, all be deemed cash payments paid over to apply on the note of Ross & Co., although, as between Ross & Co. and Fenske, the credit may not have been collected, and may in fact have.been unpaid at the time of the accounting. In Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214, an agreement was entered into between a mortgagor and mortgagee, wherein the mortgagee agreed, among other things to “take business notes running sixty and ninety days, to be indorsed by said Frank E. Darrow, and apply the same' in pay
Lane v. Starr, 1 S. D. 107, 45 N. W. 212, is an interesting case upon the point just considered. The sheriff there levied upon a stock of drugs and other goods under attachments and executions against one C. J. Lane, then personally in possession. Starr claimed ownership by virtue of a chattel mortgage executed by C. J. Lane to him, and brought action. The question considered was the validity of Starr’s mortgage as against the creditors of Lane. The mortgage contained a clause authorizing C. J. Lane to remain in possession until
Finding no error in the record, the judgment must be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur.
Mr. Justice Pigott: I am not entirely satisfied, upon the facts as they appear in this case, that the provision of the mortgage permitting the actual and necessary living expenses of one of the mortgagors to be paid out of the proceeds of the mortgaged personalty does not, of itself, invalidate the mortgage as to the plaintiffs; I am inclined to think, however, that the better reasoning supports the conclusion of the opinion, that such provision does not, per se, necessarily avoid the mortgage as to creditors, and I therefore concur. Upon the other points decided I concur also.