This appeal and cross-appeal concern the pension benefits owed to plaintiff Carlo Novella, a retired carpenter, and members of a class he purports to represent. During Novella’s three-decade career, he performed jobs for which his employers were obligated, under collective bargaining agreements, to pay into the defendant pension fund on his behalf. But there were multi-year periods — principally from 1982 to 1986 — during which Novella did not perform any work requiring his employer to make such a contribution. In 1995, when Novella was nearing his sixty-second birthday, he became disabled as a result of injuries sustained while he was on the job. He applied for, and received, a pension (“Disability Pension”); however, he was disappointed to learn that his benefits were not calculated using the pension rate in effect in 1995, but rather using two different rates for Novella’s two periods of service. The rate applicable in 1995 was applied to benefits for work performed between 1987 and 1995, and the lower rate in effect in 1981 was applied to benefits for work performed between 1962 and 1981. The use of the 1981 rate for the earlier period resulted in a lower aggregate monthly pension payment.
After unsuccessfully seeking administrative redress from the pension fund, Novеlla filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of pensioners whose benefits also were allegedly miscalculated. He asserted that the fund was guilty of seven violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court agreed with Novella that the defendants— the pension fund and its trustees — had erred in calculating his Disability Pension at two different rates. The court did not reach Novella’s other claims.
*132 Novella then moved to certify a class action on behalf of either of two classes: one including recipients of various types of pensions whose benefits were calculated using multiple per-credit rates, and the other limited to disability pensioners whose benefits were affected by the same practice. The district court concluded that in light of Novella’s success on his individual claims, only the narrower class of disability pensioners was eligible for certification. The court determined that the statute of limitations for the absent class members’ claims did not accrue until each class member affirmatively challenged the defendants’ two-rate benefit calculation, and was rebuffed. The court found twenty-four putative class membеrs whose claims were timely and determined that this number met the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finding the other requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) to have been met, the court certified this narrower class of disability pensioners.
The parties then cross-moved for summary judgment on the class claims, which motions the district court referred to a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge recommended granting the plaintiff class’s motion on the merits and denying the defendants’, the latter of which the magistrate judge characterized as an untimely motion for reconsideration of the decision certifying the class. The district court reviewed the magistrate judge’s recommendation, adopted it, and entered judgment in favor of the class. The court also awarded prejudgment interest at the fund’s assumed annual rate of return to both Novella and the members of the plaintiff class. Both parties appealed.
We agree with the district court that the defendants’ use of two rates in calculating disability pensions finds no support in the language of the fund’s controlling documents — the Summary Plan Description and the Rules of the Pension Plan. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment in Novella’s favor on his individual claims. We also affirm its award of prejudgment interest to Novella, and its setting of the rate and date of acсrual for the award. However, we conclude that the district court erred in identifying the time at which a claim for miscalculation of benefits accrues. In light of our view that such a claim accrues when the pensioner knew or should have known that his benefits were miscalculated, we vacate the certification of the class, the judgment in favor of the class, and the award of prejudgment interest to the class members, and remand the case for further proceedings before the district court. These proceedings may include a case-by-case inquiry into when each putative class member knew or had sufficient information so that he should have known that the defendants were using two different rates to calculate his pension.
BACKGROUND
Factual History
The relevant facts are not in dispute.
The plaintiff, Carlo Novella, is a 78-year-old former carpenter. From 1962 through 1995, he worked in Westchester County, New York, and in New York City, and participated in both the defendant Westchester County, New York Carpenters’ Pension Fund (the “Westchester Fund” or the “Fund”) 1 — which is adminis *133 tered by the defendant eight-member Board of Trustees of the Fund — and the New York City District Council of Carpenters Pension Plan. It is Novella’s pension under the Westchester Fund — which is an employer-funded employee pension benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) — that is at issue in this appeal. Novella’s pension benefits under the Fund are dеtermined by the Pension Fund Rules (the “Plan”) and Summary Plan Description (the “SPD”) 2 , which have been in effect and unchanged since January 1, 1986. The Plan creates six classes of benefits, four of which are pension-type allowances: “Regular Pension” benefits, governed by sections 3.02-3.03 of the Plan; “Early Retirement Pension” benefits, governed by sections 3.04-3.05 of the Plan; “Deferred Pension” benefits, dictated by sections 3.06-3.07 of the Plan; and “Disability Pension” benefits, as set forth in sections 3.08-3.11 of the Plan. 3 See J.A. 151-54. 4 Each participant is entitled to only one type of benefit, “except that a Disability Pensioner who recovers [from his disabling injury] may be entitled to a different type of pension.” Id. at 155.
Fund participants earn pension credits based on the number of hours they serve in jobs that are covered by the Plan. A job constitutes “Covered Employment” if the employer is “obligated by its [collective bargaining] agreement to contribute to the Fund” on behalf of the relevant Plan participant. Id. at 146. Novella has had two periods of covered employment: from 1962 through 1981, 5 during which time he earned 13.20 pension credits, and from 1987 to 1995, during which time he earned an additional 6.30 pension credits. 6 In the years between 1982 and 1986, Novella performed work in New York City, which was covered by the New York City Fund — not a party to this action — but he did not perform any work covered by the defendant Westchester Fund.
On March 22, 1995, Novella, then sixty-one years old, suffered a disabling accident *134 while at work, for which he immediately began to receive workers’ compensation. He also applied to the Fund for pension benefits. To calculate the amount of Novella’s monthly pension, the defendants used two different rates: They applied a rate of $17 per credit to the 13.20 pension credits Novella earned between 1962 and 1981, and a second rate of $40 per credit for the credits he earned between 1987 and 1995.
Immediately after receiving notice in fall 1995 that his pension would be calculated using two different rates, Novella asked the Fund trustees for an explanation of his benefits. The defendants explained to him that the two-rate calculation was appropriate because of the break in his covered service from 1982 through 1986, during which time he performed no work covered under the Westchester Plan.
The defendants denied Novella’s repeated appeals from the two-benefit rate calculation, referring Novella to section 3.07 of the Westchester Plan, which applies to Deferred Pensions. 7 By letter dated August 28, 1997, the defendants explained that under that section of the Plan,
a Deferred Pension is calculated based on the rate in effect on the lаst day you worked in Covered Employment prior to the accumulation of three One-Year Breaks in Service.... Since each of the years you were not working in covered employment was a Break in Service,[ 8 ] the credits you had accumulated up to 1981 when you left covered employment under the Plan (13.20) were calculated at the 1981 rate ($17.00).
Section 3.07 also provides that if any additional credits were earned after the Break in Service, the benefit amount for the additional credits shall be calculated on the rate that was in effect at the time of termination. The credits you earned after the Break in Service (6.30) were calculated at the rate in effect when you terminated ($40.00).
J.A. 194. Although Novella was awarded a Disability Pension, not a Deferred Pension, the letter did not cite the sections of the Plan governing Disability Pensions: sections 3.08 to 3.11. The letter also failed to cite section 3.16 of the Plan, entitled “Application to Benefit Increases,” on which the defendants would later rely in this litigation. Id. at 156. Section 3.16 provides that a Fund participant is entitled to a Pension in an amount to be “determined under the terms of the Plan and [at] the benefit level, as in effect at the time the Participant last separates from Covered Employment.” Id. Under section 3.16, “[a Plan participаnt shall be deemed to have last separated from Covered Employment on the last day of Work which is followed by three consecutive calendar years of less than 1,000 hours of Covered Employment in each year.” Id.
Procedural History
On March 19, 2002, having contested the two-rate calculation through the Fund’s *135 administrative review process and having failed to obtain relief, Novella filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the defendant Fund and its Board of Trustees, asserting violations of ERISA, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 9 He filed an amended complaint on October 27, 2003. His suit was brought on behalf of himself and a class of “[a]ll [others similarly [sjituated.” J.A. 24.
The amended complaint asserted seven claims falling into two categories: Claims One and Two challenged the defendants’ failure to accord Novella credit for the workers’ compensation hours he received; Claims Three through Seven contested the defendants’ calculation of Novella’s (and the class members’) pensions using two different rates because of a break in service. As relevant to this appeal, Claim Six asserted that the defendants’ practice of applying section 3.07 of the Plan, which governs Deferred Pensions, to recipients of Disability Pensions violated the Plan’s terms, and Claim Seven alleged that bеcause the Plan “does not contain any provision describing the application of two benefit rates when a participant suffers a three-year interruption in service,” the defendants had violated ERISA in calculating Novella’s pension using two rates. Id. at 31-32.
In early 2004, before moving for class certification, Novella moved for summary judgment on his individual claims. The defendants cross-moved for the same. The district court (Michael B. Mukasey,
then-Chief
Judge) granted Novella’s motion in part. The court dismissed as unexhausted
10
Novella’s claims (styled as Claims One and Two) regarding the “defendants’ refusal to credit him with hours of service, and therefore pension credits, during the time he received workers’ compensation benefits.”
11
Novella v. Westchester County, N.Y. Carpenters’ Pension Fund (Novella I),
No. 02-cv-2192,
With regard to Novella’s challenge to the two-rate pension calculation (Claim Six), the court concluded that the defendants had acted arbitrarily and capriciously
12
by using two different rates to
*136
calculate Novella’s pension because “their decision was based on an interpretation of the Westchester Plan that is inconsistent with the plain words of that Plan.”
Id.
at *3,
The court also addressed the defendants’ theory, raised for the first time after commencement of this lawsuit, that section 3.16 of the Plan supported their decision to use two different rates because it “authorizes [P]lan administrators to apply multiple benefit levels when calculating the pension of a [P]lan participant who has had a break in service.”
Id.
at *5,
Having granted Novella’s motion on the basis of his challenge to the two-rate calculation, the district court “dismissed as moot” Novella’s other claims regarding the amount of his Disability Pension (Claims Three, Four, Five, and Seven), which were argued “in the alternative,” and were “premised on the assumption that the terms of the ... Plan support [the] defendants’ decision.”
Id.
at *2,
Following the district court’s decision in Novella’s favor on his individual claims, Novella moved for class certification under Rules 23(b)(1) and (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking certification of a class to include recipients of various types of pensions calculated using two rates, or, in the alternative, a narrower class of disability pensioners injured by the same practice.
13
The district court first determined that the only class for which
*137
Novella potentially could serve as class representative was the “more limited class of Disability Pensioners” affected by the defendants’ practice of applying section 3.07 of the Plаn — which pertains to Deferred Pensions and permits the use of multiple per-credit rates — to Disability Pensions.
Novella v. Westchester County, N.Y. Carpenters’ Pension Fund (Novella II),
No. 02-cv-2192,
On August 2, 2006, after conducting the evidentiary hearing, the district court certified the class of Disability Pension recipients.
See Novella v. Westchester County, N.Y. Carpenters’ Pension Fund (Novella III),
[t]he relevant date for fixing the accrual of [the putative class members’] claim[s] is when a plaintiff was put on notice that the defendants believed the method used to calculate his disability pension was correct. Thus, the claim does not begin to run until a prospective class member inquires about the calculation of his benefits and the Plan rejects his claim that the benefits were miscalculated.
Id. (emphasis added).
Applying this rule, the court found Novella’s claim timely. Id. With regard to the *138 other putative class members, the court determined that, “[b]ecause the defendants ha[d] presented no evidence that they confirmed the correctness of the dual-rate benefits ealculation[s] more than six years before the filing of this lawsuit, th[e] court [could not] find [that] the statute of limitations ha[d] run on the claims of any of the 24 proposed class members.” Id. at 546. The court therefore concluded that the class consisted of twenty-four disability pensioners with timely claims and therefore was sufficiently large to satisfy Rule 28, and certified it. See id. at 546-48.
After the class was certified, both parties again moved for summary judgment, this time to resolve the class-action claims. The district court (Barbara S. Jones,
Judge
15
)
referred the motions to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. On September 10, 2007, Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV issued a Report & Recommendation (the “R & R”) recommending that the district court grant the plaintiffs motion and deny the defendants’.
See Novella v. Westchester County, N.Y. Carpenters’ Pension Fund (Novella IV),
No. 02-cv-2192,
The R
&
R first addressed the defendants’ motion, in which the defendants “renewed] their argument that fifteen of the pensioners^ claims] are time-barred.”
Id.
at
*2,
The magistrate judge then turned to Novella’s motion for summary judgment on behalf of the class, agreeing with Novella that the defendants’ argument denying liability for the class members’ claims was “based exclusively on the theory of accrual
*139
that Judge Mukasey previously rejected.”
Id.
at *5,
Over both parties’ objections and on
de novo
review,
see
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3), the district court (Barbara S. Jones, Judge) adopted the R & R in its entirety.
See Novella v. Westchester County, N.Y. Carpenters’ Pension Fund (Novella V),
No. 02-cv-2192,
The parties each appeal. 16 The defendants appeal from the summary judgment in favor of Novella individually, from the certification of the class, from the summary judgment in favor of the class, and from the awards of prejudgment interest to Novella and the class members. Novella challenges the district court’s refusal to certify a broader class and its decision to award prejudgment interest to the class members only from the date that the complaint was filed.
DISCUSSION
I. Interpretation of the Plan
A. Standard of Review
“We review de novo a district court’s ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, in eаch case construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne,
“ERISA does not itself prescribe the standard of review [by district courts] for challenges to benefit eligibility determinations.”
Celardo v. GNY Auto. Dealers Health & Welfare Trust,
When the arbitrary-and-capricious standard applies, “[a] court may overturn a plan administrator’s decision ... only if the decision was without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence^] or erroneous as a matter of law.”
Celardo,
Herе, the district court did not decide which of the two standards of review should apply, because it concluded that the defendants’ interpretation of the Plan could not be sustained under either standard. However, in their briefing to this Court, the parties appear to agree that the arbitrary-and-caprieious standard applies in this case. See Defs.-Appellants’ Br. 17 [hereinafter Appellants’ Br.]; Pl.-Appellee’s Br. 49, 56 [hereinafter Appellee’s Br.]. We therefore address the defendants’ interpretation of the Plan only under that deferential standard, although, like the district court, we think that the outcome under the other, less deferential option — de novo review — would be no different.
B. The Merits
The question before us is whether the defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously in interpreting the Plan to permit them to calculate Disability Pensions using two different per-credit rates if the pensioner had a break in service. The district court held that doing so was arbitrary and capricious because “[n]othing in the provisions of the [Plan provides] that a Disability Pension may be calculated using two different benefit rates when a participant has had a break in service.”
Novella I,
Disability Pensions are governed by section 3.10 of the Plan, which provides in relevant part that “[t]he Disability Pension amount shall be equal to the Regular Pension amount for which the Employee would have been еligible if he had been age 65 when he became disabled if the Participant had 10 or more units of credit at the time of his disability.” J.A. 153. Section 3.03 sets forth the means of calculating the Regular Pension amount. It authorizes calculation of that amount by reference to the number of credits a pensioner earned during “the period during which the Employer is obligated ... to contribute to the Fund” on behalf of the pensioner. See id. at 147, 151. The defendants offer four *141 arguments in support of their contentions that this Plan language permits a two-rate benefit calculation for recipients of Disability Pensions, and that the district court erred in concluding to the contrary.
First, the defendants assert that the Trustees awarded Novella the full benefit amount to which he was entitled because, although Novella was only sixty-one years old at the time of his disability, they treated him as if he were sixty-five years old when he became disabled as required by section 3.10, the Plan section governing Disability Pensions. They did not apply the age-based reduction that would otherwise have been permissible under section 3.05, which is entitled “Early Retirement Pension — Amount.” 17 Id. at 152. The defendants contend that they therefore complied with section 3.10’s requirements.
Although it is correct that, had Novella received an Early Retirement Pension, the pension amount would have been reduced to reflect his age, the argument is irrelevant. Throughout this lengthy dispute, Novella has never contended that his pension was reduced because of his age at retirement, nor has any party argued that he should have been awarded an Early Retirement Pension instead of a Disability Pension. Novella’s grievance, and these judicial proceedings, have focused entirely on whether the defendants’ use of two different rates to calculate Novella’s Disability Pension was improper.
Second, under section 3.02 of the Plan, to qualify for a Regular Pension, a pensioner’s employment — and consequently, employer contributions on his behalf— must have been “more or less continuous to his retirement date.” Id. at 151. The Plan’s provisions explain that, in this context, “more or less continuous” means that there must be “no period of three or more consecutive years without [his performing] at least” a small, specified, amount of covered work. Id. The defendants argue that because Novella’s employment was not “more or less continuous to his retirement date,” id., 18 Novella “was not ... eligible for the single accrual rate Regular Pension.” Appellants’ Br. 22.
The defendants may be correct that Novella is ineligible for a Regular Pension, but any such eligibility is not material to this dispute in light of the fact that he was awarded a
Disability
Pension. We agrеe with the district court that nothing in the Plan provisions governing Disability Pensions requires that a disability pensioner actually be eligible for another type of pension as a prerequisite to receipt of his Disability Pension.
See Novella I,
Moreover, were we to endorse a reading of the Plan requiring a Disability Pension recipient also to be eligible for a Regular Pension, we would render the Plan’s inclusion of a Disability Pension meaningless, inasmuch as any person who qualified for a Disability Pension would also be eligible *142 for a Regular Pension. It would appear likely that the Plan’s drafters established both Disability Pensions and Regular Pensions — and assigned different eligibility requirements to each — because they contemplated that Plan participants might become disabled before they become eligible for a Regular Pension, and did not want to bar such participants from receiving pension benefits.
Third, the defendants contend that because Novella did not meet the eligibility requirements for a Regular Pension due to his failure to perform covered work from 1982 to 1986, his рension benefit amount was “calculated pursuant to the only other methodology [i.e., section 3.07, which governs Deferred Pensions] for calculating a pension where there was a break in service.” Appellants’ Br. 22. Section 3.07 states that when a pensioner has a break in service that lasts at least three years, his pension shall be calculated using two rates: compensation for all credits earned before the break in service is “based on the benefit level that was in effect on the last day [the pensioner w]orked prior to” the break, while “the benefit amount for [any] additional units of credit” earned after a three-year break in service is “based on the benefit level in effect when the additional units were earned.” J.A. 152. The defendants argue that because Novella’s break in covered employment spanned more than three years, they are permitted to “us[e] two separate benefit accrual rates.” Appellant’s Br. 21.
The defendants’ argument is fatally flawed. The quoted section, Section 3.07, explicitly applies to Deferred Pensions; however, Novella was awarded a Disability Pension, not a Deferred Pension. Nothing in the Plan permits the defendants to apply a section controlling one specific type of pension to a pension оf a different kind. In other words, the fact that the Disability Pension provisions do not include language permitting a two-rate calculation does not entitle the defendants to search for authorization to do so elsewhere in the Plan. Indeed — following both the presumption of consistent usage and meaningful variation, and the textual canon of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, see Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc.,
Finally, the defendants argue that section 3.16, which is entitled “Application to Benefit Increases,” J.A. 156, justifies a two-rate method for calculating Disability Pensions. That section provides: “The pension to which a Participant is entitled shall be determined under the terms of the Plan and the benefit level as in effect at the time the Participant last separates from Covered Employment.” Id. The Plan defines a “last separation] from Covered Employment” as the “last day of [covered] Work which is followed by three consecutive calendar years of less than 1,000 hours of Covered Employment in each year.” Id. The defendants argue that a person can “last separate” from employment more than once, and that Novella did so in 1981 and again in 1995, thus permitting the defendants to calculate a pension using multiple benefit levels.
It is apparent from the record, however, that the defendants did not use Section 3.16 to calculate Novella’s pension in the first instance. As the district court noted, the defendants identified this section as justification for their calculation of Novel
*143
la’s pension “for the first time in litigation.”
Novella I,
Because we agree with the district court’s determination that the defendants’ two-rate calculation of Novella’s disability pension was arbitrary and capricious, we affirm its entry of summary judgment in favor of Novella individually. However, for the reasons discussed below, we nonetheless decline to affirm the summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff class.
II. Statute of Limitations and Class Certification
A. Standards of Review
We review the question of the application of the relevant statute of limitations — as we do all questions of
law
— de
novo. United States v. Domino Sugar Corp.,
B. The Merits
1. Accrual of the Statute of Limitations.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit maintenance of a class action only if the “class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). This “numerosity” requirement “does not mandate that joinder of all parties be impossible — only that the difficulty or inconvenience of joining all members of the class make use of the class action appropriate.”
Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C.,
In this case, the question of whether the certified class was sufficiently large to satisfy Rule 23 hinges on whether the statute of limitations for each class member’s claim began to run upon receipt of his first pension payment, as the defendants contend, or upon a class member’s first inquiry to the Fund regarding the amount of his benefits and the Fund’s rejection of his request that his pension be calculated using one rate, as the district court concluded and as Novella urges on appeal.
The parties agree that a six-year statute of limitations governs ERISA claims and that “[t]he relevant date for fixing the accrual of a miscalculation claim is when a plaintiff was put on notice that the defendants believed the method used to calculate his disability pension was correct.” Appellants’ Br. 26 (brackets omitted) (quoting
Novella III,
The defendants urge us to reject the district court’s determination that the statute of limitations on a class member’s claim does “not begin to run until a prospective class member inquires about the calculation of his benefits and the Plan rejects his claim that the benefits were miscalculated,”
Novella III,
In support, the defendants point to
Miller v. Fortis Benefits Insurance Co.,
Some other courts, however, including the district court in this case, have required that an ERISA fund provide a formal denial of a plaintiff’s application for the adjustment of benefits to trigger the running of the statute of limitations. In
Miele v. Pension Plan of New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund,
Still other courts have applied a continuing-violation theory to the accrual of a claim in similar circumstances.
See Meagher v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Pension Plan,
We do not adopt the continuing-violation theory. We think that method is appropriate in ERISA cases, as elsewhere, only “where separate violations of the same type, or character, are repeated over time.”
L.I. Head Start Child Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Econ. Opportunity Comm’n of Nassau County, Inc.,
We also decline, however, to accept either of the approaches urged by the parties. The defendants’ bright-line approach is too harsh in that it places the burden on the pensioner — a party less likely to have a clear understanding of the terms of the pension plan and their application to his case — to confirm the correctness of his pension award immediately upon the first payment of benefits, regardless of the complexity of the calculations, or of the adequacy of the defendants’ explanation of the basis for the calculation. Indeed, this case illustrates the hazards of the defendants’ approach. The SPD — the document provided to all Plan participants, including Novella and the plaintiff class, to explain the rules of the pension plan — is silent on the underlying issue of multiplе benefit calculation rates for Disability Pensions. And, unlike the simple percentage calculation at issue in
Miller, see Miller,
The district court’s and Novella’s bright-line approach — in which a limitations period does not begin to run “until a prospective class member inquires about the calculation of his benefits and the Plan rejects his claim,”
Novella III,
Having rejected each party’s views, we choose a third approach: We conclude that notice of a miscalculation can be imputed to a pensioner — and the statute of limitations will start to run — when there is enough information available to the pensioner to assure that he knows or reasonably should know of the misсalculation. We think this method best balances a pension plan’s legitimate interest in predictability and finality with a pensioner’s equally legitimate interest in having a fair opportunity to challenge a miscalculation of benefits once it becomes known — or should have become known — to him. Stated another way, this case-by-case reasonableness inquiry mitigates some of the harshness of the defendants’ proffered approach, while better respecting the defendants’ interests in finality and repose than the district court’s and Novella’s chosen method. 22
We think this method is consistent with the Third Circuit’s reasoning in
Miller,
which we read to endorse not a strict first-payment theory — such as that urged by the defendants — but rather a similar reasonableness approach. Indeed, in
Miller,
the Third Circuit appeared to contemplate that its “clear repudiation” rule would vary in its application to the facts of any individual case.
See Miller, 475
F.3d at 521 (rejecting the plaintiffs “proposed
application
of the clear repudiation rule,” which would have required an explicit demand and refusal, and concluding that a court should ask “when a beneficiary knows or should know he has a cause of action” (emphasis added));
see also Fletcher v. Comcast Comprehensive Health and Wel
*148
fare Plan,
No. 209-cv-1272,
Turning to the present case: In light of the standard we adopt, on the factual record before us, we are unable to determine whether, and if so when, each class member had information by which he knew or should have known of the miscalculation. We note that, based on the foregoing discussion, simply receiving a lower pension payment is not enough to put a pensioner on notice of a miscalculation. Conversely, actual notice to a pensioner that a double rate method was used would put him on notice. Similarly, informing a pensioner of the correct rate-times-units calculation, so that any difference between the putative calculation and the actual amount of the check would be obvious, is also probably enough. However, we cannot yet tell how many of the class members’ claims are timely. We therefore cannot, at this stage of the proceedings, confirm the district court’s conclusion that the class is sufficiently large to satisfy Rule 23(a)(l)’s numerosity requirement.
We therefore vacate the class certification and remand to the distriсt court for further factfinding regarding when each plaintiff class member knew or should have known that the Fund had miscalculated his Disability Pension payments, and for consideration of whether there are enough class members with timely claims to merit certification. We therefore also vacate the summary judgment in favor of the class.
Finally on this score, we note that the method we adopt may in some cases require a resource-intensive, claimant-by-claimant inquiry to determine when a pensioner knew or reasonably should have known that his benefits were miscalculated. And this fact-dependent inquiry into each pensioner’s accrual date may in turn lessen the value, and indeed the availability, of class actions in this kind of litigation. However, that sort of problem is not unique to this context.
See, e.g., Avila v. Willits Envt’l Remediation Trust,
Moreover, the fact-intensive nature of our reasonableness approach could make it difficult for a potential class representative to meet the typicаlity requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). But the case law on the effect of an individualized statute-of-limitations-accrual evaluation on a proposed class’s ability to meet the typicality requirement, if any, is sparse,
see Chiang v. Veneman,
2. Novella’s Cross-Appeal. We find no merit in Novella’s contention, asserted in his cross-appeal, that the certified class was too narrow inasmuch as the district court should not have limited it to persons receiving Disability Pensions.
Novella’s amended complaint asserted claims relating both to the two-rate calculation for disability pensioners and to the Plan’s “accrued benefit” provisions.
See
J.A. 30-31. The district court granted summary judgment to Novella on his individual Disability Pension claims and did not reach the other “accrued benefit” claims, but rather dismissed them as moot in light of the fact that the other claims would entitle Novella to no further relief. When Novella subsequently moved for class certification with regard to both the Disability Pension claim аnd the other claims, the district court certified only the former class because it concluded that Novella lost standing to pursue the “accrued benefit” claims when he had already “succeeded on an alternative theory of recovery.”
Novella II,
Novella asserts in his cross-appeal that the district court “confused the mootness of an
issue
with the mootness of a case,” Appellee’s Br. 16 (emphasis in original), and therefore erred in dismissing Novella’s non-Disability Pension claims as “moot.” We agree that the claims were not “moot” in the technical sense; “it is cases rather than reasons that become moot” within the meaning of Article III.
23
Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. UAL Corp.,
In any event, we agree with the district court’s decision not to certify the broader class. It was Novella’s choice to proceed individually first and only later move for class certification. In his briefing on his individual motion for summary judgment, Nоvella offered his various arguments in support of his motion in the alternative.
See Novella I,
III. Prejudgment Interest
A. Standard of Review
“The decision whether to grant prejudgment interest and the rate used if such interest is granted are matters confided to the district court’s broad discretion, and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”
Endico Potatoes, Inc. v. CIT Group/Factoring, Inc.,
B. The Merits
The district court awarded prejudgment interest to both Novella— beginning on the date the Fund denied his claim — and to the individual class members — beginning on the date Novella first asserted the class claims. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s award of prejudgment interest to Novella individually or in its selection of the appropriate rate. 25 We nonetheless vacate the award of prejudgment interest to the class in light of our determination that we must decertify the class and vacate the judgment in its favor.
The defendants argue that the district court’s award of prejudgment interest to Novella amounts to a “windfall” because such an award would compensate him without regard to his break in service, even though his employers did not pay contributions to the Fund during that time. But this argument essentially restates the defendants’ arguments on the merits of the two-rate calculation, which we have rejected. To the extent that the payment of prejudgment interest creates a financial burden on the Fund, that is a result of the Fund’s misinterpretation of its own Plan. It does not render the district court’s conclusion that prejudgment interest is necessary to fully compensate Novella an abuse of discretion.
We similarly conclude that the district court’s determination that the proper interest rate is 7.5 percent — the Fund’s assumed rate of return — was within its discretion. In light of the other options before the court, this rate seems to us to be entirely consistent with the principlе that plaintiffs should be “made whole” and that defendants should “not profit by their failure to comply with their ERISA obligations.”
Algie v. RCA Global
*151
Commc’ns, Inc.,
We find no merit in Novella’s argument that the district court should have awarded prejudgment interest from the date of the first miscalculated check. In his R
&
R, the magistrate judge acknowledged three possible dates for the accrual of prejudgment interest: “the date of each underpayment, the date that a plaintiff asserted a claim, or the date that the Fund denied the claim.”
Novella IV,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of Novella on his individual ERISA claims and its award to Novella of prejudgment interest. We vacate the district court’s certification of the class of Disability Pension recipients, its grant of judgment on the merits in favor of the class, and its award of prejudgment interest to the class members. We remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Each party shall bear its own costs.
Notes
. In approximately 1998, the Westchester Fund "merged with and into the Suburbаn New York Regional Council Pension Fund, which is now known as the Empire State Carpenters Pension Fund.” J.A. 57. The Westchester Fund no longer exists as a distinct entity.
.The SPD is the simplified explanation of the Plan that must be provided to participants under ERISA. According to the Department of Labor, "[t]he summary plan description ... tells participants what the plan provides and how it operates. It provides information on when an employee can begin to participate in the plan, how service and benefits are calculated, when benefits becomes vested, when and in what form benefits are paid, and how to file a claim for benefits.” U.S. Dep't of Labor, ERISA — Plan Information, http:// www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/ planinformation.htm (latest visit Sept. 5, 2011);
see also Wilkins v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund,
. The other two allowances provided for in the Plan are lump-sum benefits: the “Death Benefit” and the "Termination Benefit.” See J.A. 154-55.
. For reasons described infra note 16, all citations to the parties’ submissions on appeal, including briefs, refer to documents filed in connection with an earlier appeal in this case, docketed as numbers 08-0788-cv(L) and 08-0807-cv(XAP).
. According to the plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1 statement, he did not perform any work covered by the Plan between 1965 and 1975 because there were no jobs available to him. See J.A. 220. This break in service is not at issue in this appeal.
. The Plan sets out various schedules for the accumulation of pension credits, which depend on the year in which the credits were earned. See J.A. 130-34.
. That section reads:
Section 3.07 Deferred Pension — Amount
The Deferred Pension shall be calculated in the same manner as the Regular or Early Retirement Pension but shall be based on the benefit level that was in effect on the last day he Worked prior to accumulation of three One-Year Breaks in Service. If additional units of credit were earned after the period in which he accumulated three consecutive One-Year Breaks in Service, the benefit amount for such additional units of credit shall be based on the benefit level in effect when the additional units were earned.
J.A. 152.
. Any calendar year "after 1974 in which [the participant] fails to complete 100 hours of Covered Employment” constitutes a one-year Break in Service. J.A. 163.
. Subject matter jurisdiction was premised upon the questions of federal law that underlie this dispute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).
. Although "ERISA does not contain an explicit exhaustion[-]of[-]remedies requirement ... this Circuit has inferred [one].”
Burke v. PriceWaterHouseCoopers LLP Long Term Disability Plan,
. After exhausting these claims, Novella again filed suit asserting Claims One and Two against the same defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. On March 26, 2009, the district court (Barbara S. Jones, Judge) granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Novella’s cross-motion.
See Novella v. Empire State Carpenters Pension Fund,
No. 05-cv-2079,
.The court noted that there was some question regarding whether the arbitrary-and-capricious or
de novo
standard of review was appropriate to the circumstances of this case, but concluded that the defendants’ interpretation of the Plan failed under either standard.
*136
See Novella I,
. The defendants argued that the motion was untimely because it was not made until after the court had resolved the summary judgment motions in Novella’s favor.
See Novella v. Westchester County, N.Y. Carpenters’ Pension Fund,
No. 02-cv-2192,
. The court explained that, while a class of twenty-four does not in all cases satisfy the numerosity requirement,
Novella III, 443
F.Supp.2d at 546, a balancing of the relevant factors in this case justified certification of the relatively small class,
id.
at 546-48 (discussing the five factors for numerosity set forth in
Ansari
v.
N.Y. Univ.,
. The case was reassigned to Judge Jones in October 2006, after Chief Judge Mukasey retired.
. After hearing argument in these cross-appeals on March 11, 2009, this panel determined that the district court’s judgments on appeal were not final and that we therefore lacked jurisdiction over the appeals. We therefore dismissed the appeals and instructed the parties that ”[i]n the event a final judgment is entered,” they could file a new, timely notice of appeal to return the cross-appeals to this panel for disposition.
See Novella v. Westchester County,
In September 2009, the parties each filed a notice of appeal, and their cross-appeals were returned to this panel. See Docket, Novella v. Westchester County, Nos. 09-4061(L), 09-3826(XAP) (2d Cir.). Pursuant to a scheduling order issued by this panel, the parties filed supplemental briefing, which briefing was later withdrawn on the parties' motion. As a result, we now address only the issues presented when the parties first filed their cross-appeals in 2008.
. Section 3.05 provides: "The monthly amount of the Early Retirement Pension is the amount of the Regular Pension reduced by one-half of one percent for each month by which the Participant is under age 65 on the Effective Date of his Pension.” J.A. 152.
. Novella does not dispute that he performed no covered work between 1982 and 1986, and therefore that his employment was not "more or less continuous” as defined in the Plan.
. Novella also argues, and the district court concluded, that even if the defendants had cited to section 3.16 to justify their calculation, the defendants' interpretation of that section fails because the phrase "last separated from Covered Employment” must be read to contemplate only one such "last separat[ion].”
See Novella I,
. In Larsen v. NMU Pension Trust of the NMU Pension & Welfare Plan, 902 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir.1990), we concluded that on the facts of that case — which involved a claim by a pensioner's widow seeking to receive her late husband’s pension as a "husband and wife pension” payable after his death, id. at 1070-71 — the defendant fund had not "clear[ly] repudiated]” her claim until it responded to an inquiry made on the widow's behalf and stated that "[a]ll monies have been paid that are payable and there are no further monies due [the plaintiff],” id. at 1074. We did not, however, decide that an ERISA claim cannot under any circumstances accrue before an affirmative demand is made and an explicit rejection is offered. Moreover, Larsen is factually distinguishable. That case concerned not an underpayment claim like the one at issue in the present appeal, but a denial of benefits. We therefore do not think that Larsen provides binding Circuit precedent on the statute-of-limitations issue before us.
. We do not intend to suggest that the underlying basis for the class members’ claims was undiscoverable at the time of the first payment. Rather, it is for the district court to determine in the first instance at what point the defendants provided sufficient information to each class member such that that pensioner should have been able to recognize the miscalculation.
. And it may be that in many cases, our reasonableness approach will yield the same result as the first-payment theory favored by the defendants, in that the miscalculation will be apparent from the face of a payment check, or will readily be discoverable from information furnished to pensioners by the pension plan at the time the first check is issued, thereby starting the running of the statute of limitations as of that date. Nevertheless, whether that is the case is for each district court to determine in the first instance.
. Mootness in the Article III sense occurs when there "no longer is an actual controversy between adverse litigants,” and the plaintiff therefore lacks standing to continue to pursue his claims in federal court. Erwin Chemerinsky,
Federal Jurisdiction
130 (5th ed. 2007);
see also In re Zarnel,
. Notwithstanding Novella's success on his individual claim, Novella had standing to represent the class of Disability Pension recipients inasmuch as the district court had not yet reduced Novella’s victory to a final judgment.
. Although ERISA does not explicitly provide for prejudgment interest, courts can make such awards as part of their “wide discretion in fashioning equitable relief to protect the rights of pension fund beneficiaries.”
Katsaros v. Cody,