OPINION' OP THE COURT BY
The complainants John K. Notley, Victoria Maria Ke-ala Vannatta and Lily Notley Heen are the children of respondent Charles K. Notley and Emma Alice Notley, deceased, former wife of Charles K. Notley, and Annie K. Notley is the wife of complainant John K. Notley and William C. Vannatta is the husband of complainant Victoria Maria Keala Vannatta. Respondent Annie Notley is the second wife of Charles K. Notley, and respondent William K. Notley is a son, and the only other child of respondent Charles K. Notley and Emma Alice Notley deceased. The respondent Hannah Notley is the wife of William K. Notley. Emma Alice Notley died in Honolulu January 26, 1914, without having made a will. Her four children above named were her heirs at law and inherited all of her property in equal shares, subject to an estate by curtesy therein of her husband, the respondent Charles K. Notley. Her estate consisted of the family home on Kukui street, city of Honolulu, at which place she died, and of several other tracts of land situated in different parts of the islands, the largest and most valuable tract being lot No. 19, situated at Paauilo, island of Hawaii, containing an area of about 103 acres. All of said land is of the value of about $20,000. Lot 19, above referred to, is of the value of about $14,000. Nine days after the death of Emma Alice Notley, to wit, on the 5th day of February, 1914, at Honolulu, the complainants herein executed and delivered to respondent Charles K. Notley a deed conveying all of their interest in the afore
This is a suit in equity brought for the purpose of obtaining the cancelation of said two deeds and placing all the parties interested in the estate of the said Emma Alice Notley in statu quo ante. The bill of complaint represents that respondent. Charles K. Notley is a shrewd, scheming, grasping and ambitious man, and that the. complainants John K. Notley, Victoria Maria Keala Vannatta and Lily Notley Heen have had little or no experience in matters of business, and up to the time of the alleged fraudulent transaction complained of had placed in the respondent Charles K. Notley implicit confidence and trust, yielding at all times to his parental authority, sagacity and superior judgment. It is further averred in the bill “that, for the purpose of wrongfully depriving your petitioners, John K. Notley, Victoria Maria Keala Vannatta and Lily Notley Heen, of all their right, title and interest in and to the said property so inherited from their mother, the said Emma Alice Notley, deceased, and intending to cheat and defraud your petitioners of all their said right, title and interest in and to the said property and to strip them of their said inheritance, the respondents, Charles K. Notley and William K. Notley, fraudulently combining, conspiring and
The answer of the respondents joins issue upon the material allegations contained in the bill of complaint, admitting, however, the execution of the deeds referred to, the separate answer of Charles K. Notley and Annie Notley specifically representing that the complainants, of their own volition and free will and accord, without suggestion, inducement or representation whatsoever on the part of respondent Charles K. Notley, prepared or had prepared the deed of February 5, 1914, which deed was executed, acknowledged and delivered to said respondent, and that
The case went to trial upon the issues thus formed and a vast amount of evidence was introduced both by the complainants and respondents. The circuit judge rendered a lengthy decision, finally holding that the complainants should prevail and that the deed of February 5, 1914, and also the deed of July 9, 1915, should be delivered up and be canceled and that the respondents reconvey all the property in question so as to place all parties in statu quo ante. A decree to that effect was thereafter made and entered. From the opinion and decree the respondents come to this court on appeal.
It is established by the evidence that the respondent Charles K. Notley is a man of about fifty-five years of age and that his four children, herein referred to, have all reached their majority and range from twenty-eight to thirty-four years of age. It appears that up to and for a time subsequent to February 5, 1914, a condition of tran-quillity prevailed among them. It is shown that .the father of the respondent Charles K. Notley, who died a number of years ago, left a large and valuable estate, but by the provisions of his will had disinherited his son Charles K. Not-ley; that the elder Notley had so provided in his will that his property should descend to his wife and to his children other than Charles K. Notley, and to the children of Charles K. Notley. It is further shown that Charles K. Notley’s mother received from the estate of her husband about a quarter of a million dollars in cash, besides dower rights in real estate, upon the settlement of her husband’s estate; that the respondent Charles K. Notley appears to have acquired such an influence and control over his mother that he secured the custody and disposition of the greater part,
The complainants herein having waited for many months for their father to put into effect his agreement with them to form a corporation, and finally losing faith and confidence in his intention so to do, in October, 1914, transmitted to him a written notice that all tentative agreements, undertakings and documents theretofore entered into by them having for their object the organization of the C. K. Notley Estate, Limited, a corporation, were rescinded and no longer binding upon them. No response was made by Charles K. Notley to this communication and the next active step in the transaction was the execution of the deed of May 14, 1915, by William K. Notley and his wife. William testifies that on the day of the execution of this deed he had an attorney draw a deed from his father and wife to himself conveying lot No. 19 for the reason that he wanted to buy this lot from his father; that a few days thereafter he delivered the executed deed to his father but did not impart to his father the information that he desired to buy lot 19 for the reason that he had not the nerve to do so. He states, however, that having recovered his nerve, on the 9th day of July, 1915, he advised his father of his desire to purchase the lot and his father immediately re
The circuit judge seems to have decided this case upon the theory that the complainants should be afforded relief on account of the failure of consideration, and the further ground that undue or dominant parental influence was exercised by respondent Charles K. Notley over complainants at the time of the execution of the deed. The circuit judge found “that the deed of February 5 was executed by the parties plaintiff at a time when they were under the dominant parental influence of defendant Charles K. Not-ley and the law casts upon him the burden of showing the entire fairness of the transaction and this he failed to do.” In so holding the circuit judge was clearly in error. See Jenkins v. Pye, 12 Pet. 241; Sawyer v. White, 122 Fed. 223; Turner v. Turner, 121 Pac. 616; Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17. In the latter case Mr. Justice Gray, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: “In the case of a child’s gift of its property to a parent the circumstances attending the transaction should be vigilantly and carefully scrutinized by the court, in order to ascertain whether there has been an undue influence in procuring it, but it cannot be deemed prima jade void.”
It is our opinion that where, as in this case, all the parties concerned are of mature age and of sound mentality, the
If the complainants are to recover at all they must do so upon the fact established by the evidence that the deed of February 5, 1914, was obtained from them by virtue of the false and fraudulent representations of respondent Charles K. Notley. It must appear that respondent Charles K. Notley, at the time he assured complainants of his intention to form a corporation, as alleged in the bill of complaint, had, in fact, no intention of so doing. This vital question seems to have been entirely overlooked by the trial judge. He made no findings respecting this phase of the'case although there was ample evidence to justify him in doing so. It is true that the bill of complaint does not specifically allege that respondent Charles K. Notley had no intention of forming a corporation at the time he promised to do so and had respondents demurred to the complaint the question thus raised would likely have been disposed of favorably to them. But in the absence of a demurrer, and the fact that the complaint contains inferential averments of the fraudulent purpose of respondent Charles K. Notley, and in view of the further fact that much evi
The failure of the trial judge to make any findings upon the subject compels us to do so and we therefore find from the evidence that at the time respondent Charles K. Not-ley promised complainants herein that he would form a corporation for the purposes and under the circumstances alleged in the bill of complaint, that he did so with a premeditated design to cheat, defraud and deceive the complainants and that he had no intention at the time of performing or fulfilling the promises, but used them merely as a false pretense to induce the complainants to execute the deed. It was clearly proven that the respondent agreed to form a corporation and to convey to it the property in question. That promise was the real consideration and inducement for the conveyance. It appears that on two or three occasions he spoke in a casual way about forming a corporation but he took no step toward forming one, and in his answer and upon the witness stand he positively denied having made the promise. In the meantime he conveyed a portion of the property to his son William. “To profess an intent to do or not to do when the party intends the contrary is as clear a case of misrepresentation and of fraud as could be made.” Bigelow on the Law of Eraud, 484.
“As a general rule, in order for false representations to be the basis of fraud, such representations must be relative to existing facts or facts which previously existed and cannot be founded upon promises as to future acts. There is, however, the exception to the foregoing rule, that if the promise is accompanied with an intention not to perform it and is made for the purpose of deceiving the promisee and*738 inducing him to act where otherwise he would not have done so, the same constitutes fraud.” Blackburn v. Morrison, 29 Okl. 510. See also Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U. S. 631, and Chicago T. & M. C. Ry. Co. v. Titterington, 84 Tex. 218.
Having found from the evidence before us that the deed from complainants to Charles K. Notley was secured through fraud and misrepresentation on the part of Charles K. Notley, as herein set out, it follows that equity will afford relief to the complainants.
What, if any, connection respondent William K. Notley had with the transaction at the outset is left to conjecture, but the evidence directly connects him at a later day with his father’s scheme to defraud the complainants and discloses his participation in the fruits of a transaction which he knew was fraudulent.
“The remedy which equity gives to the defrauded person is most extensive. It reaches all those who were actually concerned in the fraud, all who directly and knowingly participated in its fruits, and all those who derive title from them voluntarily or with notice. 'A court of equity will wrest property fraudulently acquired, not only from the perpetrator of the fraud, but, to use Lord Cottenham’s language, from his children and his children’s children, or, as elsewhere said, from any persons amongst whom he may have parceled out the fruits of his fraud.’ ” 2 Pomeroy Eq. Jur., Sec. 918.
While the trial judge erred in his theory of the case the ultimate result of his conclusions was correct. “The decision of a circuit judge cannot be reversed because he gave wrong reasons, provided he came to a correct conclusion.” Calaca v. Caldeira, 13 Haw. 214.
The decree appealed from is affirmed.