Notar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.Notar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Ott, Grimes, Schoonover
On September 14, 1981, appellant Agatha E. Notar sued Laszlo S. Dombrowsky for damages arising out of an automobile accident occurring on December 17, 1977. Apparently unknown to Notar at the time of bringing suit, Dombrowsky had died on March 1, 1979, and his estate had been distributed without formal administration.1 On February 8, 1982, Notar filed a motion for substitution of parties and appointment of personal representative of estate, which the trial court denied. Notar appeals the trial court‘s denial of this motion.
On February 22, 1982, Notar‘s attorney, Thomas M. Woodruff, filed a petition for administration of Dombrowsky‘s estate on his own behalf. The probate court denied this petition, and Woodruff appeals the court‘s denial of his petition.2
Under
Dombrowsky‘s death obligated Notar to comply with another statute of limitations, however. Under
In order to present a claim against a decedent, a creditor must file a written statement of the claim indicating its basis and the amount claimed.
We believe Notar‘s motion, filed within three years after Dombrowsky‘s death, stated the basis of her claim sufficiently to satisfy the foregoing statutory requirements. Thus, we conclude that Notar presented a claim against Dombrowsky‘s estate within the three-year nonclaim period.
In the same manner, Woodruff‘s petition for administration, also filed within three years after Dombrowsky‘s death, sufficiently stated the basis of his claim against Dombrowsky‘s estate as attorney for Notar in her negligence action. Indeed, because no notice of administration of Dombrowsky‘s estate had been filed, Woodruff and Notar could have done no more to preserve their rights against the estate.
Dombrowsky‘s insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contends that Notar should be precluded from bringing an action against its insured‘s estate because she took no action to substitute the estate as a party in her original suit until after section 95.11‘s four-year limitations’ period had expired. Neither statute nor case law requires such substitution. Having timely commenced her action against Dombrowsky and having timely filed a claim against his estate, Notar was required to do nothing further to preserve her claim.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the lower‘s court‘s orders and REMAND both cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GRIMES and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.