Norton v. Warner Co.Norton v. Warner Co.
- Reporters:
- , , , ,
- Before:
- Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether Nicholas Rusin, a bargeman employed by respondent, is entitled to compensation under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (44 Stat. 1424,
The Deputy Commissioner found that Rusin was a harbor worker, not a “master or member of a crew,” and granted him a compensation award. 1 The District Court upheld the Deputy Commissioner in a suit which respond-dent-employer brought to set aside the award. 45 F. Supp. 835. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 137 F. 2d 57. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the asserted failure of the court below to give proper effect to our decision in South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251.
See. 19 (a) of the Act gives the Deputy Commissioner “full power and authority to hear and determine all questions in respect of” claims for compensation. And § 21 (b) gives the federal district courts power to suspend or , set aside, in whole or in part, compensation orders if “not in accordance with law.” In considering those provisions of the Act in the
Bassett
case, we held that the District Court was not warranted in setting aside such an order because the court would weigh or appraise the evidence differently. The duty of the District Court, we said, was to give the award effect, “if there was evidence to support it.” 309 U. S. at 258. And we stated that the findings of the Deputy Commissioner were conclusive even though the evidence permitted conflicting inferences.
Id.
p. 260. And see
Parker
v.
Motor Boat Sales,
314 U. S. 244, 246. This statement of the finality to be accorded findings of the Deputy Commissioner under the Act was not new. It had been stated in substantially similar terms in
Voehl
v.
Indemnity Insurance Co.,
288 U. S. 162, 166, and in
Del Vecchio
v.
Bowers,
296 U. S. 280, 287. The rule fashioned by these cases followed the design of the Act of encouraging prompt and expeditious adjudication of claims arising under it.
2
We think the award granted by the Deputy Commissioner had such an infirmity. 3
If the award were to stand, there would be brought within the Act a group of workers whom we do not believe Congress intended to include. The Senate Report makes clear that “The purpose of this bill is to provide for com
If a barge without motive power of its own can have a “crew” within the meaning of the Act and if a “crew” may consist of one man, we do not see why Rusin does not meet the requirements. A barge is a vessel within the meaning of the Act even when it has no motive power of its own, since it is a means of transportation on water.
4
See
The General Cass,
Fed. Cas. No. 5,307;
Seabrook
v.
Raft,
40 F. 596;
In re Eastern Dredging Co.,
138 F. 942;
Los Angeles
v.
United Dredging Co.,
14 F. 2d 364;
The Robert W. Parsons,
191 U. S. 17, 30;
Ellis
v.
United States,
206 U. S. 246, 259. A crew is generally “equivalent to ship’s company” as Mr. Justice Story said in
United States
v.
Winn,
Fed. Cas. No. 16,740, 28 Fed. Cas. 733, 737. But we pointed out in the
Bassett
case that the word does not have “an absolutely unvarying legal significance.” 309 U. S. at p. 258. We know of no reason why a person in sole charge of a vessel on a voyage is not as much a “member of the crew” as he would be if there were two or more aboard. We said in the
Bassett
case
Rusin, unlike the employee in the
Bassett
case,
6
did no work of the latter variety. He performed on the barge functions of the same quality as those performed in the maintenance and operation of many vessels. His were indeed different from the functions of any other “crew” only as they were made so by the nature of the vessel and its navigational requirements. The contract under which he was employed stated that the compensation was “based upon all services and time required to safeguard and operate the barge fleet.” The services rendered con
We conclude that only by a distorted definition of the word “crew” as used in the Act could Rusin be restricted to the remedy which it affords and excluded from recovery under the Jones Act or be denied relief in admiralty. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 94 F. 2d 190; Loverich v. Warner Co., 118 F. 2d 690; Cantey v. McLain Line, 32 F. Supp. 1023, 114 F. 2d 1017, which we reversed in 312 U. S. 667.
Affirmed.
Me. Justice Roberts concurs in the result.
Notes
Cf. the finding of the Deputy Commissisoner in Diomede v. Lowe, 14 F. Supp. 380; 87 F. 2d 296.
Sec. 14 (b) makes the first instalment of compensation due on the fourteenth day after the employer has knowledge of the injury or death. Sec. 14 (f) provides that if compensation, payable under an award, is not paid within ten days after it is due, a penalty of twenty per cent is added. Sec. 18 provides for the issuance by the Deputy Commissioner of a supplementary order when an employer is in default of payment of compensation due under an award for a period of thirty days. On such an order judgment and execution may be obtained in the federal district courts, the supplementary order of the Deputy
Commissioner being final. Any waiver of the right to compensation under the Act is made invalid by § 15 (b). Agreements for compensation not made in accordance with the Act are outlawed. §§ 15 (a), 16. Limitations on the granting of interlocutory injunctions staying payment of compensation while an award is being contested are contained in § 21 (b). And the United States Attorney is directed to appear on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner and defend compensation orders. 45 Stat. 490,
In Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249, we were dealing with the problem of determining whether a so-called harbor worker could be compensated under a state act or must come under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Act. That problem was embarrassed by the fact that the line between federal and state domain had been drawn with reference to the rule of the Jensen case. There are no such complications here. In this case the line is one which Congress has drawn between two mutually exclusive federal systems. The risk of employees choosing the wrong remedy has been anticipated by Congress and at least partially avoided. For § 13 (d) provides that where recovery is denied to any person in a suit brought at law or in admiralty to recover damages on the ground that his remedy was under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Act the limitation of time for making application for an award begins to run “only from the date of termination of such suit.”
“Vessel” is defined in Rev. Stat. § 3,
“Seaman” as used in a particular context may of course have a broader meaning than “crew.” International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50. And see Carumbo v. Cape Cod S. S. Co., 123 F. 2d 991.
And see Moore Dry Dock Co. v. Pillsbury, 100 F. 2d 245; Henderson v. Jones, 110 F. 2d 952.