85 Kan. 822 | Kan. | 1911
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This appeal arises out of a controversy between the sheriff and the board of county commissioners of Shawnee county in regard to the lia
The trial court held:
“That it is the duty of the defendant Board of County Commissioners, and said board is legally obligated, to keep and maintain the jail and jailer’s residence belonging to Shawnee County, described in the agreed case herein, and to pay for all electric light, gas for lights, gas or other fuel for cooking or heating, water, toilet necessities, soap, mops, brooms, disinfectants and all necessities for cleaning, repairs of all kinds, wiring for electricity, piping for gas, and the lights, furniture and bedding necessary for the use of prisoners confined in said jail, which have been heretofore furnished to said jail building or any part thereof, or which may be hereafter furnished thereto, or which may be necessary in keeping and maintaining said jail and jailer’s residence in proper sanitary condition and suitable for use and occupancy with regard to the health and physical welfare of persons occupying said building or confined therein.”
It is argued, however, that the fee specifically provided for boarding and lodging was intended to cover such supplies. The amount to be paid by the county for-the boarding and lodging of prisoners in Shawnee county is fixed by chapter 304 of the Laws of 1903, as follows: “For boarding and lodging each prisoner, fifty cents per day, exclusive of lights, furniture, fuel,
The case of Atchison County v. Tomlinson, 9 Kan. 167, is cited as an authority for holding that supplies of the kind mentioned are included in boarding and lodging. That case did not involve the liability of the county for articles purchased by the sheriff, but it was for personal service rendered by an undersheriff in procuring supplies and for personal care of prisoners and their cells. There the county had paid the expense of the supplies purchased, and the decision was that the officer was not entitled to additional compensation for services and labor in procuring supplies.
It was stated in Hendricks v. Comm’rs of Chautauqua Co., 35 Kan. 483, 11 Pac. 450, that no more could be allowed for board and lodging than the amounts-fixed by the legislature, but the court did not undertake - to determine what was included in those terms.
There are cases holding that the sheriff shall pay for ■certain supplies, but these depend upon statutory provisions which impose the obligation. The small fee prescribed for furnishing board and lodging, although not of controlling force, indicates that it was not the theory of the legislature that there should be included in these terms the repairs and supplies and upkeep of the institution. It is now conceded that light, fuel, furniture and bedding for the jail are to be provided at county expense and that the sheriff should be reimbursed for the amounts which he paid for these items. It is said, however, that the' gas used for fuel in that ;part of the jail occupied by the jailer and his assistant
Another point in controversy is a claim of the sheriff for attendance upon the probate court. That court certified that the sheriff was in attendance during four lunacy inquests, and that he had been allowed a per diem of $1.50 in each case. There is no contention here that the sheriff is not entitled to a fee of $1.50
The remaining point for decision is the proper method of computing mileage earned by the sheriff in the service of process, or, rather, what is the meaning-of the statute making provision .for such compensation. The statute is:
_ “The sheriff of Shawnee county, Kansas, shall be entitled to charge . . . for every mile or fraction thereof actually and necessarily traveled each way in ■serving or endeavoring to serve any writ, process, order, venire, or notice, or tax warrant, ten cents; . . . and provided further, no mileage shall be taxed, or allowed and no person shall be required to pay any mileage unless at the time of making returns the sheriff make and file with his returns,, or as a part thereof, a statement showing the distance actually and' necessarily .traveled in making service on the.first person, who shall be named by him, when the writ contains the names of more than one person, and the:*829 distance actually and necessarily traveled from the place of making first service to the place of making service on second person named by him, and so on for each person served, and the distance actually and necessarily traveled in returning, so that the whole route traveled by the sheriff in making service shall clearly appear; but when the sheriff serves more than one process in the same case or on the same person, not requiring more than one journey from his office, he shall receive mileage for one service only.” (Laws 1903, ch. 304, § 1.)
It is contended on behalf of the sheriff that in serving a process he is entitled to ten cents for a fraction of a mile going and another ten cents for a fraction returning; that is, if he traveled a mile and a quarter in going he was entitled to twenty cents, and also to twenty cents for the return trip. His theory is that the expression “each way,” used in the statute, indicates that the distance traveled to the place of making service is to be regarded as one unit of travel, while the distance traveled in returning is another unit, and that he is entitled to ten cents for each of the fractions, although taken together they do not amount to a mile. It' is reasonably clear that the legislature did not intend that the sheriff, should be allowed constructive mileage. On the other hand, the act indicates that the sheriff should only be paid for the distance which he actually and necessarily travels in serving a writ, whether it contains the names of one or more persons. We think the trial court correctly held that the round trip was the unit of travel. When service is to be made on one person, the distance traveled in going to the place of service and in returning to his office are to be taken together, and only the miles ,or fractions of a mile actually traveled by the sheriff on the journey are to be counted. If more than one person is named in the writ, the computation is to be made on the basis of actual travel from the place of the first service directly to that of the second, and so on for each person
The rulings of the court, on each proposition are sustained, and its judgment is therefore affirmed.