Norton v. Hall

coguardi- unlimited findings factual that an in the interests of the

anship was best gave that it example

child.6 The fact guardianship

a situation which a limited often in the child’s best

would more be one, indicates

interests than an unlimited what, if

that the court has not considered

any, place coguardi- limits it would on the court could

anship. possible It is that the limited coguardianship

find would interests. A limited I.H.’s best possible disposition is a

guardianship

may underlying the petitioners’ resolve the natural mother

question whether parental rights.

retains all of her For this reason, discharge

additional we the second

reported question. entry

The is: report question number one is herein. The re-

accepted and answered

port question discharged. number two is to the Probate

The case is remanded

Court.

2003 ME 118 et al.

Michelle NORTON

Deborah HALL et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Dec.

Argued: Sept.

Decided: "carefully examined and eval- Costigan, when the court Costigan v. 418 A.2d 6. See 1980) well- (Me. all to the child’s (holding the court uated” factors relevant 1146-47 being). properly a child’s best interests determined Gaythwaite, Esq. (orally),

Martha C. Leavitt, Gaythwaite Friedman Wolf & Portland, for plaintiffs. Marchesi, Esq. (orally),

Peter T. Wheel- P.A., Waterville, Arey, er & for Deborah Hall. III, Esq. (orally),

John J. Wall Mona- LLP, Portland, ghan Leahy, & for Cum- County. berland SAUFLEY, C.J., Panel: CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA,* ALEXANDER, CALKINS, LEVY, JJ. SAUFLEY, C.J., and

Majority: LEVY, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, and JJ. SAUFLEY, C.J. Concurrence: DANA, ALEXANDER, and Dissent: CALKINS, JJ.

* Although argument, justice may participate in a decision even not available at oral Jus- participated opinion. tice Dana in this though present argument”). oral 12(a) M.R.App. (stating "qualified R. that a

CLIFFORD, Hall emergency response, In her J. that she used the vehicle’s blue contends Michelle Norton and John Norton disputed and siren. Other witnesses lights summary judgment appeal from the en- siren was activat- Hall’s assertion that her (Cumberland Superior in the Court tered busy Ray- Route 302 in Driving ed. J.) County, Humphrey, in favor of defen- mond, passing Hall vehicles was observed Hall, dants Deborah the Cumberland speed until she collided high at rates and County Department, Sheriff’s Cum- vehicle, making as it was with Nortons’ County. court concluded that berland The sons, ages left turn. The two a Nortons’ by the Nortons’ suit is barred the discre- of the collision. 15 and died as a result tionary immunity provisions function of the injured. Hall was Act, 14 Maine Tort Claims M.R.S.A. brought negligence, The Nortons [¶ 4] (2003) §§ 8101-8118 and that their consti- death, rights claims wrongful and civil precluded tutional claims are because of County, the Cumber- against Cumberland immunity. The Nortons contend qualified Department, County land Sheriffs that claims arise out of the State, the Maine Criminal Justice Acade- vehicle, a motor and are not operation of Police, and Hall.1 my, the Maine State subject immunity provisions to the Act Maine Tort Claims or doctrines granted The court later sum- qualified immunity. judg- affirm the We Hall, mary judgment motions filed ment. Department County Cumberland Sheriffs County, and entered

and Cumberland summary their favor. The judgment I. Hall’s choice to en- court concluded that approximately At 9:43 on the eve- in an was a dis- gage 8, 1998, Hall, ning July depu- a frill-time function, cretionary rendering Hall and the County ty with the Cumberland Sheriffs pur- immune from suit County defendants operating a Sheriffs De- Department, Act, 14 to the Maine Tort Claims suant Casco/Raymond partment cruiser in the 8104-B(3) 8111(1)(C), §§ and dispatch area. She received radio qualified entitled to immu- that were to a residence in Casco where a respond nity protecting them from the cause six-year-old reported child was out- pursuant action Civil asserted previous of-control. Hall had made re- (1994). Act, This Rights U.S.C. that involved sponses to this residence by the Nortons followed. appeal Although abuse and alcohol. physical any injuries reports there were no II. problem, Hall point, only that behavioral pro- Maine Tort Claims Act unit was stand- was also told that rescue entity not governmental that a by. Hall initiated an re- vides ing call, from: liable for claims which result to this based on her belief sponse failing perform a dis- involving “[pierforming there was a serious cretionary duty, whether or immediate function young required child that her ....” 14 M.R.S.A. unit would re- the discretion abused before the rescue 8104-B(3) (2003). 8111(1)(C) Section spond. challenged appeal. are not in this to dismiss the State of Maine 1. A motion granted, and those dismissals defendants was im- The Nortons also contend provides [¶8] similar function Hall to re munity government employees.2 even if the initial decision call as an is an act spond to the 7] The Nortons contend [¶ by discretionary immunity, the protected respond Hall’s decision to treat and response, particularly actions taken in that involving boy call the out-of-control as an vehicle, pro are not is not a act within rely Nortons on section 8104- tected. The 8104-B(3) meaning of sections A(1)(A), provides govern that “[a] which 8111(1)(C). following We have used the entity property mental is liable for dam four-factor test to determine whether dis age, bodily injury arising or death” cretionary immunity applies: acts or omissions in its own “its (1) act, omission, Does the or challenged ... any maintenance or use of ership, necessarily gov- a decision involve basic [mjotor § 8104- vehicle.” M.R.S.A. objective? policy, program ernmental or A(1)(A) (2003). in Because the deaths this (2) act, omission, Is the or questioned of a operation case resulted from Hall’s decision essential to the realization or cruiser, police the Nortons contend of that accomplishment policy, program, disagree. are entitled to recover. We objective opposed or as to one which change would not the course or direction First, by Hall to re- [¶ the decision 9] (3) policy, program, objective? of the or (the spond whether to act, omission, Does the or decision re- re- respond) cannot be isolated from the quire policy the exercise of basic evalua- (the respond). how sponse itself to tion, judgment, expertise on the exercise of discretion more than a involves part governmental agency of the in- in Ac- respond. decision the abstract to (4) governmental volved? Does the in tions taken a law enforcement officer agency possess requisite involved the emergency implicate the constitutional, statutory, or lawful au- discretionary judgment of the officer and thority duty to do or make the governmental en- immunity protecting the act, omission, challenged or decision? those tities and their extends to ¶ State, 89, 8, Roberts v. 1999 ME 731 A.2d cruiser on actions. The (citations omitted). 855, 857 The response way integral the is an to to emergency by enforcement law of, from, the part separated and cannot be governmental officer serves the basic ob- respond. initial decision jective public safety. Selby Cum- Roberts, prison ¶ In inmate was 80, 7, County, berland 796 A.2d ME slammed on injured when a cell door was Selby, deputy 680. In we held that a as the inmate finger by prison guard his engage high-speed sheriffs decision to ¶ 89, 2, ME entering the cell. 1999 discretionary chase is a decision to which ¶ 10, brought by In the suit discretionary immunity 731 A.2d at 856. applies. Id. inmate, summary judgment was en- 796 A.2d at 681-82. 8111(1) any part: Performing failing perform provides, pertinent C. Section discretionary duty, function or whether Notwithstanding any liability Immunity. abused; and the discretion is or not law, may have existed at common em- statute, charter, ordi- whether or not ployees governmental entities shall nance, order, resolution, rule or resolve absolutely personal immune from civil lia- discretionary function or under which the bility following: for the valid; duty performed is (2003). 8111(1)(C) § 14 M.R.S.A. discretionary function or guard and the der prison tered favor of the which State, part discretionary duty performed invalid[.] func- is valid or based 8104-B(S) §§ immunity. 14 tion M.R.S.A. 8104-B(3) (emphasis add- 8111(1)(C); Roberts, 89, ¶5, & 1999 ME ed). statutory lan- keeping with the rejected in- 731 A.2d at 856-57. We Portland, guage, City in Carroll v. we guard’s specific argument mate’s that the “[njotwithstanding expressly noted that in- shutting act of the cell door on the immunity provisions waiver of section sepa- as mate’s hand had to be considered 8104-A, expressly 8104-B retains section discretionary rate and distinct from immunity governmen- for types certain guard place decision of prison entities, including tal func- ¶ 10, cell. Id. 731 A.2d at inmate his ¶ immunity.” tion 1999 ME 6 n. that, purposes 857-58. We concluded added). (emphasis 736 A.2d immunity, the de- cell includ- place cision to the inmate Moreover, 14 M.R.S.A. shutting ed the of the cell door when 8111(1)(C) provides absolute himself failed to shut the door or inmate performing failing per- to Hall for Id. the door failed to shut itself. discretionary duty, function or any form regardless of whether or not she abuses Moreover, although section 8104- immunity applies that discretion. The A(1)(A) provides governmental “[a] discretionary act is reason- “whenever entity for its acts or is liable encompassed by the duties of the ably in maintenance or ownership, omissions its governmental employee ... [and is] avail- vehicle,” any: use of A. Motor section includ- government employees, able to all 8104-B(3) provides governmental entity 8111(1). § It ing police officers ....” Id. function de- with imagine statutory difficult to clearer lan- spite section 8104-A. per- guage to immunize law enforcement 8104-B(3). § If Hall the actions taken they actions take in the sonnel for the in carrying out responses legitimate emergency. to a separated placed were a different respond, dis- category from her decision The fact that the conduct of Hall immunity would effec- cretionary function protect- responding any tively be removed as a defense ease the Tort immunity provisions ed vehicle. involving operation of motor Act does not render M.R.S.A. Claims 8104-B(3) express language The section 8104-A(1)(A) op- § all meaningless. Not 8111(1) of Tort Act the Maine Claims safety involve public erations of vehicles precludes such a result. by the protected provi- acts provides: 8104r-B [¶ 12] Section 8104-B(3) of section and section sions 8104-A, Notwithstanding section a 8111(1)(C). provisions of example, For governmental entity any is not hable for 8104-A(1)(A) apply still to the ev- section claim which results from: operation gov- eryday non-discretionary vehicles, motor such as routine

ernmental im- exception The limited Performing Discretionary patrolling. Func- munity operation for the of motor vehicles Performing failing perform tion. however, 8104-A(1)(A), duty, whether out in section discretionary function or set applicable dis- is abused and does not remove otherwise or not the discretion statute, charter, immunity arising cretionary or- whether or not dinance, order, discretionary response to a policy un- the officer’s resolution 2054(6). parties dispute § § The do not 8104- emergency. true See M.R.S.A. B(3). vehicle’s using Hall was although dispute there is about lights, The Statement of Fact to L.D. operating siren whether the vehicle’s was 2448, which enacted as 14 M.R.S.A. of the accident. at the time Section as states follows: First, however, immunity. does not effect emphasis bears that the immunities [I]t sets out vehicle statute contained Title section 8111 are road for the of emer- rules important governmen- intended to serve vehicles, but it does not address gency purposes. tal Government officials are liability governmental entities or frequently required part jobs as of their damages arising out of the to take actions that have serious conse- use of such vehicles. See id. quences for the individuals affected. Moreover, correctly the trial court not- as examples Obvious are the actions of law ed, contrary if Hall acted investigating enforcement officers even If government crimes .... these offi- statutory opera- rules the road for the possi- vehicles, cials were faced with the constant tion of the statutes do bility personal liability, the inevitable strip discretionary immunity her of the result would be that would hesi- provided under the Maine Tort Claims necessary tant to take enforcement ac- Selby, “[i]mmu- Act. we concluded public tion and the interest would suffer. lacked nity exists even when official act, (113th authority to do the or abused the L.D. Statement of Fact at 15 ¶80, 6, 796 A.2d at discretion.” 2002 ME Legis.1987). Legislature clearly in- correctly the con- grant immunity Accordingly, tended to to law enforce- court responding legitimate using ment officers to a if Hall was not her cluded that even siren, emergency. Any other result would be enti- vehicle’s she was nevertheless contrary to the letter spirit immunity oper- and the in the tled to Maine Tort Claims Act. ation of the cruiser.

[¶ 16] The Nortons also contend protected by that if Hall is immunity III. cruiser, she took actions with the then The Nortons also contend statute, emergency 29-A vehicle facts they produced have sufficient (1996 § Supp.2002), 2054 & rights claims 1983 civil support meaningless. be rendered dis- would We an out-of- the circumstances of because agree. provides That statute that drivers control child was not an within vehicles have the benefit of statute, meaning of the and further privileges, exceeding certain such as indiffer that Hall acted with “deliberate posted speed driving through limit or a red 2054(5). to the call.3 The responding ence” when light. privileges Id. These are that the defendants argue Nortons further dependent operator using vehi- qualified immunity not entitled to be lights at all are cles times when objectively were not cause Hall’s actions responding emergency, to an and also us- reasonable, clearly and violated established ing “reasonably the siren when it is neces- sary rights. to warn” other Id. constitutional drivers. rights we do not address civil claims and

3. The Nortons also raised constitutional Steams, separately. Rights them See Fowles claims under Maine Civil Act. (D.Me.1995). F.Supp. 899 n. 6 analysis of such claims is similar to federal that a high- contentions that 1708. The Court found [¶ 18] The Nortons’ S.Ct. met this criteria. Id. at deprived speed have been of their constitu- chase Fourth, Fifth, rights provided by tional 118 S.Ct. 1708. Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amend- respond Hall’s decision to a call ments to the U.S. Constitution and Article analogous as an to decision one, five, I sections and six of the Maine To re- engage high-speed chase. are without merit. Their Constitution spond effectively emergency, an offi- deprivation claim of of their substantive cer must make an immediate decision. by the process rights protected due Four- weighed Hall her concern for the welfare teenth Amendment is also without merit. child, pres- in the child’s of a and those agree Superior We with the Court that ence, against speeding the risk of and ex- argument this fails because the Nortons danger. posing other citizens to Under did not demonstrate that Hall’s conduct circumstances, the Superior these Court County “shocks the conscience.” See correctly highest concluded that the stan- Lewis, 883, 846,

Sacramento v. 528 U.S. and, applies dard of “intent to harm” since (1998). 118 S.Ct. 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 there is no evidence that Hall intended to Sacramento, Nortons, no constitutional viola- County harm the 854,118 1708. Even Supreme United States Court held that a tion. See id. S.Ct. if had facts suffi- police produced officer did not violate the Four- the Nortons claim, guarantee support teenth of substan- cient to a constitutional Hall Amendment’s process by causing qualified tive due the death of a would be entitled to because, motorcycle given pos- the information she passenger through deliberate sessed, her not violate clear- pursuing or reckless indifference when conduct “does statutory motorcycle high-speed ly driver in a chase. established or constitutional 853-54, person rights Id. at 1708. The Court of which reasonable would S.Ct. circumstances, Fitzgerald, have known.” Harlow v. determined that those harm, 800, 818, 102 73 L.Ed.2d only an intent to unrelated to the U.S. S.Ct. (1982). arrest, legitimate purpose pursuing satisfy necessary would the element of ar- entry The is: bitrary shocking conduct to the conscience. Judgment affirmed. standard, “only Id. Pursuant to this the egregious most official conduct can be said SAUFLEY, C.J., concurring. arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” join majority opinion I of the the [¶ 21] omitted). (quotation Id. at 846 The Court additionally in full in con- Court and write explained meeting the behavior the lower identify I believe to be currence to what might standard of deliberate indifference analytical dispute of the that the fulcrum circum- shocking be conscience some separate caused the Court to issue has stances, situation, prison like a custodial very matter. opinions important on this higher but that a different and standard action,” It that the Tort unquestioned call “fast applies [¶ 22] when events for provides immunity Act from liabili- require balancing competing and of Claims actors who are involved ty government without the luxu- pressure, concerns under 852-53, Both the 118 in functions.4 ry of a second chance. Id. at dissent, brought change law about the Tort Contrary analysis in the to the of the majority opinion today has not Court’s Claims Act. "changed merely enforces the the law.” It truck, respond- by a fire caused the deci- ries were agree and the dissent Court call, entered which ing is a dis- to an respond to an sion therefore, and, light); Parker falls a red cretionary against intersection (1952) Tort provided by Knox, immunities A.2d 663 within the 147 Me. police Claims Act. claim that a (allowing plaintiffs his driving had caused officer’s however, analysis diverges, The [¶23] Town, Inhabitants injuries); Blier v. of possibility separating regard with (Me.1971) Kent, A.2d Fort the “whether” governmen- waiving a statute (recognizing re- from the “how” of the of insurance immunity, to the extent tal opinion has sponse. The Court its by negligent caused coverage, for losses upon found no reasonable basis which vehicle). operation of a motor Legislature conclude that intended in the subtle juries engage that courts or con- Tort Claims Act The Maine Thus, teasing apart concepts. of those two acceptance responsibility tinued this it is the the Court has concluded by negligent operation injuries caused intent to cloak the Legislature’s current in 14 M.R.S.A. motor vehicles government the decision to emergency response, both 8104(1)(A) (2003), in the Court’s quoted response, and the method of with respond, opinion termi- Today the Court’s opinion. sovereign immunity. of re- long-standing acceptance nates that Legislature’s prov- It is within the negli- injuries caused sponsibility for whether in the future those ince to decide gent driving government concepts separated two should be business. discretionary government whether one or both should not be shielded change in the law accomplishes this Court liability for Because I negligence. discretionary function by holding that the agree Legislature with the Court that the Act,6 mean provisions distinction, and yet has not articulated that respond to discretionary decision “to Legislature’s it is the role to because (the respond) whether to interests, weigh competing policy itself from the cannot be isolated Court, join I the role of Court’s ¶ (em- (the supra respond).” how to opinion today. directly original). This view phasis Russell, where holding contrary to our ALEXANDER, DANA, J., with whom drivers, doing government we stated that CALKINS, J., join dissenting. J. and emergency, duty responding I dissent. Prior to respectfully reg- exempt from traffic consequently Act, of the Maine Tort Claims enactment duty ulations, “from the not relieved were entities, by governmental though protected injury to prevent to due care exercising of responsibili- sovereign immunity,5 accepted lawfully upon the others themselves and injuries by negli- to caused ty for others 288, 29 A.2d at 917. Me. at ways.” 139 motor vehicles. gent operation of their is also con- opinion Nadeau, The Court’s v. 139 Me. 29 Russell the discretion- (1943) of trary interpretations to (affirming finding a of A.2d 916 of the immunity provisions inju- ary function a liability plaintiffs in a case where 8111(1)(C). 8104(B)(3) §§ 6. 14 M.R.S.A. Tort Claims Act was enacted 5. The Maine P.L.1977, "abrogated” the we ch. after City immunity v. sovereign defense in Davies Bath, 1976). (Me. 364 A.2d 1269 of 936 (FTCA), not, findings

Federal but those Tort Claims Act 28 sometimes do (2000), trial, of §§ occur after not as a result a sum although U.S.C. 2671-2680 discretionary mary judgment immu- because of wording discretionary of Maine v. immunity. function See Stuuk United nity provisions very is similar to their fed- States, (D.N.H.1954); Thus, F.Supp. 129 530 counterparts. eral 28 U.S.C. States, 2680(a) F.Supp. v. 117 states, Anderson United § in pertinent part, that the (D.Fla.1954) (finding liability 438 emer any United States is not liable for claim collision); gency Seaberg vehicle v. United upon performance “based the exercise or (9th States, Cir.1971); 448 F.2d 391 Pat perform or the failure to or a exercise States, 845 F.Supp. terson v. United 204 discretionary duty part function or on the (2nd (E.D.N.Y.1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 280 a agency employee federal or of the Cir.1962); Washington v. United State government, whether or not the discretion (9th Cir.1952) States, (finding 194 F.2d 38 Maine, 14 involved be abused.” In collision). liability no vehicle 8104(B)(3) § exempts govern- M.R.S.A. a entity liability “[p]erforming ment from for recently applica- We examined the fading perform discretionary to func- bility discretionary function immuni- of the duty, tion or whether or not discretion ty provisions emergency high-speed op- to ” .... Separately, government abused Selby county police erations of vehicles employees exempt are for liability County, 2002 ME Cumberland “[pjerforming failing perform any choice deputy’s A.2d 678. We held discretionary function or whether or duty, chase was enti- engage high-speed ” not .... discretion abused discretionary immunity function tled 8111(1)(C). § liability ex- if id. even the discretion abused. See emption ¶ dis- extends Selby, excep- In motor vehicle cretionary “reasonably encompassed act apply tion to did not because the by the governmental employ- duties of the injury arose pursued caused vehicle 8111(1). question.” ee in Id. negligent operation not from the county vehicle but the choice FTCA, vehicle acci- [¶ 28] Under engage of a law enforcement officer to generally dents have been treated as high-speed chase.7 involving discretionary immunity. function Zillman, relationship Protecting See Donald N. Discre- We also examined liability tion: Judicial the Dis- of the motor vehicle Interpretation immunity provi- cretionary Exception Function to the Fed- Act, Augusta Health eral Tort 4!7 ME. L. REV. sions Brooks v. Mental Claims (Me.1992). (1995). Institute, acceptance This of liabili- 606 A.2d Brooks, negligent operation voluntary patient Augusta ty has extended to (AMHI) died as a Dag vehicles. See E. Ytre- Mental Health Institute Annotation, injuries jumping received from berg, Federal Tort Claims result Cases, moving of a bus while Negligence Act: Automobile out the exit door (1970), under summarizing traveling group patients with a 7[e] A.L.R. FED. 6 employees. of three AMHI emergency supervision cases. the federal Sometimes liability, in Id. at 790. We determined that the basis finding vehicle cases result a of patrol directly involved in the Selby passenger pur- a the vehicle cruiser was not 7. was in high-speed injured Selby’s injuries. sued in a chase. He was which caused Sel collision riding 2, 678, ¶ 80, when the vehicle in which he was by, 796 A.2d 2002 ME county collided with another vehicle. The a part as of consistent in Brooks was that the FTCA—can be read complaint law, validity of negligent body reflecting AMHI were in their of both Maine supervision of the decedent. We noted Tort provisions. Even before Act, negligence that the claimed involved the discre- distinguished Claims we employee’s pro- exercise of the individual maintain tionary to initiate and an choice to judgment regard supervi- fessional with any negligent from patients negli- sion of “not the defendants’ of in the course of the operation a vehicle gent operation, Parker, use or maintenance of the Me. response. professional judg- bus.” 790. This Id. at 401, at at 666. A.2d ment was entitled to 288, Russell, at 29 A.2d 139 Me. operation immunity because the use of 917, analogous to this case most in which the patients the motor vehicle case, government held vehi- we that while implicated in traveling were was not have responding emergencies cles alleged supervision. of Id. at 791. errors way exempt right may and be Selby Brooks [¶ 31] Neither nor involved regulations, privileges: traffic these negligently operated gov- a a collision with not from the operators do relieve their Therefore, liability un- ernment vehicle. prevent duty exercising due care der the operation exception motor vehicle lawfully others injury to themselves and to the Maine Tort Claims Act was not [t]hey must include upon ways.... generated. in the care are bound exercise reviewing grant are a a [¶ 82] We against reasonable ex- precautions summary judgment. Accordingly, we traordinary of the situation dangers favorably must construe the evidence most duty them to create.... compels which party against summary judg- whom if the other vehicle Even the driver of Sebra, ment granted. was v. Wentworth disregards their through negligence ¶97, 9, Thus, 2003 ME 829 A.2d 520. still use due care right way they must purposes analysis, this we pre- must a The measure of to avoid collision. sume to engage that Hall’s choice in an under responsibility is due care all high-speed the circumstances. that, abuse of her discretion at the Id. time her with the vehicle collided Norton’s vehicle, vehicle, operating Hall was her individual’s actions in an [¶ 35] While an emergency response, her course of judged differ- may situation be negligent manner. ently, person engaged in or confronted may situation with an century quarter

[¶ 33] In the negligently judged to have acted effect, Maine been in Tort Claims Act has McGinley, 2001 Hargrove situation. v. opera- we have never held ¶¶ 587, 36, 6-7, 589-90; A.2d ME directly tion of a motor vehicle involved 559, 617 A.2d Dipietro-Kay Corp., v. Ames subject func- collision (Me.1992); Doughty, 224 liability 561-62 Hoch immunity. tion The motor vehicle Russell, (Me.1966); 139 Me. discretionary immunity provisions of A.2d 56-57 just 29 A.2d 916.8 the Maine Tort Claims like the Act— State, Notably, driving one of the vehicle. 1999 ME 731 A.2d motor Roberts v. trial, rests, gone to opinion negligence in Roberts had heavily so claims on which the Court’s 5,¶ Id. judgment State. negligence with a for the involved a claim was not the focus of building, at 857. That trial negligence A.2d maintenance of [¶ in this case indicate —as emergency response any 86] facts her and whether Russell v. Nadeau indicates —that there is negligence or failure to exercise due care proper a distinction between a emergency- proximately injury to caused the Nor- a negligent emergency re- tons. sponse. Both at the Maine Criminal Jus- Academy

tice in and later an incident on road, deficits, negligence, had been high-speed emergency

noted in Hall’s re-

sponse driving capabilities. Because of deficits,

those Hall’s emergency response authority had been limited. 2003 ME 127 A liability arising [¶ claim of out of 37] Larry et PHILLIPS al. government an accident with a vehicle en- gaged in an response involves separate questions: two Blaine JOHNSON et al. First, engage was the choice to in an emergency response consequent and the Supreme Judicial Court Maine.

high-speed driving proper? and Submitted on Briefs: March

Second, was the operated vehicle in negligent manner the course of the Decided: Oct.

emergency response, considering all the

circumstances, including exemption regulations permitted

from traffic

emergency response vehicle and the due operator emergen-

care which the observe,

cy response vehicle must even in engaged

while re-

sponse? The discretionary function immu- 8104(B)(3)

nity provisions of sections

8111(1)(C) exempt engage the choice to liability

an review,

judicial if even that choice is mis- 8104(A)(1),

taken. But section establish-

ing liability negligent operation of a vehicle,

motor allows a cause of action for

negligent operation in the course of an

emergency response. Accordingly, the Su-

perior judgment be vacated Court’s should

and the matter remanded for trial on the

questions of whether Hall negligently op-

erated her motor vehicle the course of regarding separately the Court’s Court need not examine whether statements Roberts law, but it does make Roberts uncer- negligence perform- occurred the course of precedent proposition tain for the ing function. functions, involving discretionary claims

Case Details

Case Name: Norton v. Hall

Court Name: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Date Published: Sep 30, 2003

Citation: 834 A.2d 928

Court Abbreviation: Me.