32 Ind. App. 48 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1903
Appellee instituted this action in the circuit court of Lawrence county against appellant for negligently causing the death of appellee’s decedent, Wilbur Mason. A change of venue was taken to Greene county, and from Greene county to Orange county, where a trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of appellee for $6,250. With the general verdict the jury returned answers to interrogatories.
Counsel for appellee, at considerable length, earnestly and ably argue that the record presents no question on appeal, because of the alleged lack of proper authentication of the transcript by the clerks of Lawrence and Greene Circuit Courts, respectively. The point is decided adversely to appellee’s claim in Southern Ind. R. Co. v. Martin, 160 Ind. 280.
The complaint is in three paragraphs. A demurrer to each was overruled, and each ruling assigned as error. The first paragraph alleges that the defendant is a corporation engaged in quarrying, sawing, and planing limestone in Lawrence county, Indiana, and owned and operated a stone saw and planing mill; that a great many persons were employed, among whom the plaintiff’s decedent, who was an able-bodied man, rendering the defendant much valuable service; that he had been in the defendant’s employ about two years prior to the 13th day of August, 190Q, and had worked as a scabbier of stone in its yard at $1.50 per day, and for a few days prior thereto he had been working as' a planer for the sum of $2 per day, and “while so employed it was his duty to work at the planing machine, and, when required, to grind the tools for small repairs, and while decedent was so employed in grinding tools for small repairs so stated, under and by direction of the superintendent of said mill, one Richard Roberts, under whose direction he was required by said defendant to. work, and, by reason of a defective belt on main lift
The only defect charged in the first paragraph is that the belt “was defective and of insufficient strength ior the purposes for which it was used.” The breaking of the belt prior to the accident is averred, and decedent’s want of knowledge is stated as follows: “And of which breaking and insufficiency the decedent had no knowledge.” Said paragraph does not charge negligence upon the part of appellant. It charges that decedent’s clothes were caught by a defective belt, but it does not charge that the use of a defective belt was dangerous, or its use negligent.
The second paragraph sets out practically the same facts with reference to the defendant, the business in which engaged, the employment and service of the decedent, and says: “And the plaintiff alleges that one Eichard Eoberts was then and there the superintendent of said mill and in charge of said mill for the defendant, and entrusted by the defendant with the duty of keeping the planer, tools, and machinery of said mill in proper condition, and had authority to direct said decedent in the performance of his work, and was then and there acting in the place of and performing the duty of said defendant in that behalf, and the said decedent was then and there in the exercise of duo care and diligence. And this plaintiff further avers
A complaint against a master for injuries received by his servant on account of defective appliances should charge that the use of such appliances was dangerous and that such defects were known to the master. Consolidated Stone Co. v. Summit, 152 Ind. 297; Creamery, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Hotsenspiller, 24 Ind. App. 122. Neither of the said paragraphs shows the negligence of the defendant, or the acts of negligence of the servant for which it is sought to hold the defendant liable, to be the proximate cause of the injury. The court erred in holding said paragraphs sufficient.
But appellee, while insisting that each of said paragraphs is sufficient, makes the point that the answers to interrogatories show that the verdict was foimded on the third paragraph, and that if the paragraphs in question were defective the ruling on the demurrer thereto was
The objection made to the amended third paragraph is that it does not allege that the defendant’s negligence caused the death of the decedent. It is alleged in said paragraph that the defendant negligently left a protrusion from said pulley on the side thereof, and then negligently used said defective pulley; that because.of the protrusion the belt was caught and decedent killed. This is a statement of proximate cause.
It is claimed that the said amended third paragraph does not come within the employers’ liability act. As showing negligence at common law, it is alleged.that the decedent, as defendant’s servant, was acting in obedience to orders, and defendant negligently furnished defective machinery, specifically describing it; that the decedent was doing extra hazardous work by order of the defendant; that the defendant knew of the danger and the decedent did not; that by reason of the defect decedent was caught and killed. These allegations are sufficient as a cause of action.
This paragraph is good, too, under the employers’ liability act, for it shows, following the words of the statute, that the injury was suffered by reason of the defects in the condition of machinery in use in the business of such corporation and that such defect was the result of the negligence of such corporation. Acts 189-3, p. 294, §1, clause 1.
It not appearing that the judgment proceeds upon the one good paragraph, it must be reversed. The consideration of other alleged errors is unnecessary.- The trial court is instructed to sustain appellant’s demurrer to the first and second paragraphs of complaint.