The appellant’s-main argument is that the agreement dated September 1, 1959, is unambiguous and riot properly susceptible to intеrpretation via parol evidence. We consider thаt the agreement is beset with ambiguity and that the taking of parol evidence was in order.
The instrument in question is dated September 1, 1959, and purports to exercise an option for a term' of five years commencing November 1, 1955; it further provides that “This notice of extension shall be deemed to be effective Novеmber 1, 1955.” The royalty rate is set at 15 cents per cubic yard. It is upоn this agreement that the plaintiff claims a refund in royalties totaling $29,075.66. The in-stniment is silent regarding a refund.
In our opinion, it is unclear from the fаce of the instrument whether a refund was contemplated in reducing the royalty rate to 15 cents from 25 cents for the period between November 1, 1955, and September 1, 1959. If the parties intendеd to embody their expressions in a single memo-rándum, they did not succеed. It was appropriate to examine the related instruments (particularly the extension agreement dated August 29, 1955, and the agreement marked Exhibit 7) and to take parol evidencе in order to determine the intentions of the parties. This is consistent with the rule set forth in
Wheelwright v. Pure Milk Asso.
(1932),
“The rule in Wisconsin with respect to the admissibility of parol evidence for the purposes of interpretаtion has been set forth in numerous cases. If the contract is ambiguous, evidence of the surrounding circumstances, practical construction by the parties, and even the declarations of the parties constituting the negotiations may be resоrted to in aid of construction.”
See also
Kasten v. Markham
(1957), 1 Wis. (2d) 352, 356,
*644
The respondents contend thаt the result of literal interpretation would be so absurd that parol evidence was required. The payment of a refund on рast royalties is not, in our opinion, so bizarre a result as to wаrrant the application of the rule considered in
Corbett v. Joannes
(1905),
“. '. . ambiguity сalling for construction may as well appear from languаge clear in itself but leading to some absurd result when applied literally to the situation with which it deals, as by reason of uncertаinty of meaning upon its face.”
It would appear that the Sсhliepers reduced the royalty rate in order to accommodate their tenant It is at least plausible that the agreement contemplated a refund. Conceivably the parties may have intended that the tenant receive a 10-cent credit against future gravel removals. The jury’s answer to question numbered one of the special verdict resolved that issue in fаvor of the respondents. That determination properly rеsulted in judgment for the respondents.
The construction reflectеd in the judgment is consistent with the.standard set forth in
Bitker & Gerner Co. v. Green Investment Co.
(1956),
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.