250 F. 832 | 9th Cir. | 1918
(after stating the facts as above).
“Tbe Hannon Motorcar Company mentioned in said contract was supposed by the plaintiff in error, the Northwest Auto Company, to he a corporation, and the record shows that there had formerly been a corporation known as the MeKenna-Harmon Company. Mr. McKenna afterwards retired, and it was sought to change the name of the company to the Harmon Motorcar Company, and papers seem to have been prepared with that end in view; but such, consummation seems never to have been brought about, owing to the fact that the papers were n,ever legally filed. The business, however, of what had formerly been the MeKenna-Harmon Company, continued to be transacted under the name of the Harmon Motorcar Company. As above stated, the plaintiff in error assumed, in dealing with the Harmon Motorcar Company, that it was a corporation, and that F. E. Hannon was the president and general manager of the same, and it was in full reliance upon F. E. Harmon individually having full control of the management and operation of the business that said eon-', tract was entered into. No negotiations were made with any person in con-' nection with said contract other than E. E. Harmon. If the Harmon Motorcar Company was not a corporation under the facts as they exist, 'then the ■Harmon Motorcar Company was, so far as the plaintiff in error was concerned, merely the trade-name of F. E. Harmon.”
It is not contended, either in the pleadings or proofs, that the contract as executed was not the mutual agreement of the parties, nor that any mistake or false representation was at any time made.. Indeed, we find in the record this admission of counsel for the plaintiff in error:
“The evidence clearly shows that the Harmons believed implicitly they were a corporation organized under the name of the Harmon Motorcar Company. Now, it is fundamental they couldn’t deceive anybody actionably, unless they did it deliberately and knowingly.”
The contract was exécuted by each party as a corporation, and contained no provision regarding the personal services of F. E. Harmon or any other particular person. Without conflict the evidence shows that a corporation called MeKenna-Harmon Company was engaged in the business of selling motorcars, having commenced such business in 1912, and that McKenna shortly thereafter sold his stock in that corporation to F. E. Harmon and his wife (the present defendant in error), and that steps were thereafter taken to change the name of the corporation to Harmon Motorcar Company, and that papers were executed to cany that intention into effect and left with an attorney to be filed, who neglected to do so, of which fact neither
“The defendant states to the court that, had the plaintiff been able to secure the capital necessary to conduct the business, and had she been able to have canned out said contract, this defendant would have been ready and willing to have had the same carried out by her as representing the said Harmon Motorcar Company; that this defendant only terminated said contract.when finally informed that neither the plaintiff nor the Harmon Motorcar Company would be able to fulfill the contract or carry it out by its terms or otherwise.”
There was testimony given on behalf of the plaintiff in error to the effect that during Vogler’s stay of about a week in Seattle he ascertained that the defendant in error had not the financial ability to carry out the contract of the Harmon Motorcar Company, and on
“Northwest Auto Go., Inc.
“Registered. Portland, Ore., Feb. 22, 1915.
“Hannon Motorcar Company, Seattle, Wash. — Gentlemen: Wo herewith give you notice that we are obliged to cancel the contract covering the sale of Reo cars and parts now existing between ns. The factory advise that, owing to the condition of affairs at present existing in Seattle, for the best interests of all concerned, it is desirable that a change be made. We will call your attention also to the clause attached to the contract regarding the payment of a certain note, which note has not been paid as agreed. Under the circumstances, therefore, we will consider the contract canceled ten days from to-day, as per clause No. 3 in same.
“Yours very truly, Northwest Auto Company,
“W.TO 3*5 By W. .1. H. Clark, Secy.”
Regarding the note referred to in the foregoing letter and in the contract, the evidence showed without dispute that it was fully paid long before the letter of cancellation was written — paid, it is true, in installments, but such installments were accepted by the plaintiff in error without any objection. It is needless to cite authorities to the effect that by such acceptance the plaintiff in error is bound.
The only other reason assigned for the breaking of the contract was “the condition of affairs” at the time existing in Seattle, by which, according to the brief of the plaintiff in error, was meant the financial inability of the defendant to carry out on behalf of the Harmon Motorcar Company its part of the contract. But the conclusive answer to that contention is that there was abundant evidence to the contrary, which the jury by its verdict found in effect to be true.
The remission made by the defendant in error of $893.95 from the amount of damages fixed by the jury appears to have been made lest it should he held that the estimates of selling the 43 cars remaining unsold at the time of the cancellation of the contract were erroneous. Looking at the whole record, we are unable to hold the verdict, thus corrected, unwarranted by the proof, and deeming it unnecessary to make special mention of any other points made in argument, the judgment is affirmed.