90 Cal. App. 2d 518 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1949
Lincoln A. Freeman and Molly Luke Freeman, husband and wife, appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, Jessie Northrup, declaring plaintiff to be the owner of certain real property and quieting her title against the claims of appellants Freeman under a promissory note held by Lincoln A. Freeman and a trust deed on said real property securing the same. Plaintiff acquired title by execution sale
The note for $3,500 which was to be repaid in four months, and the trust deed were dated June 24, 1939. On August 2, 1939, they were transferred to George Pepperdine as security for certain monies to be advanced to John Wight and Lincoln A. Freeman, for use in the development of oil leases in Montana. Pepperdine later transferred them to Consolidated Petroleum Company, which in turn delivered them up, endorsed in blank. Later, Lincoln A. Freeman was named in the assignment as the assignee and he proceeded to take steps for a sale of the property under the trust deed. The court found that the note and trust deed were given by Wight and his wife to Mrs. Freeman without consideration and for the sole purpose of using the same as security for the Pepperdine loan. It was also found that they had been “delivered up” by the holder to John Wight and in truth and in fact were owned by him.
Mr. Freeman testified that he met Wight some time in 1937 and loaned him $300 to help him retain some oil leases; he had borrowed this money from his father, this being his only source of income. From a memorandum book he read items totaling $1,063 as loans to Wight in 1938, part of it his money and the rest of it borrowed from his father, his sister, or from friends. The notations, however, were not made at the time of the supposed transactions. The evidence was that the account was made up as late as 1942. These loans, Freeman testified, were personal loans, not in connection with any business. In June, 1939, he was interested with Wight in an oil venture in Montana; his wife gave him $500 and he loaned it to Wight in cash; on January 10, 1940, his wife loaned Wight an additional $750 in cash; in the following month he loaned Wight $410 which he had received from his father, but this, he testified, might have been given to Wight to pay some of the expenses of their oil venture. He also testified that at the time the $750 was advanced in January 1940 he and his wife understood that the note and trust deed were then held by Mr. Pepperdine but would be returned to Wight after Pepperdine was paid off and would be given to them to secure all monies previously loaned; that he had had a written agreement to this effect, but he had not seen it for quite a long time—that he does not have the agreement; there was another agreement under which he was obligated to Pepperdine, but that he did not have it in his possession; he did not remember
Plaintiff introduced in evidence a carbon copy of an agreement bearing date August 1, 1939, between Wight and Mr. Freeman, which recited that Freeman held the $3,500 note and trust deed on the Whittier property, that he was willing
Much evidence was introduced respecting the business transactions between Wight and Freeman which extended back to June, 1939, when they entered into an agreement by which Freeman agreed to buy from Wight certain government oil and gas leases and equipment in Montana for the sum of $350,-000. The testimony given at the trial approaches 600 pages. We have given a summary of it which is sufficient for the purpose of our decision.
The circumstantial evidence strongly supports the finding that the note and trust deed were given to Mrs. Freeman for the sole purpose of their being used as collateral security for loans to be made by George Pepperdine for the joint benefit of Wight and Freeman. The testimony of Wight and Freeman, which they depended upon to support their claim that the note and trust deed were given to Mrs. Freeman as security for moneys that had been advanced and were to be advanced in the future, was vague and contradictory. It is altogether probable that Mr. and Mrs. Freeman advanced money to Wight from time to time, either for his personal use or to assist him in his oil ventures, but the evidence furnished good reason for doubting that the trust deed was given as security for the loans. Plaintiff acquired title under the execution sale November 5, 1945. Consolidated Petroleum Company assigned the note to Lincoln A. Freeman September 20, 1946. The contention of Wight and the Freemans that this reassignment was made pursuant to an agreement entered into when the note
Upon the oral argument counsel recently employed by appellants advanced a new theory of defense. It was argued that because plaintiff purchased the property at execution sale she was precluded from questioning the validity of the Freeman trust deed and that since these facts were alleged in the complaint no cause of action was stated. We are not satisfied that this alleged defense presents a pure question of law. It should have been presented to the trial court. No reason has been advanced why the issue was not raised at the trial, nor is any excuse offered for the failure to raise the point in the opening brief. Under these circumstances we do not feel called upon to consider them. (See cases cited in Beadle v. Northrup, ante, p. 510 [203 P.2d 552] this day decided.)
The judgment is affirmed.
Wood, J., and Vallée, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 6, 1949, and appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 5, 1949.