23 Kan. 432 | Kan. | 1880
The opinion of the court was delivered by
After a decree had been properly entered, foreclosing a mortgage, an order of sale was issued, the property advertised for sale, and sold to S. S. Cooper for $100. After the sale, both mortgagor and mortgagee file motions to set aside, while the purchaser files one to confirm the sale. The latter is sustained and the former overruled, and upon these rulings the plaintiffs in error come to this court.
The first question is as to the publication of the notice of sale. It is claimed that this was not continued for a sufficient length of time. The first publication was October 13th, and the sale November 12th. This, excluding the day of sale, would give thirty days’ publication; excluding both the day of sale and the first day of publication, would leave only twenty-nine days. The statute requires publication “for at least thirty days before the day of sale.” This, counsel contend, requires that thirty full days elapse between the day of the first publication and the day of sale; and they rely upon the case of Garvin v. Jennerson, 20 Kas. 371, in which this court decided that under a statute requiring a deposition to be “filed at least one day before the day of trial,” a full day must intervene between the day upon which the deposition- was filed, and that upon which the trial is commenced. The distinction is this: the filing of the deposition is a single and instantaneous, the publication a repeated and continuous, act-. So, when- the statute requires that a deposition be filed at least one day before the day of trial, it means that that single act shall be done and completed at least one day before, but the act of publication is not completed at least thirty days before, but only commenced then, and continues from its
Secondly, it is contended that the notice was defective in not fixing the precise time of the sale. It read: “On Monday, the 12th day of November, 1877, between the hours of 10 o’clock a. M. and 4 o’clock p. m. of that day,” etc. We think such a notice sufficient. It is not essential that the precise hour be named. It may be that if it were shown that any person appeared at any time between the specified limits ready io bid, and that the property was struck off at less than its value, the court should in its discretion set aside the sale; but nothing of the kind appears here. The motion is rested upon the supposed defect iii the notice, and without a suggestion even that any one was misled, or desired to bid. Counsel cite the case of Trustees, etc., v. Snells, 19 Ill. 156, in which a sale -was set aside when it appeared that the property had been sold
A third objection is, that the order of sale was defective im not stating the rate of interest which the judgment bore. It in fact bore twelve per cent, interest. We do not think this vitiates the order or the proceedings under the order. The-amount for which the property was sold was far below that of the judgment, and a'mere irregularity which does no one-the slightest injury should not work an entire overthrow of' proceedings had under the order.
A fourth matter is, that the order of sale did not specifically direct that the sale be made without appraisement.. The-judgment and decree so directed, but the order directed that, the property be “advertised and sold according to law.”' This too, if ,a defect at all, is not one sufficient to justify a setting aside of the sale. The decree directed a sale without appraisement, the law authorized such a decree, and the sale was so made. It was therefore made according to law.
A final matter is, the inadequacy of the bid. The property was sold for $100. Several affidavits were read. The
We see no error in the ruling of the district court, and it will be affirmed.