Northridge Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of RevisionNorthridge Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision
Rendered on the 18th day of February, 2022.
CHARLES F. ALLBERY, III, Atty. Reg. No. 0006244, 893 South Main Street, #386, Englewood, Ohio 45322
Attorney for Appellant, Dayton Fun Hotels, LLC
LAURA B. MARIANI, Atty. Reg. No. 0063284, 301 West Third Street, P.O. Box 972, Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Appellees, Montgomery County Auditor & Montgomery County Board of Revision
MARK H. GILLIS, Atty. Reg. No. 0066908, 547 Perimeter Drive, Suite 150, Dublin, Ohio 43017
Attorney for Appellee, Northridge Local Schools Board of Education
{¶ 1} Dayton Fun Hotels, LLC, appeals from a decision of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), which vacated the Montgomery County Board of Revision‘s (BOR) decision and remanded the matter to the BOR with instructions to dismiss Dayton Fun Hotels’ complaint as untimely. For the following reasons, the BTA‘s decision will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On March 9, 2020, Ohio‘s governor declared a state of emergency due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Executive Order 2020-01D. On March 27, 2020, also in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ohio legislature passed an emergency relief bill that, among other things, tolled certain time limitations and deadlines. 2020 Am.Sub.H.B. 197. The governor signed the bill but used a line-item veto to delete the phrase “or deadline” from Section 22(A)(10) of the bill. Based on its understanding of H.B. 197, the Montgomery County Board of Revision publicized on its website that “the deadline for filing property value appeals with the Montgomery County Board of Revision has been extended. * * * The new deadline will be August 24. The normal statutory deadline for filing Board of Revision appeals is March 31.” (Emphasis sic.)
{¶ 3} On July 31, 2020, Dayton Fun Hotels filed a complaint challenging the 2019 tax valuation of its property located at 2301 Wagner Ford Road in Montgomery County. The Northridge Local Schools Board of Education (BOE) filed a counter-complaint, asserting that the fair market value was $2.1 million, the assessed value. A hearing was held on October 15, 2020, during which the BOE moved to dismiss Dayton Fun Hotels’ complaint due to its being filed after the March 31, 2020 deadline. (A transcript of the
{¶ 4} Twelve days later, the BOE appealed the BOR‘s decision to the BTA. The BOE also filed a motion asking the BTA to remand the matter to the BOR with instructions to dismiss the complaint as untimely. The BOR and Dayton Fun Hotels filed separate memoranda opposing the motion.
{¶ 5} On June 3, 2021, the BTA granted the BOE‘s motion. Relying on Porat Group 3, LLC v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. Of Revision, BTA No. 2020-1399 (Jan. 19, 2021), a prior BTA decision on the same issue, the BTA rejected the argument that H.B. 197 had tolled the time by which a property valuation complaint had been required to be filed. It reasoned: “The Governor vetoed the portion of the bill that would arguably have extended that deadline.” The BTA noted that compliance with statutory filing requirements, including the filing deadline, is a mandatory, jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived by a tax official. Accordingly, the BTA vacated the BOR‘s decision and remanded the matter with instructions to dismiss the underlying complaint as untimely.
{¶ 6} Dayton Fun Hotels appeals from the BTA‘s decision, raising seven assignments of error. The crux of all the assignments of error is that the BTA erred in concluding that H.B. 197 did not toll the filing requirement in
{¶ 7} Before turning to the issue before us, we note that Dayton Fun Hotels and the BOE have attached documents to their appellate briefs. In determining this appeal, our review is limited to the certified transcript of the record of the proceedings of the BTA
II. Timeliness of Taxpayer‘s Complaint
{¶ 8} We review a decision of the BTA for whether it is “reasonable and lawful.”
{¶ 9} In this case, the sole issue is whether Dayton Fun Hotels timely filed its complaint with the BOR, which requires our interpretation of relevant statutes. “The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature‘s intent” as expressed in the plain meaning of the statutory language. State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 9; see also Gabbard v. Madison Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2067, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 13. “To discern that intent, we first consider the statutory language, reading all words and phrases in context and in accordance with the rules of grammar and common usage. We give effect to the words the General Assembly has chosen, and we may neither add to nor delete from the statutory language.” (Citations omitted.) Gabbard at ¶ 13. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the words as written. “An
{¶ 10} Persons who own taxable real property may file a complaint with the county auditor challenging the determination of the total valuation or assessment for that parcel.
{¶ 11} Ordinarily, the later date is March 31, and “a taxpayer protesting the valuation of a property must file a complaint by March 31 of the year succeeding the tax year in question.” Life Path Partners, Ltd. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 152 Ohio St.3d 238, 2018-Ohio-230, 94 N.E.3d 565, ¶ 1. However, it is not necessarily so. Upon application of the county auditor and county treasurer, the tax commissioner may extend the time for payment of taxes if the commissioner “determines that penalties have accrued or would otherwise accrue for reasons beyond the control of the taxpayers of the county.”
{¶ 12} The question before us is the effect of H.B. 197, the COVID-19 emergency relief statute, as enacted, on the requirements of
SECTION 22. (A) The following that are set to expire between March 9, 2020, and July 30, 2020, shall be tolled:
(1) A statute of limitation, as follows:
(a) For any criminal offense, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the applicable period of limitation set forth in section 2901.13 of the Revised Code for the criminal offense;
(b) When a civil cause of action accrues against a person, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the period of limitation for commencement of the action as provided under any section in Chapter 2305. of the Revised Code, or under any other provision of the Revised Code that applies to the cause of action;
(c) For any administrative action or proceeding, the period of limitation for the action or proceeding as provided under the Revised Code or the Administrative Code, if applicable.
(2) The time within which a bill of indictment or an accusation must be returned or the time within which a matter must be brought before a grand jury;
(3) The time within which an accused person must be brought to trial or, in the case of a felony, to a preliminary hearing and trial;
(4) Time deadlines and other schedule requirements regarding a juvenile, including detaining a juvenile;
(5) The time within which a commitment hearing must be held;
(6) The time by which a warrant must be issued;
(7) The time within which discovery or any aspect of discovery must be completed;
(8) The time within which a party must be served;
(9) The time within which an appearance regarding a dissolution of marriage must occur pursuant to section 3105.64 of the Revised Code;
(10) Any other criminal, civil, or administrative time limitation or deadline under the Revised Code.
(B) This section applies retroactively to the date of the emergency declared by Executive Order 2020-01D, issued on March 9, 2020.
(C) Division (A) of this section expires on the date the period of emergency ends or July 30, Am. Sub. H. B. No. 197 133rd G.A. 339 2020, whichever is sooner.
(Emphasis added.) 2020 Am.Sub.H.B. 197, as enrolled.
{¶ 13} The governor deleted the phrase “or deadline” from Section 22(A)(10). In doing so, the governor explained the deletion, stating:
This provision is intended to apply only to criminal statute of limitations, civil statute of limitations, administrative statute of limitations and other statutorily created time limitations in court cases. Removing the boxed language clarifies that this provision does not apply to statutory tax deadlines or due dates, including those tax deadlines or due dates adjusted elsewhere in this bill. The Tax Commissioner has the authority to
individually extend tax deadlines and due dates based on particularized situations. All other state agencies, boards and commissions will work with Ohio citizens in individual circumstances. This clarification, and maintaining revenue sources, such as the sales tax, which has already been collected by vendors but not yet remitted to the State and distributed to local governments, to fund essential government services, is imperative during the duration of the Governor‘s COVID-19 emergency declaration. Therefore, this veto is in the public interest. https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/Assets/LegislationDocuments/133/VetoMessage AmSubHB197.pdf.
{¶ 14} On appeal, Dayton Fun Hotels, as well as the BOR and the Montgomery County Auditor, claim that
{¶ 15} The Montgomery County Auditor and BOR assert that the March 31 date in
{¶ 16} The distinction between a “statute of limitation,” a “time limitation,” and a “deadline” is pivotal. Those terms are not defined in H.B. 197 or elsewhere in the Ohio Revised Code. A “statute of limitations” has been described as (1) “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered)“, or (2) “[a] statute establishing a time limit for prosecuting a crime, based on the date when the offense occurred.” Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th Ed.2019), Statute of Limitations. Similar to statutes of limitations, “time limitations” generally have referred to periods of time within which a certain action must be taken. See, e.g., Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th Ed.2019), Time Limit (“A prescribed period by the end of which some task must be completed“).
{¶ 17} In contrast, a deadline is commonly understood to mean “the time by which something must be finished or completed; the latest time for finishing something.” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/deadline; see also, e.g., Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th Ed.2019), Deadline (“A cutoff date for taking some action“); Merriam-Webster Dictionary (defining deadline as “a date or time before which something must be done“); Collins Dictionary (“A deadline is a time or date before which a particular task must be finished or a particular thing must be done.“).
{¶ 18} Some dictionaries define a “time limit” as a “deadline.” See Collins Dictionary (“A time limit is a date before which a particular task must be completed.“).
{¶ 19} H.B. 197 refers to the term “deadline” 12 times (including in Section 22), and its usage is consistent with the word‘s common definition. For example, the term deadlines in the section related to elections refers to specific revised dates by which actions were required to be taken. See H.B. 197, Section 32(C)(1)(a); Section 32(C)(3). Section 17 permits the superintendent to waive or extend deadlines for certain annual requirements regarding schools and school employees. Albeit without using the term “deadline,” H.B. 197 also extends “the date by which action is required” concerning various licenses.
{¶ 20} The Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the March 31 date in
{¶ 21} The Montgomery County Auditor and BOR assert that the Ohio Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Chapman Ents., Inc. v. McClain, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2386, ___ N.E.3d ___, which concerned whether H.B. 197 tolled the time for filing an appeal with the BTA, requires reversal in this case. In Chapman, the tax commissioner upheld tax assessments in two cases on April 29, 2020, and service of the decisions was completed on May 4, 2020. Under
{¶ 22} The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the BTA, holding that Section 22(A)(1)(c) of H.B. 197 tolled Chapman‘s appeal period. Id. at ¶ 13. The supreme court reasoned:
Although
R.C. 5717.02 speaks of an “appeal” rather than a “limitation period,” the 60-day period for filing an appeal with the BTA is functionally the same as a 60-day limitation period for initiating an administrative proceeding at the BTA. Accordingly, Chapman‘s appeal deadlines were tolled under Section 22(A)(1)(c) of H.B. 197. Even if Section 22(A)(1)(c)did not apply, Section 22(A)(10) of H.B. 197 would toll the time limit for filing an appeal with the BTA because the 60-day period prescribed by R.C. 5717.02(B) would constitute an “administrative time limitation under the Revised Code” that was not otherwise tolled.
Id. at ¶ 13.
{¶ 23} We find the appeal period in Chapman to be distinguishable from the filing requirement in
{¶ 24} In summary, we hold that the filing requirement of
{¶ 25} Dayton Fun Hotels notes that the Montgomery County BOR website informed the public that the deadline for filing an appeal with the BOR was extended until August 24, 2020, and that it reasonably relied on that information. It states, upon information and belief, that the Montgomery County Auditor and BOR extended the time for filing a valuation complaint upon the advice of the Montgomery County Prosecutor‘s
{¶ 26} “[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes a party from asserting certain facts where the party, by his conduct, has induced another to change his position in good faith reliance upon the party‘s conduct.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ingle, 180 Ohio App.3d 201, 2008-Ohio-6726, 904 N.E.2d 934, ¶ 32 (2d Dist.), quoting Turner Liquidating Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 93 Ohio App.3d 292, 295, 638 N.E.2d 174 (9th Dist.1994). To successfully raise a claim of equitable estoppel, the party asserting the estoppel must have relied on conduct of the other party in such a manner as to change his position for the worse, and that reliance must have been reasonable in that the party claiming estoppel did not know and could not have known that the other party‘s conduct was misleading. Shampton v. Springboro, 98 Ohio St.3d 457, 2003-Ohio-1913, 786 N.E.2d 883, ¶ 34; Bradley v. Islamic Ctr. of Peace, Inc., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29134, 2021-Ohio-3756, ¶ 9.
{¶ 27} It is well established that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is inapplicable against a political subdivision when the political subdivision is engaged in a governmental function. E.g., Hortman v. Miamisburg, 110 Ohio St.3d 194, 2006-Ohio-4251, 852 N.E.2d 716, ¶ 25; Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Frantz, 51 Ohio St.3d 143, 145-146, 555 N.E.2d 630 (1990). While we are sympathetic to the position in which Dayton Fun Hotels finds itself, we cannot apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel in this case.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 29} The BTA‘s decision will be affirmed.
TUCKER, P. J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Charles F. Allbery, III
Laura G. Mariani
Mark H. Gillis
Ohio Tax Commissioner