MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On the morning of November 2, 1997, while approximately two miles off the coast of Gloucester, Massachusetts, the F/V NORTHERN VOYAGER (the “VOYAGER”), a 144 foot fishing boat, began experiencing steering difficulty. Although the weather was clear at the time, a passing storm had left behind swells of approximately seven to eight feet in height. The boat’s chief engineer, Gary Tibbo (“Tib-bo”), was in the wheelhouse with the boat’s mate, Peter Flaherty (“Flaherty”). Flah-erty began to notice that the boat was starting to make circles in the water, despite the fact that it was set on automatic pilot for a straight course. He asked Tib-bo to check the steering gear.
The interior steering gear is located in a space hole called the lazerette. The lazer-ette is designed to be isolated from the rest of the vessel so that if a rudder is lost or damaged, the resultant flooding can be contained, rather than endanger the entire boat. There are two manholes by which one may gain access to the lazerette, each equipped with watertight covers. If these covers are closed, the lazerette becomes watertight and can flood without affecting the stability of the vessel. The VOYAGER had an electrical pump in the lazerette to counter the unusually high leakage from the rudder. Both manholes to the lazer-ette had been kept open for easy access to *49 check the pump. When Tibbo entered the lazerette, he found that it was flooded and water was welling up through the starboard manhole. The pressure from the flooding prevented him from closing the manhole cover. He then started to suction out the water with a bilge pump and informed the other crew members of the problem.
Tibbo told the Captain about the flooding, which by that point had entered the machinery space. At Tibbo’s suggestion, the Captain called the Coast Guard to report his position and condition and request pumping assistance. During the radio exchange, the Captain voiced his concern about the possibility that water would flood the engine room. If the engine room flooded, all of the boat’s electrical pumps and generators located therein would be rendered useless.
The Coast Guard Response
Coast Guard Station Gloucester (“Station Gloucester”) responded to VOYAGER’s call for assistance, and immediately launched its 41 foot boat into the seven to eight foot swells. Shortly thereafter, the Coast Guard’s 47 foot boat began to follow the 41 footer to the scene. At about the same time, Coast Guard Group Boston (“Group Boston”), which had also heard the call for assistance, issued an Urgent Marine Information Broadcast (“UMIB”), to alert all listeners to the VOYAGER’s situation. Group Boston then assumed the duties of Search and Rescue (“SAR”) Mission Coordinator and began to monitor the case. It also diverted a 110 foot Coast Guard Cutter to assist as the On Scene Coordinator (“OSC”).
The Rescue
At 9:13 a.m., the Coast Guard’s 41 foot boat arrived at the VOYAGER and evacuated eight crew members. The Coast Guardsmen then began boarding the fishing boat with additional pumps. With the crew’s guidance, they tried to dewater the vessel. Coast Guardsman Sean Connors told VOYAGER’s Master, David Haggerty, that they would try to keep up with the flooding, but that their main objective was to ensure the safety of the VOYAGER crew members who were still on board. As the flooding continued, the VOYAGER began to develop a port side tilt. This made both access to and escape from the boat more difficult. By the time the decision was made to fully evacuate the boat, the crew had to jump down several feet from the right side of the VOYAGER to the Coast Guard’s 47 footer. When the OSC arrived, the Commanding Officer decided to defer to the judgment of those who had already been on scene from the start. Although he expressed discomfort with the Coast Guardsmen remaining on the sinking vessel, he agreed that they could assist as long as it was safe for them to do so. The condition continued to worsen and Coast Guard Officer Dittes (“Dittes”) began to question VOYAGER crew members about the boat’s construction. Based on the information gleaned from one of the crew members and on the continual progression of the flooding, Dittes became concerned that the boat would capsize at any moment. The decision to evacuate was met with opposition from VOYAGER’s Captain, who insisted that other options for salvage were available. Specifically, he requested to stay on the scene to await the arrival of a commercial salvor who had responded to the initial UMIB. Despite the Captain’s request, Dittes ordered the evacuation of all remaining Coast Guard personnel and crew members from the VOYAGER. Fifty minutes later the vessel capsized and sank to the bottom of the ocean where it remains today.
Plaintiffs brought suit against the United States Coast Guard and the Thames *50 Shipyard Repair Company (the “Shipyard”). They allege that the United States is subject to liability under the Suits in Admiralty Act (“SAA”), 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 741-52, for its negligent interference with the VOYAGER salvage efforts. In addition, the Complaint sets forth a laundry list of intentional torts that includes trespass to chattels, conversion, breach of fiduciary obligations, and intentional interference with contractual relations. Defendant United States moves for summary judgment based on theories of comparative negligence, the discretionary function exception, and the Good Samaritan doctrine. Although both sides vigorously dispute the cause of the flooding, the timing of the evacuation, and the impact of the Coast Guard’s decisions on the VOYAGER’s fate that day, these disputed facts are wholly immaterial in light of the clearly applicable discretionary function exception.
The Suits in Admiralty Act
The SAA acts as a waiver of United States sovereign immunity for certain maritime claims against it.
Gercey v. United States,
Were there no such immunity for basic policy making decisions, all administrative and legislative decisions concerning the public interest would be subject to independent judicial review in the not unlikely event that the implementation of these policy judgments were to cause private injuries. That, in our view, would be an intolerable state of affairs, and we decline, in the absence of an express Congressional directive to the contrary, to construe this waiver of sovereign immunity as providing federal courts with that power.
Id.
(internal citations omitted);
see also Canadian Transport Co. v. United States,
The Discretionary Function Exception
Like the SAA, the FTCA states „that “the United States shall be liable ... in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances ....” 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994). One exception to this broad liability is the discretionary function exception, which reserves the United States’ immunity regarding any act based upon a government employee’s exercise of discretion.
See
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The exception shields any government act “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” Id.
(emphasis added). As a result, the exception prevents courts from making even the most basic of inquiries into the reasonableness of the government’s safety or public policy choices, as they would with a private individual under the same circumstances.
See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),
Plaintiffs’ reliance on
Indian Towing, Co. v. United States,
The Supreme Court addressed the scope of the discretionary function exception in three principal cases.
See Berkovitz v. United States,
First, it is axiomatic that the Coast Guard has complete discretion over all search and rescue procedures. Not only does the very premise of emergency rescue logically suggest that decisions be made quickly and responsively, without the constraints of inflexible procedures, Coast Guard regulations and procedural handbooks specifically mandate as much. The *52 National Search and Rescue Manual states:
Because of the many variables encountered during SAR operations and the individuality of each SAR case, the guidance provided in this manual must be tempered with sound judgment, having due regard for the individual situation. Nothing in this manual should be construed as relieving SAR personnel of the need for initiative and sound judgment. Therefore, few actions or procedures discussed in this manual are mandatory.
National Search and Rescue Manual, at V. A specific Coast Guard Addendum adds:
Coast Guard personnel are expected to exercise broad discretion in performing the functions discussed. The Coast Guard retains discretion to deviate from or change this guidance without notice. This document creates no duties, standard of care, or obligations to the public and should not be relied upon as a representation by the Coast Guard as to the manner of proper performance in any particular case.
Coast Guard Addendum, COMDTINST M16130.2B, at 2. The discretionary nature of Coast Guard decision-making is further echoed in its Boat Crew Seamanship Manual:
The primary purpose of Coast Guard SAR is to save lives at sea. Conducting damage control operations to save property alone should only be done after a complete re-assessment of the situation has been done to ensure the crew will not be subject to undue risk.
Boat Crew Seamanship Manual, at 18-19. Clearly, the exercise of judgment by the Coast Guard on November 2, 1997, was permissible, and therefore satisfies the first prong of the
Berkovitz
test.
See Varig Airlines,
Similarly, the Coast Guard’s SAR procedures fulfill the second prong of the
Berko-vitz
test. The decision of whether to save the VOYAGER from capsizing, at the expense of putting both the Coast Guardsmen and VOYAGER crew in physical danger, certainly represents “the exercise of policy-based discretion.”
Ayer,
