Plаintiff filed suit in the Wayne County Circuit Court alleging that he suffered a partial amputation of his left hand due to defendants’ negligence. Defendants filed a motion for *241 "aсcelerated judgment”, claiming that workers’ compensation was plaintiff’s sole and exclusive remedy as to .them. The lower court agreed and enterеd an order granting "summary judgment” in favor of defendants. Plaintiff now appeals as of right.
As a general rule, issues concerning injuries and their compensability in tort or through thе workers’ compensation laws must first be addressed by the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.
Szydlowski v General Motors Corp,
Whether or not an employer-employee rеlationship exists is a question of fact. However, where affidavits, depositions, and other evidence reveal no disputed issue of material fact concerning the claimant’s status as an employee, the lower court may order summary judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3). As the Michigan Supreme Court stated in
Nichol v. Billot,
" 'When a defendant’s status fоrms a material issue in an evidentiary proceeding, * * * which has for its object to determine whether the action sought to be prosecuted is one abrogated or taken away by the Workmen’s Compensation Law, * * * or "reserved” to the workman (or his widow) * * * the rule to be applied by the trial court should be the same as that which governs at the trial: if the evidence concerning the status of a party defendant is reasonably susceptible of but a single inference, the questiоn is one purely of law *242 to be decided by the court * * * but where the facts bearing on such issue are either disputed, or conflicting inferences may be reasоnably drawn from the known facts, it is error to withhold the issue from the determination of the jury.’ ”
Michigan uses the so-called economic reality test to determine if an employer-employee relationship exists.
Renfroe v Higgins Rack Coating & Manufacturing Co, Inc,
Plaintiffs deposition and defendаnt Alex Fedrigo’s affidavit reveal the following about the instant case. Plaintiff was directly employed by "Somebody Sometime”, a labor broker which sends workers to diffеrent employers who have a need for them. The accident occurred after plaintiff was sent by Somebody Sometime to work on the premises of defendant Sun Swimming Pool Chemicals (hereinafter Sun).
While at Sun, plaintiff was under the control of Sun’s employees. These employees made work assignments and providеd any .training that was necessary. Nobody in a supervisory capacity from Somebody Sometime had anything to do with plaintiffs work while on Sun’s premises. Sun also had the right tо fire workers from its projects and to refuse to accept workers sent by Somebody Sometime. Plaintiff was ultimately laid off "indefi *243 nitely” for failure to call in to Sun оn a day he was supposed to work. Both plaintiff and defendant Alex Fedrigo agreed that the tasks plaintiff performed for Sun constituted normal work toward its goal of producing products for the company. Plaintiff was paid weekly via a check from Somebody Sometime. Plaintiff also indicated that Somebody Somеtime set his hourly rate. However, Sun paid Somebody Sometime to cover plaintiff’s wages.
Renfroe, supra, involved a situation very similar to the present one. In Renfroe, the plaintiff appealed from a grant of summary judgment for defendant on a tort claim arising from an industrial accident. Plaintiff had received workers’ compensation benefits from the third-party defendant, Employers Temporаry Service, hereinafter ETS. The only issue was whether defendant was an employer of plaintiff within the meaning of the workers’ compensation laws. ETS was a labor broker, a company whose sole business was supplying temporary labor as needed to all types of industrial and commercial concerns. Under thе terms of the contract between ETS and the customer, a certain hourly rate was charged for each kind of labor. From this sum, which the customer paid to ETS, ETS рaid the worker and covered all other costs of employment, including workers’ compensation premiums, Social Security, and withholding for municipal, statе, and federal income taxes. Upon arrival at the work site, the worker was under the direction of the customer, who told him what to do, and where and how to dо it. He could be moved among different jobs during the day. If the worker was drunk or incompetent or refused to work, the customer could summarily discharge him and would only be billed by ETS for *244 work actually done. Plaintiff Renfroe had been working for defendant for about two to three weeks at the time of the accident. The Court held:
"The economic reality of this case is that both ETS and Higgins Co. were employers of Roy Renfroe, each in a different way.” Renfroe, supra, 266.
In
White v Extra Labor Power of America,
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision in
White, supra, sub nom Solakis v Roberts,
In
Allossery v Employers Temporary Service, Inc,
*245 Plaintiff argues that regardless of whether Renfroe is or is not "good” law, it does not control this case. Plaintiff points to the following language in Renfroe:
"In the case at bar, the record contains numerous interrogatories, depositions, and affidavits, which set out the underlying events and circumstances in great detаil. These, as well as the agreed statement of facts submitted for purposes of this appeal, reveal that there is no dispute as to any of the underlying fаcts.” Renfroe, supra, 261.
Defendants orginally moved for "accelerated judgment” by motion dated October 31, 1979. On November 16, 1979, the circuit court judge refused to grant the motion. The pаrties agree that this denial was based on the court’s opinion that further discovery was needed. Thereafter, on February 26, 1980, plaintiff’s deposition was taken аt defense counsel’s request. A second hearing on defendants’ motion for "accelerated judgment” was held on May 16, 1980. Plaintiff had made no efforts to obtain any discovery during the two hearing dates. However, at the May 16, 1980, hearing, plaintiff’s counsel requested additional time to complete discovery. On May 29, 1980, based on plaintiff’s deposition testimony, the court found for defendants.
Assuming,
arguendo,
that plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to engage in any discovery over an eight-month period in which she was on notice that discovery should be conducted does not waive her claim that discovery was prematurely cut off, we nonetheless believe the lower court’s decision was correct. It may well be that in
Renfroe
a greater development of the facts through different sources had occurred. Nonetheless, here, the plaintiff’s
*246
own deposition testimony shows that he was an employee of defendants under the economic reality test. Plaintiff is bound by the statements in his deposition.
Stefan v White,
Affirmed.