172 U.S. 589 | SCOTUS | 1899
NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY
v.
MYERS.
Supreme Court of United States.
*596 Mr. C.W. Bunn and Mr. A.B. Browne for appellant. Mr. A.T. Britton was on their brief.
Mr. C.B. Nolan, Attorney General of the State of Montana, for appellee.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The averments in the bill of complaint and the stipulation *597 of facts show a controversy between the railroad company and the Interior Department as to the character of the lands, whether mineral or non-mineral, taxed by the State of Montana, and the company avers "that at the time of said attempted assessments and tax levies said lands ... had not been and are not now certified or patented to said railroad company, and the said lands were not ascertained or determined to be a part of the lands granted to said company, nor were they segregated from the public lands of the United States, and the said railroad company had and has but a potential interest therein." And part of the relief prayed for was "that the lands be adjudged not subject to assessment and taxation by said county of Jefferson or by the State of Montana for the year 1894, and until the United States shall issue to said railroad company patents therefor."
A similar claim was denied by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Northern Pacific Railroad v. Wright, 7 U.S. App. 502, and by this court in Central Pacific Railroad v. Nevada, 162 U.S. 512. It is, however, now conceded that the railroad has a taxable interest, counsel for appellant saying:
"The question for decision is not whether the railway company has any interest in its grant, or in the lands in question, which may be subjected to some form of taxation; but whether the lands themselves are taxable; whether the present assessment which is on the lands themselves can be sustained. We may well concede that the taxing power is broad enough to reach in some form the interest of the railway company in its grant; that interest becomes confessedly a vested interest upon construction of the road. It then becomes property, and may well be held subject to some form of taxation.
"But here the legislature authorizes a tax upon, and the assessor makes an assessment upon, the land itself by specific description; the whole legal title to each parcel being specifically and separately assessed. When the plain fact is, that neither the assessor or the railway company can place its hand on a single specific parcel and say whether it belongs to the company or to the United States."
*598 The question which was submitted therefore by the stipulation, namely, "whether the lands described in the bill were subject to taxation under the laws of the United States and of the State of Montana," if not evaded by the concession of appellant, has changed its form; but even in the new form it seems to have the same foundation as the contention rejected in the Nevada case, supra, that because title may not attach to some of the lands it does not attach as to any. Whether it has such foundation we will consider.
In Railway Company v. Prescott, 16 Wall. 603; Railway Company v. McShane, 22 Wall. 444, and Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Traill County, 115 U.S. 600, it was decided that lands sold by the United States might be taxed before they had parted with the legal title by issuing a patent; but this principle, it was said, must be understood to be applicable only to cases where the right to the patent was complete, and the equitable title was fully vested in the party without anything more to be paid or any act to be done going to the foundation of his right. In the first case the court said two acts remained to be done which might wholly defeat the right to the patent: (1) the payment of the cost of surveying; (2) a right of preëmption which would accrue if the company did not dispose of the lands within a certain time. The dependency of the right of taxation on the first condition was affirmed with the principle announced in Railway Company v. McShane. The dependency of the right of taxation on the second ground was expressly overruled.
Embarrassment to the title of the United States by a sale of the land for taxes seems to have been the concern and basis of those cases. This embarrassment was relieved, and Congress permitted taxation by the act of July 10, 1886, c. 764, 24 Stat. 143. By that act it is provided: "That no lands granted to any railroad corporation by any act of Congress shall be exempt from taxation by States, Territories and municipal corporations on account of the lien of the United States upon the same for the costs of surveying, selecting and conveying the same, or because no patent has been issued therefor; but this provision shall not apply to lands unsurveyed: Provided, *599 That any such land sold for taxes shall be taken by the purchaser subject to the lien for costs of surveying, selecting and conveying, to be paid in such manner by the purchaser as the Secretary of the Interior may by rule provide, and to all liens of the United States, all mortgages of the United States and all rights of the United States in respect to such lands: Provided further, That this act shall apply only to lands situated opposite to and coterminous with completed portions of said roads and in organized counties: Provided further, That at any sale of lands under the provisions of this act the United States may become the preferred purchaser, and in such case the land sold shall be restored to the public domain and disposed of as provided by the laws relating thereto."
This act was interpreted in Central Pacific Railroad Co. v. Nevada, supra. The lands involved were classified in the opinion as follows: (1) those patented; (2) those unsurveyed; (3) those surveyed but unpatented, upon which the cost of surveying had been paid; and (4) like lands upon which the cost of survey had not been paid. Applying the statute, Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for the court, said: "The principal dispute is with regard to the fourth class... . In view of the statute, it is difficult to see how these lands, which are the very ones provided for by the statute, can escape taxation if the State chooses to tax them."
This case establishes that the State may tax the surveyed lands, mineral or agricultural, within the place limits of the grant, and there is nothing in the case nor its principle which limits the assessment to an interest less than the title; that distinguishes the lands from a claim to them. The statute of Nevada defined the term "real estate" to include "the ownership of, or claim to, or possession of, or right of possession to any lands;" and the Supreme Court of the State had decided that to constitute a possessory claim actual possession was necessary, and, on this account, distinguished in some way surveyed from unsurveyed lands. It was urged that the distinction was not justified, and that the necessity of actual possession applied alike to both kinds and exempted both kinds from taxation, and hence it was insisted there was nothing to *600 tax unless the title was taxed, and that this could not be done under the decisions of this court. To this contention the opinion replied that how the interest of the railroad should be defined was not a Federal question, nor did inaptitude of definition by the Supreme Court of the State or in the application of the definition raise a Federal question. "Taxation of the lands by the State," it was said, "rested upon some theory that the railroad had a taxable interest in them. What that interest was does not concern us so long as it appears that, so far as Congress is concerned, express authority was given to tax the lands."
If this case leaves us any concern it is only to inquire what assessable interest passed by the grant. It is not necessary to detail the cases in which this court has held that railroad land grants are in prsenti of land to be afterwards located. Their principle reached the fullest effect and application in Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, 142 U.S. 241, 316, in which it was held that the legal title passed by such grants as distinguished from merely equitable interests, and an action of ejectment was sustained by a lessee of the Central Pacific Railroad Company before patent was issued. But in Barden v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 154 U.S. 288, in a similar action recovery was denied to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company on the ground that mineral lands were not conveyed by the grant to it, but were "specifically reserved to the United States and excepted from the operations of the grant."
The accommodation of these cases is not difficult. In the Barden case there was a concession that the land was mineral, and there was an attempted recovery of valuable ores. In the Deseret case there was no such concession, and the primary effect of the grant prevailed. In the case at bar there is no such concession, and the primary effect of the grant must prevail. There is no presumption of law of what kind of lands the grant is composed. Upon its face, therefore, the relation of the railroad to every part of it is the same, and on the authority of Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, ejectment may be brought for every part of it. The action, of course, may be *601 defeated, but it may prevail, and a title which may prevail for the company in ejectment surely may be attributed to it for taxation, to be defeated in the latter upon the same proof or concession by which it would be defeated in the former. An averment that there is a controversy about the character of lands not yielded to, an expression of doubt about it not acted on, is not sufficient. This view does not bring the railroad company to an unjust dilemma. The company has the title or nothing. In response to its obligations to the State, it must say which. If it have the title to any of the lands, this title cannot be diminished to a claim, or an interest because it has not or may not have title to others. If there is uncertainty, it must be resolved by the railroad. Suppose, to use the language of counsel, "Neither the assessor or the railway company can place its hand on a single specific parcel and say whether it belongs to the company or to the United States." We nevertheless say again, as we said by the Chief Justice in Northern Pacific Railroad v. Patterson, 154 U.S. 130, 132, "If the legal or equitable title to the lands or any of them was in the plaintiff, then it was liable for the taxes on all or some of them, and the mere fact that the title might be in controversy would not appear in itself to furnish sufficient reason why the plaintiff should not determine whether the lands or some of them were worth paying taxes on or not."
That the Barden case does not preclude state taxation of the lands is also manifest from its expression. Mr. Justice Field, who delivered the opinion of the court, in answer to the contention that its doctrine would have that effect, said: "So also it is said that the States and Territories through which the road passes would not be able to tax the property of the company unless they could tax the whole property, minerals as well as lands. We do not see why not. The authority to tax the property granted to the company did not give authority to tax the minerals which were not granted. The property could be appraised without including any consideration of the minerals. The value of the property, excluding the minerals, could be as well estimated as its value *602 including them. The property could be taxed for its value of the extent of the title which is of the land."
The averment of the answer is that this was done; that the lands were assessed and taxed for their value as agricultural lands without including the minerals in them. The replication put this in issue but the stipulation of facts does not explicitly notice it, but probably was intended to cover it by the agreement that the assessment was made in the manner and form required by the laws of Montana.
We are referred to the act of Congress of February 26, 1895, c. 131, entitled "An act to provide for the examination and classification of certain mineral lands in the States of Montana and Idaho," 28 Stat. 683, as strengthening the contention of appellants. We do not think it does. It was passed after the time at which the validity of the assessment complained of must be determined. Besides, it does not purport to define the rights of the railway company in any particular with which we are now concerned. It furnishes the Secretary of the Interior with another instrumentality not bringing the lands to a different judgment, but to an earlier judgment.
Discovering no error in the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals, it is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS, MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM dissented.
