174 U.S. 379 | SCOTUS | 1899
NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
v.
FREEMAN.
Supreme Court of United States.
*381 Mr. C.W. Bunn for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. Stanton Warburton for defendant in error submitted on his brief, on which were also Mr. J.B. Bridges, Mr. O.V. Linn and Mr. Sidney Moor Heath.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
There was testimony from several witnesses in the neighborhood tending to show that no whistle was blown by the engineer as the train approached the crossing. There was also the testimony of the conductor, engineer and fireman that the whistle was blown. As the majority of plaintiffs' witnesses were so located that they would probably have heard the whistle if it had been blown, there was a conflict of testimony with respect to defendants' negligence, which was properly left to the jury.
The real question in the case was as to the contributory negligence of plaintiffs' intestate. For several hundred feet on either side of the highway crossing there was a cut of about eight feet below the surface of the surrounding country, through which the railway ran. The highway approached the crossing by a gradual decline, the length of which was from 130 to 150 feet. Along the greater portion of this distance the view of a train approaching, either from the north or the south, was cut off by the banks of the excavation on either side of the highway; but at a distance of about forty *382 feet before reaching the track the road emerged from the cut, and the view up the track for about 300 feet was unobstructed.
At the time of the accident, Freeman was driving along the highway, going eastward from the town of Elma in a farm wagon drawn by two horses at a slow trot. He was a man thirty years of age, with no defect of eyesight or hearing, and was familiar with the crossing, having frequently driven the same team over it. The horses were gentle and were accustomed to the cars.
The duty of a person approaching a railway crossing, whether driving or on foot, to look and listen before crossing the track, is so elementary and has been affirmed so many times by this court, that a mere reference to the cases of Railroad Company v. Houston, 95 U.S. 697, and Schofield v. Chicago & St. Paul Railway Co., 114 U.S. 615, is a sufficient illustration of the general rule.
There were but three witnesses to the accident. Two of these were women who were walking down the highway, and approaching the crossing on the opposite side, facing the team. At the time the deceased was struck by the train, they were from 200 to 250 feet away. They testified that the horses were coming down at a slow trot, not faster than a brisk walk, and that their speed was uniform up to the time of the accident; that the deceased looked straight before him, without turning his head either way; that the team did not swerve but trotted directly on to the crossing, and that the deceased made no motion to stop until just as the engine struck him. The other witness was a little girl, ten years of age, who was standing on the hill on the opposite side of the track, near the point where the descent of the highway into the cut began, and was consequently from 130 to 150 feet from the railway track. The deceased passed her and two other young children who were with her. She testified that as he passed his head was down, and he was looking at his horses; that "they went down aways, and then they run and flew back;" that they were going at a slow trot; that when Freeman saw the train he tried to pull the horses around, as *383 if he were trying to get out of the way, when the train struck them.
Another witness was driving behind the team, but he testified to nothing which bore upon the material question whether the deceased took any precaution before crossing the track.
So far, then, as there was any oral testimony upon the subject, it tended to show that the deceased neither stopped, looked nor listened before crossing the track, and there was nothing to contradict it. Assuming, however, that these witnesses, though uncontradicted, might have been mistaken, and that the jury were at liberty to disregard their testimony and to find that he did comply with the law in this particular, we are confronted by a still more serious difficulty in the fact that if he had looked and listened he would certainly have seen the engine in time to stop and avoid a collision. He was a young man. His eyesight and hearing were perfectly good. He was acquainted with the crossing, with the general character of the country, and with the depth of the excavation made by the highway and the railway. The testimony is practically uncontradicted that for a distance of forty feet from the railway track he could have seen the train approaching at a distance of about 300 feet, and as the train was a freight train, going at a speed not exceeding twenty miles an hour, he would have had no difficulty in avoiding it. When it appears that if proper precautions were taken they could not have failed to prove effectual, the court has no right to assume, especially in face of all the oral testimony, that such precautions were taken. The comments of Mr. Justice Field in Railroad Company v. Houston, 95 U.S. 697, 702, are pertinent in this connection: "Negligence of the company's employés in these particulars" (failure to whistle or ring the bell) "was no excuse for negligence on her part. She was bound to listen and to look, before attempting to cross the railroad track, in order to avoid an approaching train, and not to walk carelessly into the place of possible danger. Had she used her senses, she could not have failed both to hear and to see the train which was coming. If she omitted to use them, and walked thoughtlessly upon the track, she was guilty *384 of culpable negligence, and so far contributed to her injuries as to deprive her of any right to complain of others. If, using them, she saw the train coming and yet undertook to cross the track, instead of waiting for the train to pass, and was injured, the consequences of her mistake and temerity cannot be cast upon the defendant."
If, in this case, we were to discard the evidence of the three witnesses entirely, there would still remain the facts that the deceased approached a railway crossing well known to him; that the train was in full view; that, if he had used his senses, he could not have failed to see it; and that, notwithstanding this, the accident occurred. Judging from the common experience of men, there can be but one plausible solution of the problem how the collision occurred. He did not look; or if he looked, he did not heed the warning, and took the chance of crossing the track before the train could reach him. In either case he was clearly guilty of contributory negligence.
The cases in this court relied upon by the plaintiffs are all readily distinguishable, either by reason of the proximity of obstructions interfering with the view of approaching trains, confusion caused by trains approaching simultaneously from opposite directions or other peculiar circumstances tending to mislead the injured party as to the existence of danger in crossing the track.
Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the testimony tending to show contributory negligence on the part of the deceased was so conclusive that nothing remained for the jury, and that the defendant was entitled to an instruction to return a verdict in its favor. The disposition we have made of this question renders it unnecessary to express an opinion upon the instruction as to damages.
The judgment of the court below must therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court for the District of Washington, with directions to grant a new trial.
The CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissented.