Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Otis

liberty before the Industrial are disturb Board. We not at compensation Industrial Board’s denial of when the award appealed upon conflicting from disputed was based evi- dence. Moore Chevrolet, (1967), v. L. O. Gates 140 Ind. Inc. App. 672, denied). Additionally, (Transfer N. E. 2d 854 agree readily we that the case evidence of this does not lead inescapably appellant to the conclusion that Weeks sustained injury compensable Compensation under the Workmen’s reported replete Act. Our volumes of decisions cases are with employing language just the same similar stated. as that again Further, unnecessary we believe recite those quantum types numerous decisions which delineate the necessary upon conflicting evidence to sustain an based award herein, purposes evidence. Four our it is to state sufficient every require- evidentiary this record meets reasonable necessary appellant’s per- ment to a decision that mission was compensable. sonal rather than against appellant.

Award affirmed. Costs to assessed Hoffman, White, JJ., Sharp and concur. Reported N. E. 2d 258.

Note. — Northern Indiana Public Co. Service Regina Dehner,

John Inc. Otis. August 27, Rehearing [No. 468A78. Filed 1969. denied September 23, 1969. May 14, Transfer denied 1970.] Bruggeman, McNagny, Thomp- J. A. William L. F. Robert son, Jr., Wayne, appellant of Fort for N.I.P.S.Co. Gary Kruecheberg, Buelow, Parry Krueckeberg

John H. A. George Freuchtenicht, Rothberg, Gallmeyer, & Freuchtenicht Logan, Wayne, Ruckelshaus, Bobbitt, & Arch of Fort N. O’Connor, Indianapolis, appellant Bobbitt & for John Dehner, Inc. Haynie, Keller, Crell, David B. Marvin

Gilmore S. S. Wayne, Dildine, Haynie Livingston, Yoder, Fort & counsel, Wayne, appellee. Fort grew gas explosion J. This case out of an of a

Sharp, Broadway Kinsmoor, main at corner of also known Road, Wayne, area of Fort In- as Old Mill the downtown diana, February 3, 1966, of Plaintiff- on near the residence Regina Appellee complaint Appellee, her filed Otis. injury damages August personal as a result of substance, alleges: amended, explosion, which as said City plaintiff Wayne; was a resident of the 1. The of Fort Appellant inafter caled in gas, Company, Indiana Public Northern Service here- NIPSCO, corporation engaged an was Indiana distributing transmitting, selling business of and Dehner, Inc., Appellant John and the hereinafter called engaged Dehner, contracting corporation general was an Indiana in the City and construction business in and about Wayne. Fort whereby agreement Appellants an 2. NIPSCO entered into gas employed and install to construct Dehner per- agreement should mains, form such neers to provided that Engi- supervision of NIPSCO’s work under the using by pursuant and furnished NIPSCO materials by plans specifications NIPSCO. and furnished agreement pursuant Dehner constructed 3. That and gas running under Broad- main a twelve inch installed way plaintiff. past the of the Avenue and residence gas upon completion 4. That main NIPSCO used it gas distribution of until Febru- the transmission and ary 3, 1966. Broadway principal 5. That Avenue is motor traffic artery, heavily carrying #1 and #B and is Roads State trucks. traveled automobiles and immediately plaintiff’s south of the in- 6. That home was Broadway with Kinsmoor Avenue and that at tersection of generally Broadway in a said curves south- intersection westerly from north. direction as viewed Broadway 7. That at the with Kinsmoor the intersection gas placed that was main was in a trench curved in Broadway correspond such a with manner as to curve joined by Avenue, pipes and that sections two weld beneath the intersection. February 3, 1966, failed, 8. On as a result of such that weld or about and that high gas pressure escaped failure

large quantities exploded, plaintiff and as result injuries. suffered failure, injuries explosion, 9. That the were caused negligence of the defendants. negligent was as follows: 10. That NIPSCO requiring in such a man- a. In the main installed angle ner, depth at such a it was curved at such upon produce have would stress known NIPSCO should weld; capable cause failure of the weld failed to furnish Dehner with b. That NIPSCO an elbow join permitted pipe said Dehner to sections of with- and/or out of using it should an elbow when have know that the use reasonably necessary; an elbow was wrapping material That the bituminous c. NIPSCO furnished wrap the weld to Dehner sufficient prevent quality weakening corrosion quantity weld; wrapped d. That NIPSCO the weld in a allowed to weld; prevent manner ineffective to corrosion of the properly inspect e. That NIPSCO test the failed to and/or during weld construction. gas use, f. That while the main to was in NIPSCO failed properly weld; inspect test the and/or g. gas equip That NIPSCO failed the main with the de- to gas vices which would the in the have cut off the flow of reasonably event of a in leak which devices available were industry reasonably necessary prevent the the cre- to conditions; ation of hazardous That, immediately h. to cut off the prior explosion NIPSCO failed gas though it knew flow of into the main even or should have known was a leak in the main and that there high pressure gas escaping. that was negligent 11. alleged That Dehner was as as to NIPSCO sub-paragraphs a, b, c, failing also, d and e above and properly inspect to test or the weld. Appellant NIPSCO filed answer in admission and denial Supreme Indiana, under Rule 1-3 of the of Rules Court of the Appellant legal Dehner filed an para- amended answer five graphs. pleading paragraph first was in admission and denial Court,

under Rule specific 1-3 and contained the alle- gation employees Appellant that the of the Dehner were Appellant Appellant furnished to the NIPSCO and the Dehner given responsibility did not undertake nor was the for determining adequacy procedures by specified the the Appellant NIPSCO, by all of which was reserved to itself engineering department. NIPSCO and its construction and answer, paragraph In Appellant Dehner, its second any damage by specifically plaintiff averred that suffered solely negligence failing was due of NIPSCO in design, plan, inspect properly test and the line. answer, paragraph Appellant specifi-

In his third Dehner contract, cally alleged Appellee’s that referred to in Appellants provided only complaint, between by furnishing used equipment to be labor and NIPSCO direction, NIPSCO certain work to be done under supervision inspection NIPSCO and control stated accordance It further with their instructions. was performed the workmen furnished NIPSCO they perform such work instructed to NIPSCO, plans and no with Dehner was furnished adequacy did not to test determine the undertake NIPSCO, specified procedure and that to its workmen manner, performance of work means of method and inspection control, supervision direction, and under the sole of NIPSCO. Appellant paragraph

In its fourth answer Dehner of pointed completed and out that when line was installed by accepted by NIPSCO, approved it was tested NIPSCO and by cus- been in their NIPSCO and has ever since exclusive tody, supervision control, had and that Dehner has no knowledge control, thereof, supervision therein, or interest responsibilty that time. Deh- access or therefor since thereto tested, approved ner further that the line was averred when fully control, accepted by NIPSCO, all assumed NIPSCO interest, knowledge, responsibility supervision, for access and gas plaintiff. privity main and was alone in with specifi- paragraph Appellant In its fifth answer of gas cally alleged any permitting escape of condition arising main of after from the result matters Dehner, completion control of of the line which were not fault, its and which include but are not which arose without following causes: limited to one or more of the periodically inspect part a. Failure NIPSCO to on of might arisen from natural for which have its line defects Broadway causes, from load traffic on the increased improper utilization the line NIPSCO. from using Improper NIPSCO to trans- use of the line b. greatly contemplated of that gas pressure excess aat mit specifications testing procedure originally em- ployed by Dehner. activity

c. The of natural corrosive elements and forces and the increased subject stress to which said line was as a result Broadway, the increased traffic load all which forces being contemplations plans specifi- within the cations NIPSCO. by jury

This case was tried which resulted in a verdict against Appellee both NIPSCO and Dehner in sum of $235,000.00. 14, 1967,

On December filed its NIPSCO motion for New Trial. 19, 1967,

On December Dehner filed its Motion for New Trial. overruled,

Both Motions for New Trial is the assignment sole error here. emphasize should argu-

We NIPSCO’s counsel oral liability Appellee ment admitted NIPSCO’s explo- this reply sion. In brief in court NIPSCO stated: already “In view of the extensive briefs before this Hon- Court, spare orable we will it the burden of another such brief. “Appellant Appellee NIPSCO concedes that in is correct Appellant

her contentions that Dehner has failed to estab- any lish error harmful in record and that its brief is principally complaining rulings devoted to about which urged by Appellant Dehner invited. The other errors Dehner quantity are remarkable for their and not for their quality. principal agreement “Dehner’s contention is that loan way, is, mysterious improper apparently in some because changed ally Appellant adversary from an NIPSCO principal know of rule of law or We quires no moral which re- certainly defendants two to be not in a case allies — like this which shows on the record that Dehner defrauded by constructing gas good not NIPSCO main in then respon- workman-like manner and tried unload full by sibility agreement repudiating on NIPSCO the written performed adamantly under which it work and re- fusing any injury accept responsibilty public for damage negligence. record, and court or to caused its On such a no justice ally require should NIPSCO to Dehner’s avoiding responsibilities it in its to the innocent assist including public Mrs. Otis. however, NIPSCO, “Appellant does not concede that the urged by jury against it is error moot because verdict urged by Appellant Dehner. error NIPSCO could not The against judgment Appellant until become moot Dehner affirmed, is as it be. should unlikely any event should find merit “In the that the court urged Appel- in in of the errors the voluminous brief of urged by Dehner, Appellant lant then the errors NIPSCO prevail appeal and it not moot should its for the are original urged in its reasons brief. “WHEREFORE, judg- pray that in the we event that the against Appellant ment things, Dehner not affirmed in all judgment against Appellant court below things all should be in reversed.” NIPSCO obviously NIPSCO is Since serious about its assertions Trial, going in Motion for a New we its are not to burden opinion point point exposition although them, with a this opinion. will most of them in the course of we cover this principal dispute in this case is between The NIPSCO and responsible injuries. as which is Otis’ Mrs. grouped pur- Appellant Dehner has its The contention appeal Propositions. poses under of this Consistent with obligation propositions consider each of shall these our we doing all the so will cover essential issues involved appeal. I PROPOSITION denying separate error in it a trial

Dehner contends from support principal separate contention of a NIPSCO. agreement receipt loan made a so-called between trial was provided: Otis and Mrs. and Mr. NIPSCO Regina “WHEREAS, Delbert Otis and Otis are husband Wayne, Indiana; Fort residents of wife and Northern public Company (‘NIPSCO’) is a Indiana Public Service utility, engaged, among gas things supplying in natural other Wayne, Indiana; Dehner, Inc. to residents of Fort John company; (‘Dehner’) is a construction and year “WHEREAS, construction NIPSCO, in the upon embarked program which included the installation of a gas portion main for the transmission of natural under a thoroughfare Wayne of a in Fort known certain as ‘Broad- way.’ NIPSCO, agree- and Dehner entered into a written July 16, 1951, agreed ment dated under which Dehner to in- main; main; stall said fact installed said and gas “WHEREAS, explosion occurred in said main on February 3, 1966, allegedly inflicting painful severe and in- juries Regina allegedly upon causing consequential Otis and damages large husband, Otis; in a amount to her Delbert and Regina “WHEREAS, brought Otis has an action in the 3, Superior County, Allen Court No. Indiana, Allen to re- injuries resulting pain cover for her ing Otis has and for the and suffer- 11540; action of which bears the Cause No. Delbert brought Superior an action in Court of Allen Indiana, County, quential County, Allen to recover for his conse- damages; NIPSCO, joined Dehner and are as De- action;

fendants in each and “WHEREAS, complaint in each action is drafted theory explosion upon acts and that that said was caused negligent part and omissions each of the defendants jointly severally the defendants are liable for damages plaintiffs; suffered “WHEREAS, NIPSCO denies negligent that it was explosion such manner as is liable cause said and denies it that plaintiff either of the actions; aforesaid might that it realizes but NIPSCO that be unable to establish liable; is so NIPSCO maintains in the any alternative, a) liability part on its secondary; is primarily b) bert Regina Dehner is liabel to Otis and Del- Otis; c) that NIPSCO would be indemnity entitled to might Dehner for monies it pay Regina from Otis Otis, either as the Delbert result judgment of a and/or the aforesaid actions, them, or either of or as the result of settlement; d) compromise and a entitled that NIPSCO would be indemnity expressly both to such under the terms agreement July written dated the aforesaid principles applicable under impliedly law when one payments secondarily satisfy makes liable in whole or in part obligation liable; primarily for which another and “WHEREAS, recognizes NIPSCO the facts such that are provide possibility plaintiff

as to be awarded a substantial the will that judgment against in of each the each defendant recognizes any actions; aforesaid such that further NIPSCO judgment would, large probability, in for a sum all be money, brought by Regina particularly in Otis the action any judgment probably be in excess of where for her would $50,000.00; and recognizes “WHEREAS, plaintiff NIPSCO that the in each against judgment of the aforesaid actions could if awarded same, each in defendant execute NIPSCO as he or in the whole part, against chose; plain- she or that the any judgment plaintiffs’ tiff part would not to collect have of such wished; from Dehner unless the he she that rights regard any judgment with to collection such the any would bility unaffected that lia- NIPSCO’s assertion part secondary; on its and is Regina “WHEREAS Delbert and Otis Otis believe that position in strong their they each of the aforesaid actions is but recognize disposition the ultimate action, of said including appeals, probably is years at three least in the future, particularly inasmuch as pursued Dehner has policy delay very inception from the of the aforesaid litigation; pursuant policy delay to such Dehner has pleadings filed frivolous and Dehner has mani- otherwise fested a defiant attitude Supreme toward the of the Rules Superior Indiana Court of and Rules the Allen Court 3; Superior No. that on occasion Allen one Court No. 3 judgment against entered default Dehner because of plead, removing Dehner’s obdurate refusal to from same prior typed the order book of charge entry sheet to time docket it was into the immediately because Dehner advised entry pleading persons such and filed a before the in opportunity book had an type of the order had book; continuing policy into the order Dehner is its any delay expect change no and there is reason to of the ultimate until disposition litigation; of the and “WHEREAS, Regina and Delbert Otis Otis realize that any judgment in their favor would not have be satisfied disposition litigation; until ultimate their investi- gation date indicated that NIPSCO is correct asser- its liability part secondary, on is its tion that Dehner responsible primarily explosion for the aforesaid is and aforesaid primarily each of the liable

that Dehner actions; and largest general “WHEREAS, one of financially con- Dehner is pay able to substan- area and is tractors tially financially impairing the than prayer complaints, the Otis without more Dehner, reaching “WHEREAS, are desirous of Otis and NIPSCO Regina agreement Otis enable Delbert which would jeopard- present at time without receive monies Otis to alleged against izing in the aforesaid the claims agreement limit ulti- would NIPSCO’s and which actions mate rights indemnity affecting liability its from without Dehner; THEREFORE, promises, “NOW, in consideration of the promises expressed, and in consideration it is hereinafter agreed Regina between Delbert Otis Otis hand and on the other one NIPSCO that: Contemporaneously “1. with execution of this instru- Regina Delbert Otis ment jointly will advance to and NIPSCO Otis loan, $50,000.00, interest, as a sum of without the only repayable in the event and the extent that Delbert Regina Otis, them, recovery of or either receives a Otis and litigation, including by way costs (over the of and above of limitation, experts’ court costs and not and illustration and trial but reason physicians’ appearance for consultation and fees at including attorneys’ fees) by from not injuries damages. described and of the above Regina agree they Otis and Otis “2. Delbert that will that, diligently; pursue aforesaid actions in the the event against in judgment is awarded both defendants either or actions, they any not will cause execution said both of issue by any judgment. against reason such NIPSCO In judg- or both of said actions results in a either the event plaintiff alone, against the in NIPSCO such action ment against levy may for the execution NIPSCO but sum judgment $50,000.00. exceeds such which Regina agree Otis they and further “3. Delbert Otis that against any suit NIPSCO or initiate manner will not claim, accept demand, or receive monies from NIPSCO explosion resulting aforesaid and in- reason damages provided. other than as juries and hereinabove agreed by parties and and between “It understood is agreement does not effect a release of the this claims that Regina against Otis Otis NIPSCO and of Delbert and/or agreed parties do understood further to, they, intend respective relinquish nor do their claims against Dehner but each of shall be the aforesaid actions prosecuted stated, diligently, as hereinabove and NIPSCO steps necessary protect shall take whatever it deems to> rights against actively indemnity assert its Dehner and any liability against contest it. agreement binding parties “This upon the shall be hereto respective assigns. and their successors, heirs and day Sept., “Dated this 1967.” Separate Dehner’s Motion for Trial filed October stated: plaintiff “1. herein, Regina Otis, and defendant Northern Indiana Company Public Service have entered a settlement, into copy of which was mailed to this Court day September, 1967, about the 29th and is con- packet tained in pleadings file with in this herein A copy case. further of such settlement was mailed to the Superior County Court of Allen filed record Cause Otis, No. 93129 in said filed Delbert husband of Court plaintiff Regina herein, Otis, against Northern Indiana Company Dehner, Inc., Public Service and John for ex- penses being companion and loss of consortion, case hereto. by agreement, 2. That provisions virtue of certain of the of said settlement provisions are forth in set Exhibit ‘A’ hereof, part attached hereto and made a payments thereunder, made the defendant Northern Indiana interest against and Company acquired Public Service has a financial Regina in the cause plaintiff of action of the Otis Inc., Dehner, defendant John with inconsistent incompatible its with status as a co-defendant this pending. action which upon remains Because of its affect relationship parties action, the instant Dehner, Inc., defendant John cannot a and have fair im- partial hearing upon trial and of its case and defense the Regina claim of liability Otis until the status and of the defendant Company Northern Indiana Public Service negligence is first determined and resolved. That because of the financial interest which the said defendant has ac- quired plaintiff’s action, in the of cause said defendant Company

Northern Indiana Public Service will be con- strained to conduct in itself trial of the the within cause in position a such fashion as to unfair the be to of this defend- Dehner, precluded ant, will Inc., and this defendant John Public explaining Indiana Northern

from said conduct of jury hear case Company said to which shall Service agreement as a settlement and because of the nature of highly self-serving and because of numerous prejudicial scandalous its and and cause defendant references to this damages. high a level of of of because the establishment Inc., Dehner, said believes that defendant John 4. That great pub- agreement, arrangement or and settlement received, the' licity which said the agreement manner which said has agreement to this Court and communicated was against public policy, Superior 1No. Allen Court grossly preju- justice, contrary law, and obstructive of dicial determination of its it, impartial right of the a fair defendant’s against allegations rights made attempting limit of its defense. Without arrange- agreement, of said characterization or the effect alleged settlement, by an tort feasor it is a device or ment any responsi- apparently attempting itself from to isolate although one, bility it be declared as well as a tort feasor participation in financial benefits of a a for the device feasor, joint judgment against courage a tort induces to en- judgment of the excess amount a substantial seemingly maintaining while therein a their investment obtaining a plaintiff, all as result position a adverse to the pending of the sides con- financial interest both direct troversy.” This motion trial court. was overruled emphasized It must be manner receipt agreement trial court loan before the so-called was any ruling separate trial. All was as basis for judge parties to the trial this case and agree fully receipt of the loan contents aware imme copy trial court ment was filed with the because diately its execution and served on after Dehner. trial, any part offer at the not to it into evidence chose Therefore, jury was not aware of the contents thereof. agreement. granting separate receipt of this loan discretion of the trial court. In the is within sound trials Indianapolis Realty Co., City & and Constr. v. L. G. App. (1961), we found no N. E. 2d abuse Ind.

173 denying recently, of that separate discretion in More trials. Railway Banking Co., in Central Indiana 143 Co. v. Anderson App. 396, 840, (1968), Ind. 240 E.N. 2d 853 we stated: judges refusing granting “Trial have or mo- discretion in separate against tions to reviewable is which action causes defendants appeal but which reversed unless will not be an abuse of discretion is of demonstrat- shown. burden ing prejudicial upon appel- such an abuse and is results lant . . .” McWilliams, In Preuss App. 602, v. 141 Ind. 230 E. 2d N. 789, (1967), 792 this court stated: implies “The term ‘discretion’ of a absence hard mandatory regardless procedure varying

fast rule or of cir- cumstances. privilege ‘Discretion’ of is a court allowed judge justice within confines of to decide and act equitable. Thus, judicial with accordance what is fair and action which discretion is involves final and cannot be set appeal except aside on when there is an abuse of discretion.” also, Bonding State, See Mass. and Ins. Co. v. App. 82 Ind. 377, 149 E. (1925). N. 377

Economy time, money requires, effort practicable, if controversy

that the whole be determined one trial. policy It is of the law to limit the number of trials possible. Cain, as as 330, far Hoesel v. 222 Ind. 53 N. E. (1944). 2d 769

In this context the statement court Black 53, Marsh, App. (1903), pertinent: Ind. 67 N. E. is assignment “The appellant’s is overruling third that the court erred in separate motion for a trial. The suit was against brought appellant might persons joint as two tortfeasors. The elected have to sue one of them without joining other. Hoosier Stone McCain, Co. v. 133 Ind. Having joined them, E. 31 N. 965. he was entitled to judgment a trial issue accordance with the proof made. Section Burns’ 1901. error No was com- overruling App. 54, 55, mitted in motion.” 31 Ind. at E. at 202. 67 N. authority col- weight as with also is consistent

This in 174 R. 735: lected A. L. whole, gathered more as a two or “As will from the cases together as joint matter entitled such are not tortfeasors sued trials, right separate a sever- or severance discretionary grant with the separate trials ance not denying a will be severance

trial court action in whose clearly an abuse Appellate is aside court unless it set of discretion and is not in furtherance the justice.” regarding separate proper In the its exercise of discretion right imposition of two trials, the had a to the .court consider parties. could have trial court trials on all the seriously upon a the of two trials considered burden injured plaintiff rights important no less whose were than those trial of Dehner and NIPS CO. The court could justice, properly the have determined that in the interests negligence joint as to of either or both tortfeasors issue presented It should be in one trial. could have determined plaintiff explosion manner this that who in no caused not, put separation, in be to hazard of should a forced believing juries, absent tortfeasor was the two each wrongdoer. denying

The trial court not its discretion in did abuse separate The Indiana Dehner’s trial. authorities motion certainly adequate support of the are to the decision trial principles applicable summarized but are well court Waterloo, Supreme Way Cedar Falls Court of Iowa 244, (1947) : R.,R. 29 N. 2d and Northern 239 Ia. W. right plaintiff’s join single “The tortfeasors in a action away will not be taken fendants or avoid ant in a to suit the convenience the de- them, away either nor will it be taken joint prejudice in sense that a suit one defend- position will unfavorable than be more he would be right separate plaintiff’s suit. Before the sue tort- single away action will be taken there must feasors in showing legal prejudice that a affirmative either will an joint trial; likely joint or result from a that the result trial will will depriving a defendant of some result substan- right, joint trial, tial him available to in a but one that would be him available to if to him the cause as tried separately. stantial showing With such a there would be a sub- right plaintiff moving and of the defendant involved, for severance and the decision should rest in the discretion of the trial court. “We are not unmindful of the fact that the railroad will possibly disadvantage joint be at some in the trial. But the right urge every railroad will have the defense it would separate in a have trial. The court anticipate cannot that jury. suspect instructions will confuse the We chief disadvantage entire inability joint will be the in a trial to shift the responsibility upon the other co-defendant. That advantage the railroad should not have under the joint

pleaded petration liability joint upon case of per- based actual concurring parties. the two justice, “In the interest of negligence issue as to joint either or both of the presented tortfeasors should be in be not, one trial. Plaintiff should in a separation, forced put juries, to the hazard of two believing each the absent wrongdoer.” tortfeasor 29 N. W. 2d at 874. parties “The fact antagonistic defendant are that immaterial. drawing the railroad foresees difficulties in jury are Levy, App., v. See Driefus La. 140 So. In 261. committed this last cited it case where was held the trial court refusing guest no error severance where a colliding drivers, one car sued both the court stated: ‘In- variably, case, joint as in this where joined are tortfeasors suit, the same their antagonistic, are each defenses ” attempts place the blame on the other.’ 29 N. 2dW. added). (emphasis at 873 dispose We could of this simply saying contention the agreement receipt so-called only loan the before trial court when separate the considered matter of trials and there was no resolving abuse of discretion in controversy this in one trial. We citing single .could also fault Dehner for not case supporting separate its desire trial. Either of these would abe sufficient basis for our However, decision. repleat

record here is with regarding cross-contentions agreement. validity receipt of this loan So we add to this a 176 agreement legal validity type this

discussion merits. legiti- recognized agreement been receipt has

A loan may company An insurance Indiana law. under device mate party agreement who has receipt with a third enter into a loan alleged negligence In its insured. injured been 160, 164, 227, 229 App. 98 E. 2d Yount, N. 121 Ind. Klukas v. (1951), this court stated: an car- question in this is whether insurance case “The through injury may anyone suffered lend who has

rier negligence sufficient to cover his institute suit in his its insured amount agreement that he will loss under an own name another repay causing loss, against against the one obligated carrier, and that he will insurance recovery his in the the extent of the loan amounts to absolute suit; such a transaction and whether satisfying person’s effect of such loss. payment or has question in are no cases on this there states Counsel none but there are innumer- have found and we state this (Citations covering question. foreign cases able omitted) the intention point that it is out These authorities or not whether which determines parties transaction payment. loan or an absolute it is a just cited, loan did not amount Under the authorities payment nor lender Farm to a Mutual of the loss did the State subrogated Company, Insurance become Automobile against appellee appellant so as to re- the claim of brought name.” quire action to be in its supra, approval Yount, has cited with been Klukas v. (N.D. 1953); Supp. Gould Ziegler, 111 516 Iowa F. Bolton v. New (1952), Crocker 2d 47 v. (Fla.), 62 So. v. Weibel ; (1964) 202 N. E. 2d 793 Co., Mass. England Power (10th Andrew, 229 F. 2d 413 Co. Spring Service Western Hall, Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. also, State 1956). See Cir. ; Espland, (1942) Bland v. Ky. 22, 2d 165 S. W. Anderson, (1950); Wilson v. 113 444, W. 2d 274 43 N. Minn ; Lee, Klotz v. (1945) and 36 N. J. 690 396, P. 2d Colo. (1955). 6, A. 2d 746 Super. 1960), (N.D. Sumney, Supp. 298, Ind.

Barker v. 185 F. personal in farm for was action a driver of a tractor juries vehicles. Prior sustained in a two collision between filing as plaintiff not to sue suit entered into a covenant part: potential provided in to one defendant. The covenant January, day 2nd “Whereas thereafter and on the against damages the said the said Charles trict Court filed an William Barker action Sumney Dis- United States in the William Indiana, South the Northern District alleged Division, and averred and therein Bend Sumney of said collision at the time said Charles William was Steinman, Inc., agent, employee and of said servant Steinman, Trucking, and said Inc., or Orville Steinman Express, Inc., Pennsylvania, Motor and Illinois Indiana and Service, Incorporated Fi- Markel and American “Whereas delity Casualty Company policy insur- and had issued a Steinman, Inc., Trucking, Inc., and

ance to said Steinman covering trailer, Steinman, Orville said tractor and Sumney driving tractor the was which at the time said Charles William aforesaid, accident and Michigan Surety Michigan, Company, Lansing, “Whereas Pennsylvania, policy had issued a of insurance to said Indi- Inc., Express, policy num- ana and Illinois Motor A bered C and undersigned William Barker and said “Whereas Surety Michigan Illinois Motor Company Pennsylvania, and Indiana Inc., Express, at rest desire to set the differ- premises ences between them in without manner right proceed prejudicing said Barker William Steinman, Inc., Trucking, In.c., against said Steinman Steinman, Service, Incorporated Market or Orville Casualty Fidelity Company, and American Barker has demanded and now the said William “Whereas demands greatly in excess of that hereinafter men- a sum Surety being Michigan Company paid the said tioned Inc., Pennsylvania, Express, Motor Indiana and Illinois * * William Barker to said agreement Referring quoted in Barker Sum above Summary Judgment. ruling Motion for supra, on a ney, Judge stated: Grant

178 “Notwithstanding unsatisfied this belief that an Court’s may execution execution need not be returned before against insurer, had defendant’s the defendant tortfeasor’s argument wholly cognizance fact that in fails take right plaintiff the the covenant to sue the reserved the meaning and defendant and intent is within the that suit given Notwithstanding the title the covenant. the that, by parties, this is convinced insofar Covenant Court question, presented, precise what as it relates to is before it is a here any possible Execute’ on Not to ‘Covenant judgment William against defendant Charles named obtained Sumney. necessity exists to warrant a No discus- Ivy legal covenants. v. sion of the effect of such See Pacific 652, 1958, App. Co., Ins. 156 2d 320 P. 2d

Automobile Cal. regard.” 140, for in this a discussion Lee, supra, agreement during In Klotz v. there was an pendency plaintiff of the action between the and one defendant agreed jury and his insurer in which it was that if the re- verdict, pay plaintiff turned a the insurer would a certain sum subject satisfaction, condition, full if verdict was against plaintiff all defendants would not exact more than one-half of the verdict from his said defendant or insurer. agreement. agreement This was a valid The was revealed to judge parties the trial for all counsel as soon as it was agreement executed. The court also concluded that such should jury. not be disclosed to the

Recently, Service, in Edwards Passarelli v. Bros. Automobile Inc., 6, 8 221 (1966), Ohio St. 2d N. E. 2d 708 the court held payments evidence advance was not admissible at trial. Service, Inc.,

In Edwards v. Passarelli Bros. Automobile supra, payment technique judicially the so-called advance approved Supreme principle Court of Ohio. This has recognized jurisdictions. example, been in other For Supreme Judicial Court Massachusetts stated in Crocker v. England Co., 159, New Power 348 202 Mass. N. E. 2d 793: “* * * * * * injured result is The plain- desirable. The tiff, who is allowed funds litigated while his claim is becoming delays. from a victim of saved the law’s We are argument that a receipt agree- not disturbed loan

179 can be no con there ment is device to evade rule England New among Crocker tribution tortfeasors.” 2d 159, 202 N. E. Company (1964), Power 348 Mass.

795. leading Supreme decided in this area was case Sugar States, McCann Luckenbach v. Court of the United Ref. been cited. See Co., (1918), which has often 248 U. S. Co., also, H. Wills, 103 N. Waumbec Inc. v. Bahnson Service Company Spring (1961) ; Service Western A. 2d 1956). (10th v. Andrew, 229 F. Cir. 2d elementary Appellee-Plaintiff chosen to is could have It only been sue could also have one the two defendants. She against levy judgment tort on a either chosen to execution against thereof either received full satisfaction feasor and provided one full satisfaction. She could she received part from one tortfeasor in consid received satisfaction have proceeded a not to and for the covenant execute eration against remaining judgment tortfeasor. balance Likewise, not have executed covenant she could sue as to against joint proceeded and potential tortfeasor the other. one 53, App. ; Parry Marsh, (1903) 201 31 Ind. 67 N. E. Black v. Crull, App. 77, (1913) ; 101 N. Mfg. 56 Ind. E. 756 Co. v. DeBolt, 600, 50 (1943); 221 Ind. E. 2d N. 875 Bedwell v. Ry. Gossett, 525, L. Co. v. C. C. and St. 172 Ind. Cleveland (1909). 87 723 N. E. agreement

Therefore, receipt loan in the so-called all of options open Plaintiff-Appellee. these The loan agreement question receipt does not conflict with represents permissible innovation but in them rules these Plaintiff-Appellee. agree- receipt The fact this loan openly into the trial entered before does not affect ment was validity. its Supreme manifested the Ohio Court in

As Edwards v. good Bros., supra, policy are there Passarelli reasons to sup payment concept, port least the advance is severly injured person plain economic need of and the 180 system.

delays railroads this tech our court The used nique years ago. Detroit, and in FELA 30 See Toledo cases Pitzer, 494, Ironton 42 Law E. Railroad Ohio Abs. 61 N. v. receiving concept payments (1943). 93 2d of advance widespread acceptance liability insurance the bar industry. 1967 American Bar Association See Section Negligence Insurance, Compensation Proceedings, Law seq. 499 et page

Although hand the case at involves more than the advance payment concept, principle is involved to the extent that receipt agreement put plaintiffs the loan into the hands much litigation needed funds at a critical time while the of her case proceeded. recog- receipt agreements

The use of loan have also been nized in Compensation claims under the Indiana Workmen’s 106, Wakefield, App. Act. Weis 111 See v. Ind. 38 N. E. 2d (1941). Snyder Miller, also See Ind. N. E. (1939). 2d 985 jurisdictions

These from authorities Indiana other cer tainly provide agreement receipt for the use of a loan among

use of the same is neither joint contribution assignment tortfeasors anor of a cause of action sound ing cases in tort. See collected in 1 A.L.R. 607 A.L.R. A.L.R. and 157 1261.

Appellant heavily relies Dehner on twin cases decided Trampe Supreme Wisconsin; Court Tele v. Wisconsin phone 210, Co., (1934), 214 252 Wis. N. 675W. and 214 Wis. (1934). 252 are N. W. 678 There two immediate con First, agreement trasts between that case and this. was kept was not the point secret which case here. This repeatedly emphasized opinion. Second, law joint differs from Indiana on contribution Wisconsin tort Supreme Trampe In the Wisconsin feasors. Court condemned plaintiff joint and between the one of the settlement two tort placed disproportionate it feasors because share of the policy wrongdoer thus defeated on the other burden Indiana). (but not followed Wisconsin of .contribution argues Trampe held apparently Appellant Dehner authority defeating, is agreement in Wisconsin invalid contends, promotes which, agreement here for similar authority its either Trampe here is not contribution. reasoning or result. 2d Corp., 2d 160 P. Pellett 26 Cal.

In v. Sonotone joint agreement one (1945), plaintiff into an with entered receive and was to he received tortfeasor under which $5.00 agreed levy judgment. He not to execu- if he secured $10.00 joint Supreme particular Court tortfeasor. as to this tion of California stated: “* * * expressly plaintiff not or neces- did since right relinquish his claim or sary implication of of or abandon agree payments action, accept the in satisfaction or according agreement claims, to its terms his since pleaded as a defense to the the covenantee not be could action, agreement by plaintiff he was that and since levy property covenantee of the execution

would not judgment payment upon him for demand or make any opinion closely thereof, that it is we are of the portion legal sue, that its effect should be to a covenant akin an instrument as similar, that it is not such to be held will joint 2d feasors.” 160 P. operate other tort to release at 787. reached in a similar result was case Farrell v.

This same App., Bridge Co., (1938), 2d Kingshighway Mo. 117 S. W. Transport Whitfield, Co. v. Motor Tex. Civ. in Gillette (1945). App., 2d 186 S. W. throughout case, the record in

In various forms antagonism which complains of the existed between it and This attributed so-called loan re NIPSCO. However, cursory agreement. .ceipt even a examination by NIPSCO defenses filed and Dehner would stages they of this readily that from the earliest indicate case engaged effort to blame each in an extensive other. Such foreign litigation conduct is not defended more than one party. legal requirement There no must that co-defendants friendly defending litigation a lawsuit. The realities of clearly frequently unfriendly. indicate that are co-defendants

Unquestionably given Plaintiff-Appellee Otis could have Appellant NIPSCO a covenant not to sue consideration $50,000.00 against proceeded Dehner. could have She given against a covenant not to execute trial. NIPSCO after given against She could have a covenant not to sue or execute accepted NIPSCO trial. She before could have a so-called payment advance from NIPSCO before trial.

Admittedly arrangement between Otis and NIPSCO represents a is, blend of the however, above rules. legally It permissible blending of contrary them which is not public policy.

PROPOSITION II argues damages that the are To excessive. consider point necessary it is summarize, for us to with all infer- appellee, ences most favorable to testimony from extensive damages. Regina plaintiff, Otis, related to The was a house- children, wife and the mother 14of 12 of whom lived at home explosion. years date of age. was She theOn age United female, States Life Tables white has a life years. expectancy explosion of 38.2 An occurred in the front yard of a friend whereupon across the street plaintiff helping went to the of the friend and house her remove neighbor pets opened her from her The house. a cellar door. inferno. It was like an Plaintiff was blown across the room. neighbor lady up. was burned Plaintiff was blown against away; a wall feet her coat was her, burned off her clothing burned, and her hair other was on fire. The entire plaintiff attempted get aflame and open- house was out got ing neighbor Plaintiff out and saw window. her still driveway. burning extinguished Plaintiff in the the flames of attempted her run home but clothes She snow. police hospital. hospital Dr. cut her Gentile took At last re- off the was the she remainder of her clothes which care unit membered in the constant for some She was time. days. pain. stayed hospital 59 and was in in the extreme She doctors, Doctors was three She catheterized and treated they Gentile, attempted hospital Brucker. In the Clark and egg yolk treatments, which the neither of silver nitrate They performed plaintiff pain. a could tolerate because surgical procedure upon re- called debridement burns which They grafted square pain. sulted in terrific inches of plaintiff Her skin. feet scarred and cannot wear stock- ings tingling a has scars on neck which cause sensation. She gets it feels as if a face. When she nervous or tense crawling people million ants are on her. feels as if are She staring constantly. sleeps at her alone. She She hates fitfully. fire, two has bad dreams of the sometimes or She per problem not im- times week. The with dreams does three prove. a still at the house and there is still hole She lives same neighbor’s where the home serves to remind her is which personality changes, experienced she of the fire. She has noise, chil- overreacts to loud she doesn’t like to leave her tragedy. alone for fear of another She isn’t as dren interested family depression. was suffers in home and she before. She psychiatrist, expensive. a which is has seen She testimony explosion plaintiff There was that before the was things person happy-go-lucky who took stride. Since the verge seems on the of a explosion she nervous breakdown. Brucker, plastic surgeon, plaintiff Dr. testified had second degree graft performed and third burns. He the skin on about square body. plaintiff’s performed inches of He also cleaning surgical debridement which is of the wound. A skin graft will never withstand wear and tear tolerated normal initially are tender and Grafted skin skin. Grafts sore. will normal skin. Infection is as well as harder to treat in not heal grafted grafted skin is skin. diminished Sensation because (the regeneration good. area nerve is not It takes the donor days to graft) area from about skin used in the than people complain area heal. Most about the donor more applied. supply the skin is is diminished where Blood elasticity contraction is also There is some diminished. tightening more vulnerable of the scar area is scar. The usualy develops. Scar tissue trauma. plaintiff

Dr. testified hos- Gentile at the time entered the breathing pital experiencing difficulty she was because from the fires. At burns her face. She had inhaled fumes body plaintiff’s that time sus- estimated 45 to had he 50% degree experienced tained second or third burns. excru- She ciating large narcotics, pain which necessitated amounts analgesics pain given intravenous medication. She electrolytes. body’s He fluids and blood to maintain whole experience think she will ever to erase the doesn’t be able mind; probably her her she will live with it the rest of from permanent endings The scars are and nerve de- life. suggested plaintiff Main, psy- stroyed. Dr. Gentile see Dr. prognosis found it difficult make a for Dr. Gentile to chiatrist. she, people badly plaintiff most who are burned as because Therefore, the do amount doctors not have vast of medi- die. knowledge comparison. healing her areas cal for of scar gets probably contract and worsen as she older. will degree In third burns charred. She the skin is cauterized or pain hospital. in pages in of the hos- constant the Twelve pital drugs, narcotics, fluids chart disclose the intravenous by plaintiff. and blood received

This verdict must be considered in terms the statement Kavanagh App. Butorac, this court Ind. (1967) 2d : N. E. “By nature, injuries personal individual, to are in- the

capable of a more rule for measurement of dam- definite ages. unique Each action and it must is be so treated and peculiar on the facts to that matter. determined Because problem our seeks law to individualize the solution the torts, properly compensating the victim of no overall ex- every applies pedient case. gen- then, “For a law sets formula our common the guidelines victim, compensating eral each in its own way weighed to be trier of facts considered compensation Because determine what the total will be. personal this unique is nature of each case and since the decision particular courts have set of facts our said given discretion,’ trier facts is to be ‘sound and and damages cannot be defined ‘liberal discretion’ where calculated with mathematical .certainty by any or exact standard, (.citing cases) foregoing “With mind examined rec- we have appeal. Appellant ord and briefs in this has documented judgment numerous cases to far show that the instant says exceeds what as he ‘in or has been Indiana elsewhere’ injury.’ ‘comparable allowed for what submits to be We he say eye are not able to is the loss of an in one case worth just the same or about the If such a same another case. system such (and express is to be desired we no sentiment for idea) legislation. it must come from Our common law requires finally each merits. case to rest on its own by many expressed “This has been well authorities and language Supreme we call attention to the of the Court of Louisiana: ‘* * * upon may relied be similar in each of [C]ases injury

them involves loss of an arm, a similar such as a broken eye eyes, or or the loss of some member of the body. Thereafter, however, similarity ceases each different, case adequacy inadequacy and the or award should be determined the facts and circumstances peculiar pose pur- case under primary consideration. The judge jury fixing per- the award in a injury adequately compensate injured sonal case is to injury person for his under the facts shown to in his exist (citing case) case.’ duty “We would have it understood that devolves on damages. a trial court to determine the amount of Whether jury not, appel- is assisted a court review on the late level should be the same. The determination of the required say amount is not our decision. We are might what decision have been if we our were trier of the facts.”

186 damages say assessed cannot as a matter of law that

We grossly outrageously as to induce excessive were and so cor partiality or they prejudice, result belief that were the Powers, 138 Ind. Transit, Kampo Inc. v. ruption as defined 141, App. (1965). 211 N. E. 2d 781 Appellant Dehner Indiana cases cited Transit, supra, Kampo question of excessiveness 643, App. 86 N. E. Optical Reed, 119 Ind. Continental Co. v. for a Kampo $55,000.00 verdict (1949). a involved 2d 306 way in no and is was affirmed broken neck which verdict Optical authority involved Continental for Dehner here. factually privacy $20,000.00 verdict for invasion to this case. irrelevant v. Kavanagh Kampo Butorac cases

In addition involving recently cases number of this court has affirmed injuries. Truck In Clemans personal awards for substantial Inc. v. 404, App. E. 2d 351 N. Lines, Vaughn, 139 Ind. arm of an involved for loss (1966), $90,000.00 was a verdict of App. Greenfield, Ind. In the elbow. Hollowell v. above $55,000.00 verdict (1966), 344, we affirmed E. 2d 537 N. Indian fingers year In old child. of an loss of four Inc. v. 572, Moorman, App. 189 N. E. apolis Transit, 134 Ind. (1963), stated: 2d 111 this court damages justify question order of excessive “On the damages ground, assessed such the amount a reversal ‘on outrageous impress as to the court at appear be so must enormity.’ R. R. Co. New York Cent. “first blush” with its 457, Johnson, Admx., (1955), 234 Ind. 127 N. E. 2d etc.

v. Co. v. Kemper (1899), 603; R. 153 Ind. Louisville, etc. v. Nichols, (1921), Director, 931; Hines, Admr. 53 N. E. 445, 453, App. 130 N. E. 140. 76 Ind. jury, gen aware of apparently was the are “We, as depreciation cheapening the constant eral inflation Johnson, Admx., Co. money. York Cent. R. R. New App. (1956), 127 v. Moore Ind. etc., supra; Hahn et al. 900, 134 705. N. E. 2d E. 2d 133 N. * * * judge remembered that the trial must also ‘It passion there was whether position determine in a

187 prejudice existent, unduly the such as would influence jury assessing passed damages motion when he on the for ” (our new trial.’ emphasis) knowledge It is a matter of common that burns the most are painful personal injuries. severe and of all The extensive pain primary associated with severe burns is one of the rea among highest sons that burn cases result the awards for injuries. personal Mfg. Hulke International Co., See v. 14 Ill. 5, ; Long App. (1957) 2d 142 N. E. 2d 717 ester v. Island Holf Co., (2d 1966); Minneapolis 360 2d Cir. Larsen R. F. 369 v. Company (Minn.), (1968) ; 163 N. Gas W. 2d 755 Pan Amer Corp. (Wyo.), (1963) Like ; ican Petroleum v. 381 P. 2d 70 Peoples Bank and Trust American National Co. v. Gas and 163, App. Co., (1963), 42 Ill. 2d 191 E. 2d N. 628 Coke Camden, 450, Wytupeck 25 v. N. J. A. 2d (1957). 136 887 Recently, Boles, App. in Allison v. 141 592, Ind. 230 N. E. quoted (1967), approval 784 with 2d excellent state applicable of ment the rule Chancellor Kent in Coleman v. Johns, Southwick, 45, 253, 9 6 (1812) N. Y. Am. Dec. 254 : “The rule well established in this state that the where recovery dispute reasonable amount of is in under evi- dence, the amount awarded cannot be considered excessive scope if is within the of the evidence before the Court. Company Bend, First Bank Trust & South Executor Spiro (1954), 478, Estate App. 484, Tellson 124 Ind. E. 496. N. 2d judgment “The amount in this case does not seem excessive, recognize to be when we that the trial court was aware, court, as is this of the economy current inflated depreciated general value of the dollar. The rule of recognized applicable which been law a has the one for over years, is found in hundred be the case of Coleman v. Johns, (1812), 45, N. Y. Southwick Am. Dec. Kent stated: wherein Chancellor enough say, opinion that in court, ‘It is not damages high are given too and that we would have judgment jury, judg- much less. It is the ment and not the ' damages court, is to assess the in actions * * * injuries personal damages, torts and The there- mankind, fore, so as to must be excessive strike at first beyond measure, blush, rageous, actuated being all and out- as unreasonable manifestly jury show to have been and such corruption. partiality, prejudice, passion, or outrageous damages flagrantly short, must In line, extravagant, court cannot to draw undertake they ascertain the which to not standards have ” excess/ very apply old here are indeed wine. rules which we damages produced question of the The evidence on any Appellee Appellant offered evidence and neither the damages Appellee’s respect. stands Thus the evidence in this Indianapolis City et al. v. the court uncontested. before of al., App. 283, (1961). 2d 228 Ind. 168 N. E. et Walker III PROPOSITION give complains the refusal of court’s to its tendered 10, which stated:

instruction number you you plaintiff in favor of the are “If find instructed include, your damage, you may in consideration of following: any of the Expenses or to incurred in incurred be the future husband, nor plaintiff’s plaintiff’s either in connection with value of services The management otherwise, nor, of or the house plaintiff’s companionship Any to husband or loss of may you any purpose family, add amount for the of nor example them, party or make an to punishing either prevent further accidents.” to duty Indiana that unless the law of was the

It is give precisely the instruction trial court as re in is no error its quested, refusal. there Carbon v. App. 369, 228 Johnson, Ind. N. E. 2d 52 (1967). refusing give error no reversible instruction There though they the issues even not within elements state as to correctly. proposition of law Coleman abstract App. 220 N. Chapman, (1966). Ind. E. 2d 285 give Appellee’s did court instruction which stated: upon preponderance evidence, “If a fair the in- argument counsel, you structions of the Court and the plaintiff find that the is entitled to recover from defend- ants, them, you damages, or either of will assess the for personal Regina injuries, any, plaintiff, if suffered Otis, adequate fairly compensate in an amount her for any personal injuries may which she suffered. have necessary It plaintiff is not prove dollar values any bodily injuries may which she have suffered. It is proved bodily injuries if sufficient she has and then it is your duty money your to assess an amount judgment adequate compensation will be a fair and there- you you Regina for. I instruct if find that Otis is en- your titled to recover in this action verdict should award adequate compensation her fair and and all of the following damage they proved by items of if been have preponderance proximately fair evidence re- negligence sulted from the of the defendant or defendants: Physical suffering pain may 1. which she have suf- past may reasonably fered in to suffer expected or which she as a of this future result occurrence. Any disability bodily 2. function may which she have suffered since may or which occurrence she suffer in the future as a result of this occurrence. Any disfigurement may 3. which plain- have resulted to tiff because of the occurrence and this you in connection may any permanent disfigurement consider whether or physical and, effects have resulted therefrom so, if include compensation any permanent disfigurement for such your verdict. Any suffering 4. plaintiff mental which the has suffered or will suffer in the future as a result of this occurrence. By suffering, I anxiety, mental mean anguish mental distinguished and distress of mind as physical pain from or physical suffering. pain or determining In damages, any, the amount of if to which plaintiff entitled, flowing would be proximately from the complained of, your duty accident eration her it is to take into consid- age, life, and her physical condition in pain anguish, any, and mental if suffered, ques- which she injuries tion of whether the with which she is afflicted are permanent, any temporary or disfigurement, as the result accident; short, and, in of the award her amount, such an fairly reasonably recover, and as will if she is entitled to any, damages, injuries if

compensate her which for the and has sustained. she may your you plaintiff, be no If find for verdict adequate compensation

more no less than fair and they damage outlined, provided that I items of have evidence, proven by preponderance fair of the have been you and provided find from the in con- that evidence formity to recover plaintiff is all instructions that entitled with action, and not in of Two Hundred in this excess ($235,000.00).” Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars given pleadings within the The instruction was a cor applicable Indiana law. Columbia rect See statement 617, Grocery Schlesinger, App. 102 Ind. 200 N. E. Co. (1936). court in instruction number 12 also obvious the trial

It is to the evidence introduced specifically limited the award at Ry. Cleveland, Clark, L. C. St. Co. v. 51 Ind. In C. trial. this court stated: App. E. 97 N. expressly the instruction be that will observed lim- “[I]t damages assessing jury in

its the consideration of subject damages. instruction, relating It pre- will evidence sumed obeyed jury that damages, only p. fixing amount considered the evi- subject.” having legal relation 417. dence language 12 stated Plaintiff’s instruction substance Jury Instructions, Chapter 9, adopted in Indiana Pattern refusing Dehner’s in- find no error tendered 9.01. We § number struction 10. IV

PROPOSITION objection, admission, over claims error in the piece pipe 12 inch re- plaintiff’s Exhibit 16 which was gas line. There was evidence that from the same moved taken main from which Exhibit was in- section the same and at the contract same Dehner under stalled gas explosion the where Dehner installed line the when time occurred. The welder for Dehner the time who worked at gas question the line in he did all was installed testified that welding question. ques- the in in section line The line tion from was Plant the intersection of Hale Avenue Lexington. Old explosion Mill and occurred between points. those welding two Dehner’s did all welder between points. those two The welder testified he used same skill making all the welds. There was an abundance of testi- mony jury from explosion which the could found this have was caused points. a defective weld between those two plaintiff’s There was also evidence that Exhibit 16 was an- weld, other working defective done the same welder contractor, Dehner, the same i.e. at the same time and under the same expert testimony relating contract. Dehner offered explosion. fact, tests of other welds on both sides of the In expert Dehner’s counsel asked his own witness at trial: “Q. Again your opinion your testimony it is because similarity the remarkable of the welds to north particular you south tiff’s (Plain- of this weld which tested 15,) your opinion it is I it Exhibit take that those

welds are similar?

“A. Yes.” plaintiff’s When Exhibit was offered her counsel made following offer: “Now, Honor, Your with the same limitation and for the purpose, purpose showing same not for the that Plain- tiff’s Exhibit No. 16 was the weld explo- broke any way sion or contributed to explosion but merely showing purpose limited type of work welding line, that went into the of the entire plaintiff now offers Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 16.” Tennant, employed by Mr. Charles a welder NIPSCO testi- part fied Exhibit 16 came from of the line laid question. under the contract with NIPSCO here in Logansport Valley & Coate, Wabash Gas Co. 29 Ind. App. 299, (1902), 64 N. E. 38 resulting an action from gas other explosion. plaintiff of The introduced evidence sys- pipe explosion places other in the from

leaks before page 304: tem. This court stated at was not irrele- “The now under consideration evidence system in It the condition vant. tended show dispute.” Seal, In Farm Mut. Ins. Co. Ind. v. Bureau Ind. of App. 269, (1962), 179 N. 2d 760 this court held that E.

admission of evidence that a similar transactions as thing particular of was done is within the discretion the trial court. Unless there has an abuse of dis been point this court will not reverse on that alone. See cretion also, Exploring Irish, Mining Alexandria and Co. v. 16 Ind. & Chicago, App. 534, (1896), St. P. R. E. 680 and L. N. (1893). Spilker, Co. 134 Ind. 33 N. E. relating Appellant Dehner evidence to other offered subject properly

welds on the same and therefore the line pursued by parties to all the this case.

There was no reversible error the admission of Exhibit 16.

PROPOSITION V

Next, complains admission, objection, over defendant’s NIPSCO’s Exhibit which was a contract dated July 16, 1951: Agreement Form

“Short Wayne, Fort Ind. agreement, day This made and entered into this 16th 1951, by July, Northern Indiana Public and between the Company, corporation, party of an Indiana the first Service Dehner, (hereinafter ‘Company’) part and John called Wayne Indiana, of 1206 Clark Street Fort Contractors Inc. part (hereinafter called the party the second ‘Con- tractor’), WITNESSETH: mutual and consideration covenants That for contained, parties agreements herein hereto cov- agree as follows: enant (1) agrees The Contractor covenants and as follows: labor, To furnish tools, equipment all necessary gas construct supervision and install mains under services and/or Company’s Engineer of the Gas Inspector, or accordance with the terms and conditions of the attached Specifications. Contract and (2) That all materials furnished hereunder shall be the very respective best of the kinds and the said work shall be done in a first class workmanlike manner and to the satis- Company. faction of the guarantee (3) pay To every to each and one of the employees Contract, dependents and to the of such employees, engaged employed upon or in and about the

work done said agreement, Contractor under this com- pensation provided by any for in and Compen- Workmen’s Laws, Occupational sation Employer’s Liability Workmen’s Diseases Acts or applicable; Acts and to insure and keep liability pay Compensation insured his to under such Compensation Laws, Workmen’s Diseases Acts or Occupational Workmen’s Employer’s Liability Acts in some com- pany or liability association authorized pay to insure to compensation under said laws and to deliver a certified copy copies policy or Company said insurance upon to the request. (4) obtain, contractor The shall keep and in force dur- ing contract, performance the term of this and the of the hereunder, work a certificate from the Industrial Board of showing the State of Indiana plied that the contractor has com- 5, and with Sections 68 and 69 of the Indiana Workmen’s Compensation Section paragraphs (a), Act (b) (c) and 27 of The Indiana Occupational Workmen’s Dis- Act, eases of and shall forthwith deliver to copies the Owner pay certificates. Contractor said Said shall compensa- all tion, fees, physician’s hospital fees, nurses’ charges, and expenses injury on account burial of the any or death of Contractor, arising employee of such out of in the and/or performance by of the of the work course covered this con- by required The Indiana Compensation tract as Workmen’s Occupational Act, any Indiana Workmen’s Act, Diseases or Compensation Act, Occupational Workmen’s Workmen’s Act, Employer’s Liability or applicable, Diseases Law and and indemnify any and save harmless the shall all Owner from liability pay the same. to any brought and all (5) against To defendant suits any by employee Company or person other (whether em- not) by damages or ployed Contractor for alleged or through by the work done or claimed been caused to have indemnify agreement, and to by under this the Contractor against all claim Company from and save harmless the and Contractor; arising done out of the work claims or also to demands or any discharge or and all claims liquidate pay, and any persons damage all and injury, to loss or of, growing or incidental by, out property caused agreement, includ- under done Contractor work private damages for the obstruction ing driveways, claims for all including alleys, all costs of and and streets attorney’s event of In fees. suits and reasonable give immediate notice shall the Contractor or claim accident agrees out to take further Contractor Company. The to the satisfactory indemnifying insurance maintain copies copy thereof to or policy certified or Company, the upon request. Company to the be delivered day July, 23rd upon work on the (6) said start To the-day complete same on before 1951, and to -, 19-. agrees pay Company the Con- covenants (7) The labor, upon materials and re- work all of said tractor in accordance with the attached invoice itemized ceipt contract anof completion Upon ($-) as follows: Dollars furnishing Company satisfactory the work evidence free and clear of all mechanic’s same is possibility thereof. and the liens and other binding agreement upon shall not the Com- (8) This approval of the President or a Vice pany until President Company hereon and attested is written Secre- Secretary. tary Assistant or an WHEREOF, parties here- hereto have IN WITNESS day year hands and seals the first above unto their set written. objected:

Dehner objects to John Dehner defendant introduction with “The regard 21 Exhibit No. and moves defendant’s of 3, 4, paragraphs and 5 of the Short thereto that Form Agreement. regard paragraphs of each these move with We separately they paragraphs that be portions of excluded all, prejudicial reason, by each of them first of :the indemnity defendant, and insurance to this references Inc.; Dehner, paragraphs each of the that is imma- John

195 by not and is Mrs. Otis case filed terial to the issues parties by any or of the pleadings filed embraced relevant to the by any owing pleadings, is not raised of those owing course of the in the plaintiff to the duties agreements. under execution of the work object at separately which is found the letter Now we 1951, July 13, 21, page No. dated the first of the Exhibit allegations negligence question and the of material predates plaintiff’s complaint, letter and that the agreement of the contract embodies the contract and the merged in the terms parties and that the letter is contract.” it was in the case 21 to the issues

If Exhibit was relevant sought to properly By answer admitted. its amended employees were ground any liability its on the be relieved of responsible was not that Dehner furnished to NIPSCO and NIPSCO; it also adequacy specified procedures for the be- responsibility. The contract contended NIPSCO had full pre- highly to these relevant tween NIPSCO and Dehner was issues raised Dehner. cise in the contract does

The reference to insurance In Pickett inadmissible. itself render- the .contract (1968), Kolb, 449, 105 our 250 237 N. E. 2d v. Ind. Supreme Court stated: necessarily proof that “It follows if insurance neces- sary cause of to establish either a action or defense under * * * may competent issues, is shown. ‘In other liability proof

words, insurance and of itself is not may principle expanded not be but such admissible extent competent excluding as a means of it serves otherwise which is relevant to the evidence issues involved may think that a trial We do not court arbi- trial. competent trarily merely otherwise and relevant evidence exclude ground it will reveal an insurance on the car- page 108. is involved.” rier Deckard, also, City Terre Haute v. 243 Ind. 183 See (1962); Watson, App. 59, Rust 141 Ind. 2d 815 E.N. ; Thomas, (1966) Van Drake v. App. Ind. E. 2d N. ; (1942) p. and A.L.R. 2d 784. 2d 878 E. 38 N.

196

PROPOSITION VI overruling error in its Motion Mistrial .claims regard 28. Exhibit to admission of defendant NIPSCO’s gave following cautionary instruction: The Court you any “You are instructed that are to refer- .consider indemnity only any agreement ences in this contract insurance to agreement carry insurance and indemnify party may may another or not relate to the relationship defendants, Dehner, Inc., between the John Company. Northern Indiana Public Service You are purpose. regard consider such In references other by against complaint defendants, to the Mrs. Otis filed party carry whether a not did or did or did not insurance or did indemnify bearing absolutely the other has no or rele- vancy on the .claim filed Mrs. Otis. You are to con- they may may such sider references the contract as relationship not relate to the between defendants.” Dehner then moved for mistrial which the trial court over adequately point This been dis ruled. has considered in our Proposition In court’s cussion of Y. addition we believe the Pumphrey cautionary adequate. Tan instruction was See v. ; Gerking nehill, App. 468, (1937) 104 8 2d 414 Ind. N. E. Johnson, (1942); 44 E. 2d 90 Home Ind. N. Weir, Telephone App. Co. v. 53 Ind. N. E. (1913).

PROPOSITION VII overruling objections suggests made

Dehner next error in witnesses, expert questions Dehner’s Dehner to to two of on cross-exam- II C. McLean Harris A. Goodwin and Edward testimony pertinent witness ination NIPSCO. is as follows: Goodwin Singer “Q. you that Professor testified here when Were pipe, that section of him under oath man told if a Kinsmoor, Broadway at was buried one coating he him? protective on it wouldn’t believe a with the ob- please, this is court If the MR. KRUECKEBERG: object morning and we

jection similar to the one not in evidence. facts it assumes because jury. I have leave MR. McNAGNY: We’ll asked the up the cross-examination type reporter wrong, corrected. stand I will Singer, if I am Professor testified was asking if that simply this witness I am agree not. or with it he would whether him answer if he knows. Let THE Overruled. COURT: hypothetical question? A. Is this a

Q. you If like. hypo- you way it if it a want to answer A. do me Which question? thetical My ques- Q. question, an Why you sir? ask don’t let me you agree expert examined who with tion is this. Would University professor at the pipe, is a that a man who testimony oath under Illinois, he wouldn’t believe and said tape coating buried with that was that from the foreman agree agree that statement? you with or not on it? Would say ? A. Did he that morn- objection this This other

MR. KRUECKEBERG: Snyder. to Mr. ing, I think that was attributed I Professor mean my mistake That is MR. McNAGY: testimony typed up, having say, his Singer. I am IAs also, save that for can you and we to do I invite jury mistaken. if I am argument with the if knows. Let him answer he Overruled. THE COURT: it. A. I will answer right, sir.

THE All COURT: Singer dry knows about Professor know what A. I don’t cleaning. question? Q. you please I Witness, answer the would Mr. question agree would you or with that have asked would you not? you question that state the hear the witness I didn’t A. allege, you made. stated he that moment, I asked for a sir. Q. you back now come Would you agree or would you with that statement not? you would yes no. or may answer You the statement. hear I A. didn’t Q. giving you asking you I am now. I am assume that professor University at Illinois said he would not job

believe foreman who said oath that he on the under it, agree tape coating you buried that with him or not if on would with that? he said Judge. hypothesis, A. That is a you you question

THE COURT: Can or ? answer can’t I A. Can it: answer

THE COURT: Yes. Q. yes no, can agree You answer it or sir. You can either you agree. don’t agree.

A. I wouldn’t Q. being And if a constantly man is a craftsman he is speed pushed for so he doesn’t even have a chance to passes, make ? three is his work bad please, MR. KRUECKEBERG: evidence If the court there is no excepting McNagny’s testimony Mr. that this man being pushed constantly speed make we will object because it assumes a fact not evidence. cross-examination, THE COURT: This is him let answer if he can. Despite question A. hypothetical ques- the fact is a tion, way. will I answer it this If man is a craftsman pushed would refuse he to be because he could walk off the job get job liking and another more his to because there is pride part a on the of the craftsman in the welds that he makes.” testimony pertinent of the witness McLean: “Q. you McLean, Mr. put- if were the contractor who was

ting you responsible good the work and for job you you inspector workmanlike was not and sibility asked an who knew engineer you might go spring if trained ahead you might, you you respon- think no said would had he springing? is MR. FRUECHTENICHT: Your Honor. We There no that, evidence to going object question. are to any There isn’t MR. McNAGNY: evidence whatever he was gas spring company to ever this line. told That was is what Dehner’s decision. That the fact is. John pure That MR. FRUECHTENICHT: —well—- you question; have if MR. McNAGNY: We have made a an objection, make it. objection I MR. FRUECHTENICHT: made on the ground question implicit that the contains within its conclu- jury sions and fact which and it is not in evidence are before this objectionable for that reason. answer, THE Let him he can. COURT: if my contact, job A. If he were contact on the with company it, I and he told me to do would do it. Q. gone my question. you I That wasn’t said have you spring inspector no him it and and told wished to he had you you objection, responsibility? do then feel had no my point. That is is no MR. FRUECHTENICHT: There anybody case that from Dehner evidence in this Mr. went said, ‘Sir, spring May want this. McBride and we There is no evidence. we?’ anyone gas McNAGNY: There’s no MR. company evidence from the spring pipe. him It told is Dehner’s men gas pushed weren’t company it into the trench. There working on that line.

men you question is, Do know what THE COURT: Mr McLean? wrong. thought correctly. A. I I I answered answered it responsibility springing

I think I have would the line.” by setting opinion burdened this have forth the We entire testimony Goodwin verbatim of the witness from Dehner’s remotely only objection preserve any that could brief. The object because it assumes a is “We will fact not in error evi- expert consulting gas Goodwin was an witness dence.” The background technologist experience. extensive with His testimony including welding range covered wide tech- direct engineering installing gas problems in niques and the tests on the other welds on had made this line. main. He .certainly Welding may or science art which be the is testimony. witnesses, expert Both subject McLean and of expert qualified Goodwin, witnesses who were were give opinion acceptance evidence. The entitled is opinion evidence within the sound discretion such 200 except the trial court appeal which will not be disturbed on Hutchison, of abuse. Linton-Summit Coal Co. v. showing

upon 369, 111 (1953). 32 Ind. N.E. 819 2d No abuse is shown 2 here. scope gen expert

The cross-examination of an witness erally Hypo permitted broader than of other witnesses. that questions may

thetical used on such cross-examina be given may opinion expert tion and the of an tested be on cross-examination either omissions or additions original hypothetical question completely new propriety technique statement of facts. The is well Co. v. Louisville, Ry. Albany, Chicago illustrated in New Falvey, (1885), Ind. N. E. 389 where direct age examination plaintiff the witness testified as to the age bystander. and on cross-examination was asked the of a Taylor also, Taylor, See (1910). 174 Ind. N. E. v. hypothetical question Such a on cross-examination of an ex pert may facts of which there is include some evidence or may fairly inferred from evidence. Wheatcraft Myers, App. 371, 107 (1914). 57 Ind. N. E. 81

There was other evidence from which it could have been speed inferred that with which working Dehner was complete pipeline the construction of this could have been a defective weld. expert factor There was testimony of undercutting in this weld which could indicate the weld was There evidence made too fast. was from expert Dehner’s own only passes there two made on the weld which broke good workmanship required welding and that passes. three expert testimony causing There other the weld explosion welding passes. had two preserved Dehner has no regard reversible error with quoted testimony its witness Goodwin on cross-exami- nation. expert McLean witness was an engineer industrial with training. experience and

extensive He testified on direct exam- including range subjects stresses on ination on a broad regarding gas where the the weld this He also testified line. agree- explosion On he indicated direct examination occurred. by Dehner, Singer, expert called ment Professor another with strength question. regarding of the weld the relative Likewise, testimony witness with reference single objection any- McLean, up not there a sets is thing for us to consider. specifica-

We, therefore, find under this no reversible error tion.

PROPOSITION VIII regard testimony

Dehner next claims error to Rohrer, witness Carl Plaintiff-Appellee H. called witness on cross-examination NIPSCO: “Q. welding job What about out there? How much

has the Company Northern spent Indiana Public Service repair job? to the Dehner Objection. MR. I KRUECKEBERG: don’t think relevant.

THE Let COURT: him if he answer knows.

UpA. approximately $20,000.00. has been date Q. they Is it not a fact that were there to check installations private they nothing homes and that had to do whatever job? with the Dehner MR. KRUECKEBERG: We would like to know whether this witness knows that information before testifies. he you know, THE COURT: If Mr. Rohrer.

MR. I KRUECKEBERG: think he should be if asked he does know. Judge already MR. McNAGNY: The has asked him. Obviously, A. I since I per- wasn’t there have no absolute knowledge. practice sonal I know our it was to facilitate the work push contractor than rather to ask him to. large gas goes three-quarter pipe main under small service temporarily to the customer’s home to be removed the main pipes. until he lowered under line these smaller this, assuming, work, I am facilitate his This would this morn- three men he talked about on those case ing. answer, to strike We move KRUECKEBERG: MR. Judge. he doesn’t know. He indicated Honor, are the Your I believe we McNAGNY: MR. being right object responsive, to it ones so if that question. have is the only objection proceed I will next Alright. THE COURT: gas Q. company Rohrer, you if the have been asked Mr. qualified, him is that Dehner and found

checked this welder correct?

A. Yes. they Q. words, you checked his welds In other today kind of

good. welds on your inspector? if the same he made Would we be here you sitting pipe that he made front of No. A. object, calls Your Honor. It We FRUECHTENICHT: MR. highly witness and is conclusion from this

for an obvious improper. THE Let him answer. COURT: There is no indication he knows KRUECKEBERG: MR. anything about that. The answer is no. A. Q. any why Rohrer, there reason the Defendant Mr. any Inc., it wanted Dehner, couldn’t have made tests John obligations necessary carry out its under

to or felt contract? object. question To which we will MR. FRUECHTENICHT: regard respective speaks itself with contract The parties, Mr. Rohrer obligations is not thereunder interpret attorney not his function to the con- it is an tract point. at that Overruled, THE COURT: No, sir, none whatever.”

A.

2Ó3 general general objections. amade These series objections vague question appeal. any were too on raise ; Schoby Smith, (1968) App. 483, v. 142 Ind. N. E. 2d 495 235 , Beaty Donaldson, App. v. 200 Ind. N. E. 2d 233 136 269 (1964); 240, rson,Adm., Vanosdol, v. Hende 216 Ind. Receiver 22 N. (1939). E. 2d 812 general objection

A may evi where sustained patently Plank, dence is Ex. admissible on basis. v. Combs, 446, 84 App. (1926). 151 Ind. E. 342 There N. Healey are numerous cases to this Some effect. are: v. Healey, App. 155, (1952); 123 Ind. 109 E. 2d 101 N. Pepin, App. 427, Lautman v. 26 (1901); Ind. 59 N. E. 1073 Walters, App. 358, 141 (1956); Burks v. 127 Ind. N. E. 2d 872 Altmeyer v. Norris, App. 124 119 2d 31 Ind. N. E. (1953). examining party only party who, solely

The is the unresponsiveness, the basis of is entitled to testi have mony Strader, stricken. McCord Ind.

N. 2d (1949). E. party

A examining who is not cannot witness use motion objection strike as question a means of to a after it has been

answered. Robbins, Prudential Ins. Co. America v. App. 172, (1941). party Ind. 38 N. E. 2d 274 given wait until the.answer cannot is and then move Ziegler Tipton 249, to strike. App. Lumber 128 Co., Ind. (1958). 147 N. E. 679 2d The to motion strike a non- questioning present ground party must also a valid for the Yards, exclusion of the answer. v. Himsel Stock Kraft App. 238, 139 (1957). Ind. N. E. 2d regard

In to the motion to strike in Southern Indiana Gas Gerhardt, and Electric Co. v. 241 Ind. 172 N. E. 2d 204 Supreme (1961), specific, stated our Court such must be testimony strictly properly applica- is to the to which it limited The court added: ble. be error a court would to sustain “It too broad a striking competent testimony.

motion, relevant and thus out ** n * very concise sustained must be motions to be Such testimony go specific out.” to to light no revers- in authorities there was of these Examined sustaining to strike. error in not the motion ible Proposi- regard of both contentions Dehner to the under In Supreme in Court statement of our tions VII and VIII the (1962), E. is Monninger, 182 N. 2d 243 Ind. State v. highly relevant: position appellee opinion “It is our considered admitting in evi is settled that error

is correct for it well appeal where on is not available dence at trial complaining party evidence to substan submits tially the same effect.” including parties, introduced extensive All of Dehner relating precise evidence, including testimony expert to the proposition. subject under this matter considered IX PROPOSITION gave

NIPSCO tendered and the court instruction number 3 which states: Defendant, “The Northern Indiana Public Service Com- guilty negligence failing inspect pany, to cannot be Defendant, Dehner,

the work of the unless the Defendant guilty negligence Dehner, performance was the work.” objected: contrary 3No. is to law inasmuch as it “Instruction entirely pursuant possible weld have been made for the defendant, NIPSCO, and instructions of made inadequacy manner incompetent of the virtue said defendant, instructions, and the Northern Indiana Public negligent failing Company, inspect Service therefore adequate. instruction, to see whether weld suggests hand, that defendant Dehner would have the other defendant, negligent NIPSCO, in order for have been Furthermore, negligent. the instruction omits been have acceptance and use fact line consideration proximate NIPSCO was and of the could be result occurrence, acceptance knowledge if was with of the condi-

tion of the line.”

The above tendered instruction number 3 is a statement negli- i.e., aspect negligence, the law limited to a narrow gence failing inspect. v.

Appellant Harper 131, cites James, 246 Ind. 203 N. E. 2d v. Southern Colonization (1965); Burroughs Co., 96 Ind. App. 93, 173 Slagell v. (1932); Lester, N. E. 716 App. 125 Ind. 257, 123 (1955), mandatory N. E. 2d 923 all of which involve also cites Vance v. Appellant Wells, instructions. App. (1959), point

Ind. 159 N. E. 2d 586 which is more of Vance v. Wells in Appellee. light here for Examined certainly mandatory. struction number 3 is not necessary Appellant specif It is likewise for the Dehner to ically mandatory question raise the instruc nature an timely objection. Company tion in a Dorr, General Electric App. 442, (1966). obviously 140 Ind. 218 N. E. 2d 158 This was not done here.

PROPOSITION X gave

The court NIPSCO’s instruction number stated: you “I instruct impose upon that he law did not de- Company duty

fendant Northern Indiana Public Service every possible precaution to use prevent explo- the fire complained safety sion of. It was an insurer of the plaintiff. only required degree It the which was to use that of care person ordinary prudence used would have under the same or similar circumstances. you failed, If find alleged weld which in the

.complaint, employee was not made of the defendant Dehner with such care under reasonable the circumstances and negligence, any, proximate if was a plain- cause of the injuries, you further tiff’s find that the Defendant Company guilty Indiana Public Northern Service negligence failing properly inspect super- weld or

206: of, complained place time and construction at the’

Vise the charged negligence guilty any act of of other and was not in the you you cannot return complaint, then I instruct against Defendant plaintiff and the a verdict in favor of the_ also Company,' without Northern'Indiana, Service Public against the plaintiff and returning of in favor the a verdict Company, with- Public Service Indiana defendant Northern out also plaintiff and of returning in favor verdict against Dehner.” Defendant objected: Dehner To acceptance, of 2 the consideration “Instruction No. omits acceptance contrary law, as inasmuch to and is therefore Company and use of by Service Indiana Public Northern Company by could Public Service Northern Indiana line

.the complained of, if proximate occurrence imputed of the cause be they knowledge, the circumstances of actual or had existing.” general rule, acceptance relieve would not As a NIPSCO liability did Appellee Dehner’s work to unless from dangerous imminently In condition.

not result in an Nauracaj, App. Company 105 Ind. Furnace v. Holland 574, held that lack (1938), 2d this E. court N. injured party pre not did privity contractor and between “imminently object recovery was constructed where the clude also, Sandefur, 245 Ind. dangerous”. I. J. Case See regard general is (1964). rule 197 N. E. 2d 13 A.L.R. 2d 233 as follows: well stated exceptions non-liability rule of “One of the thing inherently constructed is is that if or contractor imminently dangerous, or if the contractor’s acts result dangerous imminently probable situation the natural or which, which, .consequences the inevitable or result of injury persons other than the contractee who be would acceptance of the work or structure con- after the therewith, liability likely contact to come in tractor are consequences negligent his act the contractor any extends as well to contractee but limited to the injury damage or receives person who direct third act.” of such result - gave properly In this context court also Dehner’s in- struction number which stated: complained solely “If the occurrence proximately from, 1) specification inappropriate resulted proce- dures Northern Indiana Public Company, 2) Service or

from the failure of Northern Indiana Public Service Com- specify pany appropriate procedures properly engi- line, 3) neer the Public or from the failure of Northern Indiana Company adequately qualify Service and test the you welds, if welder or find that it respon- retained sole sibility qualify to so and test the welder welds, and the 4) from appropriate failure to furnish materials; and, you If find further that Northern Indiana Public Service negligent Company therein, such omissions could not chargeable Dehner, to John Inc.” given Dehner’s instruction number 1 was on the basis of its theory of case and NIPSCO’s instruction number 2 was given theory on its of the case. gave court

Likewise Dehner’s instruction 2, number which stated: engages perform “One who another to work or furnish labor in connection with the in which the'former .work is skilled and over which he retains supervision, engineer- ing employees inspection, and is bound to furnish other, or the other, adequate of the plans with and directions, may rely; on which the laborers nishes such person and the who fur- engineering, supervision inspection

retains and exercises control thereover, responsible is supervision, engineering, and for the lack thereof.” the results of such trol and direction, con- inspection gave Likewise court Dehner’s instruction 4, number stated: “A perform contractor who furnished labor to work ac- cording plan, direction, to instructions, specifications or may rely thereon, certifications another charge- and is not any inadequacy with insufficiency able or plans, of such instructions, directions, specifications certifications, or nor employees, except plans, are his where such directions, in- structions, specifications or certifications are so defective person rely upon a reasonable would not them.” gave

And also Dehner’s instruction number which stated: selling distributing one is the business of “When gas obligation may himself of to natural he not relieve safely by entering its installed into an see that lines are responsible independent contract, but rather it continues safely properly see that the line is installed.” gave num- In this same view the court Dehner’s instruction ber which stated: engineer- supervision work, “If the overall of the and the

ing provided of the work was Northern Indiana Public Company Dehner, and the defendant Inc., John Service equipment super- undertook to furnish labor and under the Company, vision of Northern Indiana Public Service Dehner, Inc., responsible is defendant John not for failures occurring appearing or or defects afterwards as result of wearing elements, consequences effects .contemplated at of uses not the time of construction. expected Workmen are insurors of the everlast- ingness ship work, of their or that the materials and workman- against they wear-proof used will be the elements.” abundantly theory It clear that Dehner’s of defense was given by well covered the instructions the trial court. It is equally clear that NIPSCO’s defense theories were likewise by the instructions. covered

PROPOSITION XI

Dehner contends the verdict is not sustained sufficient contrary and is evidence Under law. these two contentions groups sub-parts, duplica- a total of 39 most of which are already opinion. is, tions of matters considered It how- necessary ever, with all summarize inferences most favor- pertinent appellee, the evidence able to with reference to the liability appellants. both only welder who worked on the installation

The of the sec- gas question employee. was of the line Dehner’s The tion explosion site and at least one the other on the weld at same contrary wrapped, elementary princi- had not been the line good pies wrapping workmanship. either was no There testimony explosion side of the weld at the site. This came job inspector from at least on the three witnesses. NIPSCO’s plans testified were no installation of this line. there the company never furnished Mr. testified his was plans specifications job by wrapping The for this NIPSCO. responsibility. welds been was Dehner’s Dehner had wrap question. instructed to Dehner’s welder the weld welding necessary. passes testified There was were three testimony from two he had made other witnesses that passes.

Henry Dehner, for Dehner on who was foreman danger job, if the line was testified that was of the he aware gas com- properly passed not laid. Dehner’s welder had inspected pany’s who test. no one from NIPSCO He knew of job. welder’s first the work of the This was the welder on this job None for Dehner. Dehner was not welder. Mr. inspectors job No one welders. on this for NIPSCO were other than Mr. Dehner was to check the welds Dehner to they wrapped. explosion pipe see that theAt site the go sprung angle, had 20° elbow been about around no point. was used at that furnished the materials and NIPSCO spring pipe explosion the decision to site. made at testimony expected pipe There was life of like that years. years, possibly in this main in excess used question which broke showed metal had The weld done, stronger weld, properly completely A if will be fused. pipe material at weld site is thicker. than the because the explosion time pipe site rusted. Between the at the had explosion in 1951 was installed and this when line causing February, 1966, at least two of the welds had broken dig question up pipe in the line. The was made NIPSCO greatest pounds pressure, at least 900 withstand pressure pounds. By on this line amount of was about merely looking of a weld one cannot tell at outside whether good good may not be job, and

the welder has it look done a right penetrated. the down The this weld came break on was responsible center of that the work it. Dehner was to see in the in a Because of the bend done workmanlike manner. good pipe 1951. A stress had been under constant since getting proper welder can he is a weld. tell whether welding inspector Hunter, a Panhandle Eastern Mr. for Pipeline Company, expert, the an examined the weld where poorest probably explosion occurred the and testified it was existing pipeline. seen in It was not done weld he had an good manner. testified without con- and workmanlike He stronger proper parent tradiction that a weld is much than metal on each side. Hunter further stated weld which improper penetration, non-fusion and a definite broke showed anywhere unacceptable which is the outside undercut pipe. inspector job. quali- was of this He was not a Mr. McBride Dehner had done lots of other work for NIPSCO fied welder. they reputation experience depended on Dehner’s job. wrap was to Dehner Dehner the welds. do a workmanlike properly. supervision job on to weld was relied entirely under the workmen were directions supervision. Dehner’s Engineering, Peletier,

Mr. for Vice President of NIPSCO way did. testified he this one had never seen a weld break the years accounting department He also testified set 50 longer. actually pipe life of A weld but lines lasted some longer. equal showed would an life The broken weld have being subjected pressures no evidence or stresses. years Coleman, experience, with Mr. a welder examined explosion plaintiff’s at as well as exhibit 16 weld site they penetration, improper pass revealed no root and testified undercutting visible, and external non-fusion detectable gas slag pockets in the He he or . weld.. testified that had poor a weld service on line. seen as This testi- never apprentice mony duplicated trains Mr. Litchfield who welders. Conwell, Dehner, that one of welder

Mr. testified penetrated. explosion at the He was welds site was job. experienced for this said welder hired He goes good requires penetration to the bottom of weld the root. University Singer, professor

Dehner called Mr. a at the welding. Metallurgy, including Illinois, expert who was an in wrap He testified that it would be a mistake a He not weld. particular would not told him believe someone who that pipe ground airtight put wrap. had been He the with pass plaintiff’s would not a like that in weld made exhibit 16. supervisor If the were a welder and didn’t know whether Singer question good, the welds would were Mr. as to how he got job Singer supervisor. his as Mr. found the weld which penetration. expect failed had would about He con- 75% good accomplish penetration tractor to 100 for a and work- % people’s in front of homes. manlike weld testimony gas expert was also direct There inher- ently dangerous specifications provided the adequate. contractor were not employees extremely

Dehner’s instructed to be cautious putting line in. while the liability gas of a contractor who constructs a main is scope Heating of the rule set forth in Peru

within Com 319, Lenhart, App. pany 48 95 (1911). Also, Ind. N. 680 v. E. Light, Heat and Power Leap, 443, Lebanon Co. v. 139 Ind. Supreme (1894), our 57 Court 39 E. held both N. the con gas company negligent contractors liable for struction gas pipe was laid. in which manner application good example principles these

A in a Company Paul Harris Furniture gas explosion Morse, case is v. 28, (1956), N. E. 2d 275 139 where Ill. 2d the Illinois Supreme Court stated: general independent rule is contrac “The that where an employed given tor is or install construct work or instrumentality, and has the same and it is done accepted employer and contractor dis longer charged, persons is no liable to third he injuries as a result of received defective construction Empire Laundry Machinery Brady, Co. v. installation. rule, however, subject 58, is cer 45 N. E. 486. This Ill. whereby recognized may exceptions a contractor

tain well acceptance even after of his work be held liable thing imminently (1) where dealt with is contractee dangerous kind, explosives, poisonous drugs such subject like, (2) matter of where the contract the be protection thing tractor particular purpose requiring security for the the used for scaffold, life, (3) such as a where dangerous by a defect con is rendered deceitfully conceals, and which knows but causes thing particular pur is used for the when an accident pose Empire Laundry was constructed. Ma which it Brady, 486; 58, 45 chinery 164 Ill. N. E. Colbert v. Co. v. Co., Furnace 333 Ill. N. E. 60 A.L.R. Holland Healey Heidel, App. 210 Ill. 387. are 353; opinion We clearly excep comes within case the first that this second and tion, third. not also within if gas storage liquid propane is imminently That the dan- seriously disputed.” p. 282, gerous cannot be 283. 2d, 417 of Torts states: Restatement The § employs independent “One who contractor to do work carefully public place a of a risk which unless done involves making dangerous physical place the condition of for for the liability public, subject is to the use of members of the by negli- public physical harm caused to members of the gent the act omission of contractor which makes the or dangerous physical place for their use.” condition of the Appellant questions sufficiency the of the evidence appeal. only to sustain the verdict on We will examine the any record to see if there is evidence or reason logical may or inferences which able be drawn from evidence, which, jury, if believed will sus weigh Kempf will not tain the We the evidence. verdict. v. 488, (1951) ; Himsel, App. 98 E. 121 Ind. N. 2d 200 Peckham

213 452, 609 App. 165 N. E. 2d Smith, Minor, A 130 Ind. v. 2d 629 455, 85 N. E. Gamble, Lewis, Ind. ; et al. 227 (1959) v. 442, 24 2dE. Handlon, 216 Ind. N. ; (1949) Indiana Ins. Co. v. (1940). 1003 against Appellant Dehner which the verdict was

Since prove question its defenses no is raised as had the burden to concerning insufficiency of evidence these de Johnson, 529 223 Ind. 60 N. E. 2d Rowe v. fenses. Walker, City Indianapolis, etc. v. (1945), and regard (1961). In to these App. 168 N. E. 2d Ind. only Appellant must consider whether Dehner we defenses of regard only contrary In consider to law. this we is the verdict together Appellee with all to most favorable the evidence Unless the evidence is with therefrom. inferences reasonable one and trial court conclusion and leads out conflict conclusion, contrary must affirmed. the verdict reached Walker, supra. Indianapolis, etc. City v. See fact, jury, reconcile, case trier of is for the It disputed conflicting testimony part accept or even reject, or witness, including party same wit when made judge jury trier of is fact The ness. credibility. judge weight weight court will This and weigh appeal. credibility. will not evidence We It only appellee most favorable to the evidence look will City Indianapolis therefrom. favorable most inferences App. 227, (1965). E. 2d 839 N. Bates, 137 Ind. v. independent Dehner was an jury have found could rejected furnished or loaned ser- its so-called contractor defenses. its other defense vant contrary charge to law is sub the verdict

Dehner’s Pok Supreme Court in our general stated rule ject to the Co., 523, 104 2d 230 Ind. N. E. Lummus raka, al. et only evidence consider will (1952), that we evi where the Appellee favorable most but one conclusion and can lead to conflict without dence 214 opposite

the trial court will verdict reached conclusion contrary Hinds, reversed also, as to law. Executor v. See McNair, al., 34, et (1955). 235 129 A Ind. N. E. 2d 553 care ful examination of the record in this case reveals the verdict contrary is sustained sufficient and is evidence not law. PROPOSITION XII gave

NIPSCO tendered and the court 6: Instruction number you pipes “If find that laid Defendants properly accident if scene installed functioned should have danger general public without to the under the conditions existing period fifty years, then and and if there in excess of you function, pipes further find that such not so did you you may I then instruct these facts in .consider determining negli- guilty whether the defendants gence.” objected: To which Dehner permits “Instruction No. 6 a comment on the evidence by length Judge testimony regarding to the effect that the being years life of the line in excess 50 significance particular and, gives therefore, is .of an undue

preference position defendant, to the NIPSCO, prejudice position Defendant, Dehner. suggests warranty Furthermore, existed guaranty that a and that the defendant Dehner would be and could responsible be considered matters that occurred stated, period though within the line within the of time even engineered by the line defendant Dehner.” Kasper, App. 465, 488, In Jones v. 109 Ind. 33 N. E. 2d (1941), court stated: province “It is within the trial court properly assuming they certain facts refer to without have been jury and to instruct as to applicable found those facts are the law if found.” also, Ridens, Vogel App. Ind. See N. 2dE. (1942).

215. expert testimony expected There was 12 life of a gas type question years inch main of the in of 50 excess possibly years. and 75 giving

We therefore find no reversible error instruction number 6. XIII

PROPOSITION gave NIPSCO tendered and the court number instruction which stated: you Defendant, “If find that Northern Indiana Public Company, workmanship Service failed to discover defective Broadway part Dehner, Inc., on the of John in the weld at Kinsmoor, you I on the instruct that such a failure

part Company of Northern Indiana Public Service would way Dehner, Inc., in no excuse from the Defendant John responsibility, any, public negligent its if work.” objected: To which Dehner acceptance “It fails to take into fact .consideration the line, and use of it fails to take consideration into requirement knowledge that John Dehner had immediately fact and the condition caused the line to be imminently dangerous.”

This perfectly instruction seems consistent with the state ment in Holland Nauracaj, supra. Furnace Co. jury could have found from the evidence that Dehner left the line imminently dangerous per a defective condition to third very sons. This of law has a pro rule sound basis in order to public tect from disasters such as the here. one regard to In instructions have we made a careful examina- given. all instructions tendered appears tion of It preliminary 9 Appellee instructions, tendered of which the gave Appellee 8 and instructions, court also trial tendered gave trial court nine. NIPSCO which tendered in- gave trial court and the nine. Dehner tendered structions gave court and the trial 8 of them. instructions Considering given, the trial we find that instructions all the jury fully in this case. adequately instructed court XIV PROPOSITION Hunter, by plaintiif, there of Mr. direct examination

On objections: following questions, answers and you you “Q. whether or not inspector I ask will As an 14B accepted ? the weld shown your opinion, have would explosion occurred] weld where the [The ob- question we will MR. FRUECHTENICHT: To gentleman indicates ject, Your Honor. What acceptance has particular method of inspector or his about inwas nothing method which to do with the manner NIPSCO, acceptable to in 1951 which was existence case. co-defendant this question. I will reframe MR. HAYNIE: you not? Q. had inspector prior to had an You been Yes, A. sir. you Q. inspector 1951 do go an back to 1951. As Let’s you have ac- would opinion or not as to whether

have an cepted that weld. Definitely A. not. question we will ob- To which MR. FRUECHTENICHT: ject. inspec- an representation he is again is no Once there he is indicated This witness has

tor for NIPSCO. familiar any opin- therefore standards with NIPSCO’s case. totally to this irrelevant part is on his ion say would like to hear Let me NIPSCO MR. McNAGNY: objection. make no this and we objection stands, Your The FRUECHTENICHT: MR. Honor. question. preliminary Let me ask a

MR. HAYNIE: right. All THE COURT:

Q. inspector East- say you for Panhandle have an been You ern? Yes, sir.

A. Q. brought gas company Is that the same that here 1951? They did, gas they A. presume furnish them now. I yes. Q. throughout length pipes And their run and breadth of the United States? A. From Texas to Detroit. Q. Now, going you you I again, am to ask do have opinion, basing an year you it in the what knew then as inspector, you opinion whether or have an not —do your passed inspection? whether or not this would have objection, MR. We make the same FRUECHTENICHT: totally

Your Honor. It is irrelevant. THE COURT: Overruled. Let him answer. No, sir,

A. I accepted would not have it. Q. jury you Tell on that what kind of test conducted piece pipe (Plaintiff’s 22) and what the out- Exhibit No. come test was ? MR. Dehner FRUECHTENICHT: Defendant will ob- ject any tests made on weld other than those involved in this action. What sort of one from tests: No present was at the time tests were made. We have no .these they idea under what conditions made. We cannot were possibly veracity, determine man’s this the conditions under made, they which We that and most test properly. whether made absolutely regard. helpless are And aside from important, question the weld in here and objecting any testimony for that reason we are for the patently Object reason reason that was cannot irrelevant. further for the testimony break, has shown the weld did subjected year period to conditions over a fifteen which possibly nothing duplicated, is and there in this be they testimony duplicated. man’s to show MR. McNAGNY: I like the record show there is would any testimony gas objection of this man com- no pany. my is the record show it MR. HAYNIE: Have understand- ing pieces tested have been the Defendant these Dehner. offering purpose for the proving this not areWe what at the explosion. in the weld that broke time occurred welding that was testified he pipe, welder has the same actually the same end each Exhibits 14A and one of these using 14B, procedure, he the same that he was that using the same care. testimony however, MR. FRUECHTENICHT: There is no being ex- this weld which this is now asked to man subjected conditions that the weld amine was to the same question consequence was and as a examination absence of those this weld has to be irrelevant because of the specific in this case. conditions which are vital Honor, to, objection Your HAYNIE: I no MR. suggesting would have jury merely goes question of this to the weight. They may consider the fact— irrelevant and it is not It is MR. FRUECHTENICHT: weight. matter of you may gentlemen, THE COURT: Overruled. Ladies and it is consider for what worth.

Q. you what test test conducted and Tell them what revealed. see, hydraulic bending you put it in a ma- A. As can we proper strap, and bent weld should chine degrees, pipe prob- of this thickness to 180

have went eight ably pounds per taken ten thousand would have or square pressure inch bend. Q. jury you should bend show the what weld to? Will degrees, less, prob- approximately 180 A. more see, This less, you ably As broke. without a break. can one Q. right. All slag porosity. in it

A. It also has inclusion evidence this Plaintiff’s HAYNIE: now offer in MR. We No. 22. Exhibit grounds Objection on the same MR. FRUECHTENICHT: clearly again, we The matter is irrelevant. Once before. specific pipe this is the that was removed have no idea that whatsoever, over it that location and have no .control

from objection repeat I made before. gas objection part No com- McNAGNY: MR. pany. Let it admitted and shown Overruled. COURT: THE jury. Hunter, you Q. jury frankly, Mr. what do think Tell this weld? already given MR. object, FRUECHTENICHT: he We has opinion explained his jury repeti- it to the and this is prejudicial tious. This can Dehner. Defendant may question. THE COURT: You Overruled. answer the poorest probably A. That is I seen in weld have ever existing pipe line.” “MR. HAYNIE: Q. Rohrer, you asking I Mr. I was believe about some welds pipe

which were taken from either side of that broke Broadway at the weld on ? Kinsmoor Yes, A. sir. Q. pipes, welds, Were you these these taken for the

purpose of tests? destructive Yes, A. sir. Q. you enough And were kind to make them available to

men I had chosen to have make destructive tests on them? Yes, sir,

A. this is so. Q. going you INow am parts— to ask if the (Plaintiff’s Exhibit marked identification No. reporter.) Q. you Is this box marked Exhibit did Plaintiff’s No. portion pipes make this of those either from side available for tests? Yes, A. sir. Q. you yourself And had them for destructive available

tests ? A. Yes. you going MR. Are to offer them before KRUECKEBERG:

you question him about them? happy MR. I HAYNIE: would be to. MR. We oppor- KRUECKEBERG: would like to have an

tunity object to their offer. Certainly. MR. HAYNIE: Q. parts, exception And these are the with the of that is that

portion correct? tests, of them which have been taken for A. Yes. Plain- in evidence The.plaintiff now offers HAYNIE: MR. eight pieces consisting or nine Exhibit tiff’s No. pipe.

metal objection. MR. No McNAGNY: Honor, would like to ob- we KRUECKEBERG: Your MR. ject nothing pipes. There these introduction of contributing part pipes that a to this shown these were years; they pipes fifteen didn’t occurrence. These served I thereafter. don’t would have continued to serve break and they this see how are relevant to matter. my point make HAYNIE: I want to clear. I MR. offering am they part are the show of these to occurrence explosion. purpose The of of this offer to show the welder, welding type this Don that went into line of pipe We have before us the that broke. None of Conwell. going us are make destructive tests on as evidenced to something here. did fact it is We have could we on, perform not tests and we have. And are destructive we showing offering purpose for the of this was the these offering purpose, it are for the limited pipe that broke. We jury happy to Honor I have Your instruct the the and would be showing offering purpose type it of we are workmanship that went into the weld.” of every testimony Again forth verbatim word of we have set proposition brief under to demon- contained Dehner’s regard. sterility their contentions in this of strate the lifelong many years was welder with The witness Hunter welding inspector Eastern experience for Panhandle of as a Companies. at Pipeline direct examination He testified welding length tests which were avail- as and detail good can welder tell whether testified in 1951. able He stronger proper A will weld getting proper weld. be ishe adjacent pipe. than the expertise involved in cross-examination

On welding explored was good further with workmanlike Hunter. witness group exhibit of sections of was a Exhibit Plaintiff’s immediately adjacent the north to and south welds which B, the 14A and weld was the cause plaintiff’s exhibit explosion. of we Proposition What have said under IV regarding admissibility plaintiff’s adequate 16 is exhibit dispose to of all contentions properly exhibit 15. It remaining objections admitted into The evidence. of Dehner vague are best at and are indefinite without merit. Rickart, In Baber v. (1876), Supreme Ind. our Court stated: proved was, “The fact per- whether the machine

formed in place specified warranty. manner and in the Evidence as machinery the manner in which per- such place formed prove at another would tend capacity perform place machine to specified at the in the warranty. weight The greatly such evidence would de- pend upon the difference in soil and the other surround- ings places. might perform the two Such a machine well soil, yet in one character would fail in another and ought different character of soil. Evidence not to be ex- cluded because is entitled to but little consideration or weight. competency between the and weight difference clearly evidence is marked That which is defined. strong, competent, weak or whether should be admitted.” (emphasis supplied) expert witness, On direct examination Dehner’s own Mr. exclusively Singer, by testified almost on tests conducted him adjacent on welds.

Certainly jury there is evidence from substantial which the Plaintiff-Appellee could found for the have Otis on her com- against plaint Appellants Likewise, jury both here. the arriving properly reject at its verdict could the defenses of obviously Appellants, which both it did. appeal

From careful examination the of record in this it appears fairly to the this court that merits of this case just tried and result reached.

Every by reasonable effort has been Appellant made the demonstrate, to but we error have been unable to dis- presented on appeal. reversible error cover In order carefully fully we have considered inform the ourselves by parties all the and the submitted writer has briefs read all transcript contains original which in the of evidence pages. total of 1256 .competent evi- supported and substantial

The verdict is dence. Therefore, judgment should

There no reversible error. Appellants. hereby Costs is affirmed. be and White, J., Hoffman, J., concurs Pfaff, C.J., concur. opinion. result with

Concurring Opinion judge My brother has executed with commend- White, J. imposed herculean task him dispatch and skill the able “give writing a statement statute which mandates us arising question record . and . . the decision of each of Ry. Cleveland, etc., Co., Hunter v. therein”. Court (1930). hoped E. It be 174 N. is to that Ind. general pro- approve, election, at the next will electorate (H.J.R. 6, judicial ch. reform amendment Acts posed 1359) Constitution Indiana 375, p. to Article YII repeal imposition alia, inter constitutional will, impose Supreme upon the duty upon the Court and not it replace Appeals this court. which will create to Court of opinions by justices and presumably, written Thereafter, jurisdiction appellate those judges exercising will discuss writing jurist alleged trial courts which the feels will errors administration make a constructive contribution justice. Judge propositions Sharp required was

Of the fourteen dealing validity discuss, only one with of the advance employed appellee, payment NIPSCO device co-appellant, prejudicial to NIPSCO’s its effect whether novelty possibility possesses error sufficient portion I opinion. opinion, In un- worthy an reservedly concur. remaining rulings court involved of the trial

The technically though may have been some propositions, even incorrect, deprive appellant not fair did either of a trial. 38, provisions (Spec. Sess.), ch. Under the of Ind. Acts 1881 2-3231), not (Burns have IND. ANN. we could STAT. § § any reversed for the merits of the mere technical error when concurring fairly cause In tried and determined. thus only, express disapproval in the I result do intend to opinion’s merely any alleged error, disposition but wish ruling jury approving instruction to avoid trial court believe, possibility abstract, when, exists that Ias might in the context of a case a statement different different appropriate. more Reported in 250 N. E. 2d 378. Note. —

Smithers v. Smithers. August petition rehearing Filed 1969. 568A85. No for [No. filed.] Ward, Palmer K. Indianapolis, appellant. Holwager, Holwager E. Harrell,

J. & Grove, of Beech appellee. appeal judgment J. This granting from a

White, appellee appellant. an absolute divorce from error

Case Details

Case Name: Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Otis

Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals

Date Published: Aug 27, 1969

Citation: 250 N.E.2d 378

Docket Number: 468A78

Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.