41 P. 931 | Or. | 1895
Opinion by
The determination of the question brought up by this appeal involves the construction and constitutionality of an act entitled “An act to change in part the compensation and mode of payment thereof to the county clerks, recorders of conveyances, clerks of the Circuit Courts and County Courts in the State, and of the sheriffs of the several counties; to repeal certain provisions of statute providing for the payment of certain fees to said officers, and of trial fees in certain cases; to provide for the payment by parties to appeals, actions, suits, and proceedings of certain sums to assist the State and the several counties in defraying expenses consequent upon the administration of justice; to provide for the appointment of deputies for the various offices above enumerated in certain cases, and for their compensation, and for the payment to the State and several counties of sums of money and fees paid to
The act provides for a fixed salary for the clerks, sheriff, and recorder in each of the counties of the State,
The provisions of this act are thus fully set forth that its scope and purpose may be readily comprehended. In the inquiry as to the intention of the legislature, where the language- employed is of doubtful signification or import, we are permitted to consider the surrounding circumstances attending the adoption of the act. “The true meaning of any passage,” says Mr. Endlich in his work on Interpretation of Statutes, § 27, “is to be found, not merely in the words of that passage, but in comparing it with every other part of the law, ascertaining also what were the circumstances with reference to which the words were used, and what was the object appearing from those cir
The general tenor of the language employed indicates very clearly that the legislature was dealing with the clerks and sheriffs of all the counties of the State, without excepting any from its purview, which, taken in connection with the evident legislative belief that all were included in the list of salaries affixed, leaves no doubt as to its correct interpretation. To illustrate: Section i provides that “each of the county clerks of the several counties in this State in which there exists such office shall receive a salary as follows”; section 4, that “the sheriffs of the several counties in this State shall receive an annual- salary as follows”; section 6, that “the sheriffs of the several counties in the State shall be entitled to receive,” etc.; and section 8, “It shall be the duty of the several clerks of the Circuit and County Courts in the State.” These and other clauses that may be noted all indicate general legislation with the purpose of affecting all clerks and sheriffs of the State alike, and such is the effect of the act. The legislature has simply omitted to fix a salary for the clerk and sheriff of Lincoln County, but they are not less bound to the observance of the provisions of the act than the other clerks and sheriffs of the State. The act is therefore not local, and does not contravene the provisions of subdivision 10, section 23, article IV, of the State constitution. This also disposes of the counsel’s second contention, that it is a local law regulating the practice of courts of justice contrary to subdivision 3, section 23, article IV, of our constitution.
Another question in this connection. The view is ad
Does the act of 1893 contravene section 22, article IV, of the State constitution, which provides that “No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or section amended shall be set forth and published at full length”? The purpose and effect of this, clause of the constitution has received extended and intelligent consideration at the hands of Lord, C. J., in Warren v. Crosby, 24 Or. 558 (34 Pac. 661), a recent case, and, if applicable here, it is decisive of this case. It was there
It is next contended that “this act provides salaries, levies taxes, and provides for the appointment of deputies, and all three subjects are expressed in the title,” and that neither the act nor the title, of the act is single, but embraces more than one subject, contrary to the requirements of section 20, article IY, of the constitution above quoted. We are required to look to the body of the act and the provisions therein contained for the ascertainment of the subject-matter. The title is of but little importance, except to index and fairly indicate the subject of legislation. Matters germane to or properly connected with the subject or matters of detail have no place in the title, although the circumstance of their being found there affords no constitutional reason for rendering the act void or inoperative: People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58 (69 Am. Dec. 645); State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 231. The object of this clause of the constitution, so far as the objection here made to the act is concerned, is to prevent the combining of incongruous matters and objects totally distinct and having no connection nor relation with each other in one and the same bill, as well as to discourage improper combinations by the members of the legislature which would secure support for a bill of an omnibus nature with discordant riders attached, which, if acted upon singly, would
The next objection made is that the act under considerationis one for raising revenue, and originated in the senate, contrary to the requirements of section 18, article IV, of the State constitution. This proceeds again upon the assumption that the fees which are required to be paid to the officers named in the bill, and which are to be turned into the county treasuries, are taxes. Whether this assumption is right or wrong we do not decide, but, if it be conceded that the assumption is well founded in law, non constat that the act is one for raising revenue. Bills for raising revenue are required to have their origin in the lower branch of the legislature because it is the more numerous of the two bodies, and, being oftener renewed by elections, presumptively it more closely and directly represents the people: Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, § 157. The controlling feature which characterizes bills of this nature, says Johnson, J., is that they “impose taxes upon the people, either directly or indirectly, or lay duties, imposts, or excises, for the use of the government,
In The Nashville the court say: “It is certain that the practical construction of the provision by congress has been to confine its operation to bills, the direct and principal object of which has been to raise revenue, and not as including bills out of which money may incidentally go into the treasury, or revenue incidentally arise.” Deady, J., in Dundee Mortgage Co. v. Parrish, 24 Fed. 200, says:
Lastly, it is contended that the act is in violation of
Affirmed.