*1 bodily injury claim for loss tained the is limited to held that a husband’s court bodily from the person” liability specified consortium is derivative “each limit of “All coverage is claimed. injury for which policy. damages arising bodily injury out of language Lepics’ The clear and Cash- lumped together by person are
tained
one
policies
liability
ners’
limits the insurer’s
limit,”
liability
purposes of the
damages
$100,000
for all
for covered
Id.
court stated.
damages
persons
all
suffer as a result of a
persuasive authority on the
The most
Thus,
bodily injury
person.
to one
under
here is Mackoul
language at
contract
issue
policies,
parents’
loss of consortium
Co.,
Casualty
Fidelity
v.
&
“The limits of under the are
not affected the number of causes might bodily
action that accrue from the Id.
injury single person.” of a
A of courts have reached number Florida, Illinois, Ken
same result as the Louisiana, Wyo EDU- tucky, Jersey and NORTHEAST COMMUNITY New ASSOCIATION, ming courts on the limit of liabil CATION language pa Appellee, ity policy on similar when spousal of consortium claim rental or loss v. in addition to the claim of the is raised SCHOOL NORTHEAST COMMUNITY Smith bodily injured. person who was Boyer, DISTRICT and Marvin Co., 252 Ark. Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. State Appellants. 186, 187 (1972); Faber v. 57, 58, 477 S.W.2d 438-40, 428, Roelofs, 311 Minn. No. 85-1856. Hampshire Ins. (1977); New 817, 823-25 Supreme Court of Iowa. 1226, Bisson, 747, 449 A.2d Co. v. N.H. (N.H.1982); Greenberg v. Medi-Cab 18, 1987. March 107-08, Inc., 104, 451 N.Y.S.2d 114 Misc.2d 9, Rehearing April Denied Smith v. Cassi (Sup.Ct.1982); 337-38 da, 406-08, A.2d 403 Pa. (1961). uniformly These courts
540-41 unambig policy language held the thus,
uous; recovery of the de joint
prived claimant and the individual who sus- *2 Howes,
Brian L. Gruhn and Steven E. Rapids, appellants. Cedar Sayre Sayre Gribble, P.C., James L. & Moines, Des appellee. by HARRIS, P.J.,
Considered and McGIVERIN, WOLLE, LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and JJ.
LAVORATO, Justice. issue, presented by parties, whether a school district its superin- tendent of schools impose disciplinary suspension, without pay, on a school parties teacher. The are Community District, Northeast School corporation public and a employer, 20.3(1) (1983); see Iowa Code §§ Superintendent Boyer, employee Marvin an District, of Northeast (1983); see 279.20 and Northeast Commu- § nity Association, Education an employee organization, 20.3(4) (1983), repre- see § senting O’Rourke, James P. a teacher and employee an of the school district. This case arises from oc- events which 12,1984, curred on October when O’Rourke hit a student on the shoulder. was This the third time O’Rourke had struck a stu- Superintendent dent thirteen months. Boyer immediately discussed the incident Boyer’s with O’Rourke in office. He decid- days ed to O’Rourke for three day, Later that O’Rourke Boyer letter notifying received a from him of this action. At no time did Boyer seek to invoke the termination discharge procedures of Iowa Code O’Rourke, On the employee behalf organization sought declaratory judg- the disciplinary ment that beyond powers of the and school district and was also violation procedural process rights. due Boyer argued school district and 20.7(3)(1983)permits Code section them to pay. Filing an opposing summary judgment, motions for parties joint stipulation into entered limiting of material fact the issue before are question superintendents, superintend- the district court assistant constitutionality suspen- ents, of the legality and principals, principals. and assistant of, underlying rea- sion. merits Code See Iowa School teachers for, suspension are not at issue. sons employ- as O’Rourke are thus *3 subject provisions ees chapter the of our decision in The district court cited Education, 20. 277 McFarland v. Board of (Iowa 1979), 901, and held N.W.2d 905-06 only powers of a school district are suspension illegal the and be- that “was granted expressly those or im- necessarily powers public corpora- the of a school
yond plied governing in Bishop statutes. v. thereof, superintendent under tion the Instruction, Board State Public of that the Iowa law.” The court found factu- (Iowa 1986); 891 McFar- suspension the was not al framework of Education, land v. Board of sufficiently purposes for of in the record (Iowa 1979). 906 The school district summary process judgment on the due is- argues 20.7(3) gives it, that section as a sue. employer, express the to sus- Because the district court we believe pend public employee a like O’Rourke. right granting result in the reached the provides pertinent part Section 20.7 that: employee organization’s motion for summa- [pjublic employers have, shall in addi- judgment, hold that ry we affirm. We duties, powers, tion and rights to all es- general pow- the while school districts have provision, tablished constitutional impose disciplinary suspensions er to with- statute, ordinance, charter, act, or special 20.7(3), superintend- pay out under section power, duty, right the exclusive the case, Superintendent ents do not. In this suspending Boyer’s independent action pay not authorized
O’Rourke without was prescribed by any statute or rule discharge public Suspend em- of by the school board. As a result our proper ployees for cause. holding, procedural not we do reach the organization responds the process due issue. argument holding school district’s with our relating is to our dispute There no stan- statutory “There no au- McFarland: is reviewing dard for a district court’s sum- thority punishment, nor for Parkison, mary judgment. Fritz 397 suspension, pay, or without any for (Iowa 1986). prevail, To N.W.2d of the board on following the decision any the movant must show the absence dis- superintendent’s recommendation for fact and entitle- genuine issue of material charge section [under 279.27].” judgment ment to as a matter of law. Id. district court inter- N.W.2d at 905-06. The light stipulation, there no joint In preted to mean “that section McFarland dispute regarding relevant facts. 20.7(3) provide not a school board will I. The sus- school district’s granted by authority it is more than pend pay under Iowa Code sec- Chapter Chapter 279 makes no 279....” 20.7(3). tion suspensions. provision disciplinary (1983) entitled Iowa Code Thus, the suspension court reasoned (Collective Relations Employment Public illegal. comprehensive statute for Bargaining) is a our court read We believe district regulation public employment labor broadly. holding too McFarland 20.3(3)defines a relations Iowa. Section McFarland, recom- superintendent “any individual public employee to include that teach- the school board mended to except indi employed by public employer, a McFarland, er, to sec- be fired. Pursuant provisions of exempted under the viduals 279.27, suspended tion personnel only school section 20.4.” pending dis- chapter 20 McFarland without provisions of excluded from the charge hearing.1 hearing, expressly grants After the school districts the school discharge proper board not teachers for decided McFarland; however, provided voted to no board section approve prehearing suspen- discharge proceeding McFarland’s has been initi- sion ated. See Iowa Code 4.7. say precludes We held in that section McFarland 20.- To section 279.27
7(3), general grant suspend, pension reasons alone give does not much of to would eviscerate the effect of punishment put, Simply teacher as under such pro- reasoning, context apply section 279.27 would not *4 McFarland, ceeding. large segment at to public employees: 905- a of specifically legislature 06. Section 279.27 authorizes a teachers. Had the to intended “suspend to a teacher un- treat teachers in a manner different than pending hearing der this section employees, easily and deter- other it could only purpose mination the so. board.” said suspension discharge section, of under the Moreover, previously we have acknowl- 279.27, provide safeguard is to a for the edged gives that section 20.7 “school dis- by removing students the teacher from the tricts, public employers as pow- ... broad classroom; purpose punish the is not to the dealing ers with their staffs order to McFarland,
teacher. See
277 N.W.2d at
governmental operations.”
achieve efficient
905.
Gere v.
Council Bluffs
District,
We
(Iowa
reasoned McFarland that
310
“[t]o
separate
1983).
conclude that
is a
Depart-
See also
[section
Clinton Police
20.7]
grant
suspend
to
or discharge ment
Bargaining Unit
Iowa Public
procedures
Board,
without
limitations or
Employment
ac-
Relations
397
companying
(Iowa 1986) (section
it would
spe-
conflict with the
766
N.W.2d
procedures
cific
chapter
rights
set out in
279.”
reserves
public employers).
broad
to
McFarland,
By recognizing
277
N.W.2d at
There-
the school districts’ authori-
fore,
chapter
provides
ty
where
for “safe-
to
teachers for
rea-
guard” suspensions,
279.27,
sons,
give
see
we
the school districts the neces-
20.7(3) “merely
flexibility
sary
govern-
confirms or reserves” to
to maintain efficient
school
proceed
operations.
districts the
as mental
Without that flexibili-
specifically
out
ty,
set
in section 279.27. Id.
a school district is faced with an unrea-
holding
We view our
as lim-
McFarland
sonable choice when a teacher
its
violates
ited to
proceed
those cases where the school district
rules: either
with a termination
discharge proceed- procedure
initiates
section 279.27
pursuant
ig-
279 or
ing.
did not
question
We
address the
nore the violation. The first choice could
whether a
school district
time-consuming, costly,
against
could
be
the
pursuant
district,
teacher
to section
for disci- best
interest of the school
plinary
only.
ruling
reasons
Therefore
public, especially
teacher and the
where the
analysis
McFarland does not aid our
is minor. Such
violation
a choice could also
present
severely damage
discipli-
relationship
because
case involves a
between
nary suspension
employees.
and not a
school district and its
section 279.27
discharge proceeding.
counter-productive
second choice would be
havoc
ability
would wreak
with the
specific statutory
We find
provision
no
the school administrator to maintain con-
conflicting
limiting
general
trol of the school staff.
pension
20.7(3).
granted by section
Absent such a
employee organization
teacher’s
statutory provision,
argues
we hold that section
further
that
does not
pointed
dealing
year-end
1. We
out in
McFarland
Iowa has
sections 279.13-279.18
statutory procedures
dealing
two
that allow a school
termination and section 279.27
with im-
employment:
discharge.
district
terminate a teacher's
mediate
law or prescribed by rule the school board court’s order sustaining orga- as of October summary nization’s motion for judgment. Disposition. III. AFFIRMED. 20.7(3) expressly Iowa Code section All Justices except WOLLE, concur grants school districts J., specially. who concurs
pend proper discipli- teachers WOLLE, (concurring Justice specially). provided nary reasons no section 279.27 discharge proceeding has been initiated. I concur in the result the reasons ruling expressed district court’s on this issue was in Division II. However, incorrect. the court reached the
right result because our conclusion that
Superintendent Boyer’s suspending action illegal
O’Rourke beyond pow- his Accordingly,
ers. we affirm the district