288 S.W. 257 | Tex. App. | 1926
The stipulations in the policy and notes referred to in the statement above were valid ones. Thomas v Insurance Co. (Tex.Com.App.) 277 S.W. 1041; Insurance Co. v. Baggett (Tex.Civ.App.)
There was testimony that, as to the policy sued upon, Eddins was merely a soliciting agent. Defendant in error insists, and we agree, that, while Eddins may have been that kind of an agent so far as the issuance of the policy was concerned, he was plaintiff in error's collecting agent so far as the unpaid premium due on the policy was concerned. But we do not agree with defendant in error that, treating Eddins as such a collecting agent, his conduct as shown in the facts stated above constituted a waiver by plaintiff in error of the breach by defendant in error of the stipulations in the policy and note in question, and operated to estop it from setting up the failure of defendant in error to pay said note at the expiration of the time to which payment thereof had been extended as a defense against recovery by defendant in error of anything on account of the policy.
A collecting agent, unless expressly authorized to do so, cannot extend the time of payment of a debt due his principal (Behrns v. Rogers [Tex. Civ. App.]
As we view it, there is nothing in the record before us showing authority in Eddins (had he pretended to do so and he did not) to bind plaintiff in error by an agreement to further extend the time of payment of the note, nor anything showing authority, express or implied, in Eddins (had he pretended to do so, and we think he did) to accept anything except money in payment of the note in question.
The most defendant in error can contend for as supporting his view is that Eddins agreed with him to draw on him through the bank for the amount of the unpaid premium represented by the note; that, had Eddins so drawn on him, the draft would have been paid; and that the note remained unpaid at the time of the fire because Eddins failed to keep his promise to him.
If, as we think appeared in the testimony, Eddins was without authority to bind plaintiff in error by such a promise, defendant in error had no right to charge plaintiff in error with the consequences of Eddins' failure to keep it. As defendant in error did not possess such a right, it is clear there was no merit in his claim that plaintiff in error had waived its right to set up his failure to pay the past-due note before the fire occurred as a defense against the recovery awarded to him, and that the judgment, therefore, should have been in plaintiff in error's favor.
It will be reversed, and judgment will be rendered here that defendant in error take nothing by his suit against plaintiff in error, and that the latter recover its costs of the former.