138 Tenn. 161 | Tenn. | 1917
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These two actions were brought separately in the circuit court of Shelby county for the death of the two intestates mentioned in the margin, but, resting on the. same facts, were consolidated and heard together;
“Defendants failed to put a lock at the top of the shaft so as to be able to keep compressed air in the shaft-... Had the shaft been supplied with a lock*165 at the top, all deadly gases and vapors would have been kept out of the shaft by reason of air pressure. This method of construction was the proper and scientific method to have been pursued, and by reason of the failure of'defendants to place a lock at the top of the shaft and to keep air in the shaft, they were guilty of gross negligence and want of proper care and caution, which resulted in the presence of gases in the shaft, causing the death,” etc.
The third count alleges that the intestates were directed to go down the shaft referred to, and that at the time the shaft was filled with deadly gas, which fact was unknown to the intestates, and they were overcome by the gas and died in the shaft; that shortly before defendants directed the intestates to descend the shaft, they had been informed that the decking of the caisson, at the bottom of the shaft, was burning, and they had reason to know that fumes and gasses would be generated from such burning deck of a dangerous and deadly character, but that the intes-tates were in ignorance of these facts, and so went to their death.
The plaintiffs introduced their evidence but the defendants introduced none. At the close of the introduction of the evidence the defendants moved for a peremptory instruction, which was granted by the trial judge. A verdict was accordingly rendered by the jury, and on this a judgment was based dismissing the cases of the plaintiffs. An appeal was
In order to properly understand the controversy, it is necessary to explain the structure referred to in the declaration, and the nature of the work in which the intestates were engaged.
Pier No. 5, at the time the accident occurred,was within a day or two of completion. It was forty-six feet one way and twenty-five feet the other, and extended down into the bottom of the river eighty-five feet, counting from the top of the pier. The method of construction was this: The first thing was the sinking of a caisson in the bottom of the river. On the top of this there was a structure of heavy timber, called decking. On this decking there was erected a wooden form into which the concrete was poured. The weight of the concrete caused the caisson — on the bottom of which was what is called a cutting edge — to sink deeper. As the pier sank the wooden form was built higher, and the concrete filled into it, and so on until it had reached a point sufficiently high above the surface of the river. But it was necessary that men should go down into the caisson in order to eject therefrom sand, mud, stone, and pieces of wood, and whatsoever else might be found therein. Access to this caisson, called the work chamber, was given to the men by placing in the middle of the pier a steel pipe three feet in diameter, called the man shaft. This was made up of'
At the time the accident occurred, the caisson, or work chamber, was then at a depth of eighty-five feet. Various sections had been added to the man shaft. About forty feet from the bottom of this shaft there was located what was called the lock. This lock had two purposes. The main one was to gradually accustom the men to breathing the compressed air which they would have to encounter in the caisson, or work chamber. When they entered the lock they were required to open a valve which let into the lock compressed air from the work chamber, which mixed with the ordinary air, and after they had thus experienced this mixture of common air and compressed air for a time they were fitted to open the door of the lock and descend into the work chamber, and could then breathe the compressed air without, discomfort. The same plan was followed when they were about to ascend to the surface. That is to say, they stopped .in the lock for a while and admitted the common air from a valve on the upper side, and thus mixing it with the compressed air they became suf-ficently accustomed to the natural air to enable them
At this point it. is proper to state that the compressed air was used, not only for breathing, but also to aid in the work in other ways. By its use sand and water were expelled from the caisson, by means of a pipe or hose, and by the force exercised through its pressure, water was kept from flowing into the caisson, thus enabling the men to work and dispose of sand, mud, dirt, and other things in the bottom of the caisson; likewise at periodical times the pressure of the compressed air was slackened, and- this had the effect of sinking the caisson deeper and introducing more sand and mud and other matter for removal.
The compressed air was introduced into the work chamber by means of a pipe which ran down through the pier on a line parallel with the man shaft, but separated from it a considerable distance, perhaps three feet. This air shaft passed down through the wooden decking into the workroom. It was, of course, covered with concrete along with the man shaft and other parts of the structure as the pier was built up, and it was added to in sections from time, to time as the pier sank, so as to keep its upper end above, water. Still further from the man shaft, and running parallel with, the air shaft some distance from it, was the
The men were' accustomed to work in shifts of nine, and at the expiration of each two hours were relieved by another shift of the same number.
On the morning’ of April 6, 1914, at six o’clock, the customary shift descended to the workroom. They were to be relieved at eight o’clock. Sixteen minutes before eight o ’clock Smith, the lock tender of the gang then in the work chamber, accompanied by Lewis, another member of that gang, ascended to the surface through the man Shaft. A few. minutes after Smith and Lewis had so left and ascended to the surface the compressed air in the work chamber was slacked as usual, and as a consequence the work chamber descended further into the bottom of the river, the result of which was that additional material accumulated which was to be removed by the shift which was expected to descend' at eight o ’clock. The men .who were- in the work chamber, so expecting to be relieved, were not relieved by the arrival, of the expected new shift. They remained in the chamber from an hour and twenty minutes to an hour and a half before they had any means of escape. They
It was evidently supposed by those in charge of the work that some kind of poisonous gas had developed in the man shaft, inasmuch as the first
The plaintiff attempts to account for the gas in the following manner: As previously noted, the man shaft was composed, of lengths of eight feet of various sections. Each section was connected with the one below it by being fitted onto the other by a flange. These joints, as they were added on, were screwed tight, the space between the joints being covered by rubberoid to prevent leaking. But it was impossible to secure them so tightly that they would not leak water slightly, a small drip. Such is the nature of the work. It was also impossible to make them perfectly air tight. At four o’clock, Sunday afternoon, April 5th sixteen hours before the accident, it was discovered by the witness Howerton, a member of the shift then descending the man shaft to the work chamber below for the customary two hours’ service there, that one of the joints of the shafts, about sixteen feet above the lock was leaking air into the shaft, with a hissing sound. At six o ’clock of the same afternoon, fourteen hours before the accident, as Howerton had completed his two hours’ work.in the work chamber, and was ascending the ladder of the man shaft on his way to the surface, he discovered that another one of the joints, still higher up, was
It is the theory of the plaintiff that the fire which developed, in the wooden decking before referred to
As .to whether any gas from the fire could ascend •from the ignited decking along the pipe, the only evidence upon this subject is that it would ascend until it reached the bottom of the pier where the shaft was inclosed in cement, and that it would then spread out; that it _would not ascend along the air shaft, but would spread out along the under surface of the pier. It is in evidence that cement clings very closely to iron.
It is also the theory of the plaintiff that even if the gas had ascended to the sprung joints of the man shaft. it never could have entered that shaft if the lock had been placed at the top of the shaft instead of near the bottom. It is in evidence that when the lock is at the top of the shaft the compressed air which fills the work chamber also fills the shaft and its pressure — thirty-two pounds to the square inch-keeps out water and would keep out gas, and would have prevented the entry of either. (IC
We have stated that the evidence shows that the lock was expected to serve two purposes. One has already been explained, that is the equalizing of the natural air and the compressed air; the other purpose was to guard the men against the danger of the flooding of the shaft. The evidence is in conflict as to which is the better method to guard against that danger. Some of the witnesses ■ say that the lock built near the top of the shaft is the safer for that purpose; that is, to protect the men in ease of a flooding with water. Other evidence is to the effect that in long or deep piers the lower lock is the safer, because the men can get into that quickly, shut the door, and prevent the rising of the water. This lower lock was the much more expensive of the two forms of locks, and was generally used, as stated, in constructing deep piers which were operated with an elevator, instead of a ladder. This shaft, however, had a ladder instead of an elevator.
The lock of either form was constructed without any view of guarding against gas; no danger from gas having ever before been experienced, and previously stated.
It is contended for the plaintiff that the rule res ipsa loquitur applies. The defendants insist that this rule does not apply as between master and servant, but concede that all of the facts should he considered together for the purpose of discovering whether, in the circumstances so developed, there is to he found a basis.for inferring that there was any wait of reasonable care on the part of the employer, or master, in the performance of the duties -imposed upon him by law, in providing a safe place to work, having in view, at the same time, the effect of any contributory negligence on the part of the servant, and likewise the assumption of the ordinary 'risks of work by the latter; also the negligence of fellow servants.
The rule res ipsa luquitur, in its primary or distinctive sense, may be thus defined: Where the evidence shows an injury inflicted, and also the physical thing inflicting it, and that thing does not usually, or in the ordinary course, produce such a result where due care is exercised by those in charge of it, it may be inferred that those so in charge of the thing inflicting the injury, failed to exercised such due care; that is, that they were guilty of negligence. The term re ipsa lo.quitur is often used in the more extensive sense of including all pertinent facts both
We see no reason why the rule res ipsa loquitur may not apply between master and servant where proof of the injury and of the physical thing inflicting it also excludes the presumption in favor of the master having performed his duty in the furnishing of a safe place to work and suitable tools to work with; also the servant’s own negligence, that of his fellow servants, and the servant’s assumption of the risks of the employment; hut obviously - such a case must he rare.
We have several master and servant cases in this State in which the rule was invoked, but not applied. Gill v. Brown, 130 Tenn., 174, 169 S. W., 752; Railroad v. Hayes, 117 Tenn., 680, 689-691, 99 S. W., 362; Railroad v. Lindamood, 111 Tenn., 457, 78 S. W., 99; Railroad v. Stewart, 13 Lea (81 Tenn.), 432. In Gill v. Brown, while the rule was learnedly discussed, the case turned on the point that another fact was discovered which indicated the master as the author of the injury. That was a case wherein it appeared that a boiler had exploded killing the servant. The fact, in addition to the mere explosion of the boiler, was that in the wreckage there were found some
Where, in addition to the facts which constitute the res in its distinctive sense, that is the infliction' of the injury, and the physical agency inflicting it, there appear other facts which in and of themselves point to .the responsible human cause, a case of circumstantial evidence is produced rather than a pure case of res ipsa loquitur. However, in considering these
It frequently occurs, as in the case last mentioned, that counsel do not pause after merely having proven the res, but proceed to develop their whole case,
At this point it is proper to consider a question which has been much mooted, and upon which the decisions of the courts have produced some apparent confusion. This question turns upon the relation between the rule res ipsa loquitur and the burden of proof. The confusion has arisen from the two senses in which the term “burden of proof” is used in the authorities. In one sense the meaning of the term involves that burden which the party who has the affirmative of an issue must always bear until the conclusion of the case, a burden which never shifts no matter what the changing aspects of the controversy may show as the case develops on the evidence. The other meaning is expressed in the duty which devolves .upon the respective parties to meet with evidence the inferences adverse to them that may develop at any point in the trial from the beginning to the end of the case. Some authorities indicate this aspect of the. matter by the term “burden of the
“The term ‘burden 'of proof’ has two distinct meanings. ‘It is used to refer: First, to the duty of establishing the truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case, whether civil or criminal, in which the issue arises; and, second, to the duty of producing evidence at the beginning, or at any subsequent stage of the trial, in order to make or meet a prima-facie case.’ This burden of proof never shifts during the course of a trial, but remains to the end with the party asserting the affirmative of the issue. Here the burden of proof was on plaintiff to show that defendants were guilty of negligence, and it was not upon defendants to show that they were not guilty of negligence, and this burden of proof did not shift during the trial, but remained with the plaintiff to the end. In some of the text-books and decisions it is said that, by reason of the introduction of rebutting testimony by defendant in the case, the ‘burden of proof’ is shifted, but all that is meant by this is that there is a necessity of evidence to answer the prima-facie case, or it will prevail, but the burden of maintaining the affirmative of the issue -involved in the action is upon the party alleging*186 the fact which constitutes the issue; and this burden remains throughout the .trial”—citing Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Mee 218 Ill., 9, 15, 75 N. E., 800-802 (2 L. R. A. [N. S.], 725, 4 Ann. Cas., 7).
Again:
“ ‘Burden of proof’ and ‘burden of evidence’ are often confused. The phrase ‘burden of proof’ is in fact more philosophical than practical. It means generally that a plaintiff, however often the evidence shifts, must, upon the whole, persuade the jury that his contention is right. The risk of nonpersuasion is all the time upon him.” Foss v. McRae, 105 Me., 140, 143, 73 Atl., 827, 829; 1 Words and Phrases (Second Series), 521.
Further:
“ ‘Burden of proof,’ in the sense of the duty of producing evidence, may he passed from one party to another as the case' progresses, while in the sense of obligation to establish the proof of the claim on which plaintiff’s case rests it is upon him throughout the trial.” Id., 522, citing Colston v. Bean, 78 Vt., 283, 285, 62 Atl., 1015, 1016.
Still further: “In the sense of the burden of the evidence, the ‘burden of proof’ may change from, one side to the other as the trial proceeds; but in the sense of maintaining the issue involved in the action, it constantly remains on the party alleging the fact which constitutes the issue, and when all the evidence has been introduced the jury must
The same thought is a little more fully expressed in the following quotation:
“Where the party having the ‘burden of proof’ establishes a prima-fade case, and no proof to the contrary is offered, he will prevail. Therefore the other party, if he would avoid the effect of such prima-fade case, must produce evidence of equal or greater weight, to balance and control it, or he will fail. Still the proof upon both sides applies to the affirmative or negative of one and the same issue or proposition of fact; and the party whose case requires the proof of that fact has all' along the burden of proof. It does not shift though the weight in either scale, may at times preponderate.” Id. 522, citing Klunk v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 74 Ohio St., 125, 77 N. E., 752, 755 (quoting and adopting Powers v. Russell, 30 Mass. [13 Pick.], 76).
See, also, numerous other cases cited on the point in the same volume of Words and Phrases just referred to, and also the same title in volume 1 of the first series of that work. See, also, the subject fully discussed in the learned notes to Cleveland C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hadley, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.), 527, and the note to Hughes v. Atlantic City & Shore Railroad Co., L. R. A., 1916A, 930 to 940.
“In- our opinion, res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an .inference; that they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where direct evidence of it may he lacking, but it is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; that they call for explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily that they require' it; that they make a case to be décided by the jury, not that they forestall the verdict. Res ipsa loquitur, where it applies, does not convert the defendant’s general issue into an affirmative defense. When all the evidence is in, the question for the jury is whether the preponderance is with the plaintiff.”
This excerpt is also.quoted in two of our previous cases: Gill v. Brown and Memphis Street Railway
Now as to the present case. The plaintiff below introduced witnesses who testified to all the cir
We are of the opinion that there was no error in the action of either court.- The theory of the plaintiff is that the two intestates and the seven other men who were found at the bottom of the shaft with them were all suffocated by foul gas that had accumulated in the man shaft. There is no direct evidence that ■ gas had accumulated, but by a process of elimination it is said that the conclusion is inevitable that gas was in the shaft and was the physical cause of the death of these men. Let that be granted; still, it appears that, ten minutes before these men went down the shaft, Smith and Lewis came out of the shaft with impunity; therefore the gas must have accumulated within that ten minutes, and there is not the slightest evidence that the defendant companies had any, notice of the fact, or any information whatever upon the subject, so it was. not possible for them to guard against it. They were as ignorant of its existence as were the men who went down the ladder.
As to the claim that the defendants were guilty of negligence because the lock was not placed at the top of the man shaft instead of near the bottom, there is no evidence of negligence to be found here. The undisputed facts show that the purpose of the lock was to protect the men in case of flooding of the shaft as well as to enable them to pass from the outer air into the work chamber filled with compressed air, and from the latter hack to the outer air. There is no evidence that the injury occurred from flooding, or that there was any flooding of the man shaft; likewise, there is no evidence that any injury occurred by reason of passing from the outer air to the compressed air. There is evidence, as set out in the statement of facts, that, if the lock had been at the top of the man shaft, instead of near the bottom, the compressed air would have filled the man shaft, and because of its great pressure it would have kept out not only all water, but gas as well. But no negligence could he inferred from this fact as it appears from the evidence that gas had never before de
As to the springing of the joints of the man shaft the evidence is that the' only .cause that can be assigned for such a state of affairs as to the water leak was the sinking of the caisson or work chamber on two logs, and this was the action of the fellow servants of the decedents, and no recovery could-be had therefor. However, from what lias already been said, it is apparent that, even if gas entered through these openings, it was a danger that could not have been anticipated, and there could be no liability therefor. Moreover, it does not appear that notice of this condition of two of the jpints of the man shaft was brought to the attention of the defendants, nor is there any evidence
The foregoing disposes of all of the assignments of error made by the plaintiffs except the last, and that is to the effect that, inasmuch as the trial judge overruled a demurrer to the first count of the declaration, he could not thereafter direct a peremptory instruction as to the matter therein presented, since he was bound by his previous decision, that the facts' stated in that count made a good cause of action, and it is added that the evidence sustains the facts so charged. s ■
It is enough to say in response to this assignment that there was no evidence at all to sustain that count.
Since the accident occurred on the Arkansas side of the river, it is insisted that the laws of Arkansas should control. No such laws were proven formally in the, trial court, and so we must presume that the Arkansas laws are the same as our own, so far as
It results that there was no error in the judgment of the trial court, or of the court of civil appeals, and the judgment of the latter, affirming the judgment of the trial court must itself be affirmed.