153 N.Y.S. 204 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1915
This is an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. The plaintiff sues in the right of the copartnership firm of G-lick & Eckstein, who had a contract with the appellant for varnishing, painting, papering and decorating three five-story apartment buildings containing ninety-three apartments. The contract provided that the plaintiff’s assignors should do all the work for the gross sum of $3,200. They were paid $2,150 on account, and the plaintiff by this action sought to foreclose the lien for the balance. It alleged complete performance by its assignors, excepting in so far as performance was waived.
The principal questions litigated on the trial were concerning performance by the plaintiff’s assignors with respect to varnishing the floors, enameling the dadoes and tubs in the bathrooms, and painting the bathrooms, kitchens and bedrooms. W ith respect to these matters the plaintiff claimed full performance, and failed to give any evidence tending to show a waiver of complete performance. Testimony of a general nature was offered in behalf of the plaintiff tending to sustain its contention that the contract was fully performed in these respects; but more definite testimony was offered in behalf of appellant to the contrary, and the learned trial court found, and we agree with his determination, that it outweighs the evidence offered in behalf of the plaintiff. The court did not find, and on the evidence could not have found, that there was any waiver of performance with respect to this part of the work. The court did, however, find that the plaintiff’s assignors per
The principal question presented by the appeal is whether, in view of the pleadings and of this finding with respect to the value of the work omitted by the plaintiff’s assignors, from which plaintiff has not appealed, the judgment can be sustained. The omission aggregated about fourteen per cent of the entire contract price of the work. If the evidence showed or tended to show that the plaintiff was entitled to recover on the theory of substantial performance, we could, if the ends of justice required it, find substantial performance or grant a new trial. An examination of the evidence, however, convinces us that the plaintiff would not he entitled to recover even on the theory of substantial performance. The courts have been quite liberal in these suits in equity to sustain a cause of action in favor of one who has attempted in good faith to perform his contract, but has through oversight, misunderstanding or any excusable neglect failed to completely perform in certain respects deemed unsubstantial, for which the owner may he adequately indemnified by an allowance and deduction from the contract price for the work, and in such case, on an allegation of full performance, permit a recovery on the theory of substantial performance where the contractor shows the cost of performing the omitted work. (Woodward v. Fuller, 80 N. Y. 312; Spence v. Ham, 163 id. 220; Van Orden v. MacRae, 121 App. Div. 143; affd., 193 N. Y. 635; Fox v. Davidson, 36 App. Div. 159.)
But there is a limit to the application of this rule, and a party who knowingly and willfully fails to perform his contract in any respect, or omits to perform a substantial part of it, cannot be permitted, under the guise of this rule, to recover for the value of the work done; and the trend of the more recent decisions is
It follows that the findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment should be modified in accordance with these views, so that it will appear thereby that the plaintiff’s assignors did not in good faith endeavor to complete performance of their contract, and did not substantially perform, and failed to perform substantial and material work of the reasonable value of $450; and directing the dismissal of the complaint, with costs, but in all other respects allowing the judgment to stand in favor of the defendant Sinnott.
Ingraham, P. J., McLaughlin, Clarke and Scott, JJ., concurred.
Judgment modified as directed in opinion. Order to be settled on notice.