North American Sugar Industries, Inc. v. Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd.North American Sugar Industries, Inc. v. Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Wilson, Luck, Lagoa
LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
North American Sugar Industries, Inc. (“North American Sugar“)1, sued five defendants under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act,
Although none of the five defendants are from Florida, North American Sugar initiated this action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Allegedly, the defendants participated in a conspiracy that involved Helms-Burton trafficking from China, through Miami, Florida, and then to Puerto Carupano, Cuba. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. A magistrate
After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we vacate the district court‘s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Helms-Burton Act
In January 1959, Fidel Castro and the 26th of July Movement seized control of the Cuban government. Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2022). During the years that followed, Castro “confiscated the property of” “millions of his own citizens,” “thousands” of U.S. nationals, and “thousands more” Cubans who fled to the United States.
One of the primary goals of the Helms-Burton Act is to “deter trafficking in wrongfully confiscated property;” specifically, the property of “United States nationals who were the victims of these confiscations.”
[A]ny person that . . . traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property for money damages in an amount equal to the sum of—
(i) the amount which is the greater of—
(I) the amount, if any, certified to the claimant by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, plus interest;
(II) the amount determined under section 6083(a)(2) of this title, plus interest; or
(III) the fair market value of that property, calculated as being either the current value of the property, or the value of the property when confiscated plus interest, whichever is greater; and
(ii) court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.
The Act broadly defines “traffics” for purposes of § 6082(a)(1)(A):
[A] person “traffics” in confiscated property if that person knowingly and intentionally—
(i) sells . . . or . . . uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person,
without the authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to the property.
Although the Helms-Burton Act was originally enacted in 1996, the Act‘s private cause of action “remained dormant for 23 years.” Garcia-Bengochea, 57 F.4th at 919. “[T]hrough three different administrations,” “the right to bring an action under Title III was suspended by Presidential decree.” Id. at 919–20 (citing
B. Factual Background
i. North American Sugar‘s Stolen Property
When Fidel Castro seized control of the Cuban government, North American Sugar was one of the largest sugar producers in the world. The company‘s property included a large commercial shipping port known as Puerto Carupano, which is in the municipality of Puerto Padre, Cuba. Puerto Carupano was and remains the only commercial shipping port in Puerto Padre.
On July 20, 1960, the Cuban government confiscated Puerto Carupano from North American Sugar. The Cuban government uses Puerto Carupano for its own commercial and non-commercial activities. Indeed, on January 20, 1978, Fidel Castro made a public speech at Puerto Carupano, where he proclaimed that ports that were previously owned by “the capitalists” were now the “property of the people.” He reiterated that the ports had “ceased to be operated by private enterprise.”
In October 1964, Congress enacted Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act,
ii. The Alleged Trafficking
Defendant-Appellee Goldwind is a Chinese wind-energy company that contracted in 2013 with Energoimport, a Cuban public energy company. Defendant-Appellee Goldwind International negotiated and signed the contract as Goldwind‘s “authorized representative.” Under the contract, Goldwind agreed to deliver wind-turbine units to Energoimport‘s new wind-farm project in Herradura, Cuba. And, importantly for this case, the wind turbines would be delivered to and unloaded at Puerto Carupano—the port stolen from North American Sugar by the Cuban government.
But to deliver wind-turbines to Puerto Carupano, Goldwind needed help. For one thing, Goldwind needed wind-turbine
LM‘s status as a subsidiary of an American company, however, raised a problem. For decades, the United States has sanctioned and maintained a trade embargo with Cuba. As part of the embargo, companies exporting goods to Cuba that contain U.S.-manufactured components generally must have two export licenses: a license from the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS“) and a license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC“). See
To obtain the proper licensing for the shipment, LM sought the assistance of Defendant-Appellee DSV. DSV believed that obtaining an OFAC license would be especially difficult because “the Department of Treasury,” which issues OFAC licenses, “is not pro-business with Cuba and [it] could take a while to obtain such license.” However, under the Treasury Department‘s regulations, the Department authorizes the shipment of certain goods to Cuba without an OFAC license if the shipment is covered by a BIS license and is an export “from the United States.”
But there was a catch. DSV and LM needed Goldwind‘s wind-turbine shipment to come “from the United States.”
To accomplish the Goldwind shipment, DSV‘s Danish affiliate engaged BBC Chartering Carriers GmbH & Co. KG (“BBC Carriers“), a shipping and logistics company, that through its affiliates, Defendants-Appellees BBC USA and BBC Singapore, allegedly provided additional shipping logistics assistance. Most significantly, two of BBC Carrier‘s vessels—the BBC Jade and BBC Moonstone—were ultimately used to ship the wind turbines to Miami and then to Puerto Carupano, Cuba. The BBC Jade left China on
November 15, 2018, and arrived in Miami on December 30, 2018. After clearing customs in Miami, the BBC Jade left for Cuba on December 31, 2018, and arrived at Puerto Carupano on January 6, 2019. Likewise, the BBC Moonstone left China on December 24, 2018, and arrived in Miami on January 30,
As is evident by now, the scheme to ship wind turbines from China to Cuba, with a stop in Miami, involved many actors. Here, North American Sugar sues five actors in particular: Goldwind, Goldwind International, DSV, BBC Singapore, and BBC USA. North American Sugar‘s hook for personal jurisdiction over each of these Defendants is the stop of the BBC Jade and the BBC Moonstone in Miami. But after jurisdictional discovery, each of the Defendants submitted declarations claiming that they were not involved—or had limited involvement—in the Miami stops.
With respect to DSV, North American Sugar alleges that DSV committed Helms-Burton trafficking by routing the BBC Jade and the BBC Moonstone from China, through Miami, and then to Puerto Carupano. Also, North American Sugar alleges that DSV participated in procuring the requisite BIS licenses while the ships were docked in Miami. And importantly, North American Sugar alleges that Carol Scheid, a customs broker from DSV‘s Miami office, was involved in these activities while working in Miami. DSV responds with a declaration from Kenneth Witkowski, DSV‘s Director of Quality & Compliance. Witkowksi declares that DSV had no role in planning or tracking the route of the BBC Jade and BBC Moonstone and that none of DSV‘s Florida offices were involved in the Goldwind shipments.
North American Sugar contests both of Witkowski‘s claims with several pieces of evidence, including DSV emails discussing the legal propriety of the Miami stops, twenty-two DSV emails about the Miami stops to Carol Scheid (DSV‘s Miami-based customs broker), including one sent to Scheid alone, and four DSV documents related to the Goldwind shipments that list DSV‘s Miami office as the source of the documents. Two of the documents are Importer Security Filing (“ISF“) forms that DSV prepared for U.S. Customs in connection with the stops of the BBC Jade and the BBC Moonstone in Miami. Both ISF forms list the Miami office‘s address, telephone number, and fax number at the top of the documents. Also, DSV drafted two letters to Energoimport—Goldwind‘s customer in Cuba—that listed the address and phone number of DSV‘s Miami office at the top of the letters.
Regarding BBC Singapore, North American Sugar alleges that “BBC Singapore was responsible for facilitating the voyages of the two vessels,” and most importantly, “BBC Singapore . . . corresponded and coordinated directly with port agents in Florida to facilitate the vessels’ stopover in Miami, including arranging for customs clearance while in Florida.” BBC Singapore responds with a declaration from Lars Schoennemann, the managing director of BBC Singapore. Schoennemann declares that BBC Carriers—a separate, German corporation—hired and directed the Miami port agents. Also, according to Schoennemann, “BBC Singapore does not own or operate any ships,” including the BBC Jade and the BBC Moonstone.
But Schoennemann admits that “BBC Singapore‘s business is to act as [an] agent for BBC Carriers.” And, to counter Schoennemann‘s declaration, North American Sugar presents email correspondence between BBC Singapore and the Miami port agents suggesting that BBC Singapore performed a managerial role over the Miami port agents. In a January 2019 email to the Miami port agents, Randall Sullivan—a Chartering Manager from BBC Singapore—thanked the Miami port agents for “getting my BBC Jade pushed through Miami” and he said “everything went fine for us and we‘re happy with the service that you guys provided to BBC.”
Regarding BBC USA, North American Sugar alleges that BBC USA “directly participated in the months-long planning, scrutinization, and ultimately consummation of” the Miami stop. In response, BBC USA submitts a declaration from its President, Per Petersen, disclaiming any role in the BBC Jade shipment and any role in the BBC Moonstone‘s trip to Cuba. According to Petersen, BBC USA “does not own or operate any ships,” including the BBC Jade and the BBC Moonstone. BBC USA also highlighted the Schoennemann declaration, which says that “BBC USA had no role in connection with the shipments to Cuba” because “as a matter of policy established between BBC Carriers and BBC USA . . . BBC USA never becomes involved in any shipments to or from Cuba.”
But North American Sugar responds with several emails suggesting that BBC USA was involved in the Goldwind shipment, notwithstanding its usual policy. For example, Randall Sullivan of BBC Singapore emailed Ed Anderson, BBC USA‘s general counsel, asking for “comprehensive guidance on what the requirements are . . . to move [the Goldwind] cargo into Cuba – without getting in trouble with uncle sam.” The exhibit documents no email response from BBC USA. But a few months later, an operations manager at BBC Singapore sent an internal email regarding the Goldwind shipments, and she said, “pls note this info shall not be directly sen[t] to BBC Houston as we are calling Cuba. Kristina can you pls coordinate with Houston (via PHONE ONLY).” North American Sugar also highlights a second email with similar directions. And although BBC USA was directed to discuss the Goldwind shipments “via PHONE ONLY,” there is an additional email suggesting that BBC USA was involved in reviewing the BIS licenses for the BBC Jade shipment. On November 6, 2018, BBC Singapore forwarded an email chain to Beverly Scott, a customs specialist at BBC USA. The email chain related to DSV‘s procurement of licensing for the Goldwind shipment on the BBC Jade. BBC Singapore asked Scott to review DSV‘s work and provide “any comments.” Scott responded, “[e]verything looks good and correct to me.”
Finally, North American Sugar alleges that Goldwind and Goldwind International participated in the trafficking scheme. But Goldwind and Goldwind International disclaim any connection with Florida, the United States, or the other defendants. Li Guoliang—Goldwind‘s Legal Director—and Zhu Hui—Goldwind International‘s Chief Financial Officer—submitted declarations stating that neither Goldwind Defendant is a party to any contract with DSV, BBC Singapore, or BBC USA; that neither Goldwind Defendant communicated with the U.S. office of any entity concerning the BBC Jade and BBC Moonstone shipments; and that neither Goldwind Defendant conducts business in Florida or the United States. On appeal, the Goldwind Defendants emphasized that LM—the blade supplier—hired DSV and planned the Miami stops with DSV to secure the requisite licenses.
In response, North American Sugar presents evidence that the entire scheme was created to enable the Goldwind Defendants to deliver wind turbines to Energoimport in Cuba. LM‘s blade-supply contract with Goldwind obligated LM to procure the necessary licensing so that Goldwind could complete its shipment. And, when Goldwind purchased the wind-turbine blades from LM, LM expressly
Also, North American Sugar presents documents suggesting that the Goldwind Defendants were aware of and involved in the Miami stops. An email chain shows that DSV kept Goldwind informed of the BBC Jade‘s progress toward Miami. And Goldwind submitted export-control declarations for the wind-turbine shipments. Next, the BIS license issued by the Department of Commerce lists “Goldwind” as the “Purchaser” in China and the “Approved End User” in Cuba of the LM blades. Finally, Goldwind sent the BIS license to Energoimport (Goldwind‘s customer in Cuba) so that Energoimport could review the licenses.
C. Procedural History
On June 15, 2020, North American Sugar filed suit against the Defendants in the Southern District of Florida. The Defendants moved to dismiss North American Sugar‘s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, see
After completion of jurisdictional discovery, North American Sugar filed its first amended complaint, which remains the operative pleading. The Defendants again moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, see
The district court referred the Defendants’ 12(b)(2) motions to a magistrate judge, and the magistrate judge held a hearing on the Defendants’ motions. The magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss North American Sugar‘s amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction as to all five Defendants. Overall, the magistrate judge emphasized that because North American Sugar‘s stolen port is in Cuba, “the Plaintiffs’ claims hinge on . . . trafficking that occurred in Cuba.” Further, the magistrate judge found that none of the Defendants engaged in any activity in Florida related to the Goldwind shipments.
North American Sugar objected to the report and recommendation. While its objection was pending, this Court published its opinion in Del Valle, 56 F.4th 1265. North American Sugar filed a notice of supplemental authority, arguing that Del Valle rejects the idea that Helms-Burton “trafficking” occurs only “in Cuba“—a central premise of the report and recommendation. The district court adopted the report and recommendation concluding that Del Valle was inapplicable to this case. North American Sugar appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[T]he issue of whether personal jurisdiction is present is a question of law and subject to de novo review.” Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009). And, because the district court resolved this case under a prima facie standard, as discussed below, we review it‘s factual representations de novo.
If the district court holds an evidentiary hearing, then it should “impose the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard right away” and “‘find the relevant jurisdictional facts‘” “during the pretrial phase.” AcryliCon, 985 F.3d at 1364 (quoting PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Constr., N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2010)). Those factual findings are reviewed for clear error on appeal. Id. at 1363. But if the district court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, “the district court does not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations.” Id. at 1364–65. Instead, it simply reviews “[w]hether the plaintiff satisfies the prima facie requirement,” which “is a purely legal question” that is subject to de novo review on appeal. Id. at 1364; Oldfield, 558 F.3d at 1217.
To be sure, even if the district court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, the defendant challenging jurisdiction may submit “affidavit evidence in support of its position” at the pleading stage. Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274. And in that case, “the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.” Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int‘l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002). But even then, if the district court does not hold an evidentiary hearing under Rule 12(i), the district court must construe all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff to the extent that “the plaintiff‘s complaint and supporting evidence conflict with the defendant‘s affidavits.” Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int‘l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Meier, 288 F.3d at 1269). If the court applies the prima facie standard instead of making factual findings at a Rule 12(i) hearing, “[a]fter trial, if the defendant still believes personal jurisdiction is lacking, it may invite the district court to revisit personal jurisdiction in light of the evidence produced at trial, at which time the court will impose a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.” AcryliCon, 985 F.3d at 1365.
Here, we review the district court‘s factual representations de novo because the district court decided this case under a prima facie standard and did not hold an evidentiary hearing under Rule 12(i). See, e.g., id. at 1363–65. To be sure, the district court authorized jurisdictional discovery and referred the Defendants’ 12(b)(2) motions to a magistrate judge who held a videoconference hearing on the Defendants’ motions. But the magistrate judge‘s hearing was not an evidentiary hearing. And although the magistrate judge considered declarations and documentary evidence that the parties attached to their motions and responses, the parties did not call witnesses, and only presented legal arguments about their motions. The
III. ANALYSIS
The district court‘s dismissal of North American Sugar‘s complaint turned on two incorrect assumptions. First, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge‘s determination that the alleged Helms-Burton violations occurred only “in Cuba,” notwithstanding the broad definition “traffics” under the Act,
A. The Helms-Burton Act is Broader than the District Court Conceived.
The initial error in this appeal stemmed from the magistrate judge‘s narrow reading of the Helms-Burton Act. The magistrate judge‘s recommendation was largely premised on the notion that North American Sugar‘s Helms-Burton claims “hinge” on “alleged trafficking that occurred in Cuba” while no trafficking occurred in Florida. The district court agreed, explaining that “the record evidence simply does not establish that [the] Defendants engaged in any Florida-based activities that constituted a substantial aspect of the alleged trafficking.” However, neither the magistrate judge nor the district court addressed the broad definition under § 6023(13)(A) of the Act of the word “traffics.” While the
magistrate judge‘s report quoted parts of
The Helms-Burton Act imposes liability on anyone who “traffics” in property that “was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959” and was owned by someone who is now a “United States national.”
(i) sells . . . or . . . uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or
otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person, . . .
Our decision in Del Valle confirmed this broad reading of the Helms-Burton Act. In Del Valle, the plaintiffs were Florida citizens who sued “several entities that own and operate travel websites.” 56 F.4th at 1271. The plaintiffs “were the living heirs to separate beach-front properties nationalized by the Cuban government after the 1959 revolution.” Id. The travel websites “trafficked” the plaintiffs’ properties by advertising the properties and enabling customers to book stays at the properties. Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, explaining that the tort at the heart of the plaintiffs’ Helms-Burton Act claims was “traffic[king] in . . . confiscated property, which occurred in Cuba.” Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH, No. 19-22619-CIV, 2020 WL 2733729, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2020) (emphasis added).
On appeal, we reversed, noting that the district court had personal jurisdiction under both Florida‘s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1272–77, 1279. Del Valle explained that because
The district court‘s reading of the Helms-Burton Act and Del Valle led to an erroneous conclusion about the locations of the trafficking that North American Sugar alleges in this case. That, in
B. The Tortious-Act Prong of Florida‘s Long-Arm Statute
In light of our discussion above of the Helms-Burton Act, we find it necessary to address what constitutes Helms-Burton trafficking “within” Florida under the tortious-act prong of Florida‘s long-arm statute. See
Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) confers specific personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants “who personally or through an agent” “[c]ommit[] a tortious act within” Florida and a cause of action “aris[es] from” that tortious act. When interpreting and applying Florida‘s long-arm statute, see
Two important rules should inform the district court‘s analysis on remand. First, as we held in Del Valle, under
Second, although a non-resident can commit a tortious act in Florida through telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida, that possibility exists only in contexts where the plaintiff suffered an injury in Florida. Horizon Aggressive Growth, 421 F.3d at 1168 (“[J]urisdiction may be found in certain instances where an out-of-state defendant commits a tort that produces an injury in Florida. For example, allegations about an out-of-state defendant‘s ‘telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida, are sufficient to trigger jurisdiction under the Long–Arm statute provided, however, that the cause of action arises from those communications.” (emphasis added) (quoting Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1260 (Fla. 2002))).
The district court correctly articulated this principle, but this rule merits our attention because North American Sugar challenges it on appeal. North American Sugar conceded at oral argument that it did not suffer an injury in Florida, but it argues that Florida law does not impose a Florida-injury requirement in cases involving telephonic, electronic, or written communications that are sent into Florida.
It is true that the standard articulated in Wendt—the seminal case on this question—does not explicitly impose a Florida-injury element. Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1253, 1260 (holding that a non-resident can commit a tortious act “in Florida” through “telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida” provided that a “cause of action . . . arise[s] from the communications“). But Wendt articulated this standard in the context of a Florida plaintiff who suffered a Florida injury due to an out-of-state defendant‘s electronic communication into Florida, Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1254, and Wendt‘s test only applies in that context. See id. at 1253 n.2 (noting that the court did not “decide the broader issue of whether injury alone satisfies the requirement of
Overall, North American Sugar‘s concession that it did not suffer a Florida injury makes Wendt inapplicable. So, to establish personal jurisdiction under Florida‘s long-arm statute, North American Sugar must demonstrate that the Defendants, their agents, or their co-conspirators committed Helms-Burton trafficking while they were physically located in Florida.
As explained above, even though Puerto Carupano is in Cuba, under the Helms-Burton Act, the Defendants could have “traffic[ked]” Puerto Carupano while they were physically outside of Cuba. See
Notwithstanding this evidence, the district court held that none of the Defendants engaged in trafficking activities in Florida. Our precedents are clear: under a prima facie standard, if “the plaintiff‘s complaint and supporting evidence conflict with the defendant‘s affidavits, the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Meier, 288 F.3d at 1269. “Whether the plaintiff satisfies the prima facie requirement is a purely legal question; the district court does not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations.” AcryliCon, 985 F.3d at 1364–65. Although
The district court failed to do that here. DSV, for example, submitted a declaration from Kenneth Witkowski, DSV‘s Director of Quality & Compliance, who declared that none of DSV‘s Florida offices were involved in facilitating the Miami stops or the Goldwind shipments. Relying on the Witkowski declaration alone, the district court concluded none of DSV‘s Florida offices participated in the alleged trafficking. However, North American Sugar provided significant evidence—particularly the ISF forms and the letters to Energoimport—that listed the Miami office (with its address and telephone number) as the source of the documents. True, in his declaration, Witkowski claimed that “DSV US filed the ISF forms . . . from its office in New Jersey” and that “[t]he ISF forms that were filed did not list DSV US‘s Miami, Florida address as that of the filing party.” But the ISF forms that Witkowksi describes are nowhere in the record, notwithstanding the fact that the Parties completed jurisdictional discovery. Also, even if DSV did correct the ISF forms, the fact that some of the drafts contained the Miami office‘s address and phone number supports
Moreover, because North American Sugar alleges that all the Defendants participated in a conspiracy, Florida‘s long-arm statute could confer personal jurisdiction over the BBC Defendants and the Goldwind Defendants even if none of them personally acted in Florida. See Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1281–82 (“[Florida‘s] long-arm statute can support personal jurisdiction over any alleged conspirator where any other co-conspirator commits an act in Florida in furtherance of the conspiracy, even if the defendant over whom personal jurisdiction is sought individually committed no act in, or had no relevant contact with, Florida.“); Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 585 (Fla. 2000) (although Japanese defendant sold thermal paper “only in Japan” and maintained no office in Florida, it was subject to personal jurisdiction under Florida‘s long-arm statute because of alleged co-conspirators’ violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act in Florida); NHB Advisors, Inc. v. Czyzyk, 95 So. 3d 444, 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“[I]f a plaintiff has successfully alleged a cause of action for conspiracy . . ., and if the plaintiff has successfully alleged that any member of that conspiracy committed tortious acts in Florida in furtherance of that conspiracy, then all of the conspirators are subject to the jurisdiction of Florida through its long-arm statute.“); accord Amersham Enterprises, Inc. v. Hakim-Daccach, 333 So. 3d 289, 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022); Machtinger v. Inertial Airline Servs., Inc., 937 So. 2d 730, 734–36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Wilcox v. Stout, 637 So. 2d 335, 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
The district court rejected a conspiracy theory of jurisdiction on the premise that North American Sugar “ha[d] not established that any Defendant committed a tortious act in Florida in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to traffic the Property.” But as we noted above, the district court incorrectly concluded, under the prima facie standard, that DSV did not commit Helms-Burton trafficking in Florida. On remand, the district court should first determine whether it has personal jurisdiction over DSV or any other Defendant for Helms-Burton trafficking in Florida. If it does, then the district court should also consider whether it has personal jurisdiction over the other Defendants under the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we vacate the district court‘s order adopting the magistrate judge‘s recommendation, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.