North American Derivatives Exchange, Inc. v. State of NevadaNorth American Derivatives Exchange, Inc. v. State of Nevada
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Andrew P. Gordon
Plaintiff North American Derivatives Exchange, Inc. d/b/a Crytpo.com (Crypto) is a Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) designated contract market (DCM). Earlier this year, Crypto began offering event contracts that turn on the outcome of sporting events. The Nevada Gaming Control Board deemed these contracts to be sports wagering subject to Nevada‘s gaming laws and sent Crypto a cease-and-desist letter. Crypto brought this suit to permanently enjoin the Nevada Gaming Control Board, its members in their official capacities, and the Nevada Attorney General from pursuing civil or criminal enforcement against Crypto for offering event contracts in Nevada. Crypto contends that its contracts are legal under federal law and that Nevada law is preempted due to the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction over transactions on DCMs.
Crypto moves for a preliminary injunction to preclude the defendants from pursuing civil or criminal remedies against it. Crypto also moves for judgment on the pleadings and to strike the defendants’ affirmative defenses. The defendants oppose, arguing that Crypto is not likely to succeed on the merits because the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) does not preempt Nevada gaming laws and, in any event, Crypto‘s sports wagers are not “swaps” and thus do not fall within the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction. Additionally, the defendants argue that Crypto cannot meet the other factors to support preliminary injunctive relief. The defendants contend that judgment on the pleadings is premature because fact issues remain, and they argue that the motion to strike should be denied, except for one affirmative defense that they concede is now moot. Several Indian tribes and Indian gaming associations move for leave to file an amicus brief.1 Crypto does not oppose granting leave for the amicus brief to be filed and responded to the amicus brief on the merits.
I deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because, based on the pleadings, Crypto‘s event contracts are not “swaps” falling within the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction. I deny the motion for preliminary injunction because Crypto has not met its burden to show that it is likely to succeed in demonstrating that its event contracts based on the outcome of live events are
I. BACKGROUND
The CFTC regulates financial derivative markets. “A derivative is a financial instrument or contract whose price is directly dependent upon (i.e.[,] derived from) the value of one or more underlying assets—for example, commodities (like corn and wheat), securities, or debt instruments.” KalshiEX LLC v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, No. 23-3257 (JMC), 2024 WL 4164694, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2024) (quotation omitted). Derivatives “provide a way to transfer market risk or credit risk between two counterparties.” Id. (quotation omitted). Event contracts are a form of derivative in which the “payoff is based on a specified event, occurrence, or value.” Id. at *2 (quotation omitted). “These contracts usually pose a yes-or-no question. The buyer of the event contract, for example, may take a ‘yes’ position on whether the underlying event will happen,” and the “seller implicitly takes the opposite, or ‘no,’ position.” Id. The contract prices fluctuate because they are based on the current probability that the relevant event will occur. Id.
An entity like Crypto must apply to and receive designation from the CFTC to become a DCM.
In 2010, Congress amended the CEA again by enacting a special rule for event-based contracts in “excluded commodities.”
The CFTC subsequently conducted a public interest review under
(a) Prohibition. A registered entity shall not list for trading or accept for clearing on or through the registered entity any of the following:
(1) An agreement, contract, transaction, or swap based upon an excluded commodity, as defined in Section 1a(19)(iv) of the Act, that involves, relates to, or references terrorism, assassination, war, gaming, or an activity that is unlawful under any State or Federal law; or
(2) An agreement, contract, transaction, or swap based upon an excluded commodity, as defined in Section 1a(19)(iv) of the Act, which involves, relates to, or references an activity that is similar to an activity enumerated in § 40.11(a)(1) of this part, and that the Commission determines, by rule or regulation, to be contrary to the public interest.
In addition to this general prohibition on the front end, the CFTC‘s regulation provides a review process through which it can determine on the back end whether an event contract that was listed despite the prohibition involves a prohibited activity. Under
may determine, based upon a review of the terms or conditions of a submission under § 40.2 [(self-certification)] or § 40.3 [(preapproval)], that an agreement, contract, transaction, or swap based on an excluded commodity, as defined in Section 1a(19)(iv) of the Act, which may involve, relate to, or reference an activity enumerated in § 40.11(a)(1) or § 40.11(a)(2), be subject to a 90-day review.
The CFTC can approve or disapprove a contract following that review.
When adopting this regulation, the CFTC acknowledged that “the term ‘gaming’ requires further clarification and that the term is not susceptible to easy definition.” Provisions Common to Registered Entities, 76 Fed. Reg. 44776, 44785 (July 27, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt 40). The CFTC noted that it had “solicited public comments on the best approach for addressing the potential gaming aspects of some event contracts and the potential pre-emption of state laws.”
Crypto is a CFTC-registered DCM. ECF No. 15-2 at 3. On January 30, 2025, Crypto self-certified to the CFTC that it would start offering event contracts based
Crypto advised the CFTC that certain persons were prohibited from trading these event contracts, including the players, coaches, agents, staff, employees, management, and owners, as well as these persons’ immediate family and household members.
The CFTC thus far appears not to have acted against Crypto or other DCMs who have offered similar event contracts that are based on the outcome of sporting events. Instead, various state entities, like the Nevada Gaming Control Board (Board), have attempted to regulate Crypto and other DCMs who are offering sports-based event contracts. That led Crypto and other DCMs to file suits seeking injunctions against state regulation based on the argument that because they are CFTC-designated exchanges, only the CFTC can regulate them and state laws are preempted.
And that is what happened in this case. On May 20, 2025, the Board sent Crypto a letter stating that the Board was “aware that Crypto.com has been offering, and continues to offer, event-based wagering contracts in Nevada on sporting events on its exchange,” and that “offering event-based wagering contracts is unlawful in Nevada, unless and until approved as licensed gaming by the Nevada Gaming Commission.” ECF No. 15-4 at 2. According to the Board, Crypto was operating as an unlicensed sports pool and thereby violating Nevada law, including Nevada criminal law.
Crypto thereafter filed this lawsuit and moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the Board and the Nevada Attorney General from pursuing civil and criminal penalties against Crypto. In another case involving a different DCM, I granted an injunction based on my preliminary conclusion that the Board was likely field preempted from regulating the event contracts offered by that DCM, KalshiEX, LLC (Kalshi). KalshiEX, LLC v. Hendrick, No. 2:25-CV-00575-APG-BNW, 2025 WL 1073495, at *6 (D. Nev. Apr. 9, 2025). The District of New Jersey reached a similar conclusion. KalshiEX LLC v. Flaherty, No. 25-CV-02152-ESK-MJS, 2025 WL 1218313, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2025). But the District of Maryland concluded the opposite and held that Maryland state gaming laws were not preempted and therefore the Maryland state gaming authorities could regulate event contracts on
Despite my prior ruling in Hendrick, I reach a different conclusion in this case. For the reasons discussed below, I deny Crypto‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings and for a preliminary injunction.
II. CRYPTO‘S EVENT CONTRACTS BASED ON THE OUTCOME OF LIVE EVENTS ARE NOT SWAPS FALLING WITHIN THE CFTC‘S EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.
“A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party‘s pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fajardo v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999). When, as here, the plaintiff moves for judgment on the pleadings, I look to the defendants’ allegations in their answer. See Nat‘l Lifeline Ass’n v. Batjer, No. 21-15969, 2023 WL 1281676, at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2023) (“Because [the plaintiff] moved for judgment on the pleadings, this court looks to the allegations in the Defendants’ pleadings, here their answer.“).
To qualify for a preliminary injunction, a party must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm, (3) the balance of hardships favors the movant, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Alternatively, under the sliding scale approach, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) serious questions on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm, (3) the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff‘s favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011).
Under the Supremacy Clause, “state laws that conflict with federal law are without effect,” meaning they are preempted by federal law. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (simplified). The “ultimate touchstone” in preemption analysis is congressional purpose. Id. (quotation omitted). “Congress may indicate pre-emptive intent through a statute‘s express language or through its structure and purpose.” Id.
Absent an express preemption clause, federal law may preempt state law where Congress has occupied the field or where state laws conflict with federal law. Field preemption occurs when it “can be inferred from a framework of regulation so pervasive that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it or where there is a federal interest so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (simplified). Conflict preemption occurs when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” or “where the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. (quotation omitted). I assume that the States’ “historic police powers” are not preempted “unless that was Congress‘s ‘clear and manifest purpose.‘” Id. at 400. Regulation of gambling has long been considered
I begin with the “plain meaning of [the CEA‘s] language.” United States v. Lillard, 935 F.3d 827, 833 (9th Cir. 2019). Title
The Commission [CFTC] shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts, agreements and transactions involving swaps or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery traded or executed on a contract market designated pursuant to section 7 of this title . . .. Except as hereinabove provided, nothing contained in this section shall (I) supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities and Exchange Commission or other regulatory authorities under the laws of the United States or of any State, or (II) restrict the Securities and Exchange Commission and such other authorities from carrying out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with such laws. Nothing in this section shall supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the United States or any State.
As I stated in Hendrick, “Section 2‘s plain and unambiguous language grants the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over accounts, agreements, and transactions involving swaps or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery that are traded or executed on exchanges that the CFTC has designated under section 7.” 2025 WL 1073495, at *5 (internal footnotes omitted). “The second sentence in section 2—which states that nothing in section 2 supersedes ‘other regulatory authorities’ under state law—does not give states regulatory authority over swaps traded on CFTC-designated exchanges because that language is limited by the phrase ‘[e]xcept as hereinabove provided.‘” Id. “Section 2‘s first sentence supersedes the SEC and state regulatory authorities’ jurisdiction for transactions involving swaps on a CFTC-designated exchange.” Id. “The remainder of the second sentence preserves the SEC and states’ regulatory authority over exchanges or transactions that are not covered by the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction.” Id. “For example, [state regulators] could pursue an entity that offered sports event contracts that were not listed on a CFTC-designated exchange.” Id.
But to fall within the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction under
Preliminarily, I have authority to interpret the CEA, including its definition of “swap.” Crypto argues that the legislative history shows that Congress intended the CFTC, not courts or state regulators, to decide what is a swap and whether that swap is contrary to the public interest under the special rule. See 156 Cong. Rec. S5902-01, S5906 (July 15, 2010) (Sen. Lincoln stating that the “Commission [(CFTC)] needs the power to, and should, prevent derivatives contracts that are contrary to the public interest because they exist predominantly to enable gambling through supposed ‘event contracts‘“). But the CEA does not expressly delegate to the CFTC the exclusive power to decide what is a swap. Compare Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 430-31 (1977) (evaluating a statute that expressly “authorize[d]” the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Various dictionaries from before the 2010 amendment to the CEA that added swaps to the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction define “occurrence” as “[s]omething that happens or takes place.” Black‘s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).4 Dictionaries define “event” in various ways, including “a happening or occurrence, esp. when important,” “a particular contest or item in a program (the pole vault, high jump and
Dictionaries often identify “event” as a synonym for “occurrence,” but make distinctions between the two. For example, Webster‘s stated that “occurrence is the general word for anything that happens or takes place,” while “an event is an occurrence of relative significance, especially one growing out of earlier happenings or conditions.”
Although definitions for both occurrence and event refer to a happening and are often referred to as synonyms, Congress chose different words for occurrence and event in the definition of a swap, and I must ascribe some significance to that decision. See S.E.C. v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is a well-established canon of statutory interpretation that the use of different words or terms within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different meaning for those words.“). I thus cannot interpret occurrence and event to both mean anything that happens. The ordinary meaning of the word occurrence is something happened, and that is consistent with the surrounding words of nonoccurrence and extent of the occurrence. Those words mean something happened, did not happen, or happened to an extent. For example, in the context of sports,8 a boxing match could either take place (occurrence), not take place (nonoccurrence), or go only three rounds (extent of the occurrence).
The ordinary meaning of event is a happening of some significance that took place or will take place, in a certain location, during a particular interval of time, such as a particular sporting event or an organized activity or celebration for the public or a particular group. And the ordinary meaning of event in terms of sports would be the sporting event itself, not who wins it. Indeed, Webster‘s notes that equating an event with an outcome or result is an archaic use of the word “event,” not the ordinary meaning. An ordinary American interpreting the word “event” would conclude that the Kentucky Derby is an event. But who wins the Kentucky Derby is an outcome of that event, not a separate event in and of itself.9
Crypto‘s live presentation industry event contracts are not swaps because, as Crypto self-certified to the CFTC, these contracts turn on the outcome of the live
Crypto‘s proposed reading of the statute knows no limiting principle because anything could be defined as an event. Although Crypto argues that Congress intentionally defined swaps broadly, the words Congress chose must have content. If everything can be defined as an event, the statutory words either have no meaning or have such a broad meaning that they would render superfluous other portions of the CEA‘s definition of a swap. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (A “statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” (simplified)). For example, section 1a(47)(iii) includes credit default swaps within the definition of a swap. A “credit default swap is a bilateral financial contract in which a protection buyer makes periodic payments to the protection seller, in return for a contingent payment if a predefined credit event occurs in the reference credit.” Aon Fin. Prods., Inc. v. Societe Generale, 476 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). In other words, a credit default swap is a contract that provides for payment dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event (a default) associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence (credit). Because a credit default swap could fit the definition of a swap in
Crypto‘s position, that its live presentation event contracts are swaps, would sweep nearly all sports wagering into the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction even though the states historically have regulated gambling through their police power. According to Crypto‘s arguments and self-certification to the CFTC,10 nearly every sports bet would be a transaction in which payment is dependent on the outcome of a sporting event and is associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence.11 That cannot be a proper reading of the statute because that would mean that all sports wagering must be done on a DCM, and not at casinos, as the CEA forbids nearly all swap dealing and trading unless done on a DCM, except for certain market participants, none of whom are casinos or the average sports bettor.12 The
factual distinctions Crypto
Had Congress intended such a sea change in the regulatory landscape, it surely would have said so. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.“). The CEA‘s language and legislative history show that Congress did not intend such a change and, to the contrary, did not want gambling to take place on CFTC-designated exchanges. As discussed above, Congress enacted the special rule granting the CFTC authority to determine whether
swaps contracts in excluded commodities are contrary to the public interest.
The CFTC‘s decision to prohibit DCMs from listing gaming contracts is consistent with congressional intent to “prevent gambling through futures markets.” 156 Cong. Rec. S5902-01, S5906 (July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Lincoln). Legislators commented specifically on sports
wagers on events like the Super Bowl or the Kentucky Derby as the type of “supposed ‘event contracts‘” that the CFTC had “the power to, and should, prevent . . . because they exist predominantly to enable gambling.”
With this congressional intent in mind, the CFTC stated when promulgating its regulations that “the term ‘gaming’ requires further clarification and that the term is not susceptible to easy definition.” Provisions Common to Registered Entities, 76 Fed. Reg. 44776, 44785 (July 27, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt 40). So the CFTC “solicited public comments on the best approach” for addressing the “potential gaming aspects of some event contracts and the potential pre-emption of state laws.”
“Pre-emption fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” Eng. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990). Congress did not intend for gaming to be conducted on DCMs, and it defined swaps and enacted the special rule to achieve this intent. Thus, based on the statutory language and Congressional intent, Crypto‘s contracts on the outcome of live events are not “swaps” that fall within the CFTC‘s exclusive jurisdiction in
Because Crypto must show that all four Winter factors support granting an injunction, I need not address the remaining factors. But given my ruling that Crypto has not shown it is likely to succeed, the analysis of those factors changes from what I determined in Hendrick. Allowing Crypto to offer sports wagers guised as swaps on its exchange unfettered by state regulation imposes substantial hardships on the defendants, who are statutorily charged with the “dut[y] to preserve public confidence and trust in licensed gaming.” State Gaming Control Bd. v. Breen, 661 P.2d 1309, 1310 (Nev. 1983) (citing
III. I GRANT IN PART THE MOTION TO STRIKE, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Crypto moves to strike the defendants’ affirmative defenses for various reasons, including that they are denials of Crypto‘s allegations, not affirmative defenses; they either do not apply or fail as a matter of law; or they lack factual support.
Under
A. I deny the motion to strike the defendants’ denials that Crypto is a DCM on which sports event contracts are listed.
Crypto argues that I should strike the defendants’ denials in their answer that Crypto is a DCM and that sports contracts are traded on it. Crypto argues that these facts can be verified through its filings with the CFTC and thus are not subject to reasonable dispute. The defendants respond that their denials are not proper subjects for a motion to strike and the way for Crypto to test the defendants’ denials is through dispositive motions after discovery. The defendants also argue that they should not have to take Crypto‘s word for it that it is a DCM properly listing sports event contracts.
I deny this portion of Crypto‘s motion because the defendants’ denials are not insufficient defenses, immaterial, or impertinent. Crypto‘s preemption argument fails
B. I deny the motion to strike affirmative defense one.
The defendants’ first affirmative defense alleges that Crypto‘s complaint fails to state a claim. ECF No. 38 at 16. Although failure to state a claim is merely a denial of Crypto‘s ability to state its claim,
C. I deny the motion to strike affirmative defenses two, three, four, and five because the motion seeks to litigate the merits of the defenses rather than to strike them.
The defendants’ second, third, fourth, and fifth affirmative defenses are that Crypto‘s claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, official act immunity, discretionary act immunity, and the Tenth Amendment. ECF No. 38 at 16. Crypto relies on my rulings in Hendrick to argue that these defenses fail and should be stricken. The defendants respond that Hendrick did not resolve the defenses as they may apply in this case and that my order in that case is not final.
I deny the motion to strike. If Crypto wants a ruling on these defenses, it should file a dispositive motion addressing them in the context of this case, rather than moving to strike them.
D. I strike the affirmative defenses asserting judicial and collateral estoppel because the answer does not give fair notice of the grounds for them.
The defendants’ sixth and seventh affirmative defenses assert that Crypto‘s claims are barred by judicial and collateral estoppel.
An affirmative defense is sufficiently pleaded if it gives the plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the defense. See Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010). The fair notice standard “only requires describing the defense in general terms.” Kohler v. Flava Enters., Inc., 779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). It does not “require a detailed statement of facts.” Vanguard Dealer Servs., LLC v. Cervantes, No. 2:21-cv-01121-JAD-EJY, 2023 WL 3852404, at *3 (D. Nev. June 6, 2023) (quotation omitted). For example, the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff received fair notice of the nature of a statute of limitations defense because the amended answer stated only that the “plaintiff‘s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations,” but the defendant attached a memorandum of points and authorities that mentioned the specific statutory section on which the defendant relied. Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Kohler, 779 F.3d at 1019 (declining to “disturb the district court‘s finding” that an answer gave fair notice of a defense that the store gave
Here, the defendants’ answer gives no hint as to how either doctrine would apply to Crypto. Although the defendants need not give a detailed statement of facts to support their invocation of these defenses, they must at least give fair notice of the grounds for them. Because they have not done so, I strike the judicial and collateral estoppel defenses. But I grant the defendants leave to amend. See
E. I strike the unclean hands affirmative defense because the answer does not give fair notice of the grounds for it.
The defendants’ eighth affirmative defense is that Crypto‘s claims are barred by the unclean hands doctrine. ECF No. 38 at 16. Crypto argues that this defense does not give fair notice of the grounds for asserting it. And it contends that even if the defense was adequately pleaded, the doctrine should not apply because enjoining the defendants from prosecuting Crypto serves the public interest where state law is preempted. The defendants respond that whether Crypto‘s alleged unclean hands prevents it from obtaining injunctive relief is a disputed question that cannot be resolved through a motion to strike.
I grant the motion to strike this defense because, like the defendants’ estoppel defenses, the answer gives no indication how the defense applies to Crypto in this case. But I grant leave to amend because the defendants may be able to properly plead this defense. Crypto‘s argument that enjoining the defendants from prosecuting Crypto serves the public interest is a merits argument that is based on disputed questions of fact and law, so I do not address it in ruling on a motion to strike.
F. I grant in part the motion to strike affirmative defenses nine, eleven, twelve, and thirteen and construe them as denials of Crypto‘s claims rather than affirmative defenses.
The defendants’ ninth affirmative defense asserts that Crypto cannot show irreparable harm. ECF No. 38 at 16. Their eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth defenses assert that Congress did not intend the CEA to preempt state gaming laws, the Nevada gaming laws do not conflict with the CEA, and there is a presumption against preemption in areas of traditional state regulation.
Crypto argues that I should strike these defenses because they are mere denials of Crypto‘s allegations, not affirmative defenses. The defendants respond that this is not a basis to strike the defenses and Crypto does not identify any prejudice from being required to respond.
I agree with Crypto that these are denials, not affirmative defenses. But I do not strike them. Instead, I construe them as denials.
G. I grant the motion to strike the tenth affirmative defense because, although Crypto‘s conduct may bear on the balance of the equities in Crypto‘s request for injunctive relief, the defense has no factual content.
The defendants’ tenth affirmative defense is that Crypto failed to mitigate
The defendants have clarified that this defense refers to Crypto‘s conduct and how that may impact the balance of the equities in determining whether an injunction is appropriate. But like some of the defendants’ other defenses, it has no factual content to give Crypto fair notice of the defense. Indeed, Crypto assumed it was a defense based on the failure to mitigate damages, which does not apply in this case where Crypto seeks only injunctive relief. I therefore strike it, with leave to amend.
H. I strike the fourteenth affirmative defense because the defendants acknowledge it is moot.
The defendants’ fourteenth affirmative defense asserts any affirmative defense advanced by the intervenors in this case. ECF No. 38 at 17. The defendants concede this defense is moot because intervenor Nevada Resort Association has not pleaded any additional defenses. See ECF Nos. 50-2; 64 at 4. I therefore strike this defense.
I. I grant the motion to strike the fifteenth defense that seeks to incorporate all affirmative defenses enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because it is conclusory and seeks to incorporate defenses that plainly do not apply.
The defendants’ fifteenth affirmative defense seeks to assert “the affirmative defenses enumerated in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” ECF No. 38 at 17. Crypto argues this defense does not give fair notice and seeks to incorporate defenses that do not apply in this case. The defendants argue that Crypto has not shown that this defense causes it any prejudice.
I strike this affirmative defense because it improperly seeks to incorporate every defense in
IV. CONCLUSION
I THEREFORE ORDER that North American Derivative Exchange, Inc.‘s motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 15) is DENIED.
I FURTHER ORDER that North American Derivative Exchange, Inc.‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 42) is DENIED.
I FURTHER ORDER that North American Derivative Exchange, Inc.‘s motion to strike (ECF No. 43) is GRANTED in part as set forth in this order.
I FURTHER ORDER that the defendants may file an amended answer by November 4, 2025.
I FURTHER ORDER that the motion for leave to file an amicus brief (ECF No. 74) is GRANTED.
I FURTHER ORDER the clerk of court to substitute as a defendant the current chairman of the Nevada Gaming Control
DATED this 14th day of October, 2025.
ANDREW P. GORDON
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE