delivered the opinion of the court:
This is the second time this case has come before the appellate court. The defendant National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. (National Union), contends the uninsured motorist coverage limits rulings against it the first time were wrong and asks us to change them. National Union also contends the statutorily required arbitration based on the first decision is not binding on the parties and should not have been confirmed by the trial court. We adhere to the rulings in the first Norris decision and we affirm the trial court’s judgment on the arbitration award.
FACTS
A clear understanding of the issues before us requires us to recount the history of this case.
Plaintiffs Thadeus and Nicolette Norris are special administrators of the estate of Tommy J. Norris, a truck driver employed by Jones Truck Lines, Inc. (Jones). Jones was insured under a commercial fleet general liability policy issued by National Union. On October 4, 1989, Tommy Norris was involved in a fatal accident with an uninsured motorist while working for Jones. The National Union policy had personal injury limits of $2 million per accident but did not include uninsured motorist coverage. Norris’s estate received $200,000 in workers’ compensation benefits as a result of his death.
Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaration that National Union’s policy should be reformed to include uninsured motorist coverage equal to the policy’s bodily injury liability limits of $2 million. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion to reform the policy but ordered the policy reformed to the minimum statutory limits of $20,000 per person and $40,000 per occurrence. Because Norris’s estate received $200,000 in workers’ compensation benefits, the trial court held the workers’ compensation setoff provision in the policy barred recovery under any possible uninsured motorist claim. Plaintiffs appealed.
In Norris v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,
The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the cause for further proceedings, finding the National Union policy should have been reformed to include uninsured motorist coverage up to the personal injury limits of the policy, $2 million. Norris,
The court rejected National Union’s argument that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/ 5(a) (West 2000)) barred plaintiffs’ claims, finding “[t]he category of third parties liable in tort to an injured employee is conspicuously absent from the language of the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Norris,
On remand, the trial court ordered the matter to arbitration pursuant to the 1989 version of section 143a(l) of the Insurance Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 73, par. 755a(l) (“any dispute with respect to [uninsured motorist] coverage shall be submitted for arbitration to the American Arbitration Association.”) The defendant did not attempt to appeal the trial court’s order. The arbitrator entered a $2 million award for plaintiffs, which was reduced to $1,575,500 based on the decedent’s contributory negligence and the workers’ compensation benefits received by decedent’s estate. On June 3, 2005, plaintiffs filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award. National Union filed a rejection of the arbitration award and requested a trial, relying on Supreme Court Rule 95 (134 Ill. 2d R. 95). National Union did not file a motion to vacate the arbitration award. On August 19, 2005, the trial court confirmed the award, noting:
“The law in effect at the time the policy was issued provided for mandatory and binding arbitration. If mandatory and binding arbitration means anything, it means that the losing party does not have a right to a trial de novo.”
DECISION
National Union contends this court’s decision in Norris I should be overturned because it is palpably erroneous and works a manifest injustice against both insurers and insureds. National Union contends the law of the case doctrine does not bar reconsideration of the issues raised and decided in Norris I.
Plaintiffs contend National Union forfeited its right to challenge Norris I as palpably erroneous because it failed to raise the issue on remand in the trial court. We fail to see how National Union could have raised such a challenge in the trial court. On remand, the trial court was bound to follow this court’s directions. See Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Otis Elevator Co.,
Under the law of the case doctrine, questions of law decided on a previous appeal are binding on the trial court on remand as well as on the appellate court on a subsequent appeal. Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co.,
The law of the case doctrine’s purpose is “to protect settled expectations of the parties, ensure uniformity of decisions, maintain consistency during the course of a single case, effectuate proper administration of justice, and bring litigation to an end.” Petre v. Kucich,
There are two recognized exceptions to the law of the case doctrine’s application: (1) when a higher reviewing court, subsequent to the lower court’s decision, makes a contrary ruling on the same issue; and (2) when a reviewing court finds its prior decision was palpably erroneous. Martin,
I. Section 143a — 2 of the Insurance Code
National Union contends the Norris I court erroneously held National Union’s offer of uninsured motorist benefits to Jones was invalid under section 143a — 2 of the Insurance Code.
The 1989 version of section 143a — 2(1) of the Insurance Code provides:
“No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be renewed or delivered or issued for delivery in this State *** unless uninsured motorist coverage as required in Section 143a of this Code is offered in an amount up to the insured’s bodily injury limits.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 73, par 755a — 2(1).
To satisfy the requirements of section 143a — 2 of the Insurance Code, an offer must: (1) notify the insured in a commercially reasonable manner if the offer is not made in face-to-face negotiations; (2) specify the limits of the optional coverage without using general terms; (3) intelligibly advise the insured of the nature of the offer; and (4) advise the insured that optional coverage is available for a relatively modest premium increase. Cloninger v. National General Insurance Co.,
In this case, the offer form instructed Jones to accept or reject uninsured coverage and informed Jones of the basic limits required in several states, including Illinois. As to Illinois, the form stated the basic limits required $30,000 in coverage. That was incorrect. The Insurance Code required a minimum of $20,000 per person and $40,000 per occurrence. The form also failed to identify how much additional coverage would cost.
Larry E. May, director of risk management for Jones, testified at his deposition and by affidavit that it was Jones’ corporate policy to reject uninsured motorist coverage where possible or, alternatively, to carry only the statutorily mandated minimum coverage. May testified at his deposition:
“Q. And I think you answered earlier, I just want to make sure the record is clear. You understood at all times when procuring insurance from National Union that you could purchase uninsured coverage up to your liability limits of $2 million?
A. It was my understanding if I wanted it, they probably would sell me anything I was willing to pay for it.
Q. Anything over—
A. Let me add one comment to that. They at all times offered me uninsured and underinsured motorist, and I at all times said no, as I’ve told you in my initial presentation, I would reject — I do not want uninsured motorist or underinsured motorist to be a part of my program. If it’s mandated by law, I will have to have it and you will have to cover it, but at whatever their absolute mínimums are. And at that point in time there is no need to talk about, well we can give you $5 million. I am not interested because I don’t want it coming out of my pocket.”
May did not directly answer the question asked: whether Jones knew National Union could provide it with uninsured motorist coverage up to the $2 million bodily injury policy limit. Nor did May explicitly say the $2 million limits were offered to Jones by National Union. An “offer” is required by section 143a — 2(1) of the Insurance Code. Failure to obtain from May a clear statement that the $2 million limit was offered to Jones substantially weakens National Union’s case for a finding of palpable error.
In Norris I, the majority held that as a result of the errors on the offer form, considering all presumptions in favor of the insured, it was as if no offer was made. Norris,
If we are going to apply the palpably erroneous standard, we should endeavor to define it. New cases do. It comes up when courts are asked to deviate from the law of the case doctrine. See Stallman,
The abridged sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines “palpable” as “[ejasily perceptible, plain, obvious, readily visible, noticeable, patent, distinct, manifest.” Black’s Law Dictionary 767 (6th ed. 1991). In A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, second edition, “palpable” is defined as “tangible, apparent.” A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 635 (2d ed. 1995).
Not many Illinois decisions have applied the palpably erroneous standard to change the law of a specific case. It does happen. It happened in Stallman where the court decided to reconsider the parent-child tort immunity rule. Stallman,
The other recognized exception to the law of the case doctrine— when a higher reviewing court makes a contrary ruling on the same issue — has not happened to Norris I. In fact, this court has relied on Norris I to support the proposition that “ 1 “every liability insurance policy issued for any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in Illinois must provide coverage for bodily injury or death caused by an uninsured or hit-and-run vehicle.” ’ ” Harrington v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,
We conclude the law of the case doctrine prevents us from revisiting the Norris I reformation ruling. We reach this conclusion with some reluctance. Had the judges on this panel decided the issue in the first instance, the result well might have been different. But this is the second instance, and good legal policy reasons and the factual record compel the result we reach.
The law of the case doctrine, as we read it, applies to all of the issues raised by National Union. We could move directly to the arbitration issue raised by National Union, but for the sake of completeness, we will address National Union’s other two reasons for contending Norris I should not be followed.
II. Exclusive Remedy Provision
National Union contends the Norris I court’s decision that the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity bar did not prohibit employees and their families from seeking and obtaining uninsured motorist benefits from the employer’s insurer was palpably erroneous.
Section 5(a) of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) states, in relevant part:
“No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer, his insurer, his broker, any service organization retained by the employer, his insurer or his broker to provide safety service, advice or recommendations for the employer or the agents or employees of any of them for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury.” (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2000).
However, section 143a(l) of the Insurance Code, which was passed after the adoption of the Workers’ Compensation Act, provides that no policy shall be issued in Illinois unless uninsured motorist coverage is provided up to the statutorily required minimum set forth in section 7 — 203 of the Illinois Vehicle Code “for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 73, par. 755a(l).
The intent of the legislature in enacting section 143a was to ensure persons injured by an uninsured motorist are protected at least to the extent that compensation is made available to persons injured by a motorist insured for the legal limits. Severs v. County Mutual Insurance Co.,
In this case, Jones was required to include uninsured motorist benefits up to the statutorily mandated minimum when he purchased his commercial fleet general liability policy from National Union. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 73, par. 755a(l). Norris, a truck driver employed by Jones, was an intended beneficiary of the statutorily required protection. The injuries that ultimately led to Norris’s death were caused by an uninsured third party, not by his employer or a co-employee. As the majority in Norris I noted, nothing in the Act explicitly precludes an employee’s recovery of uninsured motorist benefits from the employer’s automobile insurer. “The category of third parties liable in tort to an injured employee is conspicuously absent from the language of the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Norris,
We recognize the language “his insurer or his broker to provide safety service, advice or recommendations for the employer” in section 5(a) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2000)) has been interpreted to extend immunity beyond workers’ compensation carriers to general liability insurers in one distinct area — liability for negligent safety inspections. See Mier v. Staley,
After reviewing the analysis and reasoning of the Norris I court’s decision, we agree “the bar contained in section 5(a) does not apply.” Norris, 326 Ill. App, 3d at 323.
Although no other Illinois case has considered this precise question, a majority of jurisdictions that have considered the question have reached a similar conclusion. See Elam v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,
National Union contends both Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Payton,
Contrary to National Union’s contention, neither Payton nor Robertson applies in this case. In Payton, the court held an employee was not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits from his employer’s automobile insurance carrier because the co-employee who caused the injuries was immune from suit under section 5(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Payton,
In Robertson, our supreme court held an employee could not file a common law action for outrageous conduct against his employer’s workers’ compensation insurer because section 19(k) of the Act provided the exclusive remedy for the unreasonable or vexatious delay in payment of benefits. Robertson,
We therefore find this court’s prior decision regarding the applicability of the exclusive remedy provision was not palpably erroneous. In fact, it was correct.
III. Insurance Policy’s Employment Exclusion
National Union contends the Norris I majority erroneously held the insurance policy’s employment exclusions violated Illinois public policy.
“[A]n insurance policy is a contract between the [insurance] company and the policyholder, the benefits of which are determined by the terms of the contract unless the terms are contrary to public policy.” Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,
In this case, the insurance policy issued to Jones specifically excludes from coverage “bodily injury” to “[a]n employee of the ‘insured’ arising out of and in the course of employment by the ‘insured.’ ” Exclusion three of the policy, entitled “Workers Compensation,” also excludes “[a]ny obligation for which the ‘insured’ or the ‘insured’s’ insurer may be held liable under any workers compensation, disability benefits or unemployment compensation law or similar law.”
In Norris I, the court held the exceptions were unenforceable as a matter of public policy. Norris,
“Logic dictates that a commercial trucking venture necessitates the use of employees to drive the trucks. It is highly likely that, like the decedent, some employees are going to get into traffic accidents with persons other than employers or co-employees. *** If the other driver had insurance, the Norris plaintiffs would be suing him and his insurer and would likely recover. As we have seen, the requirement of uninsured motorist coverage is mandated by the statute so as to facilitate an injured plaintiff or his or her heirs being made whole. In this particular situation, it would be both inequitable and against public policy to leave the heirs of this dead driver with no remedy.” Norris,
Although no other Illinois court has considered whether employee or workers’ compensation exclusions preclude an employee from recovering uninsured motorist benefits, other jurisdictions that have considered the issue have held the exclusions do not apply when a negligent third party is at fault.
In Mirales v. Snoderly,
The court’s conclusion was based on the determination that while an employee may recover workers’ compensation benefits for injuries that occurred in the course and scope of his employment, he “is not statutorily- barred from also pursuing [his] claims against the third party as this individual does not enjoy the immunity afforded by the workers’ compensation statutes.” Mirales, 216 W Va. at 97,
In this case, similar to Mírales, decedent was injured by a third-party tortfeasor, not his employer or a co-employee. Since the exclusions in Jones’s policy do not specifically refer to uninsured motorist coverage or to injuries caused by a negligent third party, we might have found a different reason to conclude the exclusions did not prevent plaintiffs’ recovery of uninsured motorist benefits. In our opinion the employee and workers’ compensation exclusions in Jones’s policy simply do not apply to the facts of this case. See Mirales, 216 W Va. at 97,
IV Binding Arbitration
National Union contends the 1989 version of section 143a(l) of the Insurance Code provides for mandatory but nonbinding arbitration of uninsured motorist claims. In support, National Union points out that mandatory arbitration and binding arbitration are not always the same. Because the legislature did not use the word “binding” to modify “arbitration,” National Union contends the arbitration in this case cannot be read as binding.
Questions of statutory interpretation are issues of law reviewed de novo. In re Application of the County Collector,
Pointing to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 86 through 95, which provide for mandatory but nonbinding arbitration, National Union contends arbitration cannot be considered binding unless expressly indicated.
Contrary to National Union’s contention, Supreme Court Rules 86 through 95 do not apply to this case. 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 85, 87 through 91, 93 through 95; 155 Ill. 2d Rs. 86, 92. Uninsured motorist claims are arbitrated pursuant to section 143a(l) of the Insurance Code, not Supreme Court Rule 86. See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Fisher,
As National Union points out, a mandatory arbitration process has been established in several large urban counties in the State pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 86. But Supreme Court Rules 86 through 95 apply only where money damages do not exceed the maximum amount established by each judicial circuit. 155 Ill. 2d Rs. 86(b), (c). The maximum amount in Cook County is $30,000. See Cook Co. Cir. Ct. R. 18.3(b). The arbitration rules do not apply in this case, where the claim made by plaintiffs far exceeds the maximum limit anticipated by the supreme court rules. See State Farm, Insurance Co v. Harmon,
Section 143a(l) of the Insurance Code provides:
“No policy shall be renewed, delivered or issued for delivery in this State *** unless it is provided therein that any dispute with respect to the coverage shall be submitted for arbitration to the American Arbitration Association or for determination in the following manner: Upon the insured requesting arbitration, each party to the dispute shall select an arbitrator and the two arbitrators so named shall select a third arbitrator. If such arbitrators are not selected within 45 days from such request, either party may request that such arbitration be submitted to the American Arbitration Association.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 73, par. 755a(l) (now codified, as amended, at 215 ILCS 5/143a(l) (West 2004)).
This court has previously concluded arbitration conducted pursuant to section 143a(l) of the Insurance Code is binding. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Baaske,
We see no reason to depart from our prior decisions in Baaske and Brooks. Accordingly, we find mandatory arbitration pursuant to the 1989 version of section 143a(l) of the Insurance Code is binding.
CONCLUSION
We find this court’s rulings in Norris I were not palpably erroneous. We further find the arbitration conducted here was mandatory and binding pursuant to the 1989 version of section 143a(l) of the Insurance Code, as the trial court found.
Affirmed.
HOFFMAN and SOUTH, JJ., concur.