Wе granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the “doctrine of binding precedent” should be recognized in Georgia. We conclude that it should not.
Norris, an employee of Signal Delivery Service, Inc. (SDSI) drove a delivery truck on the tracks of the railroad. The truck was hit by a train. As the train braked and hit the truck, a crew member was injured. The crew member sued SDSI in the Superior Court of Fulton County, alleging that his back injury was causеd by the negligence of SDSI’s employee Norris. SDSI defended on the theory that the injury was caused by failure of the railroad to provide a sаfe crossing and by the crew member’s own negligence. The jury awarded a verdict of $20,000 to the crew member.
The present suit was filed in the Superior Court of Coweta County by Norris and his wife against the railroad for injuries to Norris and Mrs. Norris’ loss of consortium. The railroad moved for summary judgment, relying on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the Norrises were precluded from suing the railroad under the “doctrine of binding precedent” because the issue of Norris’ negligence had been fully litigated.
Norris v. Atlanta & West Point R. Co.,
OCGA § 9-12-40 provides that “A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to аll matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside.” OCGA § 9-12-42 provides that “For a former judgment to be a bar to subsequent action, the merits of the case must have been adjudicated.” These code sections together set out the basic principles of res judicata in Georgia. For res judicata to act as a bar of a subsеquent action, the
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original and subsequent action must bear certain identical characteristics. The two actions must be between identiсal parties or their privies, and the cause of action in each suit must be identical. Collateral estoppel, like res judicatа, requires identity of parties or privity. However, unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel does not require identity of the claim but оnly precludes readjudication of an issue already adjudicated between the parties or their privies in a prior action.
Sumner v. Sumner,
As Judge Carley pointed out in his dissent,
Norris v. Atlanta & West Point R. Co.,
suprа at 396, the matter of res judicata or collateral estoppel is complicated in master-servant cases by the principle of derivative liability. Although under certain circumstances the master or, more rarely, the servant, may claim the benefit of a prior adjudiсation in favor of the other,
McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,
The Court of Appeals based its holding that the Norrises are barred not on res judicata or collateral estoppel but, rather, on the “doctrine of binding precedent.” This precept, first enunciated by the Court of Appeals in
Bray v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
This court has never accepted the “doctrine of binding precedent,” and we have found nо other jurisdiction which has done so. As used by the Court of Appeals the “doctrine” is a species of collateral estoppel in whiсh no privity is required. Our treatment of
Stapleton v. Palmore,
A search of opinions from other jurisdictions reveals thаt the term “binding precedent” refers to the doctrine of stare decisis. See, e.g.,
Miller Building Supply, Inc. v. Rosen,
Binding precedent in the sense of stare decisis is not aрplicable to this case. There was no principle of law laid down as a result of the Fulton County action which would dictate a given result in the Coweta County action.
Finally, summary judgment on the basis that there were no material issues of fact and Norris’ negligence was established аs a matter of law is not appropriate in this case. There are questions of fact remaining in this case concerning the possible negligence of the railroad. The fact that Norris may have been adjudged negligent does not reach the question of the possible сoncurrent negligence of the railroad. The possibility remains that his injuries could have been proximately caused by the negligence оf the railroad as well as his own. The comparative negligence rule would then apply.
Therefore, Mr. and Mrs. Norris, who have never had an opportunity to litigate their claims may not be barred from asserting these claims by res judicata or collateral estoppel. Summary judgment is not appropriate in this case because material issues of fact remain. Finally, we disapprove the “doctrine of binding precedent” enunciated by the Court of Appeals and find that although it may promote judicial economy it is violative of due process.
Judgment reversed.