127 Ga. 347 | Ga. | 1907
1. Whether a brief of evidence in a case is a proper brief is a question to be determined primarily by the trial judge; and when the trial judge refuses to approve a brief of evidence, upon the ground that the stenographic report of the evidence was not “briefed as required by law,” but was “presented in a very contradictory' and confused condition,” and that certain documentary evidence introduced was neither copied nor briefed therein, this court will not reverse a judgment dismissing the motion for new trial on account of the failure to present a proper brief of the evidence as required by law, unless it can be made to appear that the evidence was reduced to a brief as required by law, and was not presented in a confused condition, apd that the omitted evidence was immaterial.
2. In the present case the documentary evidence claimed to have' been omitted does not appear in the record or-bill of exceptions; and it can not be determined by this court that it was not material. The fact that the judge refused to approve the brief, on the ground that the documentary evidence was not included therein, was a finding by him that it was material and should have been embraced therein; and this court, in the condition in which the record appears, can not say that the judge erroneously held such evidence to be material.
4. Had the bill of exceptions made the specific point that the movant was not allowed an opportunity to correct the brief presented, a different question from that actually before us would have been made. The bill of exceptions recites that the presiding judge refused to approve the brief and dismissed the motion for a new trial, “to which said order the defendant excepted, and now assigns the same as error;” and it assigns error because it was the duty of the presiding judge to approve the brief of evidence and to grant a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.