*1 No. June 24449. [S.F. 1983.] NORMAN,
MARY TERESA Plаintiff Respondent, BOARD, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS Defendant and Appellant; DEPARTMENT,
EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT Real in Interest and Party Appellant.
Counsel Rubin, and Asher General, Charlton G. Holland
George Deukmejian, Attorney Real General, Party and for Attorneys for Defendant Appellant Deputy Interest Appellant. Rice Plaintiff and Cynthia Respondent.
Robert J. Shull L. for Plain- behalf of Curiae on Charles Hertz and Leonard Graff as Amici Frederick tiff and Respondent.
Opinion RICHARDSON, J. termination of one’s employment the voluntary Does another location constitute order to follow a nonmarital “loved one” to com- to receive determining eligibility unemployment purposes 1256; refer- statutory further (See benefits? pensation Unemp. not, that it does indicated.) Concluding are to this code unless otherwise ences of the a decision which sets aside we will reverse trial court’s judgment com- (Board) denying unemployment Insurance Board benefits. pensation
Section 1256 in relevant “An provides individual is part: disqualified benefits if the compensation director finds that he left his most recent work without voluntarily cause . . . .” We this standard to apply the record before us. 4, 1979,
On January commenced her with Mohawk employment Data Sciences in California. Corp. July boyfriend, whom she had been found living, in the State of Washington. Plaintiff gave notice to her thereupon that she intended to her employer job quit 7, 1979, as of September order to move him. Washington join Plaintiff about inquired work before California but *4 was told that no were positions available. She nonetheless felt that she could ob- tain employment moved as she had After her intended. further search job was unsucсessful she filed a claim for benefits unemployment compensation with the California On Employment Development Department (Department). 4, 1979, October she was informed that she was Department ineligible move,” receive benefits because “There was no reason for the compelling therefore there was no cause” for her work with Mohawk. leaving
During of her hearing administrative that acknowledged appeal, plaintiff she had no definite job left her prospects had Washington position “Because fiance my was and I moved here with moving Washington my up words, fiance.” In her the “sole reason” she work was to her fiance join quit and “it kind of me on the either come him put here and live with spot, up up here in or to Washington break Plaintiff further in January testified that up.” she and not, her fiance decided to in June She did marry 1980. imminent, that her represent was her was that presence or, indeed, for the required definite or prepare that she had wedding, any fixed marital plans.
The administrative law found that for her judge reasons did not constitute On the Board affirmed. “good cause.” appeal, Plaintiff then (Code for a writ petitioned of mandate in the court. Civ. superior Proc., 1094.5.) While law of fact of administrative adopting findings cause, the trial court held that judge, had voluntarily quit not, law, and that the absence of marital did as a matter of an award of preclude benefits. The Board and the unemployment compensation Department appeal. 100,
In section described Legislature its the creation policy underlying an insurаnce as unem- unemployment system “providing own, no fault ployed of their and to reduce through involuntary unemployment and the caused to a minimum.” been that in deter- suffering thereby It has said meaning within voluntarily” “left whether an work mining employee An meaning. 1256, literal “the have not that its given section cases phrase that his it is enough need not choose to be actually unemployed; employee instigating causing willful act is result of his own fault—a Bd. Ins. (Evenson Appeals v. Unemployment his unemployment. [Citations.]” However, 1005, 488].) voluntary (1976) 62 as long not from benefits so does an departure disqualify employee cause, “an adequate which we have defined very generally shown In Unemployment with the a cause comports purposes [California] In v. Unemployment surance Code with other laws.” (Syrek California 97, 354 P.2d Board 54 Cal.2d Appeals surance 55, 70 (1977) 20 Cal.3d 625]; Ins. Unemployment Appeals Sanchez cause may “Good 740].) 569 P.2d court has One suggested and compel but those must be so personal imperative exist reasons reasons (Evenson v. as to make ling voluntary leaving ‘involuntary.’ [Citation.]” Bd., who Former section had provided employee repealed her left to join be married or to his her “employment accompany spouse *5 In- him at from which commute” was deemed place it impractical [was] for or her eligible voluntary benefits unless the individual at the time of his or her and the of his departure filing of claim was “the sole or major support this the the Court of family.” repeal of section followed decision of Appeal in v. 250 (1976) Boren Dev. 59 Department Cal.App.3d Employment [130 of 683], Boren held 1264 was im- Cal.Rptr. disqualify effect of section of claimants demonstration any from certain benefits without properly group by the state of a the discriminatory interest compelling governmental justifying statutory classification. law, obligations for the
Under former even the state and respect marriage not, alone, cause termina- therefrom good did constitute deriving standing Thus, (1976) Bd. 63 tion from work. in v. Ins. Douglas were 604], 110 insurance Cal.App.3d [133 when, a wife left no denied that she had knowing guarantee reemployment, had her who been her former in order to husband accompany Kerekes, also, (See re In to the State of for three months. assigned (1968). Bd. Dec. No. P-B-26 Unemp. Cal. Precedent Benefit App. [Deci- as certain decisions sion to 409 the board to pursuant permits designate Wife was and the thereafter as to referees precedents controlling director.] (1) leave area before where she intended to denied benefits evidence established (3) (2) her and occurred soon before wife left marriage, employment, marriage husband.) wanted did wife to move and not move simply accompany (Perales Whether or not there is cause” is an issue of law. Human Resources Dev. Department (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d connection, 167].) Cal. In Marvin this relies Rptr. heavily upon (1976) 106], v. Marvin 18 Cal.3d and the 557 P.2d ap decision Industrial pellate Department Comp. Ap Relations v. Workers’ 183], that her peals arguing deter of a relationship equivalent purposes cause.” mining “good We conclude otherwise. Marvin, wе when of nonmarital emphasized rights property partners terminated,
their who live relationship holding voluntarily together “adults sexual engage relations are nonetheless as as other per- competent sons contract their ... So respecting earnings long property rights. consideration, does agreement not rest illicit meretricious upon parties choose, order their may economic affairs and no as they policy precludes courts from added.) enforcing (18 Cal.3d at italics agreements.” to the As marital we that “the relationship, carefully emphasized structure itself society the institution of largely marriage, depends upon we nothing have said in in- this should be taken to from that opinion derogate (P. 684.) stitution.” The essence of Marvin thus was thаt nonmarital partners were not barred by virtue of their contractual from those asserting rights remedies which are available to other persons. Similarly, Department Industrial v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Relations
Bd., entitlement issue was a nonmarital partner’s to death benefits. Labor Code section 3503 “No is dependent provides person of any deceased family unless in faith a member employee household of the . . . .” evidence that the There was substantial employee *6 claimant had been a member of the and at least a partial decedent’s household Marvin, After from the dependent. and the reviewing flowing implications 269a, of former “in a repeal Penal Code section which had made state living offense, that the cohabitation and court held adultery” a criminal the appellate nonmarital was a faith” member of the deceased partner employee’s rela- household and unmarried the The survivor’s dependent upon employee. with the which she was other- decedent did bar her from benefits to tionship not wise entitled under the statute. Marvin and have
Recent have the limitations of appellate opinions recognized Thus, v. declined in People a nonmarital equate marriage. relationship 416], (1979) 4 A.L.R.4th the Delph 411 Cal.Rptr. [156 court was the term within the “marital communications” examining “spouse” 970, 980.) (Evid. In to extend this privilege. declining privilege §§ nonmarital the court characterized Marvin as accurately providing: partners, where “. . . for a method resolution of in situations equitable рroperty disputes formal that, for the on a except the not carried only relationship parties an con- into implied also entered they was but where ceremony, marriage-like, reasonable thus as to agreement protecting tract or ownership property, elevation general way signals of the This no expectations parties. and all for any marriages to the level of meretricious themselves relationships such relationships, whether It is for the determine Legislature purposes. reasons, other today’s policy of their commonness in for society because union.” of the sanctity afforded statutory deserve protection (P. omitted.) fn. Airlines, 118 Cal. (1981) Inc. Southwest Harrod v. Similarly, Pacific Co. 68], and in Garcia v. Douglas
App.3d Aircraft which 390], were affirmed judgments of action a cause barred from surviving asserting partner Subdivision under of the Code of Civil Procedure. death section 377 wrongful including actions as (b) may bring of this section defines “heirs” who succession, spouses, at law or take in intestate putative heirs those who would in dece- living and minors children of putative spouses, step-children, parents, holding that that, to our The Garcia court noted dent’s household. response (1974) 12 Airlines (Steed v. Imperial could not such actions bring step-children 1204]), the 329, 524 A.L.R.3d Cal.3d 115 P.2d such persons. had to include amended statute Legislature specifically intent, notwithstanding “The has manifested its Legislature court stressed that Marvin, to include recover classification of entitled not expand had behalf been on their meretricious becаuse no similar amendment spouses,” Co., (Garcia enacted. 133 Cal.App.3d Douglas Aircraft claims that section Both the Harrod and Garcia courts examined rejected law, court holding: Harrod 377 denied and due equal process protection which the parties “The could conclude a Legislature reasonably necessary permanence have chosen not lacks the to formalize by marriage death—damages allow damages wrongful survivor recover addition, for future loss. look to the future and are intended to compensate of proof action based on a relationship presents greater problems meretricious spouse. action putative of fraudulent than an dangers spouse claims to the related rеasonably exclusion of meretricious Finally, spouses *7 v. (Harrod marriage. state’s interest in legitimate promoting [Citation.]” Airlines, Inc., 158; v. at Garcia 118 p. Southwest supra, Pacific Co., 133 Douglas Aircraft (1982) re Cummings recently This last concern was echoed us most in 826, we 1101], 30 P.2d wherein sustained Cal.3d 870 privileges which limited visitation validity regulations overnight prison that such restrictions of an “immediate We found family.” members inmate’s were neither nor unreasonable that: “The arbitrary, emphasizing prolonged and intimate personal contact afforded is limited to those prisoners whom the has a traditional prisoner readily cognizable, family provable, legally ... To other relationship. recognize ‘alternative’ relationships justifying Moreover, visitation an invitation ‘family’ is into semantic it would quicksand. (P. 873.) We noted the in the encourage subterfuge.” difficulty, specifically tie, absence of a formal the truth asser- recognized of an inmate’s assessing tion regarding family 874), his status here. concern (p. equally applicable
Nothing unmarried state her from receiving precludes to which she would otherwise be entitled. Legislature’s give decision weight marital determination cause” relationships “good supports public policy alleviating and is a reasonable method of encouraging marriage otherwise difficult problems proof. our review of
Finally, recent administrative amendments legislative which touch on marital on a deter- their effect cause” relationships mination contributes additional to our conclusion that support legislative scheme is not intended accord the to nonmarital same weight arrangements. Legislature’s recent amendments to 1030 and 1032 indicate sections in- Board’s treatment of relationships conforms legislative tent. In not when an leaves an reserve account charging employer’s employee reasons, for non- maritally related out such thus Legislature singled work-related terminations as declined to extend cases but has similar special protection to the in nonmarital employer situations.
Moreover, 1980, were while not regulations binding promulgated case, this are in our Or instructive intent. legislative interpretation we dinarily, to the the ad give great weight of a statute by interpretation ministrative to advance agency pur its empowered promulgate regulations (See, unless the Steel pose Judson interpretation clearly e.g., erroneous. 658, v. Corp. Workers’ Comp. (1978) Cal.3d 564]; 586 P.2d Rivera Fresno Cal.3d City of 793].) 490 P.2d In the new (Cal. tit. et seq.), Admin. 1256-1 regulations section 1256-9 describes factors to be considered in terminations general domestic reasons. Such circumstances are considered real, if “the claimant’s is of a substantial and obligation compelling nature . . . and the claimant’s reason work is due to a moral legal alia, to, obligation” related inter “the marital status prospective existing re claimant.” The comment this stresses regulation among are quirements “obligation due to circumstances” in conjunction domestic *8 added.) (Italics terminating reason” for employment. “compelling cir- extend to cause” which are deemed to obligations provide “good Domestic as well as family spouses. cumstances named members involving marriage or imminent which marriage 1256-12 recites instances in Section an imminent due to In event of relocation constitute cause.” may of from are time the departure to be factors considered marriage, among or marriage relocation related the need for and other employment packing this reflects “This section The comment further recites that related duties. the marital of favor and maintenance in of the establishment policy state’s relationship.” her marriage”
Plaintiff here did not demonstrate the of “imminency left of need for termination of time she work because at the employment came Washington related decisiоn move marriage Plaintiff’s obligations. that, interest 10 months before her be of some may was It marriage anticipated. indeed, later, that no at oral we were informed more than two argument years notification of had as More her marriage yet nothing occurred. significantly, compensation termination to her or in for unemployment her employer request of benefits indicated that was because necessary her presence concrete which required arrangements. plans “on-the-spot”
We reaffirm our favoring marriage. of a recognition strong public policy (Marvin, 18 Cal.3d at the maintenance 684.) No similar favors policy not, of nonmarital We did as a therefore conclude that relationships. plaintiff law, from her matter establish for her voluntary departure within the absence of legislation 1256. In the meaning section benefits as those grants members of a nonmarital the same no to nonmarital basis exists in this context for granted spouses, extending relations relations. status afforded marital preferential claim, Plaintiff her the deny also asserts a constitutional that to arguing benefits accorded to are her right those who married violates privacy association, freedom v. Adamson citing City Santa Barbara essence, Cal.3d P.2d 12 A.L.R.4th 219]. all the rights that nonmarried must be afforded plaintiff’s argument and benefits extended married We not agree. Underlying do persons. interest legitimate pro scheme is state’s unemployment compensation Barbara, herein Unlike the moting City Santa marriage. plaintiffs choice, not her nor has she been denied to live with the right person but her unmarried been denied benefits which she otherwise might enjoy state.
Recognizing those with established marital and favoring familial ties not furthers the only state’s interest in but promoting relationships assures a more readily verifiable method of Plaintiff here has demon proof. strated no compelling obligations termination of her she requiring employment; was neither nor following spouse because of imminent moving plans As in marry. Cummings, numerous standards difficulties problems would arise if we an proof imposed administrative the function upon agency deciding merited treatment the treatment af relationships equivalent forded those with formal The inevitable would include marriages. questions issues such as the relevant, factors deemed of the length relationship, eventual as to parties’ plans marriage, and the of their beliefs as to sincerity they whether should ever The marry. administrative intrusions potential into rights privacy association would be severe if bore the agencies burden of out the “true ferreting depth” and of a intimacy relationship order to determine whether the existence and nature of the was relationship equivalent marriage. course,
Nothing, would claimants such situations from estab- prevent cause” lishing “good based on circumstances which make the vol- compelling untary akin (See to an involuntary Evenson v. departure. Unemploy- Bd., ment Ins. Thus, supra, 62 1016.) example, where are there children a nonformalized and an employee relationship, leaves his or her to be position nonmarital loved one and their chil- dren, However, cause be might shown. neither the statutes nor our deci- sions with Marvin beginning that we extend to nonmar- require partners ital such as relationships plaintiff, the extended to mari- evidentiary benefits tal partners. of the trial court reversed and the remanded to the judgment cause is court with
trial directions the writ. deny Mosk, J., Kaus, J., J., concurred. Reynoso, BROUSSARD, J. dissent. I
Plaintiff is entitled to if benefits she left work for cause.” (Unemp. trial court found that deci- sion to move to State live with her fiance met that standard. The majority, on the fiance reject and her finding ground were not married yet and did not her arrival plan marry upon promptly Washington.1 1I am majority barring uncertain whether the rule opinion upon newly rests created of law partnеrs, upon evidentiary My impression first was presumption. majority hold leave partner that a to a heterosexual join only engaged in order to with a partner other if the two are married or *10 of “good determination case-by-case section 1256 envisions a my opinion, an evidentiary create presumption the courts may reasonably
cause.” While married, cause” “good one to be acts with that a about married person, create rule have no to authority work to we join when he leaves his spouse, with “good that he too acted the to a nonmarital denying partner right prove rela- a nonmarital the fact that cause” We cannot deny in leaving employment. lives and of hopes in the can tionship significance importance acquire faith decide one and in reasonably good the involved that partner may If the that the current terminating employment. preserving justifies evidentiary pre- without resort to any can thus cause” partner prove “good he is entitled to benefits. sumption, unemployment
The trial court in the that she left work case held that present plaintiff proved for that term decisions and “good cause” as defined in the relevant is judicial administrative The do not defect regulations. majority point show that married or to be married—a proof. They only she was not about in- sufficient to of but her of the the showing deprive advantages presumption sufficient to her of without resort benefits if she cause” deprive “good proves to the We trial should therefore affirm the of the court presumption. judgment awarding unemployment compensation. conclusion, 1256, to the
To this I section turn to of support specific language cases that prom- and to the construing language, implementing regulations the ulgated pro- Insurance Board. Section Unemployment Appeals vides that individual is for compensation disqualified “[a]n benefits he without good if ... has left recent work voluntarily his most ” the kind (Italics added.) cause. The of term cause” this section “good broad, foregoes that the uses when it open-ended language Legislature making view, early definite and date for the states wedding. point majority opinion From this the rule, rule of unemploy- law—a mistaken on amends the statute establish a limitation ment Legislature that the benefits never enacted. however, penultimate The paragraph majority of the majority opinion, suggests that the intend only deny partners evidentiary paragraph nonmarital That presumption. the benefits of an course, “Nothing, prevent [i.e., states: would claimants in such a nonmarital rela situations tionship] establishing ‘good from which make compelling cause’ based on circumstances Appeals voluntary (See Evenson Ins. akin to an involuntary departure. Bd., Thus, p. children of a non- example, where there are relationship, and an employee position formalized leaves his or her to be with a nonmarital children, However, loved good might one and their the statutes nor our cause be shown. neither with Marvin relationships beginning require partners decisions thаt we extend to in nonmarital (Ante, evidentiary such as plaintiff, partners.” extended to marital italics benefits added.) paragraph deny That implies majority only partners intend marriage. of an evidentiary presumption parties present imminent created in favor evidentiary party recovering denial if he can presumption, of an would not bar from prove upon attempt without no serious presumption. majority his case reliance make examine present proved the facts of the case whether in- to determine dependently any presumption. from individualized, rules favor of specific case-by-case consideration. Recogniz- this ing in the legislative purpose, only decision of this court to discuss the con- cause” in cept section we stated view the statutory “[i]n objectives limited; ... cause’ be concept ‘good cannot arbitrarily ‘ circumstances, reasons, board must take account “real substantial objective conditions, results, forces palpable operate produce correlative adequate reason, will action, excuses that bear the test of grounds always just ” ’” element of faith. (Gibson v. Unemployment *11 494, 499, Cal.3d 1, fn. 8 945], 509 P.2d Cal. Portland Cal.Rptr. quoting [108 Cement Co. Cal. Bd. Unemployment Appeals (1960) Ins. Cal.App.2d 263, 37].) 272-273
The Court decision Zorrero v. Ins. Bd. Appeal Unemployment Appeals 434, 855], con Cal.App.3d elucidates this broad cause.” ception “good Zorrero that: “The term cause’ is not explains ‘good fact, susceptible definition. its precise definition varies with contеxt which it used. Very is it a broadly, means or reason legally sufficient ground action, a cause,” for certain ‘In general as used in an [f] statute, means a as compensation such cause an justifies voluntarily employee’s the ranks of the leaving and the ranks of employed joining the unemployed; must be for such quitting a cause as would in a reasonably motivate similar able-bodied and her average situation worker to his or qualified give up with its certain employment wage rewards order to enter the ranks Welfare, (81 compensated C.J.S. Social And Public unemployed.’ Security ‘ 167, 253.) [|] determined “Good cause” cannot be p. any § abstract more than can other conclusion. It can in relation legal only be determined a (Cal. set of facts.’ Portland Cement Co. v. Cal. Ins. Unemp. Appeals Board, 263, 274.)” (P. 439.) at Evenson v. Unem Cal.App.2d ployment Appeals (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 488], the same employs language.2 Insurance Board’s 1980 regulations promulgate “ broad
an definition. ‘Good cause’ work when a equally leaving exists work, time substantial factor in the claimant to leave at the motivating causing connected, real, substantial, whether or not work is and leaving, compelling and would cause a reasonable desirous of genuinely retaining employ- person Code, tit. (Cal. ment to leave work under the same circumstances.” Admin. 1256-3.) justify 2This definition of in terminating broad cause” does not Evenson states that reasons. so imperative substantial or whimsical “reasons must be ” (62 1016)— compelling leaving ‘involuntary’ to make voluntary (ibid.) (47 Evenson and Zorrero may both be overstatement—but 439) “[v]oluntary agree exigent termination must be based circumstances.” serious op to set out definition this broad regulations, go beyond The 1980 domestic cir- under which work because circumstances certain 1256-9.)3 (§ They provide specifically cause. cumstances will constitute married and must if the claimant is cause to leave work that a claimant has good 1256-12), if (§ family unity”4 his or her “to preserve accompany spouse involves relocation imminent and claimant’s is prospective “[t]he or intends established area because the claimant’s future spouse another for the there, is impractical his or her home it impossible establish effect of these (id.). the other area” claimant to commute work from about to in favor of person is tо establish a limited presumption regulations her his or mar- not become married. Such a claimant does need prove even one worth substantial and important relationship, preserving riage are worth marriages will The state expense unemployment. presume reasonably com- the claimant that he cannot saving, require only to prove former new home. mute his from the marital job *12 the cited by These from the regulations depart case-by-case analysis required That decisions and the out in 1256-3. judicial regulation depar set principles however, ture, of marital furthers the state’s the favoring policy preservation 660, (See v. 684 (1976) Marvin Marvin 18 Cal.3d relationships. generally 815, 106].) 557 P.2d It also in the recognized policy finds support liberally that of Code must be the Insuranсe provisions Unemployment “[t]he construed to further the the legislative objective reducing hardship ” (Gilles Development v. Human Resources unemployment. Department of 110, (1974) 11 A.L.R.3d Cal.3d 521 P.2d 90 Bd., 494, 499; 970]; v. Gibson Ins. 9 Cal.3d Unemployment supra, Appeals Prescod v. Ins. Appeals 540].) the two benefits where Together, policies justify providing
necessary case-by-case the marital without preserve requiring relationship of the value and proof stability relationship. “A good cause provides voluntarily leaves work with part 3Section 1256-9 that: claimant substantial, real, and com obligation on domestic circumstances if the is of a based claimant’s retaining
pelling genuinely employ nature such would desirous of person cause reasonable action, legal is due to a or moral mеnt to take similar and the reason work claimant’s relating any of obligation following: health, care, “(1) family. The or welfare of the claimant’s “(2) unemancipated The who minor. parental exercise of control over the claimant is “(3) existing prospective or marital status of the claimant.” 1256-9, 1256-10, “family unity” as com and all refer to preservation 4Sections 1256-12 “Family” defined in section 1256-9 pelling justifying employment. reason termination of is legal regardless of ties legal relationships, commentary that states that terms of but the section relationship parent-child “any person substantially with whom the claimant has had same to whom the family. mention grandparent-grandchild” or is a member of his It does not wife. Yet if we con substantially relationship had as that of husband and claimаnt has the same children, it two that constitutes couple sider an unmarried with it would seem absurd to insist (father children; children) single family. separate and of a families mother and instead however, state’s favor of policy does not a corre- marriage, imply against that sponding policy The courts recognize relationships. Marvin, such are (see common relationships and Marvin pervasive supra, 660, 683), Cal.3d give (id., 682-684), rise to and moral at legal obligations pp. and generate reasonable (id., warrant expectations protection judicial 684). The state should not seek such destroy relationships stigmatize members, their women, but should fact men that reasonable respect work, where to live and deciding consider the values and benefits of a signifi- cant nonmarital and take account of the needs and relationship, aspirations their partner. I would
Accordingly, hold that if a member can of a nonmarital relationship show that real, substantial, his motive in leaving “is employment compel- ling, would cause a reasonable desirous of person genuinely retaining to leave work under same (Cal. circumstances” Admin. 1256-3; Bd., tit. see Zorrero v. Unemployment 434, 439), he should be entitled to unemployment compensation. He cannot on rely aid, administrative but will judicial presumptions have to one, prove substantial important a reasonable person desirous of still genuinely would retaining employment choose to work in leave order to If he can meet this preserve relationship. burden of he proof, is entitled to the benefits. As statutory explained by Justice in the Feinberg Court of sec- decision in this case: “All that Appeal tion 1256 is ‘an cause . . . requires adequate comports purposes *13 Insurance and Unemployment Code with other laws.’ The purpose Unemployment Insurance Laws is to relieve the burden caused by unemploy- ment 100), Ins. (Unemp. namely, to act as a buffer against ravages of sudden and unexpected loss one’s livelihood. These ravages [Citation.] are as experienced directly a de facto a spouse by legal spouse.”
I a that determination will administrative recognize case-by-case impose have determine burden: the Board will to Unemployment Insurance Appeals whether a to nonmarital substantial and enough justify is relationship important (Cf. the worker’s decision to In re Cummings leave employment. Bird, 870, 826, (conc. Cal.3d 640 P.2d opn. 1101] J.).) C. to take account It is easier to black letter rules than always apply conditions, circumstances, reasons, just ““‘real . . . substantial objective ’ ” action, (Gibson faith” and the element of grounds always good Bd., 499, 494, 8). fn. But Cal.3d Appeals judicial supra, can creation of a rule that would to who acted prove they deny (Zorrero on v. Unemploy based serious circumstances reasonably, exigent and Bd., 434, 439), in leaving ment Ins. employ both contravening ment would constitute amendment of section judicial construction of of that section and the of liberal policy purpose insurance laws. conclusion that plaintiff the trial court’s facts of the case present The suрport to unemployment was thus entitled with cause” and left employment Mohawk left her California job As of when she benefits. September fiance, with her Stephen had been living Data Sciences Corporation, plaintiff all Bee, sharing as a married They couple, for about three lived years. together to Bee went June. following income and to marry expenses, planned to remain decided a in June of State work as Washington carpenter in As plaintiff him Washington. there He asked permanently. plaintiff join live testified, here and “kind on the either come up this me put spot, request After into looking job oppor- with him ... in or to break Washington up.” leave her and resigned tunities in decided to Washington, employment, plaintiff effective 1979.5 September the conсlusion how one could dispute
I find it difficult to understand really Can anyone to Washington. acted with cause” in plaintiff moving is necessari- close, intimate, maintain that a lifelong potentially never job would quit less than a a reasonable job—that ly important person nothing us there on the record before Certainly maintain such relationship? unreasonable, or was move to Washington decision to suggest done without and sufficient justification. benefits to plaintiff, insist that majority, denying deci- legislative out a merely are partners generally, they carrying ever made the fact that cite no evidence that the they Legislature
sion despite they The cases and no such decision.6 decision statute embodying that, indeed, than argument more majority may 5The state that be of interest at oral some “[i]t later, (Ante, 9.) p. In years marriage yet we two were informed that no had as occurred.” all, be, irrelevant; they teresting may legally but material at plans it it is if future are judged September must be as of when her California. left her opinion nothing notice of termination to significantly, also states her “[m]ore presence request that her employer unemployment compensation or in her benefits indicated ‘on-the-spot’ Washington necessary marriage plans required was because of concrete fiance, (Ante, his arrangements.” life, with her to share Plaintiff went live *14 This, “good provide support. majority say, to is not and receive emotional and financial the ” wedding that arrange reception, if the catering cause. But she went to tо for the at “good cause.” would be between majority enacting can in a distinction 6The closest the come their search a statute amendments partners’ to benefits is the 1975 married and unmarried entitlement payable that benefits provide 1030 Insurance Code sections employer’s account. employee join spouse charged work a not be to the because an left will are, however, can ob for domestic reasons many employee There cases in which an who leaves a supply example: chargeable employer. majority one tain benefits would still be (Ante, children. partner who unmarried and their partner accompany nonmarital leaves to his fact, employee who leaves In the terms do even include an of sections 1030 1032 not majori in spouse a case which join prospective marriage with imminent view—another pro to include ty approve benefits—although arguably would the statutes could be construed case, is clear that (and it spouse perhaps spouse) scope. a de facto within their spective not that claim does legislative policy deny simply to a because there is no benefits claimant scope of fall within the sections 1030 and 1032. 16
cite demonstrate on only has occasion decided to limit Legislature cer- tain benefits to married stated in the persons those limits statute expressly conferring (See benefits. (1979) v. People Delph 94 Cal.App.3d 415-416 4 Cal.Rptr. (marital A.L.R.4th [156 communication 416] Evid. privilege 980); 970 and Harrod v. Southwest §§ Pacifiс Airlines, (1981) Inc. 118 death (wrongful 68] Proc., benefits under Code 377); Civ. v. (1982) Garcia Co. Douglas Aircraft Marvin, cf. (same); Marvin 390] 18 Cal.3d Law (Family Act).) Instead of supporting majority’s these position, show decisions that when the intends to Legislature deny benefits to nonmarital it does so partners, expressly. decision, believe,
A more I of the pertinent is that Court of Appeal Depart ment Industrial Relations v. Comp. Workers’ 94 Cal. which, 183], since it construed a statute like the App.3d case, statute issue in did to married not limit benefits present expressly Instead, Labor Code section persons. granted workers’ compensation death benefits to all who were “in faith a of the persons family member good household of the The court held a nonmarital who lived employee.” partner with the deceased faith” was entitled to benefits as a member employee “good of his household. If a be a member of nonmarital can faith” partner “good household, I would work in order think he would have cause” to leave move with the household. seek to majority distinguish this last on the that it holds precedent ground
only entitled to virtue person otherwise benefits is not barred of a non- that, submit, marital But I of the relationship. the effect majority’s precisely Plaintiff has holding. shown cause” for as that term leaving employment cases, been defined in but the nevertheless past majority deny because that cause on is based a nonmarital relationship.
I do claim not that the state must relation- and nonmarital equate marriage To the ships determining rights unemployment compensation. cоntrary, the board and the may courts invoke a cause to properly presumption benefit a claimant who moves to maintain or imminent present marriage, without a like But granting presumption relationships. in favor of should not lead us to refuse to presumption recognize *15 close, that there exist enduring, significant relationships, (under Marvin) rise to moral relationships may give legal obligations, and that in of such con- particular may case maintenance a relationship stitute cause” for that the leaving employment. Finding reasons for in the case meet test terminating employment present 1256,1 of the trial court grant- under section would affirm judgment benefits. ing unemployment Grant, J., J.,*
Bird, concurred. C. Bird, 14, 1983. July was denied for a rehearing Respondent’s petition Grodin, J., Broussard, J., petition C. were the opinion J. should be granted.
*Assigned by Chairperson of the Judicial Council.