Lead Opinion
The principal question in this case is whether a parent may recover for the loss of a child’s consortium due to injuries negligently inflicted on the child by a third party.
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the allegations of the complaint. Manning v. Zuckerman,
In Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
In Diaz and Ferriter we recognized that the relationship between a negligently injured person and a person seeking recovery for loss of consortium may be such that recourse for the consortium loss must be available despite the strong public interest in not expanding tort liability beyond tolerable limits. Accepting that proposition, but also accepting the proposition that the possibility of recovery cannot wisely be extended to every relationship in which a loss of consortium has been sustained, we must draw a principled, defensible line between those relationships to which a right of recovery should attach and those relationships with respect to which no such right should be recognized. “Every effort must be made to avoid arbitrary lines which ‘unnecessarily produce incongruous and indefensible results.’” Dziokonski v. Babineau,
By the very nature of marriage, spouses depend on one another’s society, companionship, love and support (consortium) to a degree of intensity not normally present in other relationships. An injury to a spouse that impairs his or her ability to fulfil the other spouse’s needs in that regard ordinarily is uniquely serious, identifiable and predictable. Our recognition of a right of recovery for the loss of spousal consortium in Diaz reflects that fact. Subsequently, in Ferriter, supra at 510, in concluding that a dependent minor child should be en
The Appeals Court’s decision in Morgan v. Lalumiere, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 270 (1986), is consistent with Diaz and Ferriter. In Morgan, the court allowed a mentally and physically disabled adult child to recover for the loss of the consortium of his mother upon whom he was “physically, emotionally, and financially” dependent. The common thread in Diaz, Ferriter, and Morgan was the unique and intense dependency intrinsic to the relationship of the parties.
Although parents customarily enjoy the consortium of their children, in the ordinary course of events a parent does not depend on a child’s companionship, love, support, guidance, and nurture in the same way and to the same degree that a husband depends on his wife, a wife depends on her husband, or a minor or disabled adult child depends on his or her parent. Of course, it is true that such dependency may exist in a particular situation, but it is not intrinsic to the parent-child relationship as is a minor child’s dependency on his or her parents and as is each spouse’s dependency on the other spouse. Thus, a principled distinction can be made between the situations governed by the Diaz, Ferriter, and Morgan cases and the instant case. On the other hand, if a plaintiff parent is
Our opinions in Stowe v. Heywood,
Not only do our decisions involving intentional torts fail in their language to support the proposition that a parent should recover for the loss of a child’s consortium as a result of negligently inflicted injuries, but also sound policy suggests the appropriateness of a distinction between loss of consortium due to intentional wrongdoing and a similar loss due to negligence. Whether recovery should be permitted requires a proper balancing of the desirability of compensating injured persons with the undesirability of imposing unfair burdens on defendants. Whether the tort is intentional or negligent is a factor relevant to the equation. Society is rightly less concerned about the burden placed on an intentional wrongdoer than about the burden placed on one who has been merely negligent. In Payton v. Abbott Labs,
If, as a result of the defendants’ negligence, Mathew Norman had died, his parents, as next of kin, would have been entitled to recover under the wrongful death statute, G. L. c. 229, § 2, for the loss of his consortium. Does consistency require that the parents be entitled to recover for the loss of Mathew’s consortium due, not to Mathew’s death, but to his injuries? Does consistency require that recovery for loss of consortium be available to anyone who would have been the injured person’s next of kin had the injured person died? We think not. In a wrongful death action, damages are not recoverable both for the injured person’s losses and the derivative losses of others. In a wrongful death action, although the next of kin may recover for loss of consortium, no one recovers for the losses sustained by the injured deceased party. Here, the plaintiffs seek to recover for both. We conclude that the plaintiff parents cannot recover for the loss of their injured child’s consortium.
In addition to their loss of consortium claim, Meg Manderson Norman and Paul M. Norman seek to recover their contribution to the payment of Mathew’s medical expenses. Although the complaint is silent with respect to Mathew’s age, it is undisputed that, at the time of the accident, Mathew was nineteen years old, and was therefore an adult. G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-eighth and Fiftieth (1986 ed.). Because Mathew seeks his medical expenses and, assuming the defendants’ liability, is entitled to them, the parents’ claim for the same expenses should be dismissed. This case is remanded to the Superior Court for the entry of an order dismissing the parents’ claims, and for further proceedings with respect to Mathew’s claims.
So ordered.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting, with whom Wilkins and Abrams, JJ., join). I dissent. At the outset, based on the facts alleged in this case, I would rephrase the court’s statement of the issue before us as follows: The principal question in this case is whether a parent has a cause of action for the loss of an adult child’s society and companionship when that child has been severely and permanently injured due to the defendant’s negligence. In my view it is legally significant that the complaint not only alleges that Mathew Norman was struck by a Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) vehicle, negligently operated by its employee, the defendant, Steven De-Dominici, but also that, as a result, Mathew suffered “serious injury to his brain,” which has rendered him “largely incapacitated,” “permanently disabled,” and “totally dependent on his parents for financial, physical and emotional sustenance.”
The court holds today that the motion to dismiss the consortium claims of the parents should have been allowed. In reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint. Manning v. Zuckerman,
I need not review here the extensive common law history defining the rights of parents, spouses, and children for loss of services and society, whether caused by intention or negligence. That history was reviewed extensively in Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
In Ferriter, for purposes of analogy, the court also reviewed the case law pertaining to a parent’s right to recover for loss of a child’s services and society, and concluded that “[t]he common law has traditionally recognized a parent’s interest in freedom from tortious conduct harming his relationship with his child . . . [and] compensated parents for sentimental as well as economic injuries.” Id. at 512. Many years earlier, in Stowe v. Heywood,
Despite the court’s efforts in this case to narrow the reading of our case law, a more objective reading of our prior cases reveals a process where the court gradually has broadened the common law recognition of a parent’s right to recover for loss of filial consortium where the child sustains serious physical injuries as a result of the defendant’s negligence. Statutory enactments also demonstrate an analogous legislative policy. Parents, as next of kin, may recover for loss of consortium after the death of a child in a wrongful death action. G. L. c. 229, § 2.
*312 “It is easy to see that the loss of a child through his death takes from his parents the society and companionship that is the essence of the lost relationship. But consider the magnitude of the loss of society and companionship that occurs when a normal 16-year-old is suddenly reduced to a blind, nearly deaf, partially paralyzed child with a mental age of three. The parental expectations for the continuation of the family relationship are the same in either case. That the parents still have their son to love and care for is a factor to consider in determining the extent of their loss, but does not negate the loss. They have sustained a genuine loss in the nature of the society and companionship they can anticipate receiving from their son as a consequence of his injuries.
“Perhaps the loss of companionship and society experienced by the parents of a child permanently and severely injured ... is in some ways even greater than that suffered by parents of a deceased child. Not only has the normal family relationship been destroyed, as when a child dies, but the parent also is confronted with his loss each time he is with his child and experiences again the child’s diminished capacity to give comfort, society, and companionship.”
Note, The Parental Claim for Loss of Society and Companionship Resulting from the Negligent Injury of a Child: A Proposal for Arizona, 1980 Ariz. St. L.J. 909, 923.
The notion of allowing loss of consortium for an injured child is neither new nor in disrepute. It has been accepted in Florida since 1926,
Damages for loss of consortium are allowed in this Commonwealth when familial relations are affected when a husband sues for the tortious injury to his wife, Kelley v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
In both Diaz, supra, and Ferriter, supra, we scrutinized the practical objections to enlarging recognized consortium claims — (1) possibility of a multiplicity of suits; (2) inability to define the point at which the right would cease; (3) inability of a jury adequately to cope with the question of damages, both because the damages are too speculative and because overlapping recovery is probable — and ultimately found those reasons “unsound.” Ferriter, supra at 513-514, 516. Diaz, supra at 159-160. Further scrutiny is unnecessary here. None of the objections listed warrants a dismissal of this claim.
An additional objection raised by the defendants in this case, and adopted by the court, is that the absence of economic dependency of a parent on his or her child should preclude recovery. This argument also ignores the careful case by case development of the law in this Commonwealth, as well as the evolution of loss of consortium from a loss of services action to a loss of companionship action.
As we indicated in Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, supra at 516, economic dependence is just one factor to be
I acknowledge that there are differences between the way in which parents depend on their children and the way in which spouses depend on each other and children depend on their parents. However, I am not persuaded that such differences should preclude the recovery of a parent for loss of consortium of his or her child who has been seriously injured by defendant’s negligent acts, especially when the severity of the injuries has resulted in the child’s continued dependence on his parents and the parents’ continued subordination to the needs of the child. See Frank v. Superior Court,
In my view, the court should hold that Mathew’s parents have viable claims for loss of filial society if they can show that Mathew’s injuries are of such severity and permanence as to render him physically, emotionally, and financially dependent on them and that, as a result, their lives have been significantly restructured and their expectations of enjoying those experiences normally shared by parents and children have been seriously impaired. If the plaintiffs can prove such a parent-child relationship and that Mathew’s negligently inflicted injuries severely affected their relationship with him, recognition of a filial consortium right would be justified. I dissent.
Notes
Although the complaint is silent as to Mathew’s age, it is undisputed by the parties that he was nineteen years old at the time of the accident.
In Diaz, the court rejected the historical distinction between intentional and negligent injuries for purposes of recognizing spousal consortium rights, indicating that in reality the marital relationship suffers more disturbance and injury through third-party negligence than from intentional invasions. Id. at 159-160.
In Morgan v. Lalumiere,
General Laws c. 229, § 2 (1986 ed.), provides in pertinent part: “A person . . . shall be liable in damages in the amount of: (1) the fair monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered . . . including . . . care, assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guidance, counsel, and advice . . . .”
General Laws c. 229, § 1 (4) (1986 ed.), provides recovery to the “next of kin” absent surviving wife, husband, or children. The record here indicates that the parents in this action are, under c. 229, such “next of kin.” The court’s argument about other “next of kin,” relatives or even friends being able to recover is a red herring which ignores the careful process of case by case development of common law rights. The opinion in this case relates only to a seriously incapacitated adult child who becomes significantly dependent on his or her parents and whose dependence significantly alters the parents’ life-style. What we are in disagreement about is simply the importance of protecting the relationships of the nuclear family, i.e., the father, mother, and their children.
In a brief filed by amicus, a similar pending claim by parents of a daughter, now of legal age, seeks compensation for loss of consortium. In that case, the daughter is alleged to have suffered irreversible brain damage rendering her to be in a permanent vegetative state and totally dependent on her parents.
Wilkie v. Roberts,
Iowa Code Rule Civ. Proc. 8 (1951 & Supp. 1986). Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1988). Idaho Code §§ 5-310 to 5-311 (Supp. 1988). Construing the Idaho statute, the court stated that “in every such action damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just,” thus allowing recovery for the loss of a child’s society and companionship. Hayward v. Yost,
Reben v. Ely,
“[T]he parent-child relationship is undeniably unique and the wellspring from which other family relationships derive. It is the parent-child relationship which most deserves protection and which, in fact, has received judicial protection in the past.” Frank v. Superior Court,
One commentator has suggested that to draw the line limiting liability for loss of consortium between actions for lost society and companionship caused by the tortious infliction of death to a parent or a child and the same type of damage caused by physical injury, or between a spouse’s action for loss of consortium and a parent’s or child’s action for lost society and companionship, may be sufficiently irrational as to suggest a possible violation of the equal protection clause. Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Person’s Society and Companionship, 51 Ind. L.J. 590, 606-615 (1976).
See Note, Torts — Parent’s Recovery for Loss of Society and Companionship of Child, 80 W. Va. L. Rev. 340 (1978); Note, The Child’s Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent’s Love, Care and Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U.L. Rev. 722 (1976).
A dominant theme of our modem law of torts is that “presumptively there should be recourse for a definite injury to a legitimate interest due to a lack of the prudence or care appropriate to the occasion.” Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
Morgan v. Lalumiere,