After Jim Norman won the Republican primary for a state senate seat, his defeated opponent, Kevin Ambler, filed a lawsuit in Leon County, 1 alleging inaccuracies in financial disclosure forms Mr. Norman had filed to get on the ballot. In the order under review, the circuit court ruled him ineligible on that basis for nomination or election to the Florida Senate. We reverse the circuit court’s order, and dismiss Mr. Ambler’s cross-appeal (in which he contends he should be the Republican candidate in the general election) as moot.
Both men filed quаlifying papers to run as Republicans for the Florida Senate, District 12, and both appeared on the ballot for the August 24, 2010, primary. Mr. Norman won by a vote of 18,452 (55.95%) to 14,530 (44.05%). But Mr. Ambler filed in circuit court one week after the primary election. As amended, his complaint essentially allеged that Mr. Norman was ineligible because the “full and public disclosure of financial interests” form he filed with his qualifying papers failed to disclose assets obtained with a $500,000 gift one Ralph Hughes (now deceased) made to Mearline Norman, the candidate’s wife.
The comрlaint invoked section 102.168(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), which states a ground for post-election challenges to elections. The statute authorizes challenges only on limited grounds. 2 As regards the primary elec *181 tion, we are, of course, concerned with an election that has already taken plaсe. 3 In relevant part, the statute provides that certification, whether of the election to or of the nomination for office, may be contested after the election, whether primary or general, as the case may be. As pertinent here, the statute provides that a nomination may be set aside based on the “[i]neligibility of the successful candidate for the nomination or office in dispute.” Id.
After an expedited bench trial, the circuit court made findings of fact to the effect that the $500,000 gift to Mrs. Norman had been an “indirect” gift to Mr. Norman, and that the failure to make any mention of assets acquired with the money (albeit assets listed — at least for the most part — in his wife’s name) reflected an intent to deceive the public. The circuit court ruled that this omission constituted a substantial failure to cоmply with financial disclosure requirements; and concluded that Mr. Norman had “failed to properly qualify for nomination and election to the Florida Senate, District 12 and accordingly is ineligible for any nomination or election to the Florida Senate, District 12.” 4 On this basis, the circuit court rendered Mr. Norman’s primary victory a nullity, declared him “disqualified” as a candidate in the general election, and ordered him “removed from said ballot,” citing section 112.317(l)(c)l., Florida Statutes (2010).
Courts must take care in post-election challenges to avoid disenfranchising voters without clear statutory warrant. “At common law, except for limited application of quo warranto, there was no right to contest in court any public election, because such a contest is political in nature and therefore outside the judiсial power.”
McPherson v. Flynn,
Preliminarily, we reject Mr. Ambler’s argument that he was required to await the results of the election before bringing his challenge. The Commission
*182
on Ethics plainly had authority to act before the primаry election and, at least once administrative remedies had been exhausted,
5
the courts could have ordered the filing officer to take any action the law required.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Siegendorf v. Stone,
The present case is not a judicial challenge to which the filing officer has been made a party, brought before any vote has bеen cast, to test the filing officer’s decision as to whether a candidate has successfully qualified to run for office.
Cf. State ex rel. Siegendorf v. Stone, supra; Browning v. Young, supra; Schurr v. Sanchez-Gronlier,
The law distinguishes between a candidate’s constitutional eligibility for office, on the one hand, and, on the other, a constitutionally eligible candidate’s taking the necessary, statutory steps to qualify to run for office.
7
The Fourth District discussed the distinction in
Levey v. Dijols,
As far as the record reveals, he has not been “сonvicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other state to be mentally incompetent,” Art. VI, § 4(a), Fla. Const., nor served any prior term as a state senator. He is therefore constitutionally eligible to hold office as a state senator, and so to serve аs his party’s nominee for that office, whatever irregularities may have transpired in the course of his qualifying to run for office. Article VI, section 4, provides the only “disqualification” applicable across the board to candidates for offices authorized elsеwhere in the constitution.
See Cook v. City of Jacksonville,
The adoption of the disclosure requirements in Article II, section 8, did not modify Article III, section 15’s eligibility requirements. Unless a later constitutional amendment expressly modifies an existing constitutional provision, the old and the new must both be given effect. Both should operate as written, unless the clear intent of the later provision would thereby be defeated.
See Jackson v. Consol. Gov’t of City of Jacksonville,
No statute can add to or take from the qualifications for office sеt forth in the Constitution, the constitutional criteria that determine eligibility within the meaning of section 102.168(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2010).
See Miller,
That grounds for an election challenge under section 102.168 have not been stated does not mean no remedy is available if a candidate falsifies financial disclosure forms. Putting to one side the possibility of criminal prosecution for pеrjury, the Legislature has the constitutional power to judge the qualifications, elections, and returns of its members, and to refuse to seat a member; or to remove a member, notably on recommendation of the Commission on Ethics. Part III of Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, implеmenting Article II, section 8, sets forth detailed procedures under which the Commission on Ethics is empowered to receive and investigate complaints of violations of the constitutional and statutory financial disclosure provisions and to report its findings to the *184 “proper disciplinary official or body,” 10 which shall hаve the “power to invoke the penalty provisions of this part, including the power to order the appropriate elections official to remove a candidate from the ballot.” See § 112.324(8), Fla. Stat. (2010).
But, because Mr. Ambler’s complaint does not allege, and the evidence did not establish, adequate grounds under section 102.168(3)(b), the circuit court’s decision must be reversed. To establish “[Un-eligibility of the successful candidate for the nomination or office in dispute,” § 102.168(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010), a pleading must aver, and proof must show, constitutional ineligibility — the failure to mеet qualifications the constitution lays down. Even a false filing made in the process of qualifying to run for office might be cured if timely asserted. Had the Legislature intended an error or omission in a candidate’s financial disclosure documents to be a basis for a post-elеction contest under section 102.168, it could easily have said so. We must respect the legislative choice its silence on the point reflects.
The final order and the order amending final order are reversed, and the case is remanded, with directions to dismiss Mr. Ambler’s cоmplaint. The mandate shall issue forthwith, and no motion for rehearing shall be entertained.
Notes
. Venue was properly laid in Leon County because the contested election took place in a senate district encompassing portions of Hillsborough and Pasco Counties. See § 102.1685, Fla. Stat. (2010).
. Section 102.168, Florida Statutes (2010), provides:
(3) The complaint shall set forth the grounds on which the contestant intends to establish his or her right to such office or set aside the result of the election on a submitted referendum. The grounds for contesting an election under this section are:
*181 (a) Misconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of any election official or any member of the canvassing board sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election.
(b) Ineligibility of the successful candidate for the nomination or office in dispute.
(c) Receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election.
(d) Proof that any elector, election official, or canvassing board member was given or offered a bribe or reward in money, property, or any other thing of value for the purpose of procuring the successful candidate’s nomination or election or determining the result on any question submitted by referendum.
. Mr. Ambler’s theory is that, in legal contemplation, Mr. Norman was never on the ballot because he falsified a financial disclosure form; that the only candidate ever lawfully on the ballot was Mr. Ambler, and that, as the only eligible and qualified candidate in the primary election, Mr. Ambler must be deemed the party's nominee in the general election (where voting for any other candidate required writing the candidate’s name in).
. The testimony at trial revealed that Ambler had been aware of the existence of the assets in question for several years; and that, when he reviewed Norman’s financial disclosure form shortly after it was filed in June, he noted that the assets had not been disclosed. He admitted that he learned who had given Mrs. Norman the money before the election. Rather than acting at that time, he waited until after his defeat in the August 24 primary . to file his complaint in circuit court.
. As a genеral proposition, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies precludes judicial intervention where available administrative remedies can afford the relief a litigant seeks. See
Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n v. Pringle,
. It is fundamental that the factual conclusions of the trial court are presumed correct and the burden is upon the appellant to demonstrate reversible error.
Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee,
Marina v. Leahy,
. This is not to say that the language in judicial opinions always observes the distinction with crystal clarity.
See, e.g., Holley v. Adams,
. “Qualifications. Each legislator shall be at least twenty-one years of age, an elector and resident of the district from which elected and *183 shall have resided in the state for a period of two years prior to election.” Art. Ill, § 15(c), Fla. Const.
. While the requirement that legislative candidates file full and public disclosure of their financial interests has a basis in the constitution, Article II, section 8 contains no disqualification or ineligibility provision, and contemplates implementing legislation.
. In the case of a candidate for the Florida Legislature, the "proper disciplinary official or body” is the Governor.
See
§ 112.324(8)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010). After election, the power resides in the appropriate legislative chamber.
See McPherson v. Flynn,