NORMAN GAUDETTE et al. v. MAINELY MEDIA, LLC, et al.
Yor-15-550
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
May 9, 2017
2017 ME 87
ALEXANDER, J.
Argued: June 10, 2016; Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
[¶1] Mainely Media, LLC, Molly Lovell-Keely, and Benjamin Meiklejohn (collectively, Mainely Media) appeal from an order of the Superior Court (York County, O‘Neil, J.) denying their special motion to dismiss the complaint of Norman Gaudette and Joanne Gaudette pursuant to Maine‘s anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute,
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶2] The record supports the following facts. See Nader v. Me. Democratic Party (Nader II), 2013 ME 51, ¶ 2, 66 A.3d 571.
[¶4] In February 2015, an individual alleging that he had been the victim of sexual abuse committed by a diffеrent Biddeford police officer began posting about the alleged abuse on social media. Meiklejohn and Lovell-Keely, a reporter and an editor, respectively, for the Biddeford-Saco-OOB Couriеr, a newspaper owned by Mainely Media, began reporting on the new allegations. Their work led them to interview and publish reports regarding statements made by several of Gaudette‘s alleged victims and Terry Davis, the Biddеford police officer who originally brought the 1990 allegations against Gaudette to the Police Department‘s attention.
[¶5] As a result of the 2015 allegations involving Gaudette and the other Biddeford police officеr, members of the public began holding meetings
[¶6] One of Meiklejohn and Lovell-Kelly‘s articles included Davis‘s account of the 1991 grand jury proceeding. Davis‘s statements, as represented in the article, contain the following allegations. A fifteen-year-old boy spoke with Davis at the Biddeford police station and alleged that Gaudette had sexually abused him. Investigations by the Biddeford police and Maine Attorney General‘s Office identified multiple other alleged victims who claimed that Gaudette had abused them. None of the alleged victims were called to testify before the grand jury, and during Davis‘s testimony before the grand jury, an Assistant Attorney General surprised Davis by asking him probing questions about Davis‘s father‘s suicide after Davis‘s father was accused of sеxually abusing a child, suggesting to the grand jury that Davis was incapable of impartially investigating a child abuse case. Gaudette then testified before the grand jury. The article reported that after the grand jury voted not to indict Gaudette, the Assistant Attorney General went to the
[¶7] The Gaudettes filed a complaint against Mainely Media, LLC, Meiklejohn, and Lovell-Keely оn June 24, 2015, alleging that they intentionally or recklessly disregarded the truth or falsity of the accounts included in their articles. The complaint included counts of false light portrayal, defamation, intrusion into seclusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium, and sought damages for loss of employment, stress, depression, and punitive damages.
[¶8] On August 24, 2015, Mainely Media filed a special motion tо dismiss pursuant to
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶9] Mainely Media argues that its anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted because the articles constitute a “petitioning activity” for anti-SLAPP purposes and because Gaudette failed to show that Mainely Media‘s petitioning aсtivity was devoid of reasonable factual support.
[¶10] Although the order denying Mainely Media‘s motion is not a final judgment, interlocutory appeals from denials of anti-SLAPP motions are permitted. See Town of Madawaska v. Cayer, 2014 ME 121, ¶ 8, 103 A.3d 547. We review the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion de novo. Id.
[¶11] Ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion rеquires a multi-step analysis. First, the moving party “must demonstrate that the anti-SLAPP statute applies by showing that the claims against it are based on the exercise of that party‘s constitutional right to petition.” Nader II, 2013 ME 51, ¶ 13, 66 A.3d 571; accord Gaudette v. Davis, 2017 ME 86, ¶¶ 8, 16, --- A.3d ---. If the moving party succеeds at the first step, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce “prima facie evidence that at least one of the moving party‘s petitioning
[¶12] The anti-SLAPP statute permits a defendant to file a special motion to dismiss a lawsuit “brought with the intention of chilling or deterring the free exercise of the defendant‘s First Amendment right to petition the government by threatening would-be activists with litigation costs.” Schelling v. Lindell, 2008 ME 59, ¶ 6, 942 A.2d 1226. The anti-SLAPP statute applies only if the activity the plaintiff complains of constitutes “petitioning activity,” which the statute defines as
any written or oral statemеnt made before or submitted to a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of an issue by a legislative, executivе or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect such
consideration; or any other statement falling within constitutional protection of the right to petition government.
[¶13] We have not addressed whether a newspaper may utilize the anti-SLAPP statute when it is facing a defamation claim based on its reporting. We have, however, interpreted “petitioning activity” to include a letter to the editor published in a newspaper where the letter was “designed to expand the public consideration of a controversial issue recently considered by the Legislature” and where the letter writer was the party seeking dismissal pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. Id. ¶ 13. Additionally, we have held that the statute applies to a defendant‘s letters addressed to the City Council and Mayor and statements made to a newspaper where these communications were published in a newspaper. Maietta Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, 2004 ME 53, ¶¶ 3, 7, 847 A.2d 1169.
[¶14] The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute2 does not aрply to a reporter‘s statements made in articles about a local development project because the articles did not
[¶15] The Massachusetts court‘s interpretation of its anti-SLAPP statute provides useful guidance for interpreting Maine‘s statute, which applies when the moving party asserts that claims “against the moving party are based on the moving party‘s exercise of the moving party‘s right of petition.”
[¶16] Mainely Media asserts that we have previously held that an attorney‘s statements to the media on behalf of his client constituted petitioning activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, despite the
[¶17] The language of Maine‘s anti-SLAPP statute restricts its application to suits based on “exercise of the moving party‘s right of petition,”
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
James B. Haddow, Esq., (orally), Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow, LLP, Portland for appellants Mainely Media, LLC, Molly Lovell-Keеly, and Benjamin Meiklejohn
Gene R. Libby, Esq., and Tara A. Rich, Esq., (orally), Libby O‘Brien Kingsley & Champion LLC, Kennebunk, for appellee Norman and Joanne Gaudette
York County Superior Court docket number CV-2015-123
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY