*4 GREGORY, Before KING Circuit GOODWIN, Judges, and JOSEPH R. States,District Chief Judge United for the sitting Southern of West Virginia, District by designation. I. part, in part,
Affirmed in dismissed opinion. in part published vacated A. in opinion, which Judge KING wrote began April Norfolk Southern joined. Judge Judge GREGORY operating transloading facility an ethanol concurring in opinion wrote GOODWIN (the Alexandria, “Facility”) Virginia. dissenting part. part and Facility enables Norfolk Southern from shipments transfer bulk of ethanol its
OPINION tank that are railcars onto surface trucks operated by parties. Shippers third con- KING, Judge: Circuit tract Norfolk to have etha- with Southern three appeals concern whether These rail, shipped Facility by nol of federal law serve to separate provisions expense Southern includes the preempt an ordinance enacted price for trans- transloading its overall (the Alexandria, Virginia “City”). The porting ethanol. Norfolk Southern’s applied ordinance has been to Nor- (“RSI”), agent, Leasing, Incorporated RSI (“Norfolk Railway Company folk Southern *5 performs transloading operations the Southern”) through per- a series of haul Facility.2 arrangements the All further City maintains appeal, mits. In its the regarding transportation the of ethanol ruling that the district court erred truck, however, Facility by from the Interstate two federal statutes —the Com- shippers made between the ethanol (the Act merce Commission Termination private trucking compa- receivers and the “ICCTA”) the Hazardous Materials nies. The tank trucks loaded at the Facili- “HMTA”)— (the Act Transportation ty transport City’s ethanol via the streets haul permits. the ordinance and preempt nearby to interstate highways and en route Ry. City Co. v. Alexan S. See to their ultimate destinations. dria, 1:08-cv-618, 2009 No. WL Facility City The is located the near (E.D.Va. 2009) (the “District April neighborhoods, two residential an elemen- By Opinion”).1 cross-appeal, Court Nor- school, tary the Van Dorn Metro Station challenges folk the con- Southern lot, parking and associated commuter statute, clusion that a third the Federal populated other areas. Because ethanol is (the “FRSA”), Safety Rail Act does volatile, highly City the flammable and preempt permits. also the ordinance and steps took at two in June 2008 to least below, First, affirm perceived safety As we the dis- alleviate concerns. City petitioned Transpor- trict court’s on with the the preemption decision Surface (the “STB”), respect independent to the that dis- tation Board an ICCTA. Because position agency, regarding renders moot the alternative bases federal for a declaration preemption, City’s authority regulate for federal we dismiss the the to the Facili- Second, HMTA aspect City’s appeal, ty. pursuant pro- as well to ordinance Finally, hibiting hauling as the vacate the of certain on cross-appeal. we materials streets, judgment City unilaterally the court’s on the HMTA the issued a its thirty-day FRSA haul permit claims. to Norfolk Southern Opinion cross-appeal. party 1. The District Court is found at J.A. 2. RSI is also a to the For (Citations reference, primarily 97-136. herein to "J.A.-” refer ease of refer to the Appendix cross-appellants simply to the filed two "Norfolk Joint appeal.) this Southern.” (the “Permit”).3 Norfolk Southern de- B. by any to aspect clined abide of the Per- 16, 2008, On June Norfolk Southern filed
mit, taking the that it position facially was declaratory action in the and, inapplicable Facility, in any Eastern Virginia District of against event, preempted by was federal law. City and City’s Richard Baier of the De- on response, City June partment Transportation and Environ- original amended its explicitly ordinance to mental Services.5 In three counts of its govern transportation City within the complaint, Norfolk alleged Southern materials,” of “bulk including ethanol. Ordinance, as applied through the Per- 5-2-27(a) (as City Code of Alexandria mit, preempted by was separate three “Ordinance”).4 fed- amended, A violation statutes, (Count Three), eral FRSA the Ordinance constitutes a misdemean- (Count Four), or criminal offense. to Pursuant the Ordi- and the HMTA nance, 3, 2008, City, July (Count Five).6 unilateral- relief, For Norfolk South- ly thirty-day issued second Permit sought ern a declaration that the Ordi- Permit, Norfolk Southern. This and those nance and Permit preempted were and an thereafter, issued contained the same re- injunction barring enforcing from original strictions as the Permit. Norfolk them. Southern, however, position adhered to its On June filed its an- federal law ef- complaint, swer to the third-party com- regulate fort transloading ethanol at the RSI, plaint against Facility and thus refused to and a counterclaim abide Permit’s restrictions. Norfolk Southern. third-par- *6 conditions, 5) imposed 3. The Permit permit several in- This will be revoked should this hauled, cluding limiting speci- operation what could by any be governing be halted au- fying hauling through City, route the thority. restricting days the and times for such haul- During J.A. 198. period, City the relevant the ing. specifically, provided: More the Permit sought every thirty days. to reissue the Permit simplicity, For the sake of we refer to the 1) dirt, No mud or debris shall be tracked/ permits singular, various in the the as "Per- spilled public right-of-way. onto the mit,” despite permits the fact that such were 2) copy permit provided A of this must be recurrently issued. routing each driver. Failure to follow will permit. result in revocation of this No en- Ordinance, amended, provides 4. The tering city jake the before 7:00 a.m. No pertinent part "[hjauling that ... bulk materi- engine braking city brakes or within the prohibited als ... is on all streets within the obey signs limits. Driver shall all traffic City, except pursuant permit to a [by issued markings. 5-2-27(a). City].” § Ordinance 3) Hauling route is from the Alexandria facili- Road, ty to Metro Metro Road to Eisenhow- City collectively 5. Baier and the referred Avenue, er west on Eisenhower Avenue to “City.” to herein as the Street, Van Dorn south on Van Dorn Street city and out of the limits. claims, 6. In addition to its three Hauling permitted Monday through is Fri- complaint alleged original day, that the p.m. only. 7:00 a.m. ordi- to 7:00 inapplicable nance Hauling hauling was to ethanol is limited to a maximum of 20 (Count One) per day. vagueness and was trucks void for (Count Two). 4) permit being despite concluding After city This is issued that moot, objections claims in these first concerns and to Norfolk South- two counts were relating ap- summary judgment ern and its the district contractors to the court awarded propriateness transloading City of ethanol on them. Norfolk Southern does appeal ruling. this location. not that under the sought preempted de- Ordinance was and counterclaim ty complaint id., against both FRSA. 2009 WL *7-8. claratory injunctive relief See partial support City appeals and RSI. from the award Norfolk Southern Southern, thereof, City alleged summary judgment to Norfolk the Ordinance is not maintaining [bjecause and RSI Southern] [Norfolk by either the or the preempted the volume of ethanol to increase intend have HMTA. Norfolk Southern and RSI to a 24-hour a transloading operations basis, cross-appealed, contending that the Ordi- 7-day a and to use day, week nance is also under the FRSA. permit than the al- many more trucks jurisdiction to 28 lows, controversy possess pursuant actual be- We there is an authori- parties regarding U.S.C. tween City
ty regulate the use of II. by ethanol-filled trucks from streets Dorn Yard. Van novo a We review de district Following discovery, J.A. 81. summary judgment. Bryant award of summary judgment, filed cross-motions Md, Inc., Bell Atl. 288 F.3d of law. seeking relief as a matter Cir.2002). summary On cross-motions for judgment, a district court should “rule Before the district court ruled on the upon party’s separately each motion cross-motions, the STB issued its decision summary judgment determine whether is for an petition on the administrative appropriate as to each under the [Federal City’s authority concerning declaration Rule Procedure] of Civil standard.” Facility. Notably, regulate the STB Paving Excavating, Monumental & Inc. v. opera- concluded Norfolk Southern’s Co., Pa. Ass’n Ins. transportation by tion thereof “constitutes Mfrs.’ (4th Cir.1999). Summary judgment ap- rail carrier” and thus is “shielded from propriate only if the record shows “there is laws, including zoning most state and local genuine any no issue as to material fact laws, by preemption provision [of judg- Alexandria, and that the movant is entitled to Virginia— ICCTA].” *7 ment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Order, Civ. Declaratory for Finance Petition 56(c). (S.T.B. 17, Proc. 1 Docket No. 35157 at Feb.
2009) (the Decision”).7 “STB The STB III. explained Facility
Decision that “the is part opera- rail [Norfolk Southern]^ appeals Our resolution these and, such, Facility qualifies tions” as “the implicates important principles two preemption.” for federal Id. at 3. First, constitutional law. the doctrine of Decision, preemption
Two months after the STB in the Constitution’s —rooted Congress parties’ Supremacy permits district ruled on the cross- Clause— summary judgment. perti- expressly displace motions for In or local in state law part, any given Cyan- nent the court concluded that field. v. Am. See Worm (4th Co., 1301, Ordinance was under both the amid 970 F.2d 1304 Cir. 1992) (“Congress may expressly provide ICCTA and the HMTA. See District Court 1011653, Opinion, authority 2009 state supplants WL *7-15. Addi- federal law ”).8 however, Second, tionally, particular the court ruled that the in a field.... Supremacy provides al 7. The STB Decision is found J.A. 443-49. 8. The Clause Constitution and laws of the United States are
157 (the “ICC”), principle of constitutional avoidance set sion regulated which rail transportation Valley years. forth Ashwander v. Tennessee Congress ICCTA, Authority requires the federal courts to enacted the which ter- minated the rendering replaced strive to avoid constitutional ICC it with the STB, jurisdiction which has “broad rulings absolutely necessary. unless See over ‘transportation by rail L.Ed. carriers.’” U.S. S.Ct. Island Park, (1936) (“It (Brandeis, J., LLC v. CSX Transp., 559 F.3d concurring) (2d Cir.2009) (quoting 49 is not the habit of the Court to decide U.S.C. 10501(b)(1)). § Indeed, the questions of a Constitutional nature un STB has ex- “(1) jurisdiction clusive over absolutely necessary transportation to a less decision of (internal (2) by rail carriers ... quotation the case.” marks omit construc- ted)). tion, acquisition, operation, abandonment, tracks, ... discontinuance of or facili- Although the district court addressed 10501(b). § ties.” 49 U.S.C. “Transporta- upon and ruled each of Norfolk Southern’s by includes, tion” rail carriers in relevant statutory alternative preemption, bases for part, our resolution of these appeals may rest on (A) facility ... [a] related to the move- only one of those if it bases satisfies the ment of passengers both, or property, or legal standards for preemption. See Ca- rail, by regardless of ownership or an tawba Indian Tribe v. City S.C. Rock agreement use; concerning Hill, Cir.2007) 372 n. 4 (B) movement, services related to that (“We ,.. entitled to affirm the district including receipt, elevation, delivery, any ground court on support would transit, transfer storage, han- favor of the party prevail- dling, and interchange of property. below.”). And, ing herein, we 10102(9). are content to affirm § the court’s ruling Id. The ICCTA also contains Ordinance, that the as applied to Norfolk an express preemption clause: “the reme- Permit, through Southern preempt- provided dies part under this respect with ed the ICCTA. disposi- Because our regulation of rail transportation are tion of the ICCTA claim renders moot exclusive and preempt the pro- remedies Norfolk Southern’s other preemption vided under Federal and State law.” Id. claims, 10501(b). need not reach or address the preemption aspect HMTA Our Court has heretofore recog “ appeal or the FRSA preemption pre- issue nized that Congress ‘narrowly has tai sented cross-appeal. Southern’s lored the provision to We therefore dismiss the HMTA and *8 i.e., displace only “regulation,” those state aspects FRSA appeals these and vacate may laws that reasonably be said to have the court’s on those two claims. the effect of “managing” or “governing” rail transportation.’” Phosphate PCS Co. A. 212, v. Corp., S. 559 F.3d 218 Norfolk 1887, Cir.2009) In the Interstate Commerce Act (quoting Fla. E. Ry. Coast Co. v. created the Interstate Beach, Commerce City Commis- 1324, W. Palm supreme "the any Thing Law of the Land ... analyzed way nances is in the same as that of any in the Constitution or Laws of State to the Hillsborough statewide County, laws.” Fla. v. Const, Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. art. Labs., Inc., 707, Automated Med. 471 U.S.
VI,
purposes
Supremacy
cl. 2. For
of the
713,
(1985).
105 S.Ct.
159
railroad,
to
the traffic for
no
service to” the
wouldn’t be able
switch
valuable
as it
my
service
oth-
my
only
other customers and
permittee’s “operation
involved the
of
er customers as required.
private
facility”
a
distribution
on railroad-
owned .land. See
For Ordinance and Permit example, in Florida East Coast Railway, transloading operations a use of of Norfolk permittee’s a.railyard Thus, activity Facility. City not Southern at the was within ICCTA’s preemptive scope yard regulated “transportation by has a rail because car rier,” public provide[d] by no function and as “serve[d] defined the ICCTA.11 City relied attempt other authorities on ation or otherwise with or interfere inapposite. Ry., regulate are likewise See Vt. 769 A.2d operations”). rail (concluding at 653-55 ICCTA did not 11. The that the also maintains Ordinance preempt regulated activity local laws that —a carrier,” regulate Permit do not "rail as operation salt distributorship— railroad's of a sought regu- contends that has it "ancillary operations of the rail line” only travelling late to and those trucks from impact that did not have "an economic Facility. This contention is also without operations”); Operating [the CFNR railroad's] above, Co., reg- merit. As the activities F.Supp.2d (concluding at 1118 are, regulation ulated preempt ICCTA did not the Ordinance Permit that did STB, "prevent anyone running oper- recognized by integral part “an from rail *10 160 rail conducting opera- before permit issued 2. “permit- to as generally referred tions— that, if Next, even City asserts requirements ting” “preclearance” or —will regulate “trans Ordinance
the Permit and on rail an unreasonable burden impose carrier,” yet it was by a rail portation Mtn., See, 404 transportation. e.g., Green pursuant to its the Permit entitled to issue Gov’t, 643; City Auburn v. U.S. F.3d at local for a state or powers. order police (9th Cir.1998). 1025, 1030-31 154 F.3d police proper to be a exercise regulation Here, City power example, for has context, regulation a power such the trans- significantly halt or diminish (1) rail carri discriminate must not by Facility at the de- (2) loading operations rail car unreasonably burden ers or permits by haul or increas- Ry. Corp. clining to issue Susquehanna N.Y. & W. riage. (3d Cir.2007) Jackson, 238, a specified therein. As ing restrictions 643). Mtn., 404 F.3d at The (citing result, or Green the Ordinance entails “extended decision Mountain Second Circuit’s Green delays” on the open-ended based are regulations that local explains further Permit, of the and issuance issuance “at to the extent that least necessarily “the exercise requires Permit safety, are [they] public health and protect Mtn., City. by of discretion” Green defined, obeyed can be with settled and at The Ordinance and Permit F.3d 643. certainty, entail no extended reasonable notwithstanding are preempted, thus delays, approved can be open-ended powers possessed by City. Ac- police (or rejected) the exercise of discre without Permit, cordingly, the Ordinance and as subjective questions.” 404 F.3d tion on Southern, preempt- applied to 643. ed under the ICCTA.12 and Per Although the Ordinance commendably public
mit
seek to enhance
B.
unreasonably
rail car
safety, they
burden
aspect
appeal,
separate
As
of its
escape
pre
cannot
riage and thus
City
reverse the district
asks
we
exception.
emption
police power
under the
ruling
provides
that the
HMTA
recognized
courts have
re
Several
locally
preemption.
basis for
And
quiring a rail carrier to obtain
alternative
however,
operations,
provision
transportation by
and Permit on such
[the railroad's]
Transp.,
argument
rail
Hi Tech
LLC—Petition
plainly
carrier.”
meritless. See
render this
Order,
Declaratory
Locke,
Finance Docket No.
United States v.
529 U.S.
14,
Indeed,
(S.T.B.
2003).
Aug.
34192 at 7
1135,
("[A]n
(2000)
as-
S.Ct.
161
through
cross-appeal,
its
Norfolk Southern
folk Southern’s alternative
pre-
bases for
ruling
us to reverse the court’s
emption
asks
under the HMTA or the FRSA
preempted by
the Ordinance was not
any practical
could
have
effect on the
are constrained to
FRSA. We
decline both
outcome of this case. Whether those stat-
invitations. Our decision on the ICCTA utes preempt
the Ordinance and Permit
preempts
issue—that federal law
the Ordi-
impact
would have no
on
disposition
our
being applied
nance from
to Norfolk
matter, namely,
the Ordinance
through
Southern
the Permit —moots the
and Permit
preempted by
the ICCTA.
pursued
HMTA and FRSA issues
here. Thus,
pass
were we to
on the HMTA and
FRSA bases for preemption, we could of-
always obliged
We are
to as
fer nothing more than an advisory opinion
dispute
sure ourselves that a live
exists
potentially
on
questions
difficult
of federal-
parties
stages
between the
at all
of litiga
ism and constitutional law. See Friends of
tion.
English
See Arizonans for Official
Everglades
Dist.,
v. S. Fla.
Mgmt.
Water
Arizona,
43, 67,
1055,
v.
520
117
U.S.
S.Ct.
1210,
(11th Cir.2009) (“To
570 F.3d
1216
(1997).
dispute
wrong,” may only “decide cases that vacate the moot aspects of the lower matter the real Wyoming world.” judgment. Smith, See Alvarez v. Interior, Dep’t U.S. 587 F.3d — — -, U.S. 130 S.Ct. (10th Cir.2009) (“[0]ur inability to ren - (2009) L.Ed.2d (explaining that judgment der hypothetical nice or advi “normally courts ... vacate the lower sory questions ... distinguishes the role of in a moot case because judge the federal from that of the advisor doing so path clears the relitiga- future order.”). or academic in our constitutional tion of the issues parties” between the (internal
The foregoing principles are con quotation omitted)); marks see trolling with respect to the HMTA and also v. Bunting, Mellen (4th Cir.2003) (“If Any ruling by FRSA issues. us on Nor- a claim becomes moot *12 nt) customary to deviate from our a court’s final reason entry the of district after vacating judg- the lower court’s completion practice of of prior judgment review, the claims. generally we vacate ment as to moot appellate practice The established judgment....”). however, warranted, “only IV. vacatur is
of
through hap-
has occurred
mootness
where
we affirm the
foregoing,
Pursuant to the
through
than
the volun-
rather
penstance,
the
judgment
court’s
on
district
Mellen,
losing party.”
of the
tary action
issue,
dismiss the balance
preemption
is not
Although
at 364.
vacatur
moot,
as
and vacate the
appeals
these
has been rendered
when
case
warranted
as to the
and FRSA
judgment
HMTA
settlement,
seeks
by
party
“a
who
moot
preemption issues.
ruling,
an adverse
of the merits of
review
PART,
IN
DISMISSED
AFFIRMED
vagaries
the
of circum-
by
is frustrated
but
PART,
IN PART.
IN
AND VACATED
stance,
in fairness be forced to
ought not
Bancorp
U.S.
judgment.”
in
acquiesce
GOODWIN,
Judge,
District
Chief
P’ship., Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
dissenting
part:
in
in
concurring
part
18, 25,
L.Ed.2d 233
115 S.Ct.
U.S.
join
majority
affirming
I
the dis-
(1994).
issue,
ruling
trict court’s
on the ICCTA
circumstances, we are satisfied
In these
disagree with its decision
respectfully
but
judg-
court’s
that vacatur of
district
rulings
to vacate the district court’s
on
preemption
on the HMTA and FRSA
ment
Rather than
HMTA and FRSA issues.
Addressing
is warranted.
those is-
counts
I
affirm the
vacating
rulings,
those
would
advisory
in an
simply
would
result
sues
judgment
district court’s
on the ICCTA
being rendered on moot issues.
opinion
issue,
City’s appeal of the
dismiss the
Furthermore,
City’s appeal
of the
ruling,
court’s HMTA
and dismiss
preemption ruling and Norfolk
HMTA
rul-
cross-appeal
Southern’s
FRSA
cross-appeal
pre-
of the FRSA
Southern’s
ing.
by
were rendered moot not
emption ruling
By
ask us to
appeals,
parties
their
any voluntary
action of either
virtue
rulings
of cir-
address the district
party,
vagaries
but instead
short,
preempted by
is
parties
are de- whether the Ordinance
cumstance.
major-
I agree
adverse de- HMTA and FRSA.
with the
appellate
nied
review those
invitation,
ity
of our decision on
that we should decline this
terminations as
result
because our decision on the ICCTA issue
the ICCTA
issue and
be-
effectively
of some unilateral action on their
moots the HMTA and FRSA
cause
Assn., Int’l v.
Thus,
issues. See Air Line Pilots
as settlement.13
there is
part, such
sincerely appreciate
thoughtful
judgments
We
tur of the HMTA and FRSA
is
warranted,
implicit
expressed by
distinguished
whether the
vacatur
views
our
col-
sufficiently
opinion,
par-
partial
league
separate
his
advocated
dissent
fine
ticularly
protects the
and the
thank him for his concurrence in the
interests
above,
system.
preemption aspect
opinion.
judicial
We
see
of this
also
As
essential,
ruling
primar-
essentially
question.
explicit
agree on the mootness
vacatur
(''[0]ur
ily
post
application
because
of the constitutional
See
at 19
decision on the ICCTA
effectively
denied Norfolk South-
moots the HMTA and FRSA
avoidance doctrine has
issue
issues.”).
rights
appeal, pursu-
appears
their
It
that our sole difference
ern
one,
may
greater
28 U.S.C.
of the district court's
a narrow
which
well be of
ant to
preemp-
community
and FRSA
than to
on the HMTA
interest to the academic
everyday litigants:
explicit vaca-
whether an
tion claims.
Corp., 897 F.2d
gage
UAL
1396-97
Co. v. Bonner
P’ship,
Mall
513 U.S.
Cir.1990).
115 S.Ct.
Nevertheless, the HMTA and is- FRSA vacate on its belief that customary “[t]he traditional, sues are not “moot” practice when a case is rendered moot on is, III Article sense of that word. That we *13 appeal is to vacate the moot aspects of the possess jurisdiction continue to to review (cit- lower judgment.” Ante at 161 them, may but decline to do out of so — Smith, ing Alvarez v. -, U.S. prudential concerns. As the Seventh Cir- — - 576, 581, S.Ct. (2009), L.Ed.2d explained, cuit has concep- there is both a and Mellen Bunting, 355, tual practical and a reason for this: “The (4th Cir.2003)). Upon inspection, closer conceptual reason is that it is cases rather however, the cases upon by relied the ma- than reasons that become moot. Whether jority materially are distinguishable from gives a court grounds one or ten for its this case. result is not a question to which III Article
prescribes
practical
an answer. The
rea-
Méllen,
In both Alvarez and
the issues
son is that
grounds
the alternative
are ripe
appeal
on
became moot
they
before
were
deciding
may
decision and
them
help a presented
appellate
court. For in-
a
higher
subsequent
court.”
(citing
Id.
stance, in
the petitioner
Alvarez
sued state
Leon,
897,
United States v.
468 U.S.
924-
unlawfully
officials for
seizing his property.
25,
3405,
(1984);
104 S.Ct.
Therefore,
Article III case or controversy,
while we could
the
decide these
Court
held that
it
III,
jurisdiction
issues within the confines
lacked
of Article
over the
dispute,
vacated
doing
decision,
so
this case
the lower-court
inappropri-
would be
and
out,
ate. As
remanded with
majority points
instructions to
federal
dismiss.
Alvarez, 130
long
Mellen,
courts have
S.Ct. at 583.
adhered to the
And
constitu-
cadets at the Virginia
tional avoidance
Military
doctrine. See Ashwander
Institute
Auth.,
sought declaratory
Valley
injunctive
v. Tenn.
297 U.S.
relief
(1936) (Bran-
superintendent
the VMI
56 S.Ct.
that mooted
have chosen not to address the
case. We
juris-
III
court of Article
appellate
ing
rulings
court’s HMTA and FRSA
district
the cases became moot
Because
diction.
prudential
out of
concerns. Because
appeal,
be reviewed on
they could
before
issues,
those
have chosen not to address
essentially
was
judgment
lower-court
only
law from the district
point
unreviewable.
any
effect is
opinion
preclusive
court
with
however,
on the
Here,
it is our decision
(Sec-
See Restatement
ruling.
its ICCTA
issue,
any underlying
rather than
ond)
(1982)
Judgments
27 cmt. 0
facts, that has “mooted” the
in the
change
(“If
[trial]
FRSA issues. Unlike
HMTA
of two is-
was based on
determination
*14
Mellen, those
in Alvarez moot issues
sues,
indepen-
standing
either of which
appellate
from
re-
not insulated
issues are
dently
support
would be sufficient
jurisdic-
federal
a lack of
view because
result,
up-
appellate
and ....
reasons,
Rather,
we
prudential
tion.
determinations as suffi-
holds one of these
them.
declining to address
cient and refuses to consider whether
accordingly
not the other is sufficient and
presented
was
situation
A similar
is con-
judgment,
affirms the
Manning,
v.
ed each the district court’s deci- affirmed
appeals Having issue.
sion on which to affirm ground one
identified
judgment,
the court
the district
America,
UNITED STATES of
other chal-
declined to address
State’s
Plaintiff-Appellee,
footnote,
explained,
lenges.
In a
the court
“Because the CPA is invalid under
GRAHAM,
Clause,
Defendant-
Robert E.
Supremacy
we do not need
Appellant.
chal-
reach the additional constitutional
not reach the
lenges. Although we do
No. 09-6013.
immunity
chal-
sovereign
issue of
or the
Appeals,
United States Court of
lenges under the Commerce Clause
Fourth Circuit.
Clause, we decline to vacate
the Contract
order
portions
those
of the district court’s
27, 2010.
Argued: Jan.
Rather,
requests.
simply
as the
State
Decided: June
unnecessary to
express no view on issues
Manning,