Thе defendant, Virginia R. Norberg, appeals from a Superior Court (Dickson, J.) order approving a Master’s (Martha W. Copithorne, Esq.) recommendation to deny her motion to modify the permanent stipulations she agreed to with the plaintiff, Michael Nоr-berg. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.
In 1986, after twenty-nine years of marriage, the plaintiff and defendant were divorced by decree of the Strafford County Superiоr Court. The final decree provided, in part, that the plaintiff would pay the defendant $1800 per month in alimony until she remarried or died. It also provided that she would receive forty percent of the plaintiff’s pension plan.
In March 1989, the defendant filed a motion for clarification, enforcement and modification relative to the vesting and value of her share оf the pension. After lengthy negotiations, the parties agreed to a permanent stipulation whereby the defendant would receive, inter alia, an increased percentage of the pension plan benefits as well as a lump sum payment of $21,600 in lieu of future alimony. In return, the defendant agreed that upon payment of the $21,600, “all further and future obligations of the Plaintiff to pаy alimony shall forever cease, without recourse to the Defendant, to seek any further modifications hereof.” The parties signed the stipulation, and on January 17, 1990, the court aрproved and incorporated it into its decree.
The defendant does not dispute that she agreed to the permanent stipulation and that the plaintiff met his obligations under it. Rather, she claims that her waiver of the right to future alimony is not binding on the court, and, thus, the deсree awarding a lump sum alimony payment is modifiable. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the stipulation should be enforced, thereby denying the defendant any claim to future alimony рayments.
This court has consistently held that stipulations agreed to by the parties are not binding on the court in the determination of alimony awards, and that upon a showing of necessity due tо changed circumstances, the original decree may be modified. Eaton v. Eaton,
In Wallace, one of the first cases to examine the issue in this State, the parties had agreed, under seal, “that the amount of alimony in said case shall be six thousand dollars, and in consideration of the same [the plaintiff] hereby relinquishes] all claim for alimony, present and prospective ....”
Similarly, in LeBeau, the parties agreed that the defendant would pay the plaintiff $1000 in lieu of any and all support obligations. Following Wallace and relying on statutory authority, we affirmed the lower court’s modification of the alimony.
The plaintiff seeks to distinguish Wallace and LeBeau on the grounds that the permanent stipulation in those cases, unlike here,
Our case law unequivocally states that property settlements and alimony are entirely different matters, and that, although the former cannot be modified on account of changed circumstances, the latter can be so modifiеd. See generally McSherry v. McSherry,
This court has consistently upheld the modification of alimony awаrds even when the stipulation has been incorporated into a decree. For example, in Eaton the parties stipulated that the defendant was to pay the plaintiff $20 per week for 240 weeks. The stipulation was incorporated into the decree. The wife remarried, and the defendant sought modification. In addressing the alimony issue, we stated that, assuming the stipulatiоn included a provision for support, the decree adopting the stipulation “necessarily, by force of the statute, (P.L., c. 287, s. 12 [now RSA 458:14]), reserved authority to revise----” Eaton,
“Furthermore, the libelant had a claim for support. If, as the effect of her position, she waived it, her waiver was an item reflected in the amount to be paid her. But some price for the waiver is in reality a price paid for what was waived. The result is that the decree included and directed some provision for support.”
Id. And as previously noted, because the decree included some provision for support, it “necessarily, by force of the statute .. . reserved аuthority to revise----” Id. As a result, we remanded the case to the lower court for a determination of whether modification of the award
The plaintiff also seeks to distinguish Wallace and LeBeau by the fact that the parties in those cases did not expressly waive their right to seek modification of the agreement. Presumably the plaintiff is arguing that the defendant is precluded from seeking judicial intervention due to her express agreement to abstain from seeking modification of the agreement.
Whether the parties expressly аgreed to waive their rights to seek modification of the agreement is irrelevant. RSA 458:14 grants the court the authority to revise any order made by the court. This statute is to be liberally construed. See Wallace,
Finally, the plaintiff argues that RSA 458:19 authorizes agreements relative to alimony and does not preclude the parties from reaching an agreement to waive alimony rights. “Where reasonably possible, statutes should be construed as consistent with each other.” Swiezynski v. Civiello,
“Upon proper application and notice, the court may revise and modify any order made, and may make such new orders as may be necessary respecting alimony.” Wallace,
In this case, the trial court determined that the alimony payment could not be modified, and, therefore, a determination of whether the alleged changed circumstances of the defendant warranted a modification was not made. Consequently, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.