This 'is an action for damages for personal injury, against the city of Watertown, its mayor, the members of its city council, and the members of its park board. Four demurrers were interposed to the complaint, one by all of the -defendants, one by the mayor and1 members of the city council, one by the park board, аnd one by the city. From orders sustaining each of said demurrers the plaintiff separately appealed. For convenience the appeals are here héard on one set of briefs.
It 'is alleged in the complaint that plaintiff, a nonresident of Watertown, was injured in June, 1921, by diving from a diving board negligently maintainеd by defendants in Pake Kampeska within a park owned and maintained by defendants outside the city limits of Watertown. The cause of the injury is alleged to be that the diving board was placéd and maintained in very shallow water, to-wit, about 3J/2 feet in depth, so that when plaintiff' dove therefrom he struck his head Cipon th'e .lake 'bottom and was severely injured.
It is the theory of appellant (1) that the city is liable for the injury for the reasons given in Walters v. City of Carthage, 36 S. D. 11,
Appellant’s counsel call our attention to chapter 11 of part 8 of title 6 of Rеv. Code 1919, viz., sections 6433-6523, which provides for three methods of park control: ('i) By the governing body of any municipal corporation (section 6433) ; (2) in cities of the first class by a park board created by ordinance (sections 6434-6443) ; and (3) in cities of the first class by a park board created pursuant to the vote of the electors. They say that, because section 6440, as amended by chapter 274, Laws 1919, only purports to give a park board created by ordinance power over parks within the city, and since the park board, whose members are defendants herein, was so created, such board, in attempting to exercise control over the park in question-, acted ultra vires. -They contrast with section 6440 the provisions of section 6452, which purport to give the pаrk board, created pursuant to a vote of the electors authority over parks wlithin or without the city limits. There would be much force to appellаnt’s contention were it not for subdivision 10 of section 6169, Rev. Code 1919, which authorizes all municipal corporations to acquire and manage public parks, and provides:
“Aind any such public park partly or wholly without the limits
This section must 'be read and construed with section 6440 as amended, and) wflien so read and construed it is entirely clear that it was the legislative intent that park boards created by ordinance should have the same authority over parks without as within the city limits. Said prоvision is in effect a general definition, and, if it had been the legislative intent that the definition should not apply to a later enactment, such later enactment should have negatived the applicability of the definition. We are therefore convinced that the city council and the park board did not аct ultra vires.
Is the defendant city, then, liable for the negligence which caused the injury? In Walters v. City of Carthage, supra, this court said:
“It is well settled that municipal corporations have certain powers which are discretionary or judicial in character, and also certain powers which are ministerial. Thеy will not be held liable in damages for the manner in which they exercise in good faith their discretionary powers of a public character, but are liable for damages caused by their negligence when their duties are ministerial. A municipal corporation acts judicially when -it selects a plan for some public improvement; but as soon as it begins to carry out the plan, it acts ministerially and is bound to see that the work is done in a safe manner. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. §§ 949, 832, 1048. Johnston v. Dist. оf Columbia,
In that case the nonliability of the city was strongly urged because it was claimed that it was acting under its governmental powers as distinguished from its privatе, business, or proprietary powers, but this court then declined to adhere to that doctrine, although the applicability of the doctrine as to schоol 'districts or
“The same law that requires a municipal corporation to keep its streets free from nuisances, and reasonably safe for those who lawfully use them, also imposes upоn it the duty to keep its public parks and other public places in a reasonably safe condition for all who lawfully frequent and use them.”
See, also, City of Denver v. Spencer,
Note. — Reported in
On question of liability of municipality for negligence of its park board, see notes in 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147 and L. R. A. 1917E, 695.
On liability of municipal corporation for injuries through unsafe conditions in parks or other public grounds lother than streets, see notes in 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 523 and L. R. A. 1915C, 435.