31 Wis. 265 | Wis. | 1872
Lead Opinion
The following opinion was filed at the January term, 1872.
The statute enacts: “In all cases, the supreme court shall remit its judgment or decision to the court from which the appeal was taken, to be enforced accordingly; and if the appeal is from a judgment, final judgment shall, thereupon, be entered in the court below, in accordance therewith, except where otherwise ordered.” 2 Tay. Stats., 1633, § 7. This statute plainly contemplates a case where the supreme court is able to and does pronounce a judgment or decision in the cause, which judgment or decision shall be a guide for future action in the court below, and bind that court to proceed in conformity therewith. It likewise plainly contemplates a case where, if deemed just and proper, this court is capable of making some other order or giving some other specific directions for further proceedings in the court below, in place of the entry in that court of final judgment in accordance with the judgment of this court. But the case here under consideration was not such a
But the motion of the defendant was likewise based on another ground, which was the revocation in writing by the plaintiff McNdb of any authority on the part of the attorney of record for the plaintiffs to appear and prosecute the action for him or in his name, and also his, McNaVs, formal discontinuance of the action so far as he himself was concerned. Was the defendant entitled to any part of the relief demanded by the motion upon this ground ? Was he entitled to have the action dismissed as to the plaintiff McNdb f The plaintiffs are partners, and it is laid down by Mr. Grow, and is indeed a principle generally well settled, that one partner is competent to release a supposed right of action, even after proceedings to enforce it have been instituted by the firm. Gow on Parnership, 65. And the same author goes on to observe that as he may release an action, it seems to follow that he has the power of suspending proceedings in it, and he cites the case of Harwood v. Edwards, in the King’s Bench, reported by the author, note ^(r), -in which it was held, where three partners sued as
Such are some of the authorities, in fact all we know of, touching the right of one plaintiff to discontinue against the will of his coplaintiff in a case like this. It will be seen that the power is generally conceded except where fraud and collusion are shown or it appears that the remaining plaintiff will suffer injury. In this case, it will be borne in mind, the plaintiff McNab did not attempt an entire discontinuance of the action. He only sought to discontinue as to himself, or to withdraw as one of the parties plaintiff to it. It will also be remembered that no fraud or collusion on his part in this particular is shown, nor is it made to appear that his coplaintiff will sustain an injury by his being permitted to withdraw. It is provided generally by statute that, if the consent of one who should be joined as plaintiff in the action cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant, the reason therefor being stated in the complaint. 2 Tay. Stats., 1420, § 20. With such a statutory provision as this
The other branch of the order appealed from seems not to raise any question for our consideration. Although made at the same time with the order overruling the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and incorporated with it, yet it appears to have no necessary or other connection with that order than the mere fact that it was made and entered in that form. The motion of the defendant to dismiss was unconditionally denied, and there the order upon such motion appears to have ended. Then follows the residue of the entry, amounting to a distinct and independent order, based upon considerations entirely dif
By the Court.— Order reversed as above indicated, and cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.
Rehearing
The respondent moved for a rehearing and the following opinion upon the motion was filed at the June term, 1872.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff Noonan moves for a rehearing on several grounds stated in his argument, none of which are in our judgment sufficient to sustain the application.
1. It it exceedingly doubtful whether the sale by the plaintiff McNab to the defendant Orton of his, McNaVs, share or interest in the copartnership property of the firm of Noonan & McNab was, under the circumstances, any violation of the covenant or stipulation contained in the articles of copartnership. Such sale, as it seems, did not take place until after there was an end of the copartnership by the commencement of an action for a dissolution, and for the collection and payment of debts and distribution of assets under the direction of a receiver, who had been appointed and had taken possession of all the co-partnership effects and property. The sale by McNab was only of his residuary individual interest after all proper claims upon the copartnership were paid and satisfied. It is very doubtful whether a proper construction of the covenant would not limit its operation to a sale by either partner without the consent of the other during the life of the copartnership, or so as to prevent a dissolution in that way. It is very doubtful, when the copartnership was in effect ended, or no longer to be continued except for the purpose of winding up its affairs, whether McNab
2. Tbe order of tbe court in tbe action of McNab v. Noonan, for tbe dissolution of tbe copartnership, authorizing either of tbe parties to that action (who are tbe plaintiffs in tbis) to prosecute tbis action, was merely permissive. It was not ordered or adjudged by tbe court in that action, that it was necessary or proper for tbe protection of tbe rights and interests of tbe firm or tbe rights and interests of its creditors, that tbis action should or must be prosecuted by or under tbe direction of one or both of tbe plaintiffs. Neither did tbe court adjudge or direct that the same should be prosecuted by or under tbe direction of tbe receiver. On application of tbe plaintiff Noonan, tbe defendant there, tbe court merely permitted or licensed such prosecution by the plaintiffs or either of them. The order read (we quote from tbe argument of counsel) as follows: “ It is hereby ordered by tbe court that said Noonan and McNab, or either, are allowed to prosecute said suit in tbe Racine county circuit court to judgment; and orders of tbis court to tbe contrary are hereby modified so as to allow such prosecution.” Tbis case stands, therefore, as if there bad been no appointment of a receiver and no action for a dissolution, and presents merely tbe general question of McNab's right to discontinue or withdraw himself from tbe litigation.
3. Tbe provisions of sec. 1, cb. 185, R. S. (2 Tay. Stats., 1572, § 1), have no application to or bearing upon tbe question here presented. It is true, as counsel says, that tbe vendee has a right to continue tbe action in tbe name of tbe original party,
4. It is said we have made a gross mistake in supposing that McNab's discontinuance, or right to discontinue, was before us at all on this appeal. The motion was founded, as appears by it, “ upon the record and proceedings in this action.” A part of such record and proceedings as found in the printed case immediately preceding the motion, was the written revocation and discontinuance signed by the plaintiff McNab. In the order of the court overruling the motion, express reference was made to the written discontinuance, or to that part of it in which McNab refused to execute any renewal of the lease; and the same was made the foundation of that portion of the order dismissing the complaint so. far as it asked such renewal. The learned counsel is of course much more familiar with what occurred in the court below than we are, and it may be that he can see that McNab's discontinuance was entirely foreign to the order under consideration, and from which the appeal was taken; but looking on the face of the record, and taking that for our guide, as we are bound to do, we certainly cannot see it in that light. It appears to us, not only that the Written discontinuance was before the court upon the motion, as in some way the foundation of or connected with it, but that it was also actually considered by the court in making the order.
5. Costs in this court are given to the prevailing party by statute, and, except in actions for divorce and perhaps
6. It is not necessary, nor does this court controvert or question the general correctness of the principles of law stated by counsel in his sixth point or proposition. An examination of the record fails to disclose, as it seems to us, any facts and circumstances calling for an application of those principles. It does not appear that the withdrawal of the plaintiff McNab from the litigation is such a disturbance of the rights of his co-partner, or of the creditors of the firm, as ought to operate to bind McNab to continue the prosecution of it against his will, and against what he may consider to be for the good of himself and of the firm. The action may still go on, if the plaintiff Noonan so elects, in his name, McNab being made a party defendant, and thus all the rights, legal and equitable, of the partner choosing to prosecute, be saved and redressed.
By the Court. — Motion denied.
The argument of respondent’s counsel upon this motion is not found on the flies.