4 Wis. 335 | Wis. | 1856
The facts involved in this case-are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.
By the Court,
The bill filed in this case as it was amended, states in substance, that Erastus B. Wolcott, Talbot C. Dousman, Zelotus A. Cotton and Sandford D. Cotton, were seized in fee of certain lands, and being so seized in the year 1850, entered into an agreement with McNab, one of the
The bill prays that the defendant be required to make -in due form of law to the complainants a lehse of two thousand cubic' feet of water per minute for the term of ninety-nine years, to be taken from the said dam, and to he used in driving the machinery in said paper mill, with a proviso in said lease to be inserted, that until said dam is raised to the height of sixteen feet, the complainants sha-ll have the-privilege of drawing from ■said dam, so -much water as shall be equal to two thousand cubic feet of water per minute under a'head sixteen feet, and that ■the defendant may be compelled to raise said dam to the height of sixteen feet, and to carry out and fulfill the covenants in said -lease made by the said lessors, -so far -as they relate to the re
To certain parts of the bill a demurrer was interposed by the . defendant. The parts of the bill which are demurred to, are those which charge that the defendant, as assignee of Wolcott, Dousman and the Cottons with notice, is bound, by their covenants contained in the said lease to the complainants, to renew said lease and to grant an additional one thousand feet (of water), and to the relief prayed for by reason thereof. The cause of demurrer assigned is, that there is no interest in lands conveyed in said lease, sufficient to carry the covenants therein con-taffied, and that the covenants in said lease are only the personal covenants of the said lessors, and not binding on the defendant. The defendant also demurred to so much of the bill as charges that the defendant, by reason of being the grantee of Wolcott, Dousman and the Cottons, is bound to raise said dam to the height of sixteen feet, and to the relief prayed for by reason thereof. The cause of demurrer assigned is, that there was no estate in lands created or passed by said lease made by said Wolcott, Dousman and the Cottons, and that the covenants contained therein appear by the bill to have been broken by the said Wolcott, Dousman and Cottons long before the sale of the said premises to the defendant, and to have been a mere right of action against them in the complainants at the time of said sale. The defendant also demurred to the bill, and to the relief prayed, and assigned the following cause of demurrer, to wit : that it does not appear from said amended bill that the defendant had any notice of such agreement in writing; but it does
The court below overruled this demurrer.. From this decision the appeal in this ease was taken.
Admitting that the complainants cannot go behind the lease which was made to them by Wolcott, Dousman and the Cottons, and rely upon the agreement set forth in the bill, between the lessors and McNab and Cameron, we think that the bill discloses substantial grounds for equitable relief.
It was contended by the counsel for the defendant,' that the lease of Wolcott, Dousman and the Cottons was of water merely:; that no interest in land was demised by it, and that consequently the defendant, as the grantee of the land, could not be bound by the covenants contained in it. A careful consideration of the lease will, we think, lead to a different conclusion. The lease is of one thousand cubic feet of water per minute from the water power of the lessors in the village of Humboldt, to be taken from the dam in the said water power, and conveyed by the lessors in a flume to the paper mill of the lessees. This cannot be regarded as a lease of water distinct from land. The water was to be taken from the dam of the lessors, and to be -conveyed in a flume to the complainants1 mill.
The right which the complainants acquired by this lease could not be enjoyed without vesting in them an interest in the dam and water pow-er of the lessors. It gave them, therefore, an interest in the lessor’s land. We are well aware of the principle that according to the common law, by a grant of water merely the sale will not pass. Co. Litt. 4 b; Com. Dig. Grant, (E. 5.)
But this is not a lease of this description; it is a lease of water to be taken at a place designated on the lessor’s land, and as clearly eonveys an interest in land as would a right of way over the same land.
It was held in the ease of Nicholas vs. Chamberlain (2 Croke R. 121), that if one erect a house, and build a conduit thereto in another part of his land, and convey water by pipes to the house and afterwards sell the house with -the appurtenances, excepting
We are of opinion, for the reasons above given,' that the lease in question, conveyed to the complainants an‘interest in the lessor’s land. It follows conclusively, that the conveyance of the same land subsequently to the defendant, with actual knowledge of the lease, was subject to the easement created by it.
The counsel for the defendant also contended that the covenant for a renewal of the lease was void for want of. consideration. We think this position cannot be maintained. Platt on Leases, 785, and the cases therein cited.
This lease was sealed by all the parties to it, and the covenant to renew was in the usual form. We are also of opinion that the covenant to renew the lease ran with the land, and bound the defendant as the assignee of the reversion. Tanner vs. Flanend, Cases in Chancery, 259; Platt on Leases, 731.
Objection is also taken in this court that the bill is defective for want of proper parties. This supposed defect of parties arises from the fact that Wolcott, Dousman and the Cottons, the lessors of the complainants, and the grantors of the defendant, are not before the court.
We do not think that they are necessary parties to the suit, as they have parted with all their interest in its subject matter. No-decree which can be made in the case, will affect them in any way. This objection must therefore be regarded as untenable.
It follows, from the view which we have taken of the bill in this case, that the order of the court below must be affirmed--