205 F. 402 | D. Idaho | 1913
The plaintiff alleges that through defendant’s carelessness in failing to install lightning arresters in a private telephone system, which it maintains for its own' convenience, she sustained personal injuries due to a severe electric shock, and she prays for $10,000 damages. By its demurrer the defendant objects that the complaint fails to state a-cause of action; its argument being that, inasmuch as it is a “quasi municipal corporation,” it cannot be held legally responsible for the negligence of its officers.
The act under which it was organized and exists constitutes title 14 (sections 2372-2443) of the Idaho Revised Codes, and is similar in its provisions to what is commonly referred -to as the “Wright Act” in California. In general it provides for the organization and government of districts embracing lands susceptible of one mode of irrigation from a'common source; the burden of constructing and maintaining the requisite irrigation works being equitably apportioned to the several parcels of land included in the district. The sole purpose of such a district is the irrigation of the lands embraced therein.
It is to be conceded that, in harmony with the prevailing rule in California, it is settled by the repeated decisions of the highest court
. Furthermore, it is clear that in characterizing irrigation districts as public corporations, or public quasi corporations, or quasi municipal corporations, the Supreme Court has not advisedly employed the language for the purpose of classifying them with public corporations, such as counties, as distinguished from municipal corporations, such as cities and villages. Apparently the terms are used indiscriminately, without any thought of such distinction. For instance, in Pioneer Irrigation District v. Walker, supra, after enumerating the powers and characteristics of an irrigation district under the law, the court says:
':i « - Pn<! where every material and essential element of a public corporation, such ax cities, tota,it, and pillanes, is given such district, such dir-iriet certainly becomes a public corporation, and is a political subdivision of the state. If, then, an irrigation district is a political subdivision, of the stale, similar in hind and character to a. comity or city in its general form of government, and is a quasi municipal corporation, then there can be no question but that the provisions oí the Constitución in rehuion to the qualification of voters within such district are applicable,” etc.
Surely there is here manifest no intent to distinguish between the legal status of comities and that of cities and villages, or to put irrigation districts in the one class rather than the other.
Moreover, it will he found upon an examination of the Idaho cases that in ail instances except one (City of Nampa v. Nampa Irrigation District) there were involved no questions of the status of an irrigation district, or its rights and responsibilities in relation to third parties, hut only questions touching the manner of its organization and its government and control. In the main, such litigated controversies have arisen out of the operation of those provisions which prescribe Hie manner in which elections shall he held, in connection with the organization of the district, or the issuance of bonds, or the selection of officers, and doubtless such questions are to he viewed in the light of principles which apply to political elections, because in that respect there is a substantia! similarity between irrigation districts
In City of Nampa v. Nampa Irrigation District, 19 Idaho, 779, 115 Pac. 979, the only case involving the relations of such a district to third persons, the following pregnant language is used:
“An irrigation district is a public quasi corporation, organized, however, to conduct a business for the private benefit of the owners of land within its limits. They are the members of the corporation, control its affairs, and alone are benefited by its operations. It is, in the administration of its business, the owner of its system in a proprietary rather than a public capacity, and must assume and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership.”
If, as we are. bound to do, we take this expression of the highest court of the state as a correct interpretation of the local law, and if, therefore, the defendant was organized to conduct a business for the private benefit of the owners of land within its limits, and if, in the administration of its business, it “must assume and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership,” it is difficult to see how it can escape responsibility for the negligence of its agents and employes, which, under the common law, is one of the burdens of proprietary ownership. In reality there is no analogy between a county, organized, as it is, “for the discharge of public duties in the administration of civil government,” and holding, as it does, its property in a public, and not a proprietary, capacity, and an irrigation district; ■ and surely
An irrigation district is fully empowered by law to manage its ov'n affairs, and to select its own officers and agents for that purpose. The whole matter is entirely in the hands of the parties pecuniarily interested, and they may select careful and competent agents, or those who are careless and incompetent. The defendant is clothed with the right of eminent domain. It may acquire and hold property of great value; its resources are ample. Power is conferred upon it of levying and collecting assessments or dues from its members, or from the lands irrigated, to cover maintenance and operating charges. It may meet an obligation of this character and equitably apportion the burilen thereof to all who profit by its activities. It is authorized to take from its natural channel, where it flows without menace to any one, tlie public water of the state, and place it in artificial channels, where, if they are not properly constructed and maintained, it becomes the source of constant peril to contiguous and adjacent property. And yet, if the rule for which the defendant contends is recognized, it may not only escape liability for the claim here under consideration, but for the damage which may at any moment overwhelm the farmer as a consequence of the negligence of agents which it alone has the power to employ and discharge. It may not enter upon private land, and take a right of way for its canals and ditches, without first duly compensating the owner; but, if the view here urged obtains, it may, after constructing such canals and ditches, flood adjacent lands without liability, or, through the carelessness of its officers and employes, water may be permitted to escape from its canals and destroy the growing crops of its own members, and they be left remediless.
It is of no avail to say that a legal responsibility might rest upon such negligent officers or agents individually. It is not to be presumed that the particular individual chargeable with the negligence in any given case would possess such financial responsibility as to make that remedy of any practical value. As well might we relegate the injured railway passenger to an action against the negligent engine driver, instead of holding the corporation responsible. 1 can see no reason why, in a case of this character, or in the supposed case where a farmer’s crop is flooded and destroyed by the negligent breaking of one of the defendant’s ditches, the industry, instead of the individual or society at large, should not bear the loss. If, as sometimes happens, it should turn out that the plaintiff here has, by reason of her injury, been wholly disabled, and has therefore become dependent, it is only fair that those who profit by the enterprise out of which the accident grew should assume the burden, rather than the general public.
The demurrer will therefore be overruled.