History
  • No items yet
midpage
Nommensen v. American Continental Insurance
619 N.W.2d 137
Wis. Ct. App.
2000
Check Treatment

*1 Todd Nommensen, Plaintiff-Appellant,†

v. Company American Continental and Saint Insurance Center, Medical Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, Defendants-Respondents. of Appeals

Court 15, No. August 99-3018. Submitted on 2000. Decided briefs 27, 2000. September 2000 WI App 230 (Also 137.) reported in 619 N.W.2d granted. Petition to review † *3 plaintiff-appellant, On behalf of the cause was Barry Stewart, submitted on the of briefs John of Stuff Peyton, Crawford, & of Racine. Crawford Stuff defendant-respondent, On behalf of the cause was submitted on the brief of John A. Nelson and Timothy Feeley Roper, Briesen, W. of von Purtell & S.C. of Milwaukee. Snyder, Brown, P.J.,

Before Nettesheim and JJ. NETTESHEIM, J. This is a medical mal- practice against case commenced Todd Nommensen Mary's Saint Center, Medical insurer, Inc. and its (St. Company American Continental Insurance Mary's). negli- A determined that St. was gent negligence but such was not causal. ensuing judgment appeals dis- from the

Nommensen missing argues complaint. trial his He that the court testimony improperly certain and errone- admitted ously jury regarding proof. instructed the the verdict violated the five-sixths He also contends rulings uphold trial court's and rule. We all of the judgment. affirm the Proceedings

Facts and Trial Court hospitalized was at St. 2. While Nommensen Mary's following surgery, Kim chest nurse Dvorak pain Shepherd injection Toradol, administered an right thigh. medication, into Nommensen's Nommen- immediately pain. sen testified that he felt a He injection made in the front of contended that was injec- thigh, previous from all his a location different Following injection, tions. Nommensen refused all injections. Mary's Shepherd's and further records injection notes did not document the location of the nor any complaint drug from Nommensen at the time the days Shep- However, later, administered. three supervisor herd's left a note for Nommensen's doctor saying complained that Nommensen had of numbness burning right thigh. in his After sensation his hospital, release from the Nommensen continued to experience thigh. pain and numbness his Eventu- ally, diagnosed damage. he was nerve According expert testimony, injection proper shoulder, locations for an are the buttocks, the side of the buttocks and the side of the *4 thigh. Shepherd mid-third of the testified that she properly injection administered under these standards. Buggy Ellen testified on behalf of St. Nurse

Mary's properties about certain of Toradol and its propensities causing for discomfort or harm even when injected. properly objected Nommensen to this testi- mony, arguing represented superseding that it cause injury Mary's pled for his which St. had not as an disagreed per- affirmative defense. The trial court Buggy's testimony. mitted instructing jury

¶ 5. When on the burden of proof, the trial court used standard instruction WiS satisfy 200, JI—CrviL you states, which "This burden is to certainty greater weight to a reasonable 'yes' the credible evidence that should be the answer." added.) (Emphasis instructing, rejected In so the court request "probability" Nommensen's the word "certainty." should be substituted for the word jury ¶ 6. The determined that St.

negligent, jurors dissenting. However, two jury negligence further determined that such was not jurors dissenting.1 By causal, with two different sought verdict, motion after Nommensen claiming a mistrial ruling trial, and a new that the verdict did not satisfy the five-sixths rule set out in WiS. Stat. 805.09(2) (1997-98).2 § The trial court ruled that the verdict satisfied the five-sixths rule. upon jury

¶ 7. Based verdict, the trial court judgment dismissing entered a com- Nommensen's plaint. appeals, challenging Nommensen the three rulings we have discussed. $95,000. damages fixed Nommensen's at One of who dissented on the question regarding first

Mary's negligence damage also dissented on question. 2All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted.

Discussion Testimony Buggy's 1. Nurse Buggy's that testi- ¶ contends 8. Nommensen potential mony properties its of Toradol and about properly upon patient administered even when effect prod- was a defective a claim that Toradol akin to was "superseding argues cause" He that this was uct. required Mary's theory was of defense which St. pursuant plead to Wis. as an affirmative defense Stat. 802.02(3). [St. concludes, result, § "As a Nommensen Mary's] awith to a silent shifted blame defendant into the in the who was added chair courtroom silent statute of limitation ran." case after the begin reject argument. We 9. We Nommensen's Mary's dispute by noting that Nom- that St. did not theory injury. of Rather, its had an mensen suffered Shepherd properly had administered was that defense injury. injection and had not caused Nommensen's Mary's that it had end, St. answer denied To that testimony injury. Buggy's was consistent caused explaining could cause defense, that Toradol injury properly How- administered. even when such an Mary's making defense, St. did not this ever, liability products law, Toradol contend, akin to unreasonably dangerous or oth- defective, unsafe, purpose See WlS for the intended. erwise unfit theory not short, In of defense was JI —Civil 3200. superseding cause. an law invocation attorneys' opening Furthermore, Mary's jury closing that St. confirm statements theory as drawn its of defense did not deviate from anticipated pleadings. himself fact, In Nommensen repre- the kind of defense that St. would offer testimony. opening by Buggy's statement, In his sented "[W]e stated, Nommensen's counsel know that the hos- pital respond [Shepherd] gave . will that. . the shot right place, it result; but was an untoward it was a Agreeing, Mary's bad result." counsel told the *6 opening in his statement:

This ais case of an unfortunate recognized but com- plication appropriately given of an in injection Mr. thigh. you Nommensen's Now will hear that there is dispute no that Mr. Nommensen has what's called paresthesias or an area of in sensory right loss his thigh. What is in dispute is how that nerve came to impaired. expect you be We to show that such a can complication and does occur despite appropri- being given ate care by the nurses involved. Echoing very words, 11. these the first state- by Mary's argument

ment St. counsel in his final to the recog- was, "This is a case of an unfortunate but complication injection nized of an intramuscular which appropriately given." only Moreover, counsel's ref- Buggy's testimony argument erence to in his final did testimony not even deal with the that Nommensen challenges appeal. Buggy's on Rather, counsel cited to testimony unrelated about the standard of care rela- injections. tive to administration of summary, In the issue in this case was Shepherd injection where had made the Toradol in thigh. questions posed by Nommensen's One ofthe issue was how Nommensen could have sustained his injury Mary's injection in the face of St. claim that the properly Mary's had been administered. St. answer properties was that Toradol itself carries which can injury, properly occasion an even if administered —a anticipated defense that Nommensen himself his jury. opening And this was a defense statement Thus, of causation. denial consistent beyond testimony Buggy's as the issues did not move by by pleadings framed and as farther drawn prop- proceedings. pretrial court that the trial We hold testimony. Buggy's erly allowed Instruction Burden of Proof 2. jury pursuant The trial court instructed part, states, in relevant JI —Civil 200 which

to Wis certainty satisfy you to a reasonable "This is to 'yes' greater weight of the credible evidence objected Nommensen should be the answer." contending should substi that the court instruction, "certainty." support, "probability" In for tute the word published to an article looks Nommensen publication Verdict, Academy of Trial Law the Wisconsin *7 "certainty" concluding study yers, that which cites a juror's higher expectation produces in a mind than "probability." Gesler, The Burden See Alan E. of Proof: (Winter 14 12 Reasonable, How Certain is Verdict 1991). Wisconsin also cites to dated 14. Nommensen "certainty" questioned stan- has case law which Ry. e.g., Chicago, P., O. See, St. M. & dard. Pelitier v. (1894). However, none of 521, Co., 88 60 N.W. 250 Wis. the term or condemned the use of these cases have Finally, Nommensen concedes deemed it error. correctly current Wisconsin JI —Civil 200 sets out Wis subject. & Subur- In Victorson v. Milwaukee law on the Transport Corp., 336, 2d 234 332 70 Wis. N.W.2d ban (1975), under the trial court had instructed Holding "probability" that the See id. at 356. standard. harmless, the court noted error, instruction was albeit proper "certainty" level for standard is the satisfying preponderance of the evidence test. See id. at 357. And the court cautioned that the use of the "probability" encouraged." word was "not to be Id. "certainty" ¶ 15. Whether the standard is a cor proof rect statement of the burden of produced by is oftentimes expert testimony those cases where is probability." e.g., See, couched in terms of "reasonable Jenson, Brantner v. 658, 663-68, Wis. 2d (1985). Jury N.W.2d 529 The Wisconsin Civil Instruc recognized potential tions Committee has tension concepts between the two in its Comment to Wis JI — Civil 200:

Suggestions have also been made to the Com- judges mittee and to trial during instruction ("to certainty conferences that the element a rea- certainty") sonable should be replaced with the term probability." Apparently, sug- "reasonable gestion is prompted by the fact that most expert witnesses, cases, at least in malpractice medical are give opinions asked to "to a probability." reasonable Nonetheless, the Committee has concluded "that the certainty' firmly term 'reasonable has been established accurately degree case our law and reflects the answering ques- certitude must reach in verdict tions." Id. appeals principally

¶ 16. The court of is an error- correcting Benson, 1, court. See Jackson v. 213 Wis. 2d (Ct. 1997), App. 18, 570 N.W.2d 407 rev'd on other grounds, (1998), 835, 218 Wis. 2d 578 N.W.2d 602 cert. *8 (1998). by prece denied, 525 U.S. 997 are We bound the by supreme dents established our court. See State v. (1984). Lossman, 526, 118 2d 533, Wis. 348 N.W.2d 159 standing by supreme Given the law as announced court, we conclude that the trial court did not err in its

137 instructing as to J — Civil 200 when use ofWis proof. of the burden Rule

3. Five-Sixths ¶ that because the two contends 17. Nommensen finding negligence jurors dissented from who Mary's against who not the same two were finding causation, the verdict of no dissented from satisfy in rule set out WlS. did not the five-sixths Stat. 805.09(2). § states: The statute to five-sixths of the agreed A verdict VERDICT. If than jury. of the more jurors shall be the verdict to arrive at a verdict must be answered question one claim, same five-sixths of the on the same agree questions. must on all supreme letter court set out the black 18. The Montgomery principles v. rule Giese five-sixths (1983). Ward, 392, Inc., Wis. 2d 331 N.W.2d require ten that the same rule does not five-sixths every agree question. at 401. on See id. must requires ten must Rather, the rule that the same judgment questions necessary support agree on all particular Thus, See id. when we conduct on a claim. analysis, the verdict on a claim- five-sixths we review Finally, by-claim as a See id. basis rather than whole. may important to one claim be dissents which are See immaterial to another. id. argument fails because he 19. Nommensen's premise his as the for the whole verdict

seeks use jury's finding challenge when, fact, the five-sixths standing Here, alone, resolves the issue. causation, no negli- if that even it was one of St. defenses was *9 negligence gent, such did not cause Nommensen's jurors agreed injury. noted, As ten of the twelve with fully Mary's this assertion. This answer resolved St. fully extinguished claim of no causation its favor and right jury's Giese, Nommensen's to recover. Under the finding Mary's negligent other answer that St. was was "necessary support judgment" on not any negligence part claim did cause on its not injury. Nommensen's

¶20. The case law also establishes that these principles apply same whether we assess a verdict in plaintiff Augustin In favor of the or the defendant. v. Railway Transport Co., Milwaukee Electric & 259 Wis. (1951), jury 625, 49 N.W.2d 730 determined that negligent, the defendant was not with two dis- senting. jury See id. at 629. The also determined that contributorily plaintiff negligent was not with respect liability presented, to three of four theories of jurors dissenting with two different on one of the theo- supreme See id. at court held that the ries. 629-30. jury's finding negligence by agreed defendant, of no jurors, judg- ten of the entitled the defendant to a ment of dismissal. See id. at 632-33. Chicago, effect is v. Mil To same Will Railway 247, 210 Co.,

waukee & St. Paul 191 Wis. N.W. (1926), jury, dissenter, where the with one deter negligent not also mined that the defendant was but plaintiff determined, dissenters, that the two contributorily negligent. See id. at 249-50. The supreme grant court reversed a of a new trial on grounds agreed upon had that the not verdict. See id. The court held that the answer as to the absence negligence part "requires of the defendant on judgment complete it is a ver for defendant because dict, in that finds a of the essential element for it want namely, negligence plaintiff or a to maintain . . . duty." Id. at 255.

breach apart law, from this case Nommen- 22. Even must look to the entire verdict sen's contention that we *10 jury up. in this case had unani- not If the does bear negligent, mously agreed ten that St. was but negligence jurors causal, not still found that such was argue that the could not verdict Nommensen jurors the same ten would have defective because agreed questions. here, Yet where on all the Nommen- persuade to two of the on the sen has failed negligence question, argues he that the verdict is sub- challenge. ject Thus, seeks to a Nommensen five-sixths persuade the on the to use his failure to two negligence against question as a sword verdict permitted do if he had when he would not be prevailed to so negligence all on the with question. ruling uphold

¶ 23. We the trial court's that the satisfied the five-sixths rule. verdict

Conclusion properly hold that the court admit- We trial testimony correctly Buggy ted the of and instructed the proof as to the burden of under Wis JI — Civil 200. We also hold that the verdict satisfied the five-sixths rule.

By Judgment affirmed. Court.— (concurring). BROWN, 25. P.J. agree opinion case, I and as it lead particularly concurrence, relates to this Part 2.1 write separately because I am convinced that it is time for phrase supreme court to reevaluate the use of the certainty" as it exists in our standard "reasonable jury relating proof to the burden of instruction ordinary negligence, for Wis JI — Civil Wisconsin by plaintiff prove negligence requires that the law Czemierys, preponderance v. of the evidence. See Mock (Ct. 1983). App. I 207, 211, 336 113 Wis. 2d N.W.2d certainty" using am satisfied that the term "reasonable high too of a risk that in the instruction creates higher plaintiff proof hold a to a of than will burden intended. states, 26. Wisconsin relevant JI — Civil

part, as follows: question other than on proof, -(e.g., comparison negligence) the dam- verdict, age upon party in the rests questions contending question the answer to a should be you satisfy This burden is to a reasonable "yes." certainty *11 greater weight the of the credible evi- "yes" dence the answer. should be By meant greater weight the evidence is of weighed against evidence which when evidence convincing power. to it has more opposed Credible worthy your is of evidence is evidence which ... added.) belief. (Emphasis certainty" The term is not "reasonable jurors. their

defined for Jurors must therefore draw However, the term means. own conclusions about what to ascertain while are left to their own devices meaning may purposes term, assume, for of we mean law, will draw the same of Wisconsin recognized ing or term is defined a of word which dictionary. Jovoco, 273, Inc., v. 173 Wis. 2d Erdman Cf. (Ct. 1992) (stating App. that rea 279, 496 183 N.W.2d dictionary might persons to define look to a sonable words). Dictionary English of The Random House "certainty" defines the as: word Unabridged,

Language, being something certain; certain. 2. an "1. the state of certainly; certainty, for of a assured fact. 3. or with- suspect it, out a I but I don't know it doubt: for certainty." The Dictionary House of Random (2d 1987). English Unabridged ed. Language, rely assumptions ¶ 28. But we do not have to on conjecture ordinary to come to the conclusion that persons "certainty" being think of as "free of doubt." We linguistic empirical testing supporting study it. A have published England in the Journal of Medicine was indicating New "certainty" produces

that the use ofthe word expectation probability hearer an of or 94% Augustine Kong, al., more. See et How Medical Profes- Probability, Expressions Eng. sionals Evaluate New (1986). study quantify 740, qualitative J. Med. set out to expressions. Thus, certain See id. at 740. study qualitative expressions, while the was of experiment quantitative. subjects See id. The were physicians persons studying either or those who were subjects using medical and who were interactive com- puter programs. subjects See id. at 741. The asked were probability expressions: "certain," to focus on twelve "very likely," "probable," "likely," certain," "almost "fre- quent," "possible," "unlikely," reasonable," "not "improbable," "almost never" and "never." See id. The subject's probability being belief in the of a fact true along depending a scale of on the moved 0% 100% Sampling terms used. See id. error was taken into statistically account and enumerated and accounted for. See id. at 742. *12 pertinent part, outcome, 29. The was as fol- probability rating

lows: The word "certain" had a of id. 99%. See at 743. When the adverb "almost" was adjective "certain," added to the the median moved points The data thus from unescapable to 94%. See id. 99% per- words matter and a conclusion that something "certainty" being find to a son asked to something being asked to find to a thinks of the task as degree higher. empirical probability This or 99% study recognized published in one of the most ave- peer nues in the United States. There is for review strong Hence, of editorial tradition overview. reliability study's empirical is enhanced. study it is true that the did not mea- While certainty," term "reasonable I am satisfied

sure the plac- that it makes no difference. I do not believe that adjective ing the "reasonable" adverb before "certainty" downgrade qualify the hearer to or allows quality The the near of the word "certain." absolute defined word "reasonable" is THE RANDOM HOUSE DIC- judgment; "agreeable as to reason or sound TIONARY logical." at 1608. See Dictionary House Random "logi- is That are asked to determine a fact being cally not same as asked to certain" is being downgrade probability Rather, of a fact true. being simply that the decision are reminded certainty rationally made. I must one that is about be "certainty" and the term am convinced that the term certainty" ask the the same "reasonable question. of "reasonable 31. Those who defend use likely

certainty" instruction most have in the standard They disagreement empirical data. would no certainty" agree probably means a that "reasonable they probability also least or more. But would of at 94% plaintiff injustice likely s to a contend that it does no preponderance prove of the the case to probably argue that These defenders would evidence. plaintiff to a burden are not told to hold *13 convincing that them with evidence is 94% certain or only being Rather, more. the are asked to atbe "story", least 94% certain about side's has which the weight. greater point

¶ 32. The defenders no doubt would out preponderance there is a difference between They probably proof. evidence and burden of would Buchheit, 385, then cite Eichman v. Wis. (1906), following proposition: for the

Preponderance proof evidence and burden of thing, although they are not the same run into each By preponderance other. of evidence is meant the possesses greater weight evidence which or convinc- ing by power; proof duty burden of is meant the resting on the the party having affirmative of the satisfy issue to or convince the jury, by minds of the evidence, the preponderance of the of the truth of his contention. likely point

¶ 33. The defenders would most to language the of the instruction as evidence that deciding are told about difference between proof preponderance burden of of the evidence. For they likely argue instance, would that the instruction say preponderance not does of the evidence is equated certainty." Instead, with "reasonable "satisfy you are informed that the is certainty by greater weight a reasonable of the yes credible evidence that should be the answer." Wis goes say JI — Civil 200. The that, instruction on to greater weight evidence, of the is meant evidence "weighed against opposed which when evidence to it convincing power." has more Id. The defenders would prepon- thus conclude that the are informed how greater derance of the is the evidence same as the weight of the evidence. say that "reason- would then 34. The defenders necessary component certainty" of the is a

able the burden to that term addresses instruction because jurors. satisfy tells the to be The instruction plaintiff reasonably has met certain about whether *14 duty convince the of his or her affirmative weight These defenders would evidence. See id. of the right supreme got likely say court it back that the most rhetorically asked: "When court in 1894 when the fact, existence of a or convinced of the mind is satisfied reasonably Pelitier v. of the fact?" the mind certain is Chicago, Minneapolis Co., Paul, Railroad & Omaha (1894). 521, 529, 60 N.W. 250 88 Wis. that the

¶ thus conclude 35. The defenders would accurately jurors two different com- informed about are proof preponderance ponents of and of the law: burden words, would In the defenders other of evidence. being say do is to be asked to all the are that (the proving) that in own minds certain their weight greater than the other side's evidence has one evidence). (the preponderance of the side's Jury Instructions ¶ The Wisconsin Civil 36. among appeared the defend to be of 1996 Committee requested delete the Committee it was ers. When certainty," consid the Committee the term "reasonable request Comment, so. See and declined to do ered the Regents, 200, 1996, Univ. of Wisconsin. Wis JI — Civil opined follows: "The Committee as The Committee certainty' has been 'reasonable that the term believes accurately firmly in our case law established degree in must reach certitude reflects questions." answering Id. verdict agree statement I with the 37. do not "firmly And case law. while our is established" term accurately may language state instruction in the might how those well versed in the understand the law appropriate meaning of the term "reasonable cer- tainty," miserably attempt the instruction fails its explain to the to use the term how "reasonable certainty." result, As a I am convinced that the lan- guage in the instruction runs a real risk of the applying certainty" quality the term "reasonable applying of the evidence rather than the term to their convincing. state of mind about is the which side more Gesler, See Alan E. The Burden How Certain of Proof: (Winter 1991). Reasonable, is WATL VERDICT respond First, I will to the Wisconsin Civil Jury Instructions Committee's assertion that the term certainty" "firmly "reasonable has been established" in our case I law. am not so In 1894, convinced. supreme court wrote:

The expression certainty" "reasonable is not strictly accurate as a weight definition of the of evidence *15 required, may and mean no more than that quan- tum of evidence which satisfies or convinces the mind of a person reasonable of the a partic- truth of however, ular claim Possibly, or contention. it may more, mean and so be misleading. We think it bet- ter, cases, in such stop to stating usual rule party that having proof the burden of must by establish his case a preponderance great- or the weight est of evidence. (1894). Murray, 41,

Allen v. 87 46, Wis. 57 979 N.W. And in Pelitier, the court was also less than enthusias- tic about the trial court's use of the term "reasonable certainty" describing plaintiffs when burden of proof. Although the court affirmed the trial court's use reading term, of the even a casual of the decision shows misgiving. that it was done with some Pelitier, See 88 atWis. 528. Minneapolis,

¶ Fast to Sullivan v. 39. forward Railway Co., 518, Marie 167 Wis. Paul & Sault Sainte (1918). rejected the There, the court 167 N.W. negligence argument jury case that a instruction certainty" phrase "reasonable must contain proof. See id. at 527. The court describe the burden of "surplusage" nothing." "adds See called the term which id. unequivocal of the 40. The first endorsement Chicago & Electric

term was Kausch v. Milwaukee (1922). Railway 21, Co., 26, 176 Wis. 186 N.W.2d 257 given jury to the on But in that case no instruction was proof preponder- either the or definition judge Rather, See the trial ance of the evidence. id. they "reasonably instructed the that must be of their See id. that instruction certain" answers. What clearly accurately speak therefore, did, was jurors' cry language state of mind. This is a far from the in the instruction. now used standard It until v. Milwaukee & was not Victorson Transport Corp., 336, 356-57, 70 Wis. 2d Suburban (1975), gave its first 234 N.W.2d 332 court unequivocal imprimatur term as used in the jury given But the reason for this standard instruction. upon holding in Kausch. affirmation was founded Again, however, Victorson, 2d 356-57. See 70 Wis. at clearly given in Kausch told the the instruction they reasonably certain of their answers. had to be words, In Kausch, See at 26. other were Wis. mind. term to their own state of informed that the went explain attempt made the Victorson court to No told the same the standard instruction how thing *16 jurors told to the in Kausch. as was by great quote of a made the I am reminded Holmes: Oliver Wendell revolting

It is so to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of if the Henry revolting grounds IV. It is still more upon long which it was laid down have vanished since, from imita- simply persists and rule blind tion of the past. Law, Holmes, The Path 10 Harv. L. Oliver Wendell (1897). 457, 469

Rev. my "firmly ¶ 43. It is view that is not law established" and that continued use of term "rea- certainty" part, upon based, is in sonable blind allegiance inspection, what, to on closer reveals past. agree checkered I with Alan Gesler's conclusion proof language that the burden of was created acci- analysis. supra, Gesler, dent rather than See at 13. Jury I will discuss the now Wisconsin Civil Instructions Committee's statement that the instruc- accurately degree jurors tion reflects of certitude answering questions. must reach in First, verdict go enough. statement does not far An instruction is not good simply accurately one it because states the law. jurors It must also drafted be in such a manner that language understand contained within it. problem immediate with the is instruction that it attempt explain makes no how there are separate pieces being presented two of information (1) them: that the must be convinced their (2) they mind; own must be convinced one probably side's evidence is more true than the other nothing says side's. is in the There instruction that weighing process means the are asked to deter- plaintiffs mine whether the evidence is more than likely fact, truer than the defendant's. is, There no explanation "weigh of how to the evidence." This void very creates the real risk that the will use the *17 certainty" language by "reasonable as the method easily weighed. the two sides are can which say plain- the to that the understand instruction unless certainty" may tiffs is true to a it evidence "reasonable weighty enough plaintiff not be considered prevail. for the to paraphrase I will the instruction based dictionary upon empirical the definitions and data I I have set forth above. am convinced that reasonable say could the understand instruction to as fol- weighed against lows: "Plaintiffs evidence is the job deciding defendant's and the whose evidence has weight yours. you may more plaintiffs is But before find that the weight, you has

evidence more must first be plaintiff provided you satisfied that the has with evi- absolutely nearly absolutely dence that is true or true." say I would be the first to not all that would glean meaning argue from I the instruction. But job only that some would. The accurately of an instruction is to not explain state the law the but what law persons usually possess means to who do not law degrees. duty Here, the fails in its to teach. instruction conveys suggest I an instruction that plain message job their is. I about what say: would plaintiff is to determine the has job

Your whether weight evidence has than greater submitted which satisfy defendant's. It is the plaintiffs the its) mind, (his, you, your own that her or evidence you is the defendant's. The convincing more than you does not have to that the evi- plaintiff convince In absolutely dence is true or even almost true. words, not the plaintiff other need exclude contrary may conclusion be probability Rather, you has to plaintiff true. convince its) (his, outweighs the other as to her or evidence you If are satisfied that the evi- probabilities. likely is more true plaintiff dence submitted If, true, find you may plaintiff. than not for however, you plaintiffs are convinced that evi- true, find likely you may more not than dence is its) *18 (his, met her or plaintiff that the has not you. convincing proposed I instruction com- believe that jury ports It that it is the with Wisconsin law. tells duty. plaintiff Eichman, has an See who affirmative jurors 128 Wis. at 388. It tells the what affirmative jurors duty is: to convince them. See id. It tells the what plaintiff them of: that the it is that the plaintiffs must convince probably more true than the evidence is Grotjan Rice, 253, 258-59, 124 defendant's. See v. Wis. (1905). Finally, it tells the that if N.W. they plaintiffs are not convinced that the evidence is likely weight true, more plaintiffs true than not then the of the is not sufficient.

evidence analysis, In the final this concurrence is a change paradigm call to about how we write our instructions. con- Much has been written about data firming legalisms. are often lost in a sea of doing, twenty-first as What we should be we enter century, is to teach what the law means better they apply and how should it. We should not be content giving an "accurate statement of the law." jury various instructions committees Wisconsin job regard exemplary have done an in this for the most part. However, the standard instruction on burden of proof poster child for stands as those instructions juror friendly. that, that need to more may I fear be while we never for sure whether a made its deci- know upon understanding sion based an inaccurate of its responsibility, the risk that this has occurred is real. change wording should of the instruction to We really acting insure that are in accordance with given to them. law

Case Details

Case Name: Nommensen v. American Continental Insurance
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
Date Published: Sep 27, 2000
Citation: 619 N.W.2d 137
Docket Number: 99-3018
Court Abbreviation: Wis. Ct. App.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.