Nаncy NOLTING, Appellant, v. NATIONAL CAPITAL GROUP, INC., Appellee.
No. 91-CV-612.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued Feb. 6, 1992. Decided March 12, 1993.
1387
Before STEADMAN and KING, Associate Judges, and GALLAGHER, Senior Judge.
The District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act“) prohibits any employer from discriminating against an employee becausе that employee has claimed compensation under the Act, and provides an administrative remedy for any such discrimination.
I.
Appellant Nancy Nolting was employed as a financial analyst from August 1987, to Junе 1989, with National Capital Group, Inc. (“National“). In the course of her employment she suffered work-related injuries and filed a claim for workers’ compensation. On June 2, 1989, she was discharged from her position, allegedly in retаliation for her filing the claim.
Instead of pursuing the administrative remedy for retaliatory action provided in the Act,1 Nolting filed a complaint in the Superior Court on a tort theory of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. She sought front and back pay, the value of her lost employee benefits, and compen
II.
In 1982, the current Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act“), enacted by the Council of the District of Columbia, became effective. See
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee as to his employment because such employee has claimed or attempted to claim compensation from such employer, or because he has testified or is about to testify in a proceeding under this chapter.
This section also contains a specific remedy for any such unlawful retaliatory action. The prescribed remedy subjects an employer who violates this section to “a penalty of not less than $100 оr more than $1,000,” and further provides that the employee “so discriminated against shall be restored to his employment and shall be compensated by his employer for any loss of wages arising out of such discrimination.”
At the time thе Act was promulgated, it had been settled for many years that in the District of Columbia an employment contract, absent evidence to the contrary, was terminable at the will of either party5 and that an employer сould discharge an at-will employee at any time and for any reason, or for no reason at all.6 Thus, this statute was enacted against the clear backdrop of an unconditional employment-at-will doctrine. This being the case, we see no basis for any argument that in enacting the provision barring retaliatory discharge, the
III.
However, appellant argues that regardless of the status of the law at the time the provision was enacted, subsequent case law has opened the possibility of a tort remedy. She invokes the narrow exception to the employmеnt-at-will doctrine that we recognized in 1991. In Adams, supra, this court held that
there is a very narrow exception to the at-will doctrine under which a discharged at-will employee may sue his or her former employer for wrongful discharge when the sole reаson for the discharge is the employee‘s refusal to violate the law, as expressed in a statute or municipal regulation.
597 A.2d at 34. Appellant argues that § 36-342 sets forth a clear public policy, the violation of which shоuld give rise to a tort remedy based on a “public policy exception” to the employment-at-will doctrine as readily as a discharge for refusing to violate a law.
We do not think this argument is tenable. First of all, as discussed above, we are dealing here with a statutory provision which not only creates the wrong but also contains a specific remedy to compensate the person suffering that wrong. No such statute was involved in Adams; there was no administrative or other remedy available to the plaintiff. The injury to the plaintiff in Adams would have gone uncompensated if the court had refused to recognize a public policy tort. In the case sub judice, appеllant does not stand in that same position; she is not facing a situation in which the only possibility for compensation for her claimed injury is the recognition by this court of a public policy tort expansive enough to cover her situation. See, e.g., Mello v. Stop & Shop Cos., 402 Mass. 555, 524 N.E.2d 105, 106 & n. 2 (1988) (public policy liability may exist “unless no common law rule is needed because the legislature has also prescribed a statutory remedy,” citing as one example its worker‘s compensatiоn retaliation provision); PERRITT, supra, § 5.25, at 483 (“[c]ourts are reluctant to permit public policy tort recovery for violation of labor statutes containing their own administrative remedies“), § 5.28, at 494-95.
Furthermore, we have subsequently emphasized the narrowness of the Adams exception. In Gray v. Citizens Bank of Washington, 602 A.2d 1096 (D.C.), opn. reinstated on denial of reh‘g, 609 A.2d 1143 (D.C.1992), the court held that Adams, supra (creating exception for an employee who was discharged in retaliation for refusing to break a statutorily declared law or regulation), and the prior case of Sorrells, supra note 6, 565 A.2d at 289 (refusing to carve out exception where no statutorily declared public policy was involved), together “demonstrate the extent of and limitation upon” the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine in the District of Columbia. Gray, supra, 602 A.2d
Affirmed.
GALLAGHER, Senior Judge, concurring:
I would have disposed of this appeal on res judicata grounds if only because of public interest considerations. The doctrine of res judicata establishes that once a claim is finally adjudiсated “the doctrine of claim preclusion will operate to prevent the same parties from ‘relitigation of not only those matters actually litigated but also those which might have been litigated in the first proceeding.‘” Stutsman v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 546 A.2d 367, 369-70 (D.C.1988) (quoting Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Adams, 534 A.2d 292, 295 n. 6 (D.C.1987) (quoting Goldkind v. Snider Bros., Inc., 467 A.2d 468, 473 n. 10 (D.C. 1983))). In Stutsman, we stated, “It is the factual nucleus, not the theory upon which a plaintiff relies, which operates to constitute the cause of action for claim preclusion purposes.” Id. at 370.
Those considerations, which apply here, led me to conclude that this proceeding should be decided against appellant on res judicata grounds. I believe it is not in the public interest to permit such relitigation here.
Since, however, the court has determined to decide this case on the merits, I agree with the court‘s reasoned opinion and join in it.