OPINION OF THE COURT
By letter of October 12, 1984, defendants advised plaintiff that Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty), the liability insurance carrier for a vehicle registered by her in New York, had notified defendants that coverage on the vehicle had terminated on September 12, 1984. Defendants’ letter requested plaintiff to verify, inter alia, whether she had insurance for her vehicle and warned plaintiff that a failure to reply and submit proof of insurance would result in the
Plaintiff then brought the instant action for a declaratory judgment, alleging (1) that the suspension was issued in the absence of any evidence of legal termination of insurance or of lapse of insurance coverage, (2) that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 318 does not permit a suspension of registration for lapsed insurance coverage when the registrant has reobtained coverage at the time of the suspension, and (3) that section 318 was unconstitutional in authorizing the suspension of registration without affording the registrant a prior adversarial, evidentiary hearing. Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction was denied, as was defendants’ motion to dismiss. After defendants then answered the complaint, they made the instant motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposed the motion on the grounds that, inter alia, issues of fact existed as to whether Liberty had ever sent a proper, timely notice of termination of insurance to plaintiff and as to whether there had been any actual lapse in insurance coverage for plaintiffs vehicle. Defendants appeal from the denial of their motion.
Special Term’s order should be reversed. To the extent that summary judgment was denied on the ground that a proper determination of the complaint requires resolution of the outstanding issues of fact described in plaintiff’s opposing papers, a declaratory judgment action was an inappropriate method to review defendants’ administrative actions (see, All
To the extent that the instant action turns on pure matters of law appropriate for disposition in a declaratory judgment action, defendants’ motion for summary judgment likewise should have been granted. Initial registration of a vehicle is contingent upon submission of "proof of financial security * * * evidenced by proof of insurance” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 312 [1] [a] [emphasis supplied]). The suspension remains in effect "for a period of time equal to the time from the date of termination of financial security * * * to the date upon which subsequent financial security was obtained” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 318 [1-a] [a]). Thus, in ordering suspension on the basis of Liberty’s notification that the proof of insurance was no longer in effect and in extending that suspension for the period during which, on the basis of the available evidence, there was a lapse in coverage, defendants’ actions were completely consistent with the statutory framework. Nor do we find any basis whatsoever in the facts pleaded upon which an estoppel can be applied against defendants.
Plaintiff’s remaining claim, that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 318 is unconstitutional in denying her an evidentiary, adversarial hearing prior to imposing any suspension of the registration of her vehicle, is equally without merit. Minimal due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard were complied with here, since plaintiff received advance notification of the proposed suspension and the basis therefor and was invited to submit proof of continued, valid coverage
Main, J. P., Weiss, Mikoll and Yesawich, Jr., JJ., concur.
Order reversed, on the law, without costs, motion granted, complaint dismissed and it is declared that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 318 is not unconstitutional as a violation of plaintiff’s due process rights.