89 Mo. App. 172 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1901
Lead Opinion
This is an action which was commenced before a justice of the peace. The statement contained two counts, in the first of which it was alleged that the defendant employed the plaintiff, a real estate broker, to sell certain land, the property of the defendant; that plaintiff, in pursuance of such employment, procured a purchaser who was ready, willing and financially able to take defendant’s land, on the terms set forth in the contract of sale entered into between the purchaser so procured by the plaintiff and the defendant, and for which service so rendered the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff one hundred and thirty dollars, etc. The allegations of the second count were the same as the first, except that it is alleged therein that the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff the reasonable value of the latter’s services, which were one hundred and thirty dollars, etc.
In the circuit court, where the cause was removed by appeal, there was a trial which resulted in judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed here. At the conclusion of the evidence the court, at the instance of the plaintiff, instructed the jury, first, that if defendant engaged plaintiff to secure a
Some objection is made in the brief of defendant, to the second paragraph of said instruction on the ground that there was no evidence to justify the submission on the theory of an agreement touching the amount of the commission which plaintiff was to receive. During the progress of the trial the plaintiff had present one or more witnesses whose testimony, relating to the commission claimed, he was about to offer when the defendant stated to the court that this need not be done as ño question would be made as to the quantum of the recovery if he should be entitled to recover at all. The plaintiff was, therefore, entitled, under the admission of the defendant, to an instruction by the court telling the jury that if they found for plaintiff to return a verdict in his favor for one hundred and thirty dollars. This part of the instruction, in view of the admissions just noticed, was not improper or in any way harmful to defendant.
The instructions requested by defendant and given by the-court presented the converse theory of the case to that of the plaintiff. The correctness of these instructions, with the exceptions just referred to, is, of course, not called in question. The rule expressed by them is that which has often been approved by the appellate courts of this State, as will be seen by
Tbe only question is as to whether the evidence adduced is sufficient to justify the submission of the case to the jury. An examination of the record has convinced us that it is ample for that purpose and such being the case the verdict must be regarded as conclusive on us.
The statement contains, it is true, two counts; but these state but a single cause of action on which there could be but one recovery. The plaintiff could not, therefore, be required to elect. Brinkman v. Hunter, 73 Mo. 172, and cases there cited. A general verdict for the plaintiff was sufficient to support the judgment. Lancaster v. Ins. Co., 92 Mo. 460; Akers v. Bank, 63 Mo. App. 316.
No reason is seen for disturbing the judgment, which will accordingly be affirmed.
Rehearing
ON MOTION NOR REHEARING.
After the written contract for the sale of the defendant’s land had been executed, a dispute arose as to whether or not it should not have bound defendant to convey, in addition to the land, a certain roadway. After many parleys and considerable delay the defendant and the purchasers got together. They entered into a verbal agreement which had the effect to rescind and supersede the written contract. This agreement was substantially the same as that written, except that in the latter the defendant was to convey to the purchaser the roadway as well as the land. In pursuance of this agreement, Mr. Buchanan, a conveyancer, prepared a deed which was satisfactory to both parties. The defendant sent it to Kentucky, where his wife was, for her to execute. She did execute and return it. Some two weeks after this, the pur
It will not do to say that the purchasers were not willing to take the land or able to pay the purchase price, for it is not disputed but that they had on deposit in a solvent bank in the town in which the defendant resided at the time of the deposit, and for several months thereafter, seven thousand dollars in money. The defendant was in default. It was his fault that the transaction was not completed. What more was there for the plaintiff to do in his capacity as agent? The purchasers did not make the tender coupled with any demand outside of the agreement written or parol. It does not appear that there were any express conditions coupled with the tender. It seems to us that in any view that may be taken of the case the judgment is for the right party.
