The St. of 1874, c. 258, § 1, provides that “the trial justices of juvenile offenders of Suffolk County shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all offences committed in said county against the laws of the Commonwealth, by minors under seventeen years of age, and may impose such punishment as the said laws, now or hereafter in force, may provide for such offences, except when the laws provide that an offence may be punished by death or imprisonment for life.”
It is clear thаt the clause beginning with the word “ except,” was intended as a limitation of the jurisdiction of trial justices of
Before this statute was passed, the jurisdiction in the county of Suffolk, of offences committed by juvenile offenders, not punishable by death or imprisonment for life, was vested in the Superior Court, the municipal courts, the judge of the Probate Court and the trial justices of juvenile offenders. Gen. Sts. c. 76. Sts. 1870, c. 359; 1872, c. 358.
The language of this statute, that “ the trial justices of juvenile offenders of Suffolk County shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all offences,” by its natural import excludes the jurisdiction of any other tribunal over the offences described. The language used is direct and plain, and we cannot find in the context or in other statutes in pari materia any sufficient evidence of an intention of the Legislature to use it in any other than its ordinary and natural meaning. We are therefore of opinion that, by this stаtute, the Legislature intended to take from the Superior Court its original jurisdiction in the county of Suffolk, of all offences committed by minors under the age of seventeen years, except where the offence may be рunished by death or imprisonment for life.
The next question is whether the statute, by its proper construction, provides that trial justices of juvenile offenders may, if such offender is proved to be an unfit subject for the State Reform School or other reformatory institution, sentence him to the state prison. The provision is that they “ may impose suсh punishment as the said laws, now or hereafter in force, may provide for such offences.”
We are therefore of opinion that the statute purports to give to trial justices the right in some casеs to impose the punishment of imprisonment in the state prison for a term of years, without any indictment or presentment by a grand jury.
In Jones v. Robbins,
We cannot so regard them. The possession of exclusive jurisdiction of an offence necessarily involves the power to punish the offence. If we were to hold that the first part of this statute, сonferring exclusive jurisdiction, was valid, and that the other part, conferring the power of punishment, was invalid, it would fоllow that aggravated offences, for which the punishment by law is imprisonment in the state prison, if committed by minors who аre unfit subjects for the Reform School, could not be punished at all, or, if at all, only by the punishment provided for minor offences. We cannot think that the Legislature
For these reasons, we are constrained to hold that § 1 of the St. of 1874, a. 258, so far as it affects offences punishable by an infаmous punishment, is unconstitutional and void. Being inoperative and void, it had no effect to repeal or modify the statutes previously existing; and, as by the previous statutes the Superior Court had original jurisdiction of the offence for which the prisoner was indicted, it follows that such jurisdiction remains, and that the prisoner was lawfully sentenced.
Prisoner remanded.